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

GENERAL REVIEW.

VOLUME IV.

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UNIVERSALIST QUARTERLY

AND

GENERAL REVIEW.

Article I.

Nicholas Sanderson.[1]

It is a very interesting and instructive fact, that, among those who in every age have been distinguished for their scientific and literary attainments, appear the names of men who, during their whole lives, were compelled to contend with obstacles which to common minds seem utterly impossible to be overcome. But of all the disadvantages to which a human being can ever be subjected in the pursuit of knowledge, the privation of one or more of the senses, must be admitted as the most appalling. For the senses are the avenues by which the mind obtains its knowledge of the material world; and it would seem that when one of these is rendered useless, the mind could at most be but imperfectly developed. And yet, if history is to be credited, there have been in almost every age blind men, (we mention blind men, because sight is regarded as the most important of the senses,) whose misfortune has only served to stimulate them to greater exertions in the acquisition of knowledge. All that we really know of the greatest poet the world has ever produced, is, that he was a blind man; and the

[1] It will be interesting to the reader to know, that the author of this article is, himself, a subject of the privation which he describes.—*Ed.*

immortal author of the Paradise Lost was subjected to the same calamity. We might multiply instances of these, to an extent which would astonish those who have never given any attention to the subject. We could show that, not only in poetry, but in almost every other department of literature, in the sciences, and in the cultivation of many of the arts, blindness really constitutes no impediment.

We propose, however, in this article, to confine our observations to one who would, probably, have been a remarkable man under any circumstances; whose wonderful powers no misfortune, however great, could entirely prevent from making an impression, in whatever avocation he might have been called to exercise them. No one can read the life of Sanderson, without being more deeply impressed with the power of mind to subject matter to its purposes, and without feeling convinced that there is, in the mighty energies of a well-directed intellect, a force which no mere physical misfortune can withstand. It is to be deeply regretted, that a full and adequate biography of Sanderson has not yet been given to the world. A mere sketch of his life was published in the appendix to his work on Fluxions; and a short, but very interesting account of him, contained in a work published by the Society in England for the Dissemination of Useful Knowledge, is all we know of one of the greatest men of the last century. Lord Brougham, in a labored effort, has attempted to vindicate Voltaire from the obliquy to which his untiring efforts to overthrow Christianity had consigned him; and Carlyle, with, we think much more commendable zeal, has endeavored to redeem the name of Cromwell from the reproaches heaped upon it by a corrupt aristocracy, and a degraded priesthood. And may we not hope that some one of the great minds of our day, will yet do justice to the memory and merits of Sanderson? All that we can do in this paper, is to give something like a connected statement of the facts of his life, collected from the sources mentioned above; and to make a few observations upon the method by which he was enabled to substitute other senses for the one of which he was deprived. We may, in this way, testify, in our humble manner, gratitude for his example, and admiration for his success.

Nicholas Sanderson was born at the village of Thurston, in Yorkshire, England, in 1682.[2] "He was only a year old, when he was deprived, by small-pox, not only of sight, but even of his eyes themselves, which were destroyed by abscess." It was fortunate for Sanderson that he lost his sight at this early age; since those persons who become blind in infancy, or who were born blind, always possess advantages over those who have had the use of their eyes until they have arrived at maturity. Sanderson, when very young, displayed a fondness for knowledge, which, instead of being suppressed, as in most blind persons of that day, was encouraged by his parents, who sent him to a free school, at Penniston, in the neighborhood of his native place. It was probably here, where, for the first time, he had to contend with those who possessed the advantages of vision, that the energy and perseverance, to which he owed his success in after life, first manifested themselves. It is not very difficult to conceive of the method, which must have been pursued by his master, in imparting to the mind of his blind pupil the elements of knowledge. He must have had the lesson read to him frequently, until his memory was enabled to retain it. It is possible that he was assisted in the study of arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and the higher mathematics, by contrivances similar to those made use of by Abbe Hauy, and which are now employed in the institutions for the education of the blind, in Europe, and in this country. For the most part, however, his instruction must have been oral. His knowledge of the languages, in which he attained great proficiency, could only have been acquired by the assistance of an amanuensis. We are informed that, at the age of sixteen, Sanderson could read, or understand when read to him, works written in the Greek and Latin languages, with as much ease as those written in his native tongue. There are several Latin compositions of great merit, written by him, still extant. But it was probably in mathematics that he most excelled. His successor in the University of Cambridge,

[2] It may be interesting to the reader to know, that in just one hundred years from the birth of Sanderson, Abbe Hauy, prompted by Sanderson's example, made the first efforts in Europe to educate the blind.

asserts that Sanderson surveyed the whole coast of Scotland. Of course, it is meant that he performed the mathematical process, employing another person's eyes in making the necessary observations. The faculties upon which he most depended in acquiring his education, are those which, in the minds of most blind persons, predominate — memory, and concentration. These faculties are, by no means, the most important of those with which God has endowed us; but the process best calculated to develope them, is that which is best suited to invigorate all the other mental powers. The necessity, under which a blind person labors, in acquiring a knowledge of men and things, early renders his memory very retentive; and if he pursues its cultivation through life, it compensates him, in a very great degree, for the want of that sovereign organ, upon which others rely, by which they are enabled to recur to books, and take cognizance of facts in the world around them. Abercrombie mentions a blind man, who could repeat, verbatim, any part of the Bible to which his attention was directed; and he also relates many other wonderful facts, showing the extent and capability of this faculty. If we bear in mind the fact, that it is by sight alone that we obtain our knowledge of all those objects by which we are not immediately surrounded, — that, although the principal use of the eye is to make us acquainted with colors, yet we actually make use of it to obtain a knowledge of motion, form, space, &c., — we shall be able to appreciate more fully the difficulties which must have beset the path of Sanderson. But, unattracted by surrounding objects, he could the better concentrate his naturally energetic mind upon whatever subject he desired to investigate; and this, together with his powerful memory, of which we have already spoken, enabled him not merely to compete with his schoolmates, but actually to surpass them. The father of Sanderson held a place in the excise of his native county; his income was, therefore, not sufficient to enable him to give his son a liberal education, or to provide him with the means of fully gratifying his love of knowledge. When he had reached his twenty-fourth or twenty-fifth year, he was still without a profession. His own wish was to go to the university; but the limited circumstances of his father

rendered it impossible. It was therefore decided that he should go to Cambridge, not as a student, but as a teacher of mathematics and natural philosophy. Accordingly, in the year 1707, under the protection of a friend, one of the fellows of Christ's College, he commenced his career as a lecturer; which introduced him to the men of letters and science, among whom we would mention Sir Isaac Newton, who gave him many substantial proofs of his friendship. We also have to record here, to the credit of the eccentric but unfortunate Whiston, who then held the Lucasian professorship of mathematics in the University, that, on Sanderson opening classes to teach the same branches of science upon which he himself had been in the daily habit of reading lectures, he extended to him every assistance in his power. Sanderson commenced his prelections upon Newton's Optics.

"The subject itself which Sanderson thus chose, independently of the manner in which he treated it, was well calculated to attract notice, — few things seeming, at first sight, more extraordinary than that a man, who had been blind almost from his birth, should be able to explain the phenomena, and expound the doctrine, of light." Mr. Colson, successor of Sanderson, in his notice of him, describes at great length the method he pursued in explaining the primary laws of light, and the phenomena of colors, as well as the system of tangible signs, by which he performed his mathematical calculations. And the only difference between his method and that invented by Abbe Hauy is, that it was much more imperfect. Sanderson's success as a lecturer, continued still to increase, so that when Whiston was expelled from his chair, in 1711, he was appointed, through the influence of Sir Isaac Newton, to fill the vacancy. As a necessary preliminary, the degree of Master of Arts was conferred upon him. Sanderson gave his whole attention to his classes; and it is to his constant labors in his profession, that we are to attribute the fact that, with the exception of his work on Fluxions, and a small work on Algebra, he prepared very little for the press. In 1728, on the occasion of a visit of George II., he was created Doctor of Laws; at which time he pronounced a Latin oration remarkable for its eloquence.

He was married in 1728, and died in 1737, in the fifty-seventh year of his age.

During his life, Sanderson enjoyed the acquaintance and friendship of the most distinguished scholars of his day. To their influence, as well as to his uncommon talents, was he indebted not a little for that proud elevation to which he attained. It is said that, on his going to Cambridge, favors were proffered him purely on account of his misfortune. These he rejected, exclaiming, that he was a scholar, and should receive no favors simply because he was a blind man. No man ever labored with more assiduity than he, nor with more success, to overcome the effects of a physical calamity. Indeed, the extent to which he cultivated the senses of hearing and touch, seems almost marvellous. He could tell, for instance, in going into his room, by the sound of his cane upon the floor, if any article of furniture had been removed. He could distinguish the finest intonations of the human voice, and was able to determine, with astonishing accuracy, the height and age of a person by the voice alone.[3] Of course, we do not intend to assert that he could tell to an inch the exact height, nor to a day, the exact age of every one. What we mean to say of Sanderson is, (what we would say of all intelligent blind persons,) that he could judge of these matters by the voice, as well as most persons can by the countenance.

Sanderson was no mean performer on the flute; and there can be no doubt that, if his mind had not received a different direction, he might have become a distinguished musician. As to the sense of touch, it may with truth be said, that it was never so fully developed in any other person. He could distinguish inequalities upon surfaces, where it was impossible to discern them by the eye. He could detect, in a cabinet of Roman medals, the counterfeit from the true, though the difference was so slight as to deceive the eye of the most experienced connoisseurs. It

[3] Blindness is often but one of the effects of a cause which injures one or more of the other senses. Opthalmia, a species of inflammation, in many climates, not only produces blindness, but greatly affects the hearing. And besides, so great a deprivation as the loss of sight must always exercise an injurious influence, not only upon the other senses, but upon all the physical functions.

was at first thought that he might even detect colors by his touch. But he found, after repeated efforts, that it was impossible. I have often been amused to hear persons, who could not be brought to believe that a blind man could feed himself without being helped by another, assert positively, that there were blind persons of their acquaintance, who could tell the color of any article of their wearing apparel, by feeling it. This is preposterous.[4] The slightest reflection, it seems to me, must convince every one of its utter impossibility. Light is not tangible; of course a blue ray, or a red ray, is not distinguishable by this means.

There are several pleasant anecdotes told of Sanderson. We have room for one or two only, which illustrate his readiness at repartee. On one occasion, when lecturing to his class, and while he was attempting a solution of a very intricate problem, one of the persons present, filled with admiration at the astonishing mathematical acuteness which he displayed, exclaimed, "Sanderson has but one imperfection; it is in his eyes." "And yours," replied the professor, "is in your tongue." On another occasion, Sanderson was invited to spend an evening at the house of a friend, in company with several distinguished persons of both sexes. Upon one of the ladies leaving the room, he remarked that her teeth must be very white. Being asked by some of the company, how he knew this, he replied, "I do not think she is a fool, and she has been laughing a whole hour."

We have already spoken of the astonishing extent to which Sanderson cultivated his other senses. His cotemporaries mentioned many things respecting him, which they seem to have regarded as almost miraculous, but which are exhibited by almost every blind person, and in our day would seem too trite to be named. For instance,

[4] Dr. Howe, in the report of his journey in Europe, made to the Trustees of the Perkins' Institution for the Blind, says, while in England, "I visited a blind girl who, I was told, could tell colors by the touch. I found, as I expected, that this was not true. She could, however, tell the color of different pieces of cloth given her, by first laying them in the sun till they had acquired the same apparent temperature; then by raising them to her lips, she was able to perceive that some of the pieces conducted caloric with a greater degree of facility than others. In this way she could distinguish the blue from the red, and the green from the orange." [We quote this from memory.]

the fact that he could, when in the open air, ascertain when a cloud passed over the disc of the sun, is mentioned as something peculiarly wonderful; so also is the fact, that he could tell when he was approaching an object, if the air was particularly clear, by its pulsations upon his face. This, however, is nothing but what every blind person is capable of doing. We have known those who could do more than this. There are blind persons who, when approaching an object, can form some idea of its character; can tell, for instance, whether it is a stone post, a tree, a horse, or a man; and there are those who even claim that they can tell, on entering a room, whether there be other persons in the room, — of course, it is meant without hearing them speak. The principle upon which they do this is, that a living body produces a greater impression as you approach it, than an inert object. This may, perhaps, cause those to smile who have never given the subject a thought. But as we do not mean to be considered as asserting that it is a gift peculiar to the blind, but that it is only in consequence of the superior culture of the sense of touch which is occasioned by blindness, we recommend all sceptical persons to try it. It is a very easy thing; bandage your eyes, then let some person lead you towards different objects, and you will find, after repeating the experiment several times, that each of them produces upon you a different sensation, — faint and almost indistinct at first, but as you repeat the experiment, becoming more and more vivid. Now, it is these sensations, or rather impressions, which the blind are accustomed to observe and to turn to some account; for the principle, to which we have referred, enables them when walking in the streets (provided they are walking sufficiently slow,) to ascertain if there be any obstruction in their path. There are many other things which would be interesting to the curious, as illustrating the almost illimitable extent to which the sense of touch is capable of being carried, but which we must reserve for another occasion.

Much has been written upon the comparative value of the different senses. I have often been asked by those who have never felt the inconvenience caused by the want of any one of the senses, — which was really the most unfortunate, the blind, or the deaf and dumb? Of course, a

solution of this question can never be obtained. It is a beautiful arrangement of Providence, and one which we cannot too much admire, that each of these classes considers its own condition preferable. We once listened to a dialogue upon this subject; a portion of which we will give, as the best means of illustrating the views of those who are the most competent judges. The deaf mute communicated to the blind man, by writing, what he had to say, upon a slate; which being read by a third party, the blind replied in the same manner.

D. "It must be a sad life to you, never to see the earth, the sea, and the sky."

B. "But I can converse with those around me, and I am delighted with the voices of those I love."

D. "I, too, can converse, as I now do with you. 'I can see the human face divine,' and these beautiful flowers,"— pointing to a vase by his side.

B. (*Growing more excited,*) "But you cannot study, to the same extent that I can, the abstract sciences, — intellectual and moral philosophy; you cannot while away your hours with music, at the piano-forte."

D. "I can read the book of nature; I can look upon yon smiling landscape."

B. "I can listen to the voice of the birds, and the music of flowing waters, and enjoy with deep delight the perfume of ten thousand flowers."

D. (*Smiling,*) "I, too, can enjoy their fragrance, and admire their hue; and yesterday I beheld the masterpiece of Michael Angelo instinct with life and beauty."

B. "Last night I listened to the music of Beethoven, and the poetry of Goethe."

D. "I can read poetry in the smiling faces around me."

B. "Smiles do not always wreathe the face. You can see the cheek blanched, the sunken eye, and all the marks which time and decay make upon the form, to sadden the heart. I hear only the voices of my friends, whose music can never die; and, as it has been truly said,

> 'I only know that they grow old,
> By counting happy years gone by.'"

The reader may, perhaps, gather from the foregoing observations, some opinion as to which of the misfortunes is

really the greatest, as well as our own views upon the subject. But let us return once more to Sanderson. The limits we have prescribed to this article, will only allow us briefly to notice one other fact of this great man's life, which, but for the false conclusions deduced from it, we should not have mentioned. We refer to the fact that Sanderson was a sceptic in religion. His infidelity is, without doubt, attributable to the fact that his whole life was devoted to the study of the physical sciences, and that he lived in an age when the philosophy of Locke and Bolingbroke was in the ascendant. Yet there are those who suppose that the blind are more liable to infidelity, because that they cannot appreciate the argument in favor of the Deity, his attributes, &c., drawn from the material universe. We have not time to answer this as we ought; we will, however, observe that there are arguments which demonstrate the existence of God, his moral government, &c., more fully than that deduced from the material world, and which the blind can appreciate as well as other men. Besides, the religious nature is, in most blind men, developed at a much earlier period, than in seeing persons. It is generally thought that the emblems of death have a tendency to develope our sympathies; that he who beholds the hearse, the pall, the shroud, feels more keenly than he otherwise would, that he has lost a friend. Yet how transient, how evanescent, is the impression produced by these emblems! The sense of loneliness and wretchedness, which the heart experiences when we are called upon to contemplate the darkest mystery of life, makes a more enduring impression, than those external symbols, which are oftener used to gratify an ill-disguised pride. If Sanderson had devoted as much time to the study of Plato and Seneca, as he did to that of Pythagoras and Archimedes; if, in short, he had studied the spiritual instead of the material philosophy, he might have written a poem instead of his work on Fluxions; and a theological essay might have taken the place of his Latin Commentary upon Sir Isaac Newton's Principia. But he flourished at a period when the study of the physical sciences was thought the highest employment for the intellect of man. Believing all knowledge to be the result of sensation and reflection, he devoted his whole life to

the task of lessening the disparity which existed between him and his fellows. Nobly did he succeed! And while we regret that want of faith in the supernatural, of which some have complained, we still must confess that he was true to the ideas of his day, and the philosophy of the school to which circumstances had attached him. And if it be true that every age has its representative men, well did Sanderson represent the eighteenth century.

B. B. B.

Art. II.

The Pervading God.

When but a child, there was to me
A greatness and a mystery
O'er all I saw;
There hung about me everywhere,
In earth, and sky, and cloud, and air,
A brooding, penetrating awe!

The palest flower, that o'er the brook
Hung trembling, had within its look
A meaning deep;
A spirit seemed to interfuse
The frailest forms, the dullest hues;
Each had an awful *life* to keep!

Such mysteries made me weep and pray;
I stole from outward life away
To that within;
I asked my soul, with all its powers,
To league itself with silent hours,
Some answer from the deep to win.

Too unintelligible, then,
The voice that spake. But later, when
My heart had grown,
When waked by grief, and love, and faith,
It bowed to what the Spirit saith,
I heard, and understood the tone.

Oh, mighty now that awful Power,
When in some lonely, listening hour,
It speaks to me!
Ask me not why my heart swells high,
Why gushing tears o'erflow my eye —
Is it not awful then TO BE?

To be, where all around us is!
Perpetual thought, perpetual bliss,
In ebb and flow!
Life never pausing, and time — not!
In space no fixed, no central spot,
From whence we came, or whither go!

Yet nature the deep influx loves!
Through the great swelling stars it moves;
It lifts the sea!
Mountains, pervaded, breathe and speak;
The streams, o'erfull, in music break,
And set the mighty Presence free!

O heart of mine! Thou, too, shouldst be
An ever full, unsounded sea
Of joy and love!
Come, Spirit! let me feel thee near;
Soul, enter! Flow upon me here
From all beneath, around, above!

S. C. E. M.

Art. III.

ΑΙΩΝ *and* ΑΙΩΝΙΟΣ.

All who are, in any considerable degree, acquainted with the controversy between Universalists and their opponents; are aware that the words which stand at the head of this article, are by the latter urged as proof of endless suffering; whilst by the former, it is contended, that these terms are by no means sufficient to establish the dogma of eternal wo. As the writer has, for several years, been collecting facts and opinions relating to these "much vexed words," he desires, for his own convenience and that of others, to give these to the public in a condensed form, through the columns of the Quarterly. We shall commence with the definitions of these terms, as given by the popular lexicographers, most or all of whom are of the dominant creed, and several of them, as Ewing, Grove, Jones, and Robinson, orthodox divines, who wrote their dictionaries expressly for the reading of the Greek Scriptures.

Grove's definition of αἰὼν and αἰώνιος. (From ἀεί, ever, and ὤν, being.) Αἰὼν, *eternity;* an age, life, duration,

continuance of time; a revolution of ages; a dispensation of Providence, this world, or life; the world, or life to come. — Αἰώνιος, eternal, immortal, perpetual, former, past, ancient.

Donnegan's definition: — Αἰὼν, time; a space of time; life-time and life; the ordinary period of man's life; the age of man; man's estate; a long period of time; eternity; the spinal marrow; (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα,) to a very long period, to eternity; (ἀπὸ αἰῶνος,) from, or in the memory of man. — Αἰώνιος, of long duration; eternal, lasting, permanent

Pickering's definition: — Αἰὼν, an age; a long period of time; indefinite duration; time, whether longer or shorter, past, present, or future; in the New Testament, the wicked men of the age; the life of man. — Αἰώνιος, of long duration, lasting; sometimes everlasting; sometimes lasting through life, as *æternus*, in Latin.

Schrevelius's definition, [English edition,]: — Αἰὼν, an age, a long period of time; indefinite duration; time, whether longer or shorter, past, present, or future; also, in the New Testament, the wicked men of the age; and also in the feminine gender, life, the life of man. — Αἰώνιος, of long duration, lasting, sometimes everlasting; sometimes lasting through life, as *æternus*, in Latin.

Professor Robinson's definition: — Αἰὼν, (Homer,) life; also in classic usage, and in the New Testament, *ævum, an age;* that is, an indefinite long period of time, perpetuity, ever, forever, eternity; (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα,) ever, forever, without end, to the remotest time; (εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας,) used in the same sense. Some suppose that the phrase, (ὁ αἰὼν μέλλων ἐρχομενος,) means the world to come after the resurrection; others, that it refers to the days of the Messiah. — Αἰώνιος, perpetual, everlasting, eternal, chiefly spoken of future time.

Ewing's definition: — Αἰὼν, (i. e. ἀεὶ ὤν,) duration, finite, or infinite; a period of duration, past or future; an age, duration of the world, Deut. xxxii. 7, Luke i. 70; plural, ages of the world, 1 Cor. ii. 7; hence, human life in this world, Luke xvi. 8, or the next, Mark x. 30; our manner of life in the world, Psalms, xc. 8, Eph. ii. 2; an age of divine dispensation, the ages, generally, reckoned three; that before the law, that under the law, and that under the Messiah, Matt. xxiv. 3, and xxviii. 20, 1 Cor. x. 11, Heb. xi. 3; "by faith, we understand, κατηρτίσθαι τοὺς αἰῶνας ῥήματι θεοῦ,

that the ages were framed by the word of God, so that the things which are (now) seen, did not arise out of the things which did (previously) appear," — compare verses 1, 7, 26, 27; an indefinitely long period of time; hence eternity, Exod. xiv. 13, Luke i. 55, John iv. 14, Psalms xc. 2; *ἀπ' αἰῶνος*, Acts xv. 18, is equivalent to *πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων*, 1 Cor. ii. 7: *Διόπερ οὐτ' ἐν τόπῳ τὰ 'κεῖ πέφυχεν, οὔτε χρόνος αὐτὰ ποιεῖ γηράσκειν, οὐδ' ἐστίν οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ, μία μεταβολῇ τῶν ὑπὲρ τήν ἐξωτάτω τεταγμένων φοράν ἀλλ' ἀναλλοίωτα, καὶ απαθῆ, τὴν ἀρίστην ἔχοντα ζωὴν, καὶ τὴν αὐταρχεστάτην, διαιτελεῖ τὸν ἅπαντα* AΙ'Ω˜NA. *Καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τοὔνομα θείως ἐφθεγκται παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων. Τὸ γὰρ τέλος τὸ περιέχον τὸν τῆς ἑκάστου ζωῆς χρόνον, οὐ μηδὲν ἔξω κατὰ φύσιν,* A˜Γ'ΩN *ἑκάστου κεκληται. Κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον καὶ τὸ τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ τέλος, καὶ τὸ τον παντων ἄπειρον χρόνον καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν περιέχον τέλος,* AI'Ω˜N *ἐστιν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ εἶναι εἰληφὼς τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν, ἀθάντος καὶ θεῖος.* Wherefore, neither are these who are there, (namely, God and celestial intelligences,) confined to place, nor does time make them grow old; neither have any of those superior beings any change; but without mutability or infirmity, and possessing a most excellent and satisfying life, they remain through all eternity, (*αἰῶνα.*) For this word has been divinely spoken by the ancients. For the consummation which contains the time of every life that has nothing supernatural, is called its age, (*αἰὼν.*) By parity of reason, the consummation of the whole heaven, and the consummation which contains the unbounded duration, and the immensity of all, (having taken its name from everduring,) is eternity, (*αἰὼν,*) immortal and divine. (Aristotle on Heaven, book 1, chapter x.) [To the above, we may add the following continuation of the quotation from Aristotle, from the Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, page 53, — "Whence, also, it is applied to other things; to some, indeed, *accurately*, but to others, in *the lax signification* of *being*, and even *life.*"] — Αἰώνιος, (from preceding,) *eternal*, Exod. iii. 14, 15, Matt. xxv. 46, Rom. xvi. 26. *χρόνοι αἰώνιοι*, ages of the world, periods of the dispensations since the world began, Rom. xvi. 25.

Hedericus's definition: — Αἰὼν, ævum, æternitas; seculum, quasi *ἀεὶ ὤν*, vita, tempus vitæ hominis, hominum memoria, (improbi homines, New Testament,) spinæ medula. An age, eternity; an age, as if always being; time of man's life, in the memory of men, (wicked men, New Testament,) the spinal marrow.—

Αἰώνιος, æternus, sempiternus, perennis; i. e. eternal, everlasting, continual.

Neither Schweighæuser, Valpley, Pickering, nor Schrevelius, gives αἰὼν the definition of *eternity*. Pickering, Schrevelius, Hedericus, and Lutz, give *age* as the primary signification.

Jones's definition: — Αἰὼν, an everlasting age, eternity; (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα,) forever, a period of time, age, life; (the present world or life, Matt. xiii. 32;) Matt. xxviii. 20, the Jewish dispensation; Eph. ii. 2, a good demon, angel, as supposed to exist forever; see also Heracl. 900; 1 Cor. x. 11; αἰῶνες, the eternal ideas of God, which he used as the patterns in the creation of all sensible things, to which all things will perfectly conform in the end; (τὰ τελὴ τῶν αἰώνων,) Heb. xi. 3, the completion of the eternal models, i. e. the events which fulfil or realize the patterns of the things in the divine mind. Heb. i. 2, that the *eternal models* of things were made by the word of God, i. e. by faith we comprehend that the worlds we see, did not proceed from sensible objects as their ultimate cause, or from the combinations of matter and motion, but from a spiritual, intelligent being, who planned all things conformably to perfect models previously formed in his own mind. — Αἰώνιος, everlasting, ancient.

Hinks's definition: — Αἰὼν. a period of time, an age, an after-time, eternity. Comp. Latin, *ævum*. — Αἰώνιος, lasting, eternal, of old, since the beginning.

Wright's definition: — Αἰὼν, time, age, life-time, period, revolution of ages, dispensation of Providence, present world or life, world to come, eternity. — Αἰώνιος, eternal, ancient.

Giles's definition: — Αἰὼν, time, an age, an indefinite period of time, eternity, the spinal marrow. — Αἰώνιος, lasting, permanent, ancient, eternal.

Lutz's definition: — Αἰὼν, an age, time, eternity. — Αἰώνιος durable, eternal.

Schleusner's definition: — [English ed. abridged.] — Αἰὼν. Any space of time, whether longer or shorter, past, present, or future, to be determined by the persons or things spoken of, and the scope of the subjects; the life or age of man; any space in which we measure human life, from birth to death; see Matt. xxviii. 20, "I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world;" συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος, *per omnem*

vitam, "through your whole life." See Suidas and Hesychius. — Αἰώνιος, a definite and long period of time, that is, a long continued, but still definite period of time.

Passow's definition: — Αἰώνιος, long continued, eternal, everlasting, in the classics.

We will now quote some other writers on *αἰὼν* and *αἰώνιος*.

Macknight: — "These words being ambiguous, are always to be understood according to the nature and circumstances of the things to which they are applied." Though the Dr. claims the force of these words in support of the doctrine of interminable punishment, yet he remarks, "At the same time, I must be so candid as to acknowledge, that the use of these terms forever, eternal, and everlasting, in other passages of Scripture, shows that they who understand these words in a limited sense, when applied to punishment, put no forced interpretation upon them." See Truth of the Gospel History, page 28.

Aristotle: — Though Aristotle says the word *αἰὼν* is from *ἀεὶ* and *ὤν*, *always being*, yet it is manifest, from a close inspection of the passage, (see Ewing's definition above,) that he understood the word to signify simply duration, or continued being, whether longer or shorter. For he says, "The consummation which contains the time of every life, which has nothing supernatural, is called its *αἰὼν*." The word, he says, was *divinely* (θείως,) spoken by the ancients; by which he probably means, that it was used in reference to angelic beings, the *Æons* of the ancient Greek, the Oriental, and Gnostic philosophers. A single instance of this usage, I am disposed to think, occurs in the New Testament, Eph. ii. 2, where the word is rendered *course*. In his work *De Mundo*, chapter 7, *in fine*, he says, "God was termed *αἰσαν*, (Fate, or Providence,) δὲ *ἀεὶ αὐσαν*, because *always being*, or *always existing*." See Clarke on Gen. xxi. 33. From the above, we should infer, that Aristotle understood the word to signify continued, rather than endless existence; and this appears manifest from another passage in the same work, thus, — "*ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀτέρμονος εἰς ἕτερον αἰῶνα*," from an interminable aion to another *aion*. It is clearly manifest, that, had Aristotle understood the word to signify *eternity*, in the strict sense of the term, he would not have found it necessary to qualify

the word in order thus to express a limited duration of great length.

The poet *Cleanthus*, in a hymn written in praise of Jove, uses the phrase *alèv èóντα*, *ever being*, in the sense of *continued existence*, thus:

> Ὡδὲ γὰρ εἰς ἓν πάντα συνήρμοκας ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,
> Ὥσθ' ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα·
> Ὃν φεύγοντες ἐῶσιν, δσοι θνητῶν κακοισί εἰσι,
> Δύσμοροι, οἵτ' ἀγαθῶν μὲν ἀεὶ κτῆσιν ποθέοντες,
> Οὔτ' ἐσορῶσι θεοῦ κοινὸν νομον, οὔτε κλύουσιν,
> Ὧ κεν πειθόμενοι σὺν νῷ βίον ἐσθλὸν ἔχοιεν.

"For thus hast thou connected the good with the evil in one system, that one *alèv èóντα continually existing* principle of reason is in all; from which whoever of mortals are wicked, ill-starred, are endeavoring to escape, because, indeed, *continually* (*ἀεὶ*,) coveting the possessions of the good, they neither regard the common law of God, nor hearken to it; by obeying which, they might enjoy a blessed existence with you." In the same poem we find the expressions, — Ζεῦ, *παγκρατὲς alεὶ*, "O Jupiter, *ever* conquering all;" — and, *σον κράτος alèν ἀείσω*, "I will sing your power *continually*;" and, "There is nothing more incumbent on mortals, nor on the gods, than in justice (or justly,) to celebrate the universal law continually," — *κοινὸν ἀεὶ νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν*. See Græca Majora, vol. ii. pp. 297, 298.

Ignatius, in his Epist. ad Ephes., uses the phrase, *ἐφανερώθη τοῖς alῶσιν*, in speaking of Christ; that is, "He was manifested to the ages;" or his meaning may be "to mankind."

Eusebius, (in Praep. Evang. lib. i. cap. 10,) in speaking of the Phœnician philosophy, as set forth by Sanchoniathon, says of the darkness and chaos which preceded the creation, "*ταῦτα δὲ εἶναι ἄπειρα καὶ διὰ πολὺν alῶνα μὴ ἔχειν περας*, these were infinite, and, for a long time, (*πολὺν alῶνα*,) had no limits." (See Grotius, *De Verit.* lib. i. p. 23.)

The following sentence from Amelius Platonicus, shows that *ἀεὶ ὄν* signifies *continually*, and not *eternally being*: *Καὶ οὗτος ἄρα ἦν ὁ λόγος, καθ' ὃν ἀεὶ ὄντα τὰ γινόμενα ἐγίνετο, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλείτος ἀξιώσειε.* Le Clerc, (See Grotius *De Verit.* lib. i. p. 32,) translates the sentence as follows: Hæc itaque illa Ratio per quam semper sunt quæ sunt facta, quomodo et

Heraclitus censuit. "And this, moreover, was that Wisdom, by which those things which *continually exist* were made, as also Heraclitus admits."

In the Epistle of Barnabas, I find the following sentence, in which the word αἰὼν appears to signify world, though not in the sense of the material world, but the future state or world; τί δὲ τὸ δίχηλον; ὅτι ὁ δίκαιος ἐν τούτῳ κόσμῳ περιπατεῖ, καὶ τὸν ἅγιον αἰῶνα ἐκδέχεται. Le Clerc translates the passage (see Grotius *De Verit.* lfb. v.) thus: "Quid vero bifidum ungulis? quia vir justus in hoc ævo ambulat, et alterum ævum expectat." The following, we think, would be a better translation, and more literal: "But wherefore is there a disagreement? since a just man lives in this world, and looks forward to a *holy state*, or a *holy life*."

Philo Biblius from Sanchoniathon, quotes, πρωτόγονος *est* אדם; αἰὼν *est* חוה, mortalium primi. "The first born is Adam; *aion* is Eve, the first of mortals." The name Eve signifies *life;* (see Clarke's Comment. on Gen. iii. 20.) Hence αἰὼν was understood by Philo to mean *life;* (see Grotius *De Verit.* p. 48.)

Josephus, on the book of Daniel, (*Ant. fine libri X.*,) says of the prophet, "He was held in the greatest favor and honor by kings and people, whilst he lived; and, having died, he is still held in (μνήμην αἰώνιον,) eternal remembrance." The same writer, in his work against Apion, says, "It is plain from this fact, how much faith we have in these writings; for no one has dared, (τοσούτου αἰῶνος ἤδη παρῳχηκότος,) (so long a time having already passed away,) to add any thing, nor to diminish, nor to change any thing." See Grotius *De Verit.* lib. v. p. 212, &c., lib. iii. p. 159.

The Orphic verses, according to Grotius, use αἰὼν in the sense of "life,"—φίλης αἰῶνος, *sweet life*. *De Veritate*, pp. 39, 315. Homer also uses the same expression, (see Univ. Quarterly, vol. iii. No. 3.) From the same Quarterly we take the following, which the writer (T. B. T.) informs us, he has gathered from Stephens's Thesaurus Græcæ Linguæ, and Robert Constant's Lexicon. "And these they called *eternal*, (αἰώνιους,) hearing that they had performed the sacred rites for three entire generations," τριῶν γενέων. *In Solom. Parab.*, "Alter not the eternal limits or boundaries," ὅρια αἰωνία. *Bud.*—An epitome of this work, (*Bud.*,) says on αἰὼν: "Item seculum, id est, 70

annorum spatium, juxta Hieron." — that is, "an age, the space of seventy years, according to Jerome." And it adds farther, that it is employed by Homer, Herodotus, and Xenophon, as equivalent to the Latin "ævum," or age. Plato has the phrase, μεθη αἰώνιος, "*continual*, or *constant* drunkenness."

In a poem ascribed to Errina Lesbia, we find the word αἰὼν qualified by the adjective μέγιστος, as follows:

Πάντα δὲ σφάλλων ὁ μέγιστος αἰὼν,
Καὶ μεταπλάσσων βίον ἄλλοτ ἄλλως,
Σοὶ μόνᾳ πλήσιστον οὖρον ἀρχᾶς
Οὐ μεταβάλλει.

"But the greatest duration, (ὁ μέγιστος αἰὼν,) that overturns all things, and that changes the mode of life now one way and now another, for you alone, (viz. for Rome alone,) changes not the prosperous breeze of authority." See Græca Majora, vol. ii. p. 284.

Maclaine, in his Mosheim, says, "The word αἰὼν, or *æon*, is commonly used among Greek writers, but in different senses; its signification in the Gnostic system, is not very evident, and several learned men have despaired of finding out its true signification. Αἰὼν, or *æon*, among the ancients, was used to signify the age of man, or the duration of human life. In after times, it was employed by philosophers to express the duration of spiritual and invisible beings."

Josephus: — "Josephus generally applies the word αἰώνιος to the affairs of the present life. Thus he speaks of the *everlasting* name of the patriarchs; of the *everlasting* glory of the Jewish nation and heroes; of the *everlasting* reputation of Herod; of the *everlasting* memorial which he erected; of the *everlasting* worship in the temple of Jerusalem; of the *everlasting* imprisonment to which John, the tyrant, was condemned by the Romans, &c. See Antiq. b. 1, ch. xiii. 4; b. 4, ch. vi. 5; b. 12, ch. vii. 3; b. 15, ch. xv. 5; and ch. xi. 1. Jewish War, b. 6, ch. ii. 1; b. 6, ch. ix. 4. Ἀΐδιος is the word which he commonly uses for *eternal*."

Grotius, in refuting the argument of the Jews against Christianity, based on the assumption that their law was designed to be perpetual, says, "From this circumstance, the Hebrews ought to wonder less, who know that in their

law, the right was called *perpetual*, and the servitude *perpetual*, which endured from Jubilee to Jubilee. The advent of the Messiah was also called by them, (complementum Jubilæi, sive Jubilæus,) the complement or completion of the Jubilee." *In Pereck Chelʿck et alibi, idque ex Esaia* lxi. 2, Ex. xxi. 6, 1 Sam. i. 22, Psal. cvi. 30, 31, 1 Mach. ii. 55. See Grotius *De Verit.* l. v. Le Clerc has added the following, in a note on the same page: "Jus perpetuum et servitutem perpetuam, the right *perpetual*, and the servitude *perpetual*." Exod. xxi. 6, 1 Sam. i. 22. "And so the word *olam* in the law-ritual, may be received, Josephus thinks, *Albo lib.* iii. Fundamentorum, capite 16. So the priesthood of Phineas is called *od olam*, Psal. cvi. 30, 31, εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, Sarachidæ xlv. 28, 29, 30, ἱερωσύνη αἰωνία, 1 Mach. ii. 55."

Cruden says, "The words *eternal*, *everlasting*, *forever*, are sometimes taken for a long time, and are not always to be understood strictly; for example, see Gen. xvii. 8, and xiii. 15, and xlix. 36, 2 Sam. vii. 16, 1 Chron. xvii. 14, thus: Thou shalt be our guide from this time forth, even *forever;* that is, during your whole life." See Concordance on *eternal.*

Philo Judæus: — The Editor of the Quarterly says, — "We have not read all of Philo's works; but from a perusal of considerable extent, we gather the following as the general conclusion; namely, that his favorite epithet for *eternal*, or *endless*, is ἀΐδιος; and that he commonly employs αἰώνιος either in an indefinite sense as to duration, or else in the sense of *continual*, *unremitting*, though he may sometimes use it in a loose manner to denote *eternal.*" "So far as we have observed, he never applies the word to future misery; though some of its compounds are so used in two or three instances." See Philo, *Tom.* 2, pp. 419, 420. The following examples may be taken as a fair specimen of his prevailing usage of the word: "It is better not to promise at all, than not to give prompt assistance. For no blame follows in the former case; but in the latter, there is dissatisfaction from the weaker class, and a deep hatred and *lasting* punishment (κόλασις αἰώνιος,) from such as are powerful." — (*Fragmenta*, *Tom.* 2, p. 667, *edit. Mangey*, 1742.) In speaking of the care of the animal for its young, he says, — "Perceiving from

afar, with a *long-reaching* and perfect sagacity, (αἰωνίᾳ καὶ τελείᾳ φρονήσει,) what things are suitable." (*De Humanitate Tom.* 2, pp. 396, 397.) Speaking of freedom of mind, he says, — "But he who sees, after careful examination, that the divine allotments are distinguished by a *constant* order and enjoyment, (αἰωνίῳ τάξει καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ,) while every thing mortal is borne about with the tossings and fluctuations of human affairs, and vibrates to unequal impulses; he who nobly endures whatsoever comes to pass — is a true philosopher and free." — *Quisquis virtuti studet. Tom.* 2, p. 449.) Commenting on the passage, Gen. xxi. 33, he says, — "And Abraham planted a grove in Beersheba, and called there on the name of the Lord, the everlasting God. What, therefore, was the fruit of it, he himself shall inform us. For, he called on him by the names *Lord, the everlasting* (αἰώνιος) *God.* Now the names here selected denote the perfections that belong to the [*Divine*] essence: the name *Lord* implying the relation in which he rules; the name *God*, that in which he blesses. * * Moreover, the name *everlasting* αἰώνιος *God*, is tantamount to this, namely: He who is merciful, not now and then, but always and continually." — (*De Plantatione Noe. Tom.* i. p. 342.) In this last example, it is plain that Philo means to define first, the name God, as signifying the Supreme Benefactor, He who blesses; and second, the word *everlasting*, as meaning continual, without intermission, constant. And this, let it be observed, is strictly the etymological definition of the epithet, — *always being.*" See the Expositor, vol. iii., and Quarterly, vol. ii. p. 133.

We find frequently the phrase, *everlasting torment*, in a work called the *Sibylline Oracles*, written about the year 180, and yet the writer distinctly teaches the ultimate restoration of the damned. See Ancient History of Universalism, 2d edition, p. 45. Origen also makes frequent use of the phrases, *everlasting fire*, and *everlasting punishment*, and yet no one disputes his belief in the final restoration of all moral intelligences. See Ancient History of Universalism, 2d edition, 104.

Rev. John Foster: — This writer, a distinguished English Baptist clergyman, remarks on these words as follows: "I hope it is not presumptuous to take advantage of the fact, that the terms *everlasting*, *eternal*, *forever*,

original or translated, are often employed in the Bible, as well as other writings, under great and various limitations of import; and are thus withdrawn from the predicament of *necessarily and absolutely meaning a strictly* ENDLESS *duration.* The limitation is often, indeed, plainly marked by the nature of the subject. In other instances, the words are used with a figurative indefiniteness, which leaves the limitation to be made by some general rule of reason and proportion. They are designed to magnify, to aggravate, rather than to define. . . . . I therefore conclude that a limited interpretation is authorized." See Life and Correspondence of the Rev. John Foster, in a Letter to a Young Minister.

T. Southwood Smith: — "The word αἰὼν is used in Scripture in several different senses. Sometimes it signifies the term of human life; at other times an age, or dispensation of Providence. In its plural form, it denotes the age of the world, or any measurement of time, especially if its termination be hidden; but its most common signification is that of age or dispensation." He quotes the following from Simpson: "*Æon* occurs about a hundred times in the New Testament, [in all, one hundred and twenty-eight times,] in seventy of which, at least, it is clearly used for a limited duration. In the Septuagint translation of the Old Testament, it is even repeated, and several times it is repeated *twice*, without meaning eternity; and in two instances, it signifies no longer a period than the life of one man only." He quotes the following, also, from Simpson's Essays: "It is an observation of the utmost importance, that when αἰὼν, or αἰώνιος, is applied to the future punishment of the wicked, they are never joined to life, immortality, incorruptibility, but are always connected with fire, or with that punishment, pain, destruction, or second death, which is effected by means of fire. Now since fire, which consumes or decomposes other perishable bodies, is itself of a dissoluble or perishing nature, this intimates a limitation of the period of time."

Professor Stuart: — "The New Testament usage differs from the classical one, in that αἰὼν in the New Testament, most usually means an indefinite, unlimited period of time; whereas, in the classics, the sense *ævum*, *seculum*,

age, generation, in respect to time, appears to be its most usual meaning." "The most common and appropriate meaning of αἰὼν in the New Testament, and the one which corresponds with the Hebrew word עולם, (*olim*,) and which, therefore, deserves the first rank in regard to order, I put down first: an indefinite period of time; time without limitation; ever, forever, time without end, eternity; all in relation to future time. * * * The different shades by which the word is rendered, depend on the object with which αἰὼν is associated, or to which it has relation, rather than to any difference in the real meaning of the word." "The words קדם and עד (*kedem* and *od*,) rendered by Turretin *eternity*, are like the Greek αἰὼν, as that also signifies any thing ancient, which has endured, or is to endure for a long period. The question when the words are to have the meaning of absolute eternity, and when the sense of ancient, or very old, is always to be determined by the nature of the case, i. e. by the context." See Professor Stuart's Letters to Dr. Miller, p. 128; and also his Exegetical Essays on the words rendered hell, everlasting, eternal, &c.

Dr. T. Clowes:—"The word *olam* is used 459 times in the Old Testament; and when we consider how uniformly the Septuagint translators, and the writers of the New Testament have rendered the word by αἰὼν and αἰώνιος, there being probably not ten instances of deviation from this uniformity by the Septuagint translators, and not so many by the New Testament writers; and when we consider further, the manifest advantage of this uniformity to those who in former ages read the Septuagint and the New Testament in their mother tongue, in giving them a clear and definite idea of *olam;* we are led to express a deep regret that the English translators did not give their readers a similar advantage. But our translators have rendered this virtually one word, *olam*, occurring 657 times in the Bible, by almost thirty different words and phrases; most of them signifying duration to be sure, but varying their signification as to its extent from a three days' duration, to a duration without beginning and without end. The first five places in which *olam* occurs in the Old Testament, are rendered by no less than five different words:—Gen. iii. 22, *forever;* Gen. vi. 2, *always*; Gen. vi. 4, *of old;*

Gen. ix. 12, *perpetual;* Gen. ix. 16, *everlasting.*" On Gen. xiii. 15, he shows that *olam* signifies in that passage, the duration of human life, and remarks as follows: "And let no one be surprised that we use the word *olam* in this limited sense. This is one of the most usual significations of the Hebrew *olam* and the Greek αἰὼν, and it is perfectly right to use Scripture terms in Scripture senses. This sense of *olam* and αἰὼν runs through all the writers in Greek, Latin and English." "There is no evidence that any words in the Old Testament implying duration, refer to the future life of man. Neither is it certain that the ancients, by the terms of duration which they employed to describe the Divine existence, fully comprehended the idea of interminable existence. Indeed, this is an idea beyond the reach of any human intelligence. The Hebrews spoke of the earthly existence of man as his *olam.* The Greeks and Latins had the same manner of speaking. The αἰὼν or *ævum* of man, meant the period of his existence, consisting of a few years on earth; the αἰὼν or *ævum* of God conveyed the idea of existence without beginning of years or end of life. In like manner an eternal slavery, or an eternal imprisonment among the Greeks and Latins, meant a slavery for life, or an imprisonment for life. It had no reference whatever to another world, or another state of being. The same sense of the words eternity, and eternal, should be given them by those who speak English. The *eternity* of human life, ought to be understood as meaning the same thing in English, as *olam* in Hebrew, αἰὼν in Greek, *ævum* in Latin; that is, the space of time man possesses his breathing existence; and *eternal* happiness, and *eternal* punishment, ought to be understood in the same way, as a happiness or a punishment confined to this earthly existence. By the definition of our Saviour himself, John xvii. 2, *eternal life* is declared to consist of "the knowledge of God, and of Jesus Christ, whom he hath sent." As for the phrase *eternal death,* there is an utter repugnance of meaning between the two terms. If *eternal* means the same thing as αἰώνιος, and this Greek adjective is derived from the noun αἰὼν, then it properly means *living;* and the word cannot, without the greatest absurdity, be connected with *death.* It is the same thing as to say *living death;* and it is equally absurd,

as to say, *a feeble Omnipotence; a circumscribed Infinity; a white blackness*, or *a square Globe.* The advocates of endless misery have in vain sought for such a scriptural phrase as *eternal death.* There is no such phrase, nor any equivalent to it; nor can there be, except in the writings of those who believe in, or would speak of, utter annihilation. That is the idea of *eternal* death, as understood by Lucretius and other atheistic writers. In his third book, *De Rerum Natura*, verse 1104, we are told, that "*mors æterna, eternal death*, awaits every individual, whether he live many years or a few in the world." No Christian writer, who has been taught the doctrine of life and immortality by the Gospel, should use the phrase, except to condemn it, and the doctrine implied in it." "There has been at least one writer (Rev. Mr. Goodwin, in the Christian Examiner, published in Boston,) who has with great learning and judgment examined these words, and who has come to the conclusion that *olam* and its equivalent *αἰὼν*, mean spirit; and *αἰώνιος*, means *spiritual;* and that these words never, necessarily, have the meaning of duration: * * and we feel compelled to admit, that in the teachings of our Saviour, the term *αἰώνιος*, rendered *eternal*, in the phrase *eternal life*, refers much more to the character of that life, than to its duration. The only question is, whether the terms *olam*, *αἰὼν* and *αἰώνιος*, have not in other parts of Scripture a corresponding meaning." (See Registers for 1841, and 1843.)

The series of articles by the late E. S. Goodwin, to which the Dr. refers, may be found in the Christian Examiner, commencing in the December No. of 1828, and ending in the May No. of 1833. In this series of articles, Mr. Goodwin says,—"This word (*αἰὼν*,) expresses the existence of being alone." And referring to Phavorinus, who says, "*αἰὼν* is also the *eternal* and *endless* as it is regarded by the theologian," he remarks,—"Here I strongly suspect is the true secret brought to light, of the origin of the sense of *eternity* in *αἰὼν*: the theologian first thought he perceived it, or else he placed it there; the theologian keeps it there now; and the theologian will probably retain it there longer than any one else."

Lennep, in his "Etymologium Linguæ Græca," says of *αἰὼν*, "It is a noun of that kind, which in its own nature

denotes *collection* and multitude of things, as appears from the termination *ōn*." Phavorinus also calls it, "the comprehension of many times and periods."

Alexander Campbell says of αἰὼν, "Its radical idea is indefinite duration."

Parkhurst, on the corresponding Hebrew word *olam*, says,—"It denotes a hidden duration, and it seems to be used much more frequently for indefinite, than for infinite time."

Dr. Taylor, who wrote the Hebrew concordance, and copied every word of the Hebrew Bible three times with his own hand, says of *olam*,—"The word is applied to time, and signifieth a duration that is concealed, as being of an unknown, or great length with respect either to time past, or to come. It signifies *eternity, not from the proper force of the word*, but when the sense of the place, or the nature of the subject requireth it; as God and his attributes."

In *Duncan's* Hebrew Lexicon, we find the word *olam* defined as follows, — 1. "*A long indefinite period.*" Tempus homini absconditum tam infinitum et eternum quam finitum, ut Gen. xvii. 8, &c., plerumque est perpetuum, eternum, sempiternum."— *Robertson's Thesaurus.*—Exod. xxi. 6.—2. *Perpetuity, durability*, Is. lxiv. 5,—*But most frequently eternity.* — 3. *The world*, Eccles. iii. 11. — He marks the word in this instance with a star, signifying that this is the only passage in the Bible, where *olam* occurs in the sense of world. It is however rendered world in the Common Version, Psalm lxxiii. 12.

Buxtorf and *Schindler* define *olam* as follows, — "*A hidden time, an age, time hidden from man.*" *Gesenius* in the last edition of his Hebrew Lexicon, gives *eternity* as the first meaning of *olam*, but remarks that it is frequently used in a limited sense. (See Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, p. 53.)

But, we ask, if the Hebrews attached the meaning of eternity to this word, why did they find it necessary to double it so frequently, to express their meaning? and to treble it, as in Dan. vii. 18? So we ask also, if the New Testament writers understood αἰὼν to signify *eternity*, how could they speak of its END, as in the following seven passages? Matt. xiii. 39, 40, 49; and xxiv. 3; and xxviii.

20; 1 Cor. x. 11. (τὰ τέλη τῶν αἰώνων, literally, *the ends of the ages.* See Locke and others.) Heb. ix. 26; on the phrase, συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος, *the end of the world*, Pearce remarks, "*Rather the end of the age.*" Hammond says, "*the conclusion of this age.*" Campbell and Boothroyd translate it, "*the conclusion of this state;*" and Le Clerc, Whitby, Beausobre, and Lenfant, Doddridge, Macknight, and Paulus, Wakefield, and Kenrick, "*the conclusion*, or *end of the age;*" and Clarke evidently prefers this rendering. The Vulgate has it, the end of the *seculum* or *age.*

The fact that the New Testament writers speak of this αἰὼν. and the αἰὼν to come, and the αἰῶνες to come, shows conclusively that they did not understand the word to signify unlimited duration. See Matt. xii. 32, and Eph. i. 21, Mark x. 30, Luke xviii. 30, Gal. i. 4, 2 Tim. iv. 10, Heb. vi. 5, Eph. ii. 7, and (Isa. ix. 6; πατὴρ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος, "the Father of the *future age*," — *Simpson and Boothroyd*, "the Father of the *age to come*, — *S. Clarke*, *Lindsey*, *Mardon*, *Acton*, *Hinks.*) The age *to come*, or *about to come*, was the Christian age, when Jesus should be the *Father of the age*, the Judge and Ruler.

Pearce, on Matt. xii. 32, says, — "The Greek word αἰὼν seems to signify *age* here, as it often does in the New Testament, and according to its most proper signification." Clarke says, — "Though I follow the common translation, yet I am fully satisfied, the meaning of the words is, neither in this dispensation, viz. the Jewish, nor in that which is to come, viz. the Christian. *Olam ha-bo*, *the world to come*, is a constant phrase for the times of the Messiah in the Jewish writers." Wakefield and Macknight translate it, "neither in this age, nor that which is to come." Campbell and Boothroyd, "neither in this state, nor that which is to come." And as Ephesians, ii. 7, shows that there were more *aions* than one to come, it is clearly implied in the language of Jesus, that the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is ultimately to be forgiven. Mark iii. 29, is no bar to our position, for the rules of philology and exegesis require that the same word, in the same connection, or in parallel passages, should receive the same rendering; and it will be found impossible to give the word *aion* the same rendering in each, except we adopt the sense of age; hence, Mark iii. 29 should be

rendered, — "But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, hath not forgiveness *for an age*, (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα,) but is in danger of *age-enduring judgment*, (αἰωνίου κρίσεως,) or *the judgment of the age*." The age present, when the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost was committed, and when Christ came to establish his religion, was the *concluding age*, or last great jubilee of the Jewish dispensation, (see Grotius above;) and the age to come, was the *progressive* age of Christianity, until the conclusion of which, the Jews are to remain in a state of unbelief and judicial blindness; but in the *millennial* age which is to follow, they are to be brought in, and so "All Israel shall be saved; for this is the covenant with them, when God shall take away their sins." See Rom. xi. 26, 27, &c.

Beginning of αἰὼν[1]: — The beginning of *aion* is spoken of in the common version, in the following passages: Luke i. 70, (ἀπ' αἰῶνος, of old, or anciently,) John ix. 32, (ἐκ τοῦ αἰῶνος, from the greatest antiquity, or in the memory of man,) Acts iii. 21, and xv. 18, (ἀπ' αἰῶνος, of old, anciently,) Eph. iii. 9, (ἀπὸ τῶν αἰώνων, from the ages, that is, the ages or jubilees of the old dispensation.)

Repetitions of αἰὼν: — We find the word *aion* repeated in a remarkable manner in the following passages, to express very great duration. Rev. i. 18, "And behold, I am alive, (εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων,) for ages of ages. Eph. iii. 21, (εἰς πάσας τὰς γενεὰς τοῦ αἰῶνος τῶν αἰώνων,) literally, as Macknight translates it, "through all the eras of the age of ages." 1 Tim. i. 17, "To the king of ages, (τῶν αἰώνων,) the immortal, the incorruptible, and the God only wise, be glory and honor for ages of ages, (εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων.)" Rev. xiv. 11, "The smoke of their torment goeth up, (εἰς αἰῶνας αἰώνων.) for ages of ages." Sir Isaac Newton, in his work on the prophecies of Daniel and Revelation, (see

[1] In several of the sections that follow, we think the writer mistakes the interpretation of the compound phrases, ἀπ' αἰῶνας, εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων κ. τ. λ. In Greek usage, they are evidently *phrases*, to be taken together, and not to be dissected, word from word. In this respect, they are like our phrase, "forever and ever," or "forever and evermore," which cannot be interpreted by defining the separate words *lexicographically*, and then adding the several definitions together to make out the meaning. Nevertheless, the writer's treatment of them shows conclusively the weakness of the mere verbal argument for endless punishment. We may observe here, too, that we do not agree with him in his rendering of many texts, especially of some which occur in the latter part of this article.—*Editor.*

London edition, 1733, p. 18,) says, — "The ascending up of the smoke of any burning thing *forever and ever*, is put for the continuation of a conquered people under the misery of perpetual subjection and slavery." See also, Gal. i. 5, Phil. iv. 20, 2 Tim. iv. 18, Heb. i. 8, and xiii. 21, 1 Peter, iv. 11, and v. 11, Rev. iv. 9, 10, and v. 13, 14, and vii. 12, and x. 6, and xi. 15, and xv. 7, and xix. 3, and xx. 10, and xxii. 5.

More than eternal: — If *aion* signifies eternity, and *aionios* eternal, then the sacred writers very strangely speak of something *more*, or *beyond* eternity, or eternal. Paul (2 Cor. iv. 17,) uses the remarkable phrase, (*κατ' ὑπερβολὴν εἰς ὑπερβολὴν αἰώνιον βάρος δόξης*, "from an exceeding to an exceeding," or rather adverbially, "an excessively, exceeding, eternal weight of glory.") If *aion* signifies eternity, then in the Septuagint, Dan. xii. 3, we read, *to eternities, and further*, thus, (*εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας καὶ ἔτι.*) And in Exodus xv. 18, "The Lord shall reign (*τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ ἐπ' αἰῶνα καὶ ἔτι,*) from eternity even to eternity, and further." And in Micah iv. 5, "We will walk in the name of the Lord our God, (*εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ ἐπέκεινα,*) to eternity and beyond. Dan. vii. 18, (Hebrew,) "to eternity, even to an eternity of an eternity." Psalm xlviii. 14, "For this God is our God, (*εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος,*) to an age, and to an age of an age." The above phrase, (Psal. xlviii. 14,) "to an age, and to an age of an age," or "to eternity, and to an eternity of an eternity," may be found, Ps. cxix. 44, and cxiv. 2, 21, and cxlviii. 6. See Septuagint..

Dr. Whitby, on Jude, verse 7, writes as follows: — "Nothing is more common and familiar in Scripture, than to represent a thorough and irreparable vastation, whose effects and signs should be still remaining by the word *αἰώνιος*, which we render eternal." He proves his position by the following passages in the Septuagint, in which the word is used in reference to temporal judgment. Ez. xxvi. 20, 21, and xxxv. 9, and xxxvi. 2, and Isa. lviii. 12, Jer. xviii. 15, 16, and xxiii. 40, and xxv. 9, and li. 39, and l. 40, and xlix. 17, 18, Isa. xiii. 19, 20. Hammond, Benson, Gilpin, and Macknight, are all to the same import, and agree that there is no reference in the above passage to suffering in the future world.

The word *αἰὼν* occurs in the Greek of the New Testa-

ment 128 times; 66 in the singular and 62 in the plural number. It is translated in the Common Version, 2 times, *ever*; in 21 passages it occurs twice, and is rendered, *forever and ever;* in 2 instances it is rendered, *eternal*, viz.: Eph. iii. 2, 1 Tim. i. 17; in 38 passages, *world;* in 7 with *οὐκ, never*, viz. Mark iii. 29, John iv. 14, and viii. 51, 52, and x. 28, and ix. 26, and xiii. 8; in 4, *forevermore;* in 2, *worlds*, viz., Heb. i. 2 and xi. 3; in 1, *course*, viz., Eph. ii. 2; once, (occurring twice.) *world without end*, viz., Eph. iii. 21; twice it is rendered, *ages*, Eph. ii. 7 and Col. i. 26; and 28 times it is rendered, *forever*. See Register for 1841. Αἰώνιος is used 71 times in the Greek of the New Testament; and is rendered once, *forever*, Phil. 15; 3 times, *world*, viz., Rom. xvi. 25, 2 Tim. i. 9 and Titus i. 2; 42 times, *eternal*; and 25, *everlasting*. See Register for 1841.

The following are all the passages in which *olam* is applied to punishment: Isa. xxxiv. 9 to 17, Jer. xlix. 33, and xx. 11, and xxiii. 39, 40, and xvii. 4; Isa. xxxiii. 14; Ps. ix. 5, Mal. i. 4, and Dan. xii. 2.

Besides *olam*, we find the following words in the Hebrew Bible, used to express duration: *Kedem*, *Ad*, *Netsack*, *Kol Yamim*, *Orek*, *Yamim*, *Dorva-dor*, *Adi-Ad*, *La-Ad*. *Ad* is rendered *eternity*, Isa. lvii. 15; *La-Ad* is rendered forever, 1 Chron. xxviii. 9, "If thou forsake him, he will cast thee off *forever*." *Olam* is used, Lam. iii. 31, "The Lord will not cast off *forever*." All these words, like *olam*, express *time indefinite*, or *indefinite duration*. See Register for 1843.

There are only two passages in which the word αἰὼν appears to have the sense of *world* attached to it by the sacred writers, viz. Heb. i. 2, and xi. 3. Many of the most eminent critics render the word (αἰῶνας,) in the above passages, *age* or *ages*, as Arius Montanus, Tremellius, Socinius, Priestley, Samuel Sharpe, Wakefield, Simpson, Carpenter, Drummond, Chandler, Lardner, Lindsey, Belsham, and Norton. Thus, "By or for whom he constituted the age or ages," or "the dispensations." "The ages have been so ordered by the power of God, that what is seen had not its origin in what was conspicuous." The word *olam*, rendered world in Ps. lxxiii. 12, might, we think, better be rendered *time* in this instance; and in

Eccl. iii. 11, it should, I doubt not, be rendered, "The secret things of old," "hidden time," or perhaps, as some render the phrase, (*ha-olam.*) "obscurity;" and this signification will be found to be remarkably well adapted to the context. It is, therefore, extremely doubtful whether either *aion* or *olam* occurs in the sense of world any where in the Sacred Scriptures. See Scripture Proofs of Unitarianism, by J. Wilson, p. 241. See, also, A. Clarke on Eccl. iii. 11, and Duncan's Hebrew Lexicon on *olam.*

All the places where αἰὼν and αἰώνιος are used in reference to punishment in the New Testament. Matt. xviii. 8, we have the phrase (*εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ αἰώνιον,*) "everlasting fire." The same phrase occurs also in Matt. xxv. 41. In Matt. xxv. 46, we find the phrase (*εἰς κόλασιν αἰώνιον,*) everlasting, or, as it should here be rendered in contrast with "eternal life," "spiritual chastisement;" for the word *αἰώνιος,* when connected with *ζωὴ life,* signifies *living,* or spiritual. See Donnegan, Grove, and Goodwin, on *αἰώνιος* and *κόλασις.* In Mark iii. 29, we have the phrase, (*αἰωνίου κρίσεως,*) the "judgment of the age." 2 Thess. i. 9, (*ὄλεθρον αἰώνιον,*) lasting destruction, viz. that which fell upon the Jewish persecutors. See Universalist Guide, p. 189; Balfour's Second Inquiry, p. 326–337; Paige's Selections, and Whitby's Comment. on Jude 7, above. In Heb. vi. 2, we have the phrase (*αἰωνίου κρίματος,*) which Peirce renders "ancient judgment," and understands it to refer to the judgments under the old dispensation. See Paige's Selections, p. 253; 2 Peter, ii. 17, (*εἰς αἰῶνα.*) Jude 7, (*πυρὸς αἰωνίου δίκην,*) and Jude 13, (*εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.*) See Paige's Selections, p. 235–292. On Rev. xiv. 11, and xix. 3, and xx. 10. See Dr. Clarke, Paige's Selections, p. 301–316; and the quotation from Sir Isaac Newton, above. It may be proper to remark, that the last six quotations are from books whose authenticity has been disputed, and which Lardner and others say should never be alleged in proof of any doctrine not clearly established by other passages of Holy Writ. See Balfour's Inquiry.

It has been often affirmed, that if *olam αἰὼν* and *αἰώνιος,* when applied to God or to his attributes, do not signify *eternal,* or *endless,* then we cannot prove the eternity of God, nor the endless happiness of the righteous. But this does not follow. God is not eternal *because* these words

are applied to his person or attributes; but because he is "*before all things*," the Author of all things; and because he could not have created himself. He is the "I AM," the "Self-existent," and hence eternal, in the strictest sense. He is the "immortal," the "incorruptible," the "invisible" God. So the happiness of the righteous is an "immortal, an incorruptible, an unfading inheritance."

Most or all of the following words, it is believed, convey the idea of endless duration, or of an immortal, indissoluble existence, much more clearly than the words, *olam*, and *aiôn*. Several of these, it will be noticed, are connected with God, or his attributes; but none of them with the punishment of the wicked. Ἄπειρος, and Ἀπείρων, endless, boundless, infinite, unlimited. See Grove's Lexicon. By reference to the extract from Aristotle, (see Ewing's definition above,) it will be seen that this word is applied to (χρόνος,) *time*, and is manifestly used in the sense of *endless*. The corresponding noun is also used in the same sentence in the sense of *infinity*, or boundless immensity. See the phrase, (ἀπείρονα πήματ') in Græca Majora, p. 314.

Ἀπέραντος, endless, infinite. Ewing's Lexicon. Grove renders it boundless, endless, incessant, &c. See 1 Tim. i. 4, (γενεαλογίαις ἀπεραντοῖς, "endless," or innumerable "genealogies.") See also, (in Justin Martyr, Apol. 1 c. 27, p. 71, B.) the phrase, τὸν ἀπέραντον αἰῶνα, applied to the punishment of the wicked. See Quarterly, Vol. iii. No. 3.

Ἀίδιος, Ewing, *eternal*. Grove, *perpetual, continual, everlasting, eternal*. Rom. i. 20, (ἥτε ἀΐδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης, his eternal power and godhead.) Jude vi. (δεσμοῖς ἀϊδίοις,) eternal chains. The passage is a quotation from the apochryphal book of Enoch. See Quarterly, Vol. i. No. 3, Art. "Fallen Angels." See also, Clarke's Commentary on the passage, and his remarks on the book of Enoch. In Aristotle's Tropicorum, i. c. 11, we read as follows: "There are certain difficult questions which we cannot with certainty determine, (οἷον πότερον ὁ κόσμος ἀΐδιος ἢ οὔ,) as whether or not the world is eternal." See Grotius *De Verit.* lib. i. It is manifest that Aristotle uses the word in the above sentence in the sense of *eternal* in the strictest sense.

Ἀτέρμων, infinite, endless, interminable, boundless. See

Grove. In Aristotle's work, De Mundo, we find the phrase, ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀτέρμονος εἰς ἕτερον αἰῶνα, from an interminable age to another age. Ἄφθαρτος, incorruptible, immortal, eternal. Grove's Lexicon. See 1 Tim. i. 17, (ἀφθάρτῳ θεῷ,) 1 Peter, i. 4, (κληρονομίαν ἄφθαρτον, incorruptible inheritance.) Rom. i. 23, (ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ.) 1 Cor. ix. 25, (στέφανον ἄφθαρτον,) and xv. 52, (καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ ἐγερθήσονται ἄφθαρτοι) 1 Peter, i. 23, (σπορᾶς ἀφθάρτου.) Ἀθάνατος. immortal, everliving, neverdying, perpetual. Grove.—This adjective, I believe, does not occur in the New Testament; but the corresponding noun ἀθανασία occurs in the following passages, 1 Cor. xv. 52, 54. This adjective is applied to the Gods in the Golden Sayings of *Pythagoras.* See Græca Majora, p. 312, 314, and p. 241. Ἀκατάλῦτος. indissoluble, firm, stable, binding. Grove.—Heb. vii. 16, (ζωῆς ἀκαταλύτου,) endless life.

Ἀμαράντος, and Ἀμαράντινος, unfading, never-fading, ever-fair and young. See Grove and Ewing.—See 1 Peter, i. 4, (εἰς κληρονομίαν ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀμίαντον καὶ ἀμαράντον.)

Ἀτελὴς, not ended, not accomplished, defective, incomplete, endless, perpetual. Ἀτέλευτος, endless, eternal. See Grove and Donnegan.

Ἀείναος, ever-flowing, perennial, unceasing, ever-living, everlasting. See Septuagint, Job, xix. 25, and Bush on the Resurrection, p. 99. In the Golden Sayings of Pythagoras, lines 48 and 49, we read,—"I affirm by the *Tetractys*, (*the God,*) that giveth us our life, the Source (παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως) of eternal nature, or, ever-living nature. See Græca Majora, Vol. ii. p. 314.

In concluding this article, we would remark, that the word αἰὼν, is frequently used in the New Testament, in the sense of *life;* as it is also in Homer and many of the Greek authors. In Matt. xxviii. 20, we read,—"I will be with you through all your days, (πάσας τὰς ἡμερας.) even unto the end of your life, (ἑὼς τῆς συντελίας τοῦ αἰῶνος)" or, "unto the end of the age;" viz. the Jewish Dispensation. John viii. 35, "But the servant abideth not in the house (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα,) during his life. The son abideth (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα,) during his life. John xiv. 16, "And I will pray the Father and he shall give you another comforter, that he may abide with you (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα,) during your life."

The adjective (αἰώνιος,) is used in the sense of life-lasting beyond dispute in Phil. 15. See Macknight and Clarke

on the passage.—In 1 Cor, viii. 13, αἰὼν clearly signifies, *life*,—"I will not eat meat (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα,) during my life." In Luke xx. 34, 35, it is used to signify the *present* life, and also the *future*. John iv. 14, "He that drinketh of the water that I shall give him, shall not thirst, (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα,) "in," or "on account of this life," because it is a living life, that possesses the very elements of undecaying happiness,—a spiritual energy, that is opposed to death in every possible form. John viii. 51, 52, "If a man keep my saying, he shall not taste of death (εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα.) on account of this life." See also John x. 28, and ix. 26, and xiii. 8.

In Luke xvi. 9, the adjective αἰώνιος, is used in the sense of life-lasting, or lasting during life: "Make unto yourselves friends of the 'mammon of unrighteousness,' (that is, of the wealthy,) that when ye fail, (that is, become superanuated, and no longer able to support yourselves,) they may receive you into their houses during life, (εἰς τὰς αἰωνίους σκηνὰς.)" Such is the obvious sense of the above passage, on which much labor has been bestowed, but very little light evolved.

As the noun αἰὼν, often signifies *life*, and sometimes *spirit*, (as Eph. ii. 2,) it seems quite reasonable and natural, that the adjective αἰώνιος, should be used in the sense of living and spiritual. And such is manifestly its usage in a great number of instances in the New Testament, when applied to ζωὴ, *life*. The Greek word ζωὴ, in those passages which speak of entering into *life*, passing from death into *life*, &c., undoubtedly signifies, as Prof. Robinson defines it, "*happiness*," or enjoyment. It is bliss of soul, or mental enjoyment. Hence aiōnian *life* is a *living*, or *spiritual* enjoyment. It is, as Prof. Robinson defines it in his Lexicon, "that life of bliss and glory in the kingdom of God, which awaits the true disciple of Christ after the resurrection." But this life is not only that, which the true disciple, and all whom the Father hath given His Son, shall inherit in the resurrection state, (See John xvii. 2, and Cor. xv. 22,) but that which the believer *already* enjoys. Says Dr. Jebb, as quoted by Dr. Bloomfield, "He who, with his heart, believeth in the Son, is already in possession of eternal life." This life is the result of Christian knowledge, (See John xvii. 2,) and is begotten in the soul by the

vivifying effect of the Gospel. See John iii. 16, 36, and iv. 14, and v. 24. Dr. Clarke, (in his Com. on John v. 24,) says on the phrase, "But is passed from death unto life," "Death is the country where every Christless soul lives. The man who knows not God, lives a dying life, or a living death; but he who believes in the Son of God, passes over from the empire of death to the empire of life."

Barnes on the same passage, remarks, — "Religion and its blessings here and hereafter, are one and the same. The happiness of Heaven, is, living to God, — being sensible of his presence, and glory, and power, and rejoicing in that. . . . . This *life*, or this *religion*, whether on earth or in heaven, is the same; the same joys extended and expanded forever. Hence, when a man is converted, it is said that he has everlasting life; not merely *shall have*, but is already in possession of that *life* or *happiness*." See Rom. vi. 16, 23, and viii. 6. Thus the *everlasting*, the *aiönian* life of the Gospel, is the *spiritual*, the *living* enjoyment of the Christian. It is not measured by the lapse of time, nor by endless duration, but by the possession of a *divine*, a *spiritual* life. It is the well-spring of happiness, flowing from a pure and perfect faith in the living God, and producing holiness of life, peace of soul, and a spirit of charity and disinterested benevolence. This life is brought to light in the Gospel, and is imparted to the human soul, through its life-inspiring precepts. And that the reader may enjoy this *life*, that it may impart a "peace that passeth understanding," and eventually fill the souls of all with a "joy unspeakable and full of glory," is the prayer of the writer. D. M. K.

Art. IV.

Progression.

That mankind are not only liable to err, but that they have deeply erred, in all that concerns mind and morals, theory and practice, is so certain and palpable as to have acquired the force and authority of a proverb. They have

turned aside from the light, and groped in darkness; they have neglected to employ the means of advancement; they have persisted in wrong, when the right was acceptable and more eligible; and they have refused to be instructed by their experience. Yet, with these scarcely mitigated truths before us, it is more than probable that their prejudices, and errors, and offences, are less the result of perverse intentions, than of conditions and influences which they knew not how to control. For it should be remembered that error is propagated, established, and maintained by similar means, and with as certain success, as truth. And when once conceived, diffused, and sent down to other generations, like some hereditary disease, its contaminations spread more fully and fatally over the system of thought, and betray a more fearful and incurable malignity. That mankind have, in all ages, been tried by the besetments of error, — that modes of thinking and acting have been forced upon them, by the voice of the many and the power of example, — that sanguinary laws have added their terrible sanctions to all other measures and influences, — can neither be doubted nor denied. The free soul, that should have inspired the man, has struggled for a season with the restraints which were thrown around it; and then passively yielded to the dictates of an admitted and overwhelming authority. Thus it has been; thus, to a lamentable extent it still is, with the great majority of the human race.

It may not, perhaps, be denied without qualification, that men in all ages have thought; but they have not thought independently and strictly for themselves, in the great affairs of morals and religion. They have, indeed, had great reason to think that there was much wrong, and violence, and spiritual oppression; and they have neither felt satisfied nor at ease. But they have felt compelled to think and believe as they were taught, to submit in humble patience to the endurance of evils, which, though obvious, they knew not how to avoid or mitigate, and to regard their mental struggles as trials of virtue as well as of temper. When a doubt has been awakened of the utility or truth, the consistency or scriptural authority of some unintelligible or unreasonable dogma, it has been put aside, lest an impure hand should be stretched out to

steady the ark of God, and violence done to the sacredness of divine institutions. And how resolutely has every such suggestion been repressed, as the malignant insinuation of the "Father of lies," and as having for its object the utter ruin of the soul.

But while the masses have silently endured and bowed submissively to what they deemed their fate, while they have secretly mourned over the present, and looked despairingly to the future, there have been minds which not only perceived the wrong, but fixed their hold upon some tangible and assailable point, and aspired to move heaven and earth for the attainment of the right. These have in all ages, been the martyrs to public sentiment. These are the men, whose opinions and efforts are ever, in one or more particulars, in conflict with those of their times; and whose history always comprehends that of the mental and moral condition of the country and the age. Their story may be told by their enemies; their opinions may be misconstrued by prejudice, and misrepresented by malice; their imperfections magnified into offences, and their very virtues tortured into crimes, — still we shall learn the public sentiment, by learning what they opposed, and why they were despised, hated and persecuted.

The illustration of these truths are abundant in every department of human history. The religious, the political, and even the scientific world, have respectively furnished their victims; and with them, the evidence to all future times, of the moral and intellectual condition of the million. It is well that we have even these means of information, since but for them, our knowledge of the real character of some ages would have been still more limited. The will and the policy of rulers, were the unresisted and unquestioned rule of opinion and practice among the masses. And it was not until within the last few centuries, that the people, as such, bore any part, other than that of the executioners of a master's will, in the affairs in which themselves were most deeply interested. It has been at the self-sacrifice and life-labor of a few uncompromising men, — the wisest and best of men, too, that popular evils, whether political or religious, have usually been removed, and substantial human advancement effected.

Why were the Saviour and his apostles despised, hated,

persecuted, sacrificed? Because, neither the people of the Jews, nor the masses of the Gentiles, were capable of judging and acting for themselves. They were debarred from the examination of the gospel; they were prevented, by all possible means, from attaining a knowledge of its principles, or appreciating the tendency of its truths; and the stern mandates of the priesthood, or the still more cruel rescripts of the civil governor, were enforced at the sacrifice of all legitimate right and all human sympathy. And this — not because the people, as such, were indisposed to listen to the message of peace; for they often gave unequivocal evidence of their deep and lively interest in those who aspired to teach them, and who in many ways evinced an inextinguishable sympathy for them. But they were overawed, and the policy and the will of the few gave impulse and character to the movements of the many. The same reasons apply to every instance of general persecution for opinion's sake, from the apostolic age to the present. This may be distinctly perceived and fully understood, by calling to mind that there is not now a single government among enlightened nations that could enforce so much as one of the sanguinary and persecuting measures of by-gone times. There is now a *public mind*, as well as character; and that mind has outlived this most important portion of its vassalage, and will no longer suffer the operation of a law which sets the first principles of toleration at defiance.

From these data we learn, that the distinguishing feature in the character of man — of the race, is PROGRESS; a constant tendency, with occasional and limited exceptions, to improvement, to elevation. Everything relating to him combines to sustain the belief, that his moral, social, and intellectual condition is higher and better in the present, than in any preceding age. He is improved in his whole condition and character. He is better fed, better clothed, better lodged, and better governed. He is more enlightened; he feels deeper and broader sympathies; he understands more clearly his affinities, and identifies his interests and his happiness more effectually with his race. He has learned that he is at least a unit in the sum of human existence; and, consequently, that he bears, and must bear his relative proportion of good or evil, happiness or misery.

He has outlived his isolation from his fellows; he is slowly but surely rising up from his debasement; his stinted and benumbed faculties are quickening under excitement; his vacant mind is filling with ideas, alike novel and crude, it may be, but ideas still; and he is no longer satisfied with the endurance of evils at the disposal of human wisdom and power, and which he once deemed inseparable from existence.

The enviable distinctions of a class are passing away, and are becoming the inheritance of the million,—the unquestioned rights of man. And how came he by all these things? Came they from heaven in glorious vision? Did they in a moment break upon his passive soul, and overwhelm him with their number, variety, and fulness? Or did he leap at once, from the profound depths of his degradation, and seize the aggregate of all which he now enjoys? O, no, none of these things. They have been wrought out piecemeal through long ages, in the furnace of affliction. They are the incipient results of troubled thoughts, of untold sacrifices, of lives of weariness and unsubdued determination. They are the products of minds elevated above, and uninfluenced by, the considerations that sway the multitude; minds which defied the intervention of human authority between themselves and their God; minds which despised vulgar prejudices, which perils could not awe, and which gloried in the maintenance of the good and the true, even at the price of blood.

Looking back as we must, from the middle of the nineteenth century, we are struck with amazement at the tardy progress of mankind during many ages. Nor is our wonder abated, by the additional consideration, that so little was attempted or achieved, at any one time. Great and good men appear to have been incapable of perceiving or resisting more than a single error or wrong, of all the host by which they were surrounded; or of comprehending more than a single elevating truth or duty, to the promotion of which they consecrated their labors and their lives. The most prominent, but by no means the most formidable evils, were more frequently the subjects of complaint and resistance; and were it not for principles involved and too commonly unseen, the sacrifices made, seem too great for the motive, or the end attained. In a

majority of instances, the reforms which were attempted in the church, related to visible and tangible matters, rather than to the deep and real causes of the existing evils. The manner of administering a rite, — the habiliments of the clergy, — the observation of a festival; the nature, extent, and gradation of clerical offices, and of ecclesiastical powers, — were, either in substance or name, the subjects of intense interest, and absorbing consideration. It is difficult at this day, to comprehend the possible reasons why strong and sincere men should have begun and ended their labors, in conflict with such matters. Could we permit ourselves to strike out of the account the condition of this or that particular age; the circumstances under which the reformers, during several centuries, were educated, and all the influences by which they were surrounded, we could scarcely give them credit for exalted intellects, or high and worthy motives.

But under the circumstances, these contests were among the most important ever maintained by devoted men. For however we may regard the subjects of their controversies as mere "mint, anise and cummin," compared with those of more recent agitation and dispute, they were then matters of the last consequence in the estimation of the religious world. And those who perilled fame, and fortune, and life for the removal of a perceived and understood wrong, and for the attainment of the right, did what few had the ability or moral courage to undertake; and at the same time bore their part, and bore it manfully, in rolling forward the tide of human elevation and improvement. Something was always done, in these struggles with prescriptive usage and presumptive power; and something was always gained, even when the daring innovator was crushed by the weight of authority. Men learned to think, and in time, to feel their power; — and the upward tendency of their movement was accelerated and confirmed.

It is not the magnitude of an enterprise, abstractly considered, that gives it importance, but its results, its bearings and influences upon the minds of men. Hence, in the struggles of the early Reformers, we are to keep constantly in mind the whole of their condition. We are to recollect that they were surrounded and beset by all the prevailing

influences; that they shared in the tastes and habits, and were strongly imbued with the prejudices of the times. From some of these, and some of the worst of them, too, they broke loose, and planted their feet on new and untrodden ground. For its defence and maintenance, they staked their all, and then flung themselves into the conflict, resolved to triumph or to perish. And think as we may of the matters in controversy aside from their results, there is a moral grandeur, a moral sublimity, in the purposes and conduct of the early Reformers. Let the singleness of motive by which they were actuated, be taken into consideration, and it will be seen that they do not belong to the class of ordinary great men. They were not influenced by the motives or interests that govern other men; they had no exclusively selfish ends to answer, the possible gratification of which might stimulate their endeavors; they sought no mere secular power, and aimed at no temporal aggrandizement. No; but they sought, by what they deemed truth and right, to free men's souls from mental bondage; to elevate the unthinking and subdued, with thought and hope; and to bring them back from darkness and degradation, to light and manhood, and to re-baptize the human soul with knowledge and the love of God.

What at this day would not agitate the surface of the public mind nor move a hand among the million, then gathered around itself the most momentous considerations, involved near and remote consequences, and diffused over whole kingdoms the power and the terror of strong excitement. All this is too palpable to be misconceived or overlooked. But behind it all, we are to look for those moral and mental forces which inspired these mighty movements; and there we shall find the *aspiration and the effort* for something higher and better, and more satisfying to the human soul. Men asked — not all that with reason and right might have been demanded — but still, more than the age could give. They asked — what it took several centuries of progress to obtain; and what at this time we marvel should ever have been denied — the Bible, and liberty of conscience.

The Reformation — the *glorious* Reformation — in Protestant phrase, came, with all its excitement and sacrifice, its extravagance and repose; and we contemplate its

progress and results with hearts filled with gratitude and admiration. It has shown itself to be the great power that penetrated, and which in time will dispel, the "darkness that covered the earth," and throw its purifying influences over the whole family of Christians. Papacy itself is no longer the unclean and monstrous thing that it was. It has greatly mitigated its pretensions, and proportionally ceased to affront Heaven with its blasphemies. And with the same creed and the same profession, with the same language and the same ritual, but changed in heart and soul, it exhibits everywhere a more humble and tolerant spirit, and lives in name, while its former self has passed away forever.

Protestantism, in the mean time, has taken to itself the right of perpetual innovation. Hence its numerous sects, its discordant creeds, its diversified usages, and its angry disputes. But all this is well; for it stimulates thought, and leads onward and upward, however slowly, to the true ends of Protestantism — the full and free exercise of private judgment, and the ultimate exercise of true Christian charity. These things may be often overlooked in the controversies and collisions between sects; but as the means are in progress, the end will be attained in defiance of man's oversight or apathy. Flint and steel, though entirely unconscious, by a little friction can be rendered subservient to the purposes of light and heat. The assertion of the great proposition of Protestantism, the right of private judgment, was the death-warrant of all spiritual domination. And however long the execution may be postponed, the time will surely come, when the Christian will have no sacred altar, but his own heart; no master, but Christ; and no object of supreme homage, but his "Father in heaven." Let us then look behind the more obvious movements of parties, and fix our attention upon the great principles that are urging forward those convulsive and mighty efforts. He must have observed the religious and moral movements since the Reformation, to little purpose, who does not perceive that the successive impulses given to the general mind have resulted in the enjoyment of a greater degree of religious liberty; a nearer approximation of opinion to a common standard; and the exercise of a more definite and broader Christian charity.

The great fact developed by the Reformation, and which the reader should constantly keep in mind, is, the aspiration after something better; a desire to abandon the wrong and to possess the right. We may at times feel to regret that the axe was not laid at the root of the tree of error, and a thorough reform attempted in the first instance. But a little reflection will probably satisfy us that the undertaking was graduated to the state of the times and the condition of society. Had more been attempted, it is morally certain that the whole would have fallen to the ground; and a later age would have had the honor of beginning and perfecting the work. Besides, it is plainly contrary to the established laws of human progress, that every necessary good should be sought or attained, and every evil seen and exploded, at any one time. It would leave too little to enterprise, and mind would stagnate for want of excitement. Let any one reflect a moment on the mental struggles, the doubts and misgivings with which Luther entered upon and carried forward some parts of his enterprise, and it will be seen that he undertook quite as much as he distinctly perceived or understood. And when the difficulty of achieving what was really contemplated is taken into the account, — the hostility encountered, the dangers incurred, — it is evident that enough was projected, and every thing gained that the times could grant. It is morally certain, that the attempt to arrest the miserable traffic in indulgences, cost the soul of Luther more solicitude than Cæsar felt in crossing the Rubicon.

We next come upon the age of the Puritans. With these men, notwithstanding their abominable cant and offensive sanctimoniousness, are to be found many of the true elements of moral advancement. They resisted every encroachment upon the rights of conscience. Entreaties and threats were alike thrown away upon them. With a hatred of religious tyranny that knew no abatement, and with a zeal and perseverance that defied exhaustion, they went steadily forward to their purpose. For this they were prepared to make any and every sacrifice; to forego country, and home, and friends; and to peril their lives at any moment, if so they might worship God without book, or the intervention of a hated priesthood. With these

feelings and principles, they spread themselves over the land; held proscribed conventicles in the cottages; addressed all classes and conditions of men; and inspired them with the energies of new thoughts, and imparted a portion of their own indomitable spirit. A civil revolution followed. But it is the revolution of mind in which we are concerned; and it was this that wrought changes which no human power yet has, or ever can control. A thousand Hampdens, a thousand Cromwells might successively perish, and all the physical glories of as many Commonwealths pass away, without materially impeding the progress of the principles of religious liberty which the Puritans maintained. This is the enduring monument which they reared for themselves; and its moral inscriptions shall transmit their memory to the last moment of time.

That in many things and many ways, the Puritans were fully imbued with the spirit of the times, is beyond all question. But when they rejected Popery and Episcopacy under every form and name, they re-asserted the great maxim of the Reformation, in defiance even of themselves. Whatever they might think or intend, they were destined to learn,— and did learn, what their avowed principles could hardly fail to teach,— that the human mind once effectually set at work, must seek advancement in its own way; and that it is not to be controlled in its operations, or in its choice of means or measures by the authority of laws, or by ecclesiastical dictation. And there were men among them who understood their rights and their position. And they looked forward and aspired to establish principles and truths, on which coming generations might more effectually act; and by which all error should be finally seen and removed, and simple truth and moral purity bless mankind. Such men not only leave their impress upon their own age, but they admonish all men in all times, that they should hold no compromise with wrong, no fellowship with popular error, and own no master but Christ.

From that time to the present, innovations multiply upon us beyond all precedent. Minds long bowed to the yoke of orthodoxy, and bound with all its cords, have broken loose from their thraldom, and challenged their right to dissent. For ages, the fundamental doctrines of

the church had remained the same in all their essential features. Institutions and forms had felt the hand of renovation, and changes had come over them; but still the dominant theology remained the same, or slightly modified. But the time had now come, when men began to look deeper than the surface, and when they were determined to scan the principles of faith, as well as the visible symbols and ordinances of religion. This was a fearful undertaking, and those who entered upon it did so with fear and trembling. The subject was deemed sacred by all men; and many believed and asserted that it could not be questioned without impiety, nor admit of innovation without inviting perdition.

But the desire to ascertain whether the Scriptures did, or did not, justify a more rational and liberal system of Christian faith, was not to be repressed by menaces and anathemas. The Protestant world had already become satisfied, that men had been mistaken respecting other matters involved by religion, — and it was natural to infer the possibility of similar mistakes in the graver subjects of faith and divine truth. And pure hearted and strong minded men entered upon the investigation, carried forward their labors, and, in the midst of reproach, attained satisfaction to their own souls. They rejected some of the established dogmas; and they adopted others deemed more worthy of Heaven, and more in accordance with reason and revelation.

Among the substantial evidences of progress, we should not fail to notice that of increasing indulgence to dissenters. The time was rapidly passing away, when the prison, the torture, or the stake, were the most available arguments, — or, when the powers that might deem it desirable, could find it prudent or safe to employ them against heretics. This was the dawn of that day, when what the laws could not accomplish, was wisely to be left to the decisions of the public mind. And unfortunate as it is, that Christian charity did not advance with Christian liberty, it is still better that those who hold, or fancy that they hold, the key to public opinion, should spend their breath in vituperation, than waste their strength, and outrage humanity by the infliction of physical sufferings. Prejudices may be rendered more inveterate for a

season by the machinations of crafty men; but integrity even in a heretic will command respect, and the right in defiance of popular favor, will finally triumph.

Those who would reform the doctrines of the Church, and bring men back to the simplicity and purity of the primitive gospel, seized upon different points, and labored to establish positions as dissimilar as can well be imagined. In this, they not only acted without concert, but they disjoined, — or rather prevented the union under one common head, of truths which mutually belong to the great system of the gospel. They saw with different eyes, and labored for the attainment of different ends. They perceived that Christianity, originally so intelligible and comprehensible, must have been corrupted and mystified to become what it then was. They knew, that reason had not been permitted to exercise its functions in the examination and adoption of the creed; and that opinions were maintained and held essential to salvation, at which reason revolted, and which revelation would not sustain. And agreeing in these things, each one went his way to perform his appropriate work — and which, when brought together and blended into one system, will constitute a consistent and harmonious whole. Some maintained that the paternity of God was the guaranty of illimitable mercy and universal salvation; others, that like all individuals, the Deity was one; and only one indivisible being. Altogether there was a prevalent disposition to test the creed by the Scriptures; and to render religion more intelligible, more pure, and more comforting.

A remarkable instance of the different tendency of great minds in matters of faith, was furnished during the English Commonwealth. At the same time, it furnishes an interesting and striking example of the difficulty encountered by honest and resolute reformers, of grasping more than one important particular, and carrying forward more than one form of religious enterprise, at the same time. Milton and Jeremy White — the former being foreign secretary, and the latter chaplain to Cromwell — were at the same time engaged in the vindication of entirely dissimilar views of the Deity, and the results of the divine government. Milton wrote an elaborate treatise, repudiating the doctrine of the Trinity, and asserting the

indivisible oneness of God; and White composed an essay, in which he rejected the common belief of endless misery, and triumphantly maintained the truth of universal salvation. And there is probably no creed among Christians, which has not furnished individuals who have believed and defended one or the other of these systems. Catholics and Protestants, with all their social and sectarian prejudices, and in defiance of the restraints thrown around them, have respectively contributed to swell the number of the believers in the unity of God, or in the ultimate purity and happiness of all the human race. There have been minds among them all, that never could believe that one God included three distinct and equal persons, — other minds, that were never satisfied with the exclusiveness of their party; and which never could think, that a benevolent and holy God could exclude one moral being from hope and final happiness, or render one completely and interminably miserable.

It is not the mere fact, that Universalism on the one hand, and Unitarianism on the other, were inculcated and ably maintained by those men, that gives the subject its peculiar interest. For both opinions had been previously asserted, and had given mortal offence. But there is the evidence of a mental force and moral integrity in the men themselves, as well as signs of human progress, which should not be overlooked. They lived and acted under the excitement and agitation of a civil war, which resulted in the subversion of a long established monarchy; and when the public mind was intensely engaged with projects, for founding a new government and new institutions of religion. And that they should at that time, of all others, have devoted themselves to the consideration of subjects, which involved the consistency of their own and the nation's creed, can be accounted for in no other way, it would seem, than from the universal prevalence of religious speculation among all classes of society. But, leaving the cause to conjecture, the moral courage displayed in the vindication of doctrines so new, so utterly at variance with established faith, so repugnant to the prejudices of the multitude, is not often surpassed or equalled. For theirs were not mere private opinions, to be read and wondered at, when their exponents had passed off the

stage. No; they were living and influencing principles of faith, which inspired and governed their conduct. Rising far above the level of the times, these distinguished men looked abroad and beyond the reign of error and mysticism, and essayed to shed the light of sober truth over the domain of spiritual darkness, and to temper the general enthusiasm by the suggestions of enlightened reason. They virtually maintained, that while the Scriptures constituted the only authoritative rule of faith, they could neither teach an absurdity respecting the divine nature, nor authorize opinions which contravened the purity and perfection of the divine character.

Though living at the same time, and worshipping, as it were, at the same altar, their labors were directed to the attainment of very different ends. Milton addressed himself to the mere *rationale* of the creed. He would himself know, and he would have others know, whether the unity of God was as consistent with the Scriptures, as with the dictates of reason. But he took little interest, comparatively, in the great question respecting the results of the divine government. To believe in one only God, to believe that Jesus Christ was his Son in some sense, and to live a *puritan* life, was, it would seem in his estimation, enough for man here and hereafter. He could sing of Paradise Lost and Regained; but he could not in sober prose hazard the expression of his belief, that the least, and the worst, and the last, of earth's erring children would find his way back to the grace of redemption and the bosom of his God. On the contrary, the other seems not to have been disturbed by the monstrosities of the Trinity, or by the misnamed equity, that could inflict immortal anguish upon the innocent Jesus to screen and save the guilty — and all the guilty of our race. But his soul revolted at the thought of man's infinite sufferings for the sins of time. This touched his sympathy and warmed his philanthrophy into life. And he at once found it impossible to vindicate the divine character, on the supposition, that one human creature could suffer without end. That could not be impartiality, which could institute or permit an infinite distinction in man's final condition; nor could that be true benevolence which rendered a creature miserable beyond redemption.

The different tendencies of religious minds, — the different subjects to which the reforming process is in consequence directed, by individuals of the same age, country and religion, are seldom more prominently exhibited than in these eminent men. Their labors and writings evidently carried forward the work of moral advancement, among the better or higher classes of English society. They did not reach the public mind so directly and generally, as others have since done; but from their position, they must have exerted great influence over not a few of the strong men of the time. Nothing else can fully account for their personal safety and great reputation, at a time when heresy was watched with sleepless vigilance and punished with exemplary severity. But imbued with the spirit of charity themselves, they seem to have inspired others with its exercise, even when openly canvassing and impugning some of the most cherished and sacred opinions of their cotemporaries.

There is great danger, when minds, long confined within narrow limits, break forth from the restraints of their creed, that they will set all bounds at defiance; nor is the danger least, where the subject involves the aspirations of human reason. Hence, most unbelievers in divine revelation have become so — not by giving heed to the Scriptures, — but by supposing that some unreasonable dogma was, as they had formerly believed, still taught in them. Neither Milton nor White fell into this error. They never aspired to be wise "above what was written." What they rejected, they satisfied themselves, after diligent search and patient thought, was not taught in the Bible — and what they believed and taught, they were convinced by the same reasons, was sustained by divine revelation. They carried forward towards its results, the great position of the Reformers — not for the purpose of rendering the Scriptures less authoritative, or their teachings less precious to the soul of man — but with the intention of showing their consistency, and to inspire man with comforting hopes. They affected no refinements of the simple teachings of Jesus; they attempted no fastidious qualification of his miracles; and they entertained no doubts of his divine authority. So far from this, they believed him to be a "Teacher sent from God," divinely inspired

and spotless in purity. And they contemplated the history of his blameless life, his marvellous works, his persevering fidelity, his patient endurance under sufferings, with devout gratitude; while they drew sustaining hopes and unfailing consolation from the proofs of his resurrection.

It might be thought singular, that these two men should apparently wholly overlook the fact, that their respective theories were but parts of the same great system, were not similar instances too numerous and palpable to be mistaken, occurring among us every day. No successful pretensions, however, can be made to *rational* and *liberal* Christianity without their union. Both are indispensable to the consistency, and the benevolent character, of the gospel. For it cannot be pretended that the doctrine of the Trinity was ever perceived or understood by any process of reasoning; or, that it is any evidence of genuine benevolence in the Deity, to render any of his moral offspring completely and perpetually miserable. And the fact, that the doctrine of the restitution and that of the divine unity, still have a separate existence in theory as well as profession, by no means diminishes the evidence, that he who ascribes to God an all-embracing paternity, and who yet denies to any of God's children, the blessings implied by that affinity, has not perfected his title to the exclusive appellation of liberal Christian. Nor can we by any means understand, by what process of reason it has ever happened, that any one who believes in the "grace of God that bringeth salvation to all men," can suppose *that grace* to have been purchased or won from the "God of all grace," by the pains and sufferings of the unoffending Jesus. To inflict infinite sufferings on the most obdurate transgressor, is more than enough to excite the horror of all reflecting beings; but the horror of such infliction is immeasurably augmented when it is supposed to fall on the innocent. And it would seem to imply a depth of selfishness altogether unknown in any other human concernment, that can accept even salvation on terms so utterly revolting.

But different as were the ends pursued, or the means employed for their attainment, by Milton and White, they still bore a useful part in the work of religious progress. They have respectively left the most undoubted evidences

of the onward course of their own minds; and the principles and doctrines which they maintained and defended, have rendered the prevalent systems of Christianity decidedly more intellectual and more benignant. They did something for human reason and human charity; and at the same time, rendered the Scriptures more attractive, by showing that their teachings were less repulsive and less exclusive. And, regret as we may, that peculiar structure or tendency of mind, which induced them to overlook or disregard the importance of each other's views, and indeed their undeniable affinity; still we have great reason to thank God that they did so much, and did it so well.

From the time of the English Commonwealth, numerous successive instances have occurred, in which individuals have broken loose from the real or supposed bondage of a party, and asserted their right of dissent from the doctrines and usages once firmly believed and held sacred by themselves. This has sometimes been effected, without materially disturbing their previous social relations, or dissolving their religious connections. But it may be presumed that, in such instances, we are not always to impute the forbearance and indulgence to the exclusive influence of Christian charity. Innovation is more commonly followed by protracted and angry controversy, and the ultimate expulsion of the supposed heretical offender; and in due time, by the organization of a new party, another sect or denomination. Thus, while the distinguished men to whom we have referred, neither abandoned their religious connection, nor sought to establish a new and more reformed communion, their successors in the same general enterprise were eventually compelled to do both.

It was not until the latter part of the eighteenth century, that either Unitarians or Universalists became, in the proper meaning of the terms, distinct and separate denominations. Lindsay, Priestley, and others, having groped their way out of their respective communions, with great faithfulness and at considerable sacrifice vindicated the oneness and the paternity of the Deity. Their efforts were not limited to the critical investigation of the Scriptures, and the publication of a few expository essays; they en-

deavored to reach the public mind more directly and effectively by the establishment of places of worship, where all that would come might come, and hear the doctrine of the divine unity.

It was even perceived, that the rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity involved that of several kindred errors. The long established views respecting the atonement, and of the origin and extent of human depravity, were discovered to be as unfounded and repulsive, as those relating to the tripersonality of the Deity. Hence, the rejection of the Trinitarian hypothesis was but the incipient step in a series of important innovations upon the popular creed. In most other instances, however important the particular doctrine rejected or established, the general faith was scarcely implicated. But it was impossible to exclude the Trinity from the creed, without involving its concomitants. The doctrine of the divine oneness could not be engrafted upon the old theology, — it could not be maintained but at the sacrifice of some other fundamentals of the common faith — and it could not form the exclusive subject of a new and distinct system of Christian belief.

In the meantime, others, whose names will never be forgotten, devoted their life-labors to the establishment and promotion of the doctrine of Universal salvation. Relly in England, and Murray, Winchester, and others in the United States, were each, in his own way and sphere, aspiring and toiling to convince mankind of the boundless and saving grace of God. With little pretension, and with very inadequate means, these pure-minded and thinking men wrought effectually for the reformation of Christian doctrine, as maintained by the church. And they reached the general mind, with a power and success, scarcely paralleled since the age of the apostles. They taught what was of deeper and more abiding moment to the sympathies and the hopes of man, and they did more for Christian charity and human happiness, than had been achieved by all others since the Reformation. They were the instruments under God, of enabling men more effectually and confidingly to look up to him as their "Father in heaven," — whose paternal kindness never fails; which cannot be exhausted by the number or the wants of its objects, nor turned away by human miscon-

ception, frailty, or ingratitude. To know and to feel all this, to confide, in consequence, in the purposes and resources of that Father, is of far greater moment to the soul — is productive of more true devotion, and more substantial happiness, than any and all the merely rational theories, that have yet been the subjects of human speculation. There is nothing in the abstract consideration of the doctrine of the divine unity, or any of its palpable appendages, essentially calculated to reach and affect the heart. It is as easy and as natural — and observation proves that it is quite as certain, that men can love and adore a God in three persons, as in one — provided his character and purposes, in other respects, are the same. But not so, in regard to the great matter of salvation. There is an infinite difference between the Deity who renders, or permits some of his moral offspring to become endlessly and completely miserable — and the God of the Scriptures, who, though he punishes, does so for their reformation, and who will in the final issue make them all good and all happy. The student who attains to some new intellectual truth, may very properly feel gratified with the capabilities and triumphs of reason; but his heart is not necessarily nor probably touched with the feelings of tenderness and gratitude, that warm and inspire the soul of the child of want and affliction, for some small proof of sympathy or kindness. And how infinitely touching and impressive is the benignity, that forgives our sins and redeems us from all guilt, sufferings, and sorrows!

That these eminent and devoted advocates of Universalism were, in all other particulars, fully imbued with the doctrines of the prevalent orthodoxy, needs neither denial nor proof. In this respect they were not, perhaps, exceeded in absurdity by any men of their time. But, with all their zeal for not a few of the standard and prescriptive corruptions of the primitive gospel, they have the merit of laboring, faithfully and successfully, to free the souls of men from the most terrific and revolting item in the catalogue of religious errors. And, far as it might be from their wishes or their thoughts, to open the way for further innovation, it could scarcely take the prophetic discernment of Isaiah to foresee, that those who became con-

vinced of the error of the church, in a matter so momentous, as that which involved the final issue of the plan of salvation, would also suspect the divine authority of other and less important doctrines. The reflecting Universalist would not be long satisfied with the *dictum* of the church, when contradicted by the sober convictions of his own mind. He would seriously doubt, whether a God, whose very nature is love, had been won to the exercise of that perfection towards mankind, by the interposition and sufferings of his own equal Son. It would naturally follow, and it did follow, that individuals perceived that the goodness of God was the fountain, whence flowed full salvation; and, consequently, that an infinite sacrifice, by way of atonement, was not necessary, and had not been made, for man. And it further followed, as an inference from the personal labors of Christ, that his sufferings were viewed, — not as in any sense the *cause* why God's grace was extended to man, but as the *consequence* of conflicting with human prejudice and perverseness, in making that grace known. This great change in the views of Universalists, spread at once over the whole denomination; and, while it gave consistency to their faith, it added an impulse to their efforts and their success in its propagation.

In connection with these advances in the work of restoring the gospel to its primitive simplicity and purity, was another, of vital moment to the moral dignity and virtue of man. For many ages, it had unfortunately been the belief of all Christendom, that man was inherently, and of necessity, wholly depraved; and, by consequence, utterly incapable of "thinking right, or acting well." Than which, perhaps, no mere opinion ever had an equal influence in paralyzing human virtue. Morality may well languish, under the belief that all attempts at its practice must fail; and virtuous aspirations will naturally be suffered to die away in the soul, when the endeavor to cherish or act upon them, might aggravate the intensity of guilt and of punishment. Without pretending to specify the arguments or proofs, on which the advocates of the moral capability of man proceeded, we may suppose that two great questions must have presented themselves for solution: whether the Deity could consistently create and love a being, whose whole moral nature would become, and

did become corrupt; and whether, under any circumstances, such a being was worthy of the benevolence of the gospel, by which unfortunately he could not be in the least benefited, without the intervention of a perpetual miracle? But whatever were the grounds on which they proceeded, the result is, that Universalists, as a denomination, believe in the natural ability of man to understand his duty, and to practise the moral virtues. They maintain, that however debased and defiled by sin, there are within him the elements of moral greatness; that he is a creature of God, with the divine image still impressed upon his intimate nature; and that, under more favorable circumstances, his capability will develope itself in works of purity and peace. That it was for these ends that the gospel was sent to man, — not to effect a new creation, but to reform the existing one, — to give to him instructions concerning his destiny, — to influence and win him to obedience, by the example of Christ, — to inspire him with just conceptions of his worth, — and to fill his soul with lofty aspirations after the true and divine good.

It is believed that the present age is principally indebted to Universalists, for another and very important doctrine; which, though one of manifest revelation, was obscured or lost in the existing creeds of the dominant religious sects. It is the doctrine of *present* rewards and punishments, under the divine government. This is, necessarily, one of the most momentous subjects to the interests of morality, that was ever brought under consideration. And it comes so sustained by Scripture authority and human experience, as to commend itself to the faith of the reflecting Christian of all parties. It is, therefore, extending with great rapidity, and working its influences, directly or indirectly, where, but a few years since, it was neither recognized nor known. It is difficult to conceive by what mental or moral obliquity, this doctrine was so long overlooked, and its practical and experimental evidence so long disregarded. The supposition, that the Deity neither rewards men for their virtues, nor punishes them for their vices, in this state of existence, is almost a denial of his government over the world. At least, it implies that he permits its moral affairs to go on at human discretion, without any present encouragement to those who do well,

or restraint upon transgressors. All has been left to the uncertain and unavailing influence of futurity; to the power of the hopes and fears which centre and terminate there. Few things have tended more to cumber theological science, to involve it in embarrassment, and to render it suspicious in the estimation of many reflecting minds, than the reference of both virtue and vice to a future world for adjudication. The approvings of conscience for virtues done, and the most pungent guilt for sins committed, have been regarded as mere trifles, only felt as the foreshadowings of final destiny. The scriptural assurances of mental peace, as the reward of virtue, only so long as it was practised, and that sufferings for sin should terminate on reformation, have been carried forward for application to a world, where it was supposed that changes would never be known, and where, if they were possible in the creature, they could neither secure nor produce a solitary beneficial influence. It is all but self-evident, then, that while the doctrine of present judgment, according to human works, restores to man the conviction of God's government over the world, it directly tends to render Christianity less gloomy and more practical.

The great question involved by the foregoing is, whether all this is *progress?* Has man been morally enlightened? Has reason been honored and elevated? Has human brotherhood become better understood? Has the Bible received more consideration, are its precepts more venerated, its truths more loved? If so, then there is all necessary proof of the moral progress of the Christian world.

That mankind have, in various ways, become more enlightened, more civilized, is no longer a question; the precise point involved is, whether they are morally and religiously enlightened? Are there undoubted evidences of progression, in these respects? and if so, in what do they consist? Changes are neither always, nor necessarily, the evidences of improvement. On the contrary, whatever their immediate or remote benefits, they are generally regarded as hurtful, as calculated to unsettle established principles or usages, and to throw men back upon some false or exploded position. Of this, the illustrations are too numerous and obvious, to need even reference; they will occur to all who have ever thought on the ope-

rations of the human mind, or observed the progress of human affairs. Neither does the admission of any given proposition, certainly establish its truth. If it did, there is, perhaps, not a dozen follies or fallacies on record, whose truth would not be demonstrated by the general consent of mankind. And in no instance, is this more susceptible of illustration and proof, than in relation to matters that concern religion.

Where, then, are the proofs of moral and religious advancement? — in what do they consist? Precisely *where* the evidences of every other form of progress are to be found; and *in* the facts evolved by the mere progress of time — in the present condition of man, as compared with what it formerly was. The moment we compare the moral condition of the world, at the advent of Christ, or at the period of the Reformation, or at the beginning of the eighteenth century, with what it now is, we are imperatively convinced of man's moral advancement. That for a season — a long season, after the establishment of the gospel in the Roman empire, the Christian world was thrown back from the simplicity and purity of its doctrines and morality, is demonstrated by the pervading ignorance and corruption which called for and produced the Reformation. And that throughout Christendom, there has been an advancement both in knowledge and virtue, is proved — not alone by the admission, but by the moral facts written out upon the present character of the religious world.

The evidence of human enlightenment is proof of the elevation of mind — of reason. There can be no real progress in the one case without implying the other; since it is mind alone that perceives the wrong which needs correction, and discovers the right to be adopted and pursued. Thus, if we ask, by what instrumentality the atrocious wrongs of the papacy were detected by the Reformers? the answer is — by their reason. By the same means, they adopted principles and measures, ultimately calculated to secure the attainment of the true and the right. It was by the application of reason to the critical investigation of the Scriptures, that the doctrines of the moral capability of man, of the divine oneness and paternity, and of the final holiness and happiness of all mankind, were brought out

and established. And it is by the same instrumentality that many of the most obnoxious views, long cherished and held sacred by the great body of Christians, have been exploded, as alike unscriptural, absurd, and offensive. Revelation and reason are thus co-operating in the improvement of man's moral condition; nor can they again be separated, so long as simple truth is loved, or mind has any part in the adoption of principles. We may perhaps expect that reason will occasionally run mad—that so we may be reminded of our perpetual dependence upon the infinite wisdom of God; and to make us more sensible of the riches of that enduring goodness which revealed the divine Mind, for the support and guidance of the fallible mind of man.

One of the never-failing proofs of a low and corrupt moral state, is the want of fellow feeling, or charity, for man. The extremes of ignorance and bigotry are certain to meet, and mingle their worst influences in personal and national hostility and intolerance. And lamentable as still is the want of Christian charity among men, there is, nevertheless, good reason to believe, that the philanthropy inculcated by the gospel is exerting a far wider and more salutary influence than in any former age. But though all has not been done that the wise and the good have desired and labored to attain, yet something effective has been accomplished—progress has been made in the acknowledgment of the great principle of human brotherhood. The truth that "God hath made of one blood all nations," is recognized and admitted by Christians of all denominations. And this admission, so important in its practical bearings, is not easily neutralized. Nor has it been done. Public charities have been established, and munificently endowed, for the relief of the needy, the sick, the insane, the widow and the orphan. Provision, has been made, or is making, in many countries, for the education of the masses—light has been poured into the cell of the prisoner—the condition of the slave has been mitigated, and the spirit of universal emancipation is abroad—and even the spirit and practice of war have felt the touch of a humanizing power. And when man shall look up from earth to heaven—when he shall discover that the chain which binds his destiny to that of his race, also binds him in filial

affinity to his God, the impulses of his sympathy will be sent abroad over all humanity, and become as benignant as the grace that secures and perfects his own redemption.

But in the pride and progress of intellect, is there any advance in the knowledge of, and reverence for, the Scriptures? Perhaps no other question connected with our general subject, is so difficult of solution. For here, as in all other things, familiarity prevents the freshness of impression, and neutralizes the force of appreciation. Still, a blessing is none the less real and positive, because enjoyed as a matter of course, or because human sensibility is not always alive to its full power of impression. It may follow, therefore, that the Bible may be better understood and better loved, than at any former period; and yet, that some of the most natural and most looked for indications of the influence of that knowledge and veneration be apparently wanting. It is no proper evidence that mankind have no just appreciation of the benefits of *light*, that they do not express themselves in mere emotion. We rather look to their manner of employing it — to the uses which they make of it, for proof of their sense of its importance. It is in the application of the great principles of divine revelation that we should seek, and where we shall probably find, the legitimate evidences of progress in biblical knowledge, and veneration for revealed truth.

It will not be questioned, that men, in whose hands the Bible has been placed — who enjoy all the helps of exposition and elucidation that the most elaborate investigation and criticism can furnish — possess a much higher and better knowledge of its contents, than was possible to those who only knew that such a book existed. Nor are these advantages confined to the learned, the rich, or the powerful. A process of simplification has been so conducted, as to bring the most important facts of biblical science within the reach and comprehension of nearly all minds. The pulpit has directed its mighty energies in part to the attainment of the same end; and altogether, there is an amount, particularly of religious information — a diffusion of Christian knowledge, which never before existed.

With the progress of religious or biblical knowledge, the love and veneration of the Bible in some measure corresponds. And this, not alone because that book is perused

by more persons, but because it lays the foundation of deeper and better principles. There may be less passionate gratitude for the possession of the sacred treasure—there certainly is less superstition respecting its teachings and requirements—and there are proportionally more rational views, more established sentiment, more well-founded faith, and more triumphant hopes. Need any one be told, how precious its simple and beautiful, yet sublime truths are, to the heart of tried, and suffering, and sorrowing man? The impression made by its influence upon the heart, is deeper, holier, and more comforting, than was ever exerted—than ever can be exerted, by the servants of the church, upon minds and affections steeped in ignorance of divine truth. Its grave and impressive authority, its attested miracles, its divine doctrines, its simple morality, its sustaining promises, open a wide field for thought, make the Deity known, and instruct man in his destiny. And if, among the millions who are every moment made wiser, and better, and happier, by the truths of divine revelation, we occasionally find an unfortunate unbeliever, does it follow that therefore the Bible is not loved, its truths not venerated? O no; they constitute but a very meagre exception to a general rule, and furnish no substantial objection to our position — that progress has been made in the knowledge and love of the Scriptures of divine truth.

That the moral influence of the Bible has been most efficacious on man, is proved, by the decidedly superior virtue everywhere perceptible where it is best known and most read. This fact alone should induce skeptics to pause, before they attempt to weaken the faith of others in the divine record. Bad as the world is, it is incontrovertibly better under the light and influence of Christianity, than it ever was, or is, where that is wanting. Are they prepared to hazard their pretensions to superior morality and philanthropy, upon a theory which carries no evidence of improving the virtues of society? Would they take away the faith whose influences they admit to be good, under the pretence that it originated in imposture, for the sorry purpose of substituting what, at best, is of doubtful moral tendency? And are they certain, that the moral influences felt by themselves, are not principally

derived from an education in a Christian land, and perpetual association with believers in the gospel? If they have not derived their morality from this source, by what fortuitous concurrence of circumstances are they more virtuous than those beyond the pale of Christian knowledge or its influences?

But wherein does the evidence of the moral advancement of man consist? Without going so far back in the history of mankind, as when Jesus rebuked the hypocrisy of the Jews, or when Paul reproved the superstitions of the Gentiles, it is believed that the evidence may be found. What were the great subjects of complaint, before and at the period of the Reformation? The utter licentiousness both of the clergy and laity; that truth and decency, honor and honesty, were almost wholly disregarded — that partisan enmity or envy excited perpetual conflict, and personal dislike was only extinguished by blood. The enormities perhaps most frequent and flagrant, cannot even be named without offence; and humanity is shocked at the brutality of scenes of common occurrence. All this, and immeasurably more to the same effect, neither admits of denial nor contradiction. And without pretending that human virtue has attained its maximum, or presuming that there are no vices still to lament, — it is obvious that a reforming power has gone abroad and wrought important changes for the better, in the Christian world. The Catholic Church has greatly improved in its moral character; the Protestant sects have also improved; and the masses in every Christian country have attained higher views of the importance of moral virtue, and a better observance of its requirements. And the security of person and property has advanced in all Christendom, more than a hundred fold, within the last four centuries.

And why *those*, more particularly? Shall we be told, that it is the result of a better civilization? Be it so, — and what has fostered and carried forward that civilization? There is every reason to believe, that during the crusades, and even subsequently, the balance was in favor of Oriental civilization. Why was it not retained? Plainly because the Reformation brought the great doctrines of revelation within the immediate notice of mankind — the practice of the moral requirements of the gospel was

urged, instead of the observance of formal ceremonies; and virtue was made to consist in acts of integrity, justice, and beneficence, rather than in deeds of austerity and penance performed at the bidding of an ecclesiastic. Then, when Christian truth reached the hearts of men, and exerted its social and humanizing power over their lives, it brought forth, in progression, a better morality and a higher civilization. And we add, at the hazard of being thought fanciful, that there seems to be an affinity between the religious impulses that have moved the mind of the Christian world, and the activity and enterprise which prevail in the same portions of the globe. It is quite certain, that the first momentous subject of intense thought, which succeeded the mental stagnation of a thousand years, was religion — the Christian religion. And as men learned to think, and found themselves capable of thought, they ventured to look around and abroad, and embrace subjects of personal and general concern. Thought is the incipient preparation for action; and hence have followed, in succession, the discoveries and improvements which have added so much to human comfort, and the institutions and attainments that have greatly promoted general intelligence, liberty, and happiness.

As a member of a particular religious community, it will perhaps be inferred, that our notions of progress only relate to the growth of a party, — to the successful advancement of the peculiar doctrines which it maintains. And were this assumed, it is believed that, from the nature and influences of the doctrine of the restitution, it could be satisfactorily shown, that the evidence of its progress would be proof of moral and intellectual advancement. But this is not intended; our field is wider than the limits of any one class or party — it is as ample as the Christian world. It is not required, however, that we refer to the past, or that we go far abroad, for illustration. Our own age and country furnish ample proof of the general diffusion of a spirit of moral improvement, and a disposition to criticise and reform the most venerated and firmly established creed. And without adverting to particulars, it appertains to our subject to remark, that one of the most inflexible systems of religion, that ever fastened its hold upon the faith or the affections of man, has undergone

important modifications both in Europe and America. The doctrine of predestination and election, whose elements had slumbered in the Catholic Church for ten centuries, was stripped of its Romish investments, and in all its nakedness made the creed of the Protestant Church of Geneva. From some unaccountable cause, this doctrine spread with astonishing rapidity, and with a power and success that enabled it to give tone to the religion of the Protestant world. Its most prominent merit is its self-consistency. But its Deity is neither infinitely good nor impartial; and his service is extorted from unwilling hearts by infinite and indescribable terrors. Such *was* Calvinism. But even this rigid system has felt the hand of reformation. Its stern and forbidding features have finally relaxed into something like complacency under German criticism, and resolved themselves into modern Evangelism; and both its spirit and its power have passed away from its ancient seat forever. Its limited grace and irreversible decrees have given place to boundless mercy and free-will; and its charities have gone far abroad beyond its ancient landmarks, embracing those which it once reprobated, and offering grace and redemption to souls which, in its day of triumph, it had marked for eternal perdition.

Few American readers, who give much attention to what is passing in the religious world, are strangers to the name of Prof. M. Stuart, of the Theological Seminary at Andover, Massachusetts, — a man of untiring industry and patient research. He is not to be suspected of favoring the doctrine of the restitution. And yet, the tendency of his mind is, beyond all question, to greater liberality than comports with the exclusiveness of his denomination, or with the intention of the founders of the institution, of which he is the most important official. He may not be aware of his own progress, or sensible that he is slowly, but surely, sapping the foundations of the very system which he ostensibly vindicates and maintains. However this may be, many of his readers have regarded the numerous indications of the progress of his mind, with very deep interest; and in particular cases, his more rational and practical expositions of portions of the Scriptures, have excited unfeigned admiration. As an instance, — his "Hints on Prophecy," though directly and professedly

aimed at the extravagant misconceptions and misinterpretations of a class of modern fanatics, — have placed him in a new and singular position, as respects the established views of his own party. Throughout his entire book, he has gone in the very face of his denomination, and brought down the meaning of some important prophecies to events which have long since passed, instead of following his predecessors in applying them to future times. How can he now violate his own principles of exegesis, and apply them, as his sect has always done, to the affairs of distant future time, or to those of eternity? If he is the man that his book would seem to imply, he will never do this. It is far more reasonable to suppose, that he will continue to face his own orthodoxy, and substantially maintain his principles. Such a course is quite in keeping with his past public life. But whatever may be the result, this much is certain — he has done something, and done it effectually, towards modifying the views of his denomination respecting the import of the particular prophecies which he has considered. We will not say that the tendency of all this is to greater liberality; but it can scarcely fail to mitigate or remove the apprehensions of the credulous, and render the teachings of the prophets of more practical avail to his people.

A recent example of the prevailing spirit of mental independence and religious progress, has been furnished in Prof. Bush, of the New York University. This learned and eminent divine, in a work professedly on the Resurrection, embraced the consideration of the more generally received doctrine relating to a general judgment. He found that the postponement of the adjudication of human affairs, to some unknown and unrevealed period in eternity, was attended with several strong objections, if not with insuperable difficulties. And with manly fortitude, and great candor and ability, he girded himself to the task of exposing the perplexities, and of solemnly rejecting the views of his denomination respecting the judgment in the world to come.

Whatever may be thought of the views which the Professor labors to establish, it must be conceded, that their voluntary publication contains some proof of the triumph of conviction over the predilections for a party. And it is

something, that every man has not the moral courage to attempt, — to face the reproach of his friends by throwing off the restraints of his sect, and repudiating the very opinions which he, himself, once solemnly professed before God and man. And though we may find little else in his book, to excite admiration, it is still gratifying to know, that he honors divine revelation; and that he applies his energies for the purpose of rendering its teachings more obvious, and its truths more acceptable to the human mind. To rest the defence of his theory upon the Bible critically investigated, is to deserve respect, even when both his proofs and his arguments fail to convince. But if it were admitted, that he had imbibed and maintained errors in other matters of opinion, it will by no means follow, that he is either necessarily or certainly wrong respecting the judgment. It would rather serve to confirm the remark, already repeated, — that men advance slowly, and seldom explode more than one palpable error at a time. And a wider step could scarcely be taken, than that between the established opinion of the Presbyterian church, and that of the Professor, respecting the judgment.

In reviewing his particular case, we are quite disposed to yield him the merit of *originality*, — not that his views of the judgment are by any means entirely or substantially new. But it seems utterly impossible that he could have acquired them at second-hand, and not at the same time have learned something more. We are, therefore, left to contemplate him, as a conscientious man struggling with the burden of his creed, and casting off a portion which had become insupportable, in the hope of being able to carry the remainder with greater ease. In this again, he has acted upon the general principle of human progress, and yielded nothing that prejudice or conscience would allow him to retain. But thus far, he appears to have gone firmly; and to his conclusions, more or less modified, his denomination is destined to follow. Nor will his subsequent mystifications avert, though they may delay, that event. The most absurd fancies, as well as the grossest errors, may attach to a general system which comprises much of truth; and whatever becomes of the errors, the truth will stand forever.

There is one important feature in the moral and intellectual position of the present age, that merits our earnest and most profound consideration. It is the tendency to the *practical* application of principles, and to the rejection of all those not decidedly *benevolent.* A religion that does not make men better — that does not cherish and promote the kindlier affections, may be tolerated, but cannot long prosper, for it cannot be loved. It is no longer enough that men profess religion, and that its externals are decorously and punctiliously observed. The world demands something more, and insists that the profession of Christianity is, or ought to be, the pledge, not only of a decent, but of an elevated morality. There is a careful scrutiny into the principles of professors, as well as a vigilant observation of their conduct. And by the very unanimous consent of all parties, some of the dogmas that were once prevalent, but always revolting, have been expunged from the profession, if not from the creed, of most Christians. To give the catalogue of particulars which have passed, or are passing away, would only be an enumeration of monstrosities, that few can fail to recognize. But the impressive and instructive fact, developed by this general movement, is — that in every instance, the rejected dogmas have been succeeded by more benignant doctrines. The very soul of the nominal Christian world has been humanized, its formal deadness has felt the quickening power of moral life, and its exclusiveness is giving place to an expansive and ever-growing charity.

One of the most prominent and interesting indications of progress in benevolent principles, is found in the melioration of the laws. These bear all the marks of a growing and diffusive humanity. And for some time past, such has been the rapidity of advancement in this respect, that we look in vain for its parallel in human history. One after another, the cold and remorseless statutes, that crushed their victims to the earth with an iron hand, have been modified or become obsolete; and man, though guilty and fallen, is beginning to be regarded as one who still has rights, over which power itself has no legitimate control. Criminal jurisprudence is directed rather to devising means and measures for the prevention of crime, than to the specification of the nature and amount of punishment.

And by almost unanimous consent it is agreed, that the best moral results are obtained by the certain infliction of even light correction, instead of the more severe and relentless modes of punishment. The felon, though restrained for the safety of society, is no longer treated as if the sole object was to produce in him the constant feeling of misery. The public heart softens towards even offenders, its sympathies are becoming deeper and broader; and while light has been let into the dungeon, words of kindness have been spoken to the criminal. The sacredness of human life has become the theme of philanthropists, and its inviolability has already occupied the most profound regard, both of legislators and their constituents. And, if we may argue of the future from the past and the present, the time is not far distant when the death-penalty will be expunged from the statute books of every Christian nation.

The great fact developed and sustained by the preceding illustrations, is — that there has been a perpetual and irrepressible mental effort, for the attainment of better and higher moral light — for a more benevolent and more practical Christianity. In all the instances given, and they might be multiplied to any extent, we witness the constant aspiration of the wise and the good, after the right and the true. It may be that the progress has been slow, that long years have interposed their duration before a single step was attained; and that even then little was apparently accomplished. Still, so much was gained which the circumstances demanded — so much was done that was essential to further advancement. It is the result evolved by time, which gives consequence to a measure or a movement, that otherwise might appear unimportant.

It would have struck the mind of Luther with amazement and horror, could he have foreseen that his principles or his labors would have had the remotest tendency to induce the rejection of any one of the doctrines which he maintained. And yet, all unconscious as he was, nothing is more certain than that the great principle assumed by him and his coadjutors — that every man possesses the right of private judgment in matters of religion — has merely been maintained and acted upon in every innovation made or attempted in the religious world, from that

day to the present. Time, then, constitutes the true test of the importance of a moral movement; and a few centuries have abundantly proved, that the aspirations of an obscure monk have sent abroad over Christendom the elements of an ever growing moral power — of perpetual moral progression.

If our position is correct, that men have advanced slowly in the great matters of Christian simplicity and moral elevation — that their progress has been piecemeal, and by successive and isolated efforts — then it follows, that the high moral and Christian privileges which distinguish the present age, are the results of the mental struggles, and toil, and self-sacrifice of many great minds and devoted men through a succession of ages. There are probably few among the many who have attempted any thing worthy of adoption, to whom we do not owe something. Their thoughts, their conclusions, have become ours — and, however unconsciously, we have become their debtors, And, what is to us a source of proud congratulation may have cost the deepest anxiety, or protracted sufferings, or violent death. Thus it is, that "other men labored, and we have entered into their labors." It is not intended, that if those men had not lived and acted, the world would have remained stationary. Far from this. There is good reason to believe that the times would have produced such men as Wickliffe and Luther, had they never existed. However this may be, successive advances have been made, until progress has become the order of the day — reason is taking its place, and exercising its rights and its influence, and Christianity is becoming what it originally was — worthy of is divine Author, and purifying and comforting to man. Our work is not yet accomplished. There is still something to be done, and something for us to do. Each one of us has a sphere of duty and of labor, the influence of which cannot be foreseen. We should aim at progression — at the improvement of our own souls in knowledge and virtue, and the elevation and happiness of our race. But in our endeavors to advance, we should be careful not to fall back upon the gloomy errors of the past, nor sacrifice the fundamental principles ,of truth by the adoption of captious and equivocal refinements. Faith should not be evaporated in speculation, nor the consola-

tions of a well-grounded hope dissipated by the fallacious insinuations of a misnamed philosophy. Let not the light of divine truth be obscured by the mystifications of bygone days, nor its sublime morality cancelled by a gorgeous and useless ceremonial. Let not reason be hoodwinked or prostrated under pretence of submission to divine authority; nor elevated above revelation to hide the shame of infidelity. Let mind have its place, as the distinction and glory of man — as what alone made him the object of the divine communications, and by which alone he is capable of appreciating their nature and importance. Let it be what God designed it should be — the instrument by which revelation becomes available in imparting a just and true knowledge of our Father in heaven, of his beneficent purposes, and of the means which secure and promote the present and continued happiness of the human race. E. R. S.



ART. V.

Plato's Views of Immortality.

IT is our desire to define in this article, as fully as our limits will allow, and as clearly as the nature of the subject and our own ability will permit, the views of Plato upon immortality, with particular reference to his doctrine concerning the condition of the soul in its disembodied state. It would seem to be an important acquisition to our knowledge, if we could understand thoroughly the faith, and appreciate the hopes, of a mind like that of the first among Greek philosophers, — a mind which had attained probably the perfection of heathen culture, and whose intellectual development may be assumed, therefore, to be the goal and limit of uninspired thought. But

[1] The materials for the present article are mostly drawn from Cousin's French Translation of Plato's Dialogues, in thirteen volumes, Paris edition; and the references, accordingly, are made to that work, as the best modern version of the Greek philosopher, and probably the easiest of access to those who are unacquainted with the original.

the difficulties are proportioned to the interest of the task. We are not acquainted with any exhaustive examination of the question, and the conflicting results of commentators only perplex the mind, giving us no assurance and little valuable aid. Besides, few subjects offer more perplexities to criticism, than a complete analysis of the Platonic writings for the purpose of unfolding a clear, dogmatic, symmetrical result. It is exceedingly difficult even to give, in modern terms, an accurate statement of the leading points of Platonism; and probably the variety of opinions, inconsistent and even contradictory, which learned men have evolved from the words of Plato, can only find a parallel in the variety of creeds and doctrines, which equally learned and honest critics have unfolded from the Scriptures. According to his commentators, Plato becomes a Kantian or an Eclectic, a Gnostic or a Swedenborgian. His works form a sort of philosophical kaleidoscope: turned by one man, Plato appears a modern Orthodox; shifted again, he is a modern Transcendentalist. Cold-blooded men, like Mr. Norton, find nonsense in a dialogue where warm-hearted, poetic spirits, like the German Ackerman, detect delicate filaments of the Christian faith; so that it depends very much on the position and relations of the reviewer, whether we get a dissertation on Plato the skeptic, or Plato the polytheist, or Plato the Christian, or Plato the fool. Even the theory of ideas, which lay at the base of his speculative system, which is at once the corner and key-stone of his philosophy, has had almost as many interpretations as interpreters, and remains, to-day, an unexhausted subject for criticism and dispute. It must be an amusing task for the spirit of Plato to observe the various judgments of different thinkers; to see his system, as it passes through different minds, receiving from each a subjective hue and form; to range side by side the motley group of Platonisms which the ages have produced, from the dissertations of the Alexandrian school, who found a mystic sense in every name, and a subtile meaning in the number of interlocutors, to Sewell,[2] who detects in the Republic a

[2] Sewell's Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato; a powerfully written, and *very amusing* book.

dim instinct or nisus as it were of the Church of England, and Mr. Tayler Lewis,[3] who grieves that amid so much gospel doctrine of vindictive punishment and eternal woe, he can find "nothing of that great atonement which forms the basis of the Christian scheme."

The cause of this diversity certainly cannot be attributed to any lack of precision in Plato's terms; for his diction is clear and pure, a transparent medium of thought. The English critic, alluded to above, finding a similar obscurity in the Scriptures, takes occasion to hint, as a solution, that Plato possibly is inspired. If we are not disposed to acquiese in this opinion, we may find a more probable explanation in the nature and design of Plato's works. Perhaps it is needless to inform our readers that no definite, dogmatic statement of his philosophy was ever given from Plato's pen. His writings are isolated, and form no organic developed whole. They consist chiefly of dialogues upon various topics of morality and religion, through the most of which, Socrates is introduced as the central figure, for the purpose of controverting the opinions of others; himself examining and refuting propositions by the use of a rigorous analysis and dialectical skill, but rarely proposing positive opinions of his own, or leaving a definite impression upon the reader's mind. Plato never speaks in his own person, or with a purely didactic aim. He loved the dialogistic method; he was the greatest artist in composition, probably, that ever lived; and this form offered a wider scope and less restraint to the range of his taste and powers. When we consider, therefore, that his dialogues amount to more than thirty; that many of them were written seemingly for no other end, than a display of logical acuteness or artistic skill; that, through their dramatis personæ, they embody the opinions of almost every prior and contemporary school; that some may be intended to represent scenes from the History of Socrates, and develope opinions which Plato did not endorse; and that they were composed at widely different periods of life, some running back probably to his early youth, and others employing his dying moments in their

[3] Plato against the Atheists, or the Tenth Book of the Laws, with notes, &c., by Tayler Lewis, L.L. D., the last classical development of orthodoxy.

revision; we may well suppose that it is a task of no ordinary difficulty to condense and arrange his views into a consistent body of didactic statements and opinions, nicely balanced and scientifically evolved.

Besides, at the very outset of our researches into the real nature of Plato's views, we are met and staggered by the question,—have we any trusty sources from which to draw his secret doctrines? are his published writings authentic records of his honest thought? has he imparted in his dialogues, without reservation, the essence of his views as they existed in his own mind, or as they were delivered to his pupils in the retirement and confidence of the school? This is a point which demands more space for a thorough discussion than we can afford for our whole subject; but, as it is an essential condition to critical success in any department of his system, we must give a few words to it by way of introduction.

From the circumstances of the time, from a few passages of Plato himself, and from the spirit and structure of many of his works, we are convinced that while the great body of the dialogues indicate, hint, and suggest the elements of his philosophy, in no one of them, nor in all of them, can we find an entirely unreserved and honest expression of his views. He lived among a people who certainly had not shown a great attachment to innovations on the popular creed. Anaxagoras had been banished, and Socrates condemned, for the purity of their speculations, and the long established feud between philosophy and paganism had not sufficiently subsided, to render it safe for any man to evince extraordinary boldness in the domain of morals. A wise prudence was the better rule of war; and Plato had every warning, in the fate of his predecessors, to deter him at least from a rashness which would have proved fatal to success. The long life and quiet death of the philosopher would seem themselves to indicate that he used some policy in his public dealing with the popular faith of the time. Moreover, we find in some of his works expressions which, if rigidly interpreted, forbid us to expect any thorough exposition of his philosophy in written disquisitions. In the Phædrus, for instance, Socrates makes a decided and somewhat lengthy attack upon writing, as a medium for imparting clear and

solid knowledge. He labors to show that severe dialectical discourse is the only method of instruction. Written statements can be moulded into any form according to the readers' mind; they know not with whom to speak or with whom they should maintain silence; unjustly attacked, or misunderstood, they cannot answer, but, like a weak child, constantly need their father's aid; and therefore the best written compositions are useful merely to awaken reminiscence in the minds of those who know already the subjects of which they treat.[4] The letters of Plato, of which thirteen are left, would seem to be explicit on this point. In the second and seventh he expressly declares that the deepest science cannot be taught in words; that after a pure life of meditation it bursts forth like a spark, like gold becoming pure only after long years and toil, and that every man seriously occupied with things so serious, should restrain himself from treating them fully in writings intended for the public.[5] He confesses that his writings are not without merit, but declares that they do not contain that deep and pure science which conversation and reflection can alone bestow. It is proper to state that the genuineness of these letters has been questioned and severely tested by many modern critics. The whole evidence of antiquity, however, is in their favor, and they have been rejected mainly on account of those passages that speak of an esoteric wisdom which the dialogues do not convey.[6]

[4] Vol. vi. pp. 123, 124.

[5] Vol. xiii. Letter 2, p. 61. Letter 7, pp. 96, 100.

[6] Cicero quotes from the 5th and 7th Letters, and in the Tusculan Questions remarks, "Est præclara epistola Platonis ad Dionis propinquos;" also, Ad Atticum, I. xiii. mentions that a certain Hermodorus was accustomed to publish the books of Plato. (See Tennemann's Lehren der Sokratiker über Unsterblichkeit, page 22, note.) Plutarch uses the 7th Letter very freely in his life of Dion, quotes twice from the 4th and mentions the 13th. (See Langhorne's Translation of Plutarch, vol. vii., Life of Dion, pp. 144, 147, 149, and throughout.) Cousin boldly rejects the Letters, although he includes them in his translation of the Dialogues. As in many other cases of critical difficulty, however, he cuts the knot without unloosing it, settling the question by a bold French generalization, an Eclectic leap. He calls them "more affected than profound," "superficially Alexandrine," &c. (See Cousin's Plato, vol. xiii., note on page 229.) Boeckh regards the 7th alone as genuine, which is the most important as connected with our question.

If we take these declarations of Plato in the sense which probably they require, namely, that no one of his works contains a full and exhaustive treatment of his system, and that in them are many accommodations to popular prejudice and superstition, they are certainly sustained by the evidence of the dialogues themselves. Most of these are plainly intended to be guides and aids in the acquirement of precise thinking, and the attainment of the dialectic method of philosophy. They are admirable as hints and suggestions of truth which they do not state. They shine with what Heraclitus would call a humid light. We can account for and explain their artful obscurity only by keeping in view the Academy where they were more clearly unfolded, or the severity of whose lessons they were perhaps intended to recall. In different dialogues, opinions entirely contradictory are unfolded with seemingly equal honesty. He speaks at times, too, of the popular worship in terms of great respect, although the whole was the antipodes of his own belief. Often we are led through the most intricate avenues of metaphysics in chase of a sophism, and frequently, after tiresome discussions, and when the light seems ready to break upon our vision, the curtain falls and the discussion ends. The most important dialogues close with gorgeous myths drawn either from tradition or the sources of his own rich mind, and through these, as through a highly colored transparency, he throws his light upon the imagination of the reader, impressing by symbols upon the fancy what he refused to do by words upon the reason. And no reader, even now, can study his works without confessing with Ast, that "the peculiarity of Plato's compositions is that he has no peculiarity," that they are valuable chiefly as exercises in mental gymnastics, to train the mind to habits of patient thought, hinting truths which they will not tell, leading us up ideal heights and refusing at last to be our guide, but pointing the way to higher progress, making us feel indeed that the Platonism which they teach is inferior to the Platonism which they inspire.

Taking this view of the Platonic books, the only one, we believe, capable of explaining them, it is evident that mere verbal or textual criticism cannot succeed as a method of interpretation. It finds itself confused at once

with a thousand embarassments.[7] The clue to the Cretan labyrinth, or the solution of the Sphinx's riddle, were easy in comparison. The only proper and successful method is a free, liberal treatment, with a single eye to Plato's method and the general spirit of each piece. Like a tangled skein they yield easily to loose and patient handling, but if forced or strained at all, become knotted into an inextricable mass.

Especially must we bring this liberal and patient spirit to an examination of Plato's views of the future state. For it is over questions connected with the nature and destiny of the soul that the greatest obscurity is thrown. We might readily suspect it would be so. Upon these points he was brought immediately in contact with the popular religion, and there was great temptation to a guarded and incomplete publication of his opinions. Besides, Plato had a highly poetic mind. He had determined in early youth, previous to meeting Socrates, to devote himself to poetry; and throughout his works we discover a marked relish for allegories and myths, to which he always turned with eagerness, not only as a relief from the dryness of abstract discussion, but as a medium through which to hint ideas which reason could not grasp. Nothing was better fitted to feed this poetic turn than speculations upon the condition and fate of the dead. It was a question removed beyond the boundaries of science; revelation had not dispelled the gloom and mystery which lay around the future world; it offered, therefore, a fit field for the revels of a highly imaginative and spiritual mind. The mythology of his country and of the East, too, was rich in fables illustrative of the future destiny of souls; and therefore policy, together with the severe temper of his scientific method, compelled him to adopt that allegorical and legendary dress for his speculations, which his poetic genius so dearly loved to weave. The Platonic myths and stories are often contradictory with each other, embracing materials which it is impossible to harmonize by verbal criti-

[7] An amusing instance of the beauties of this method may be seen in Mr. Norton's expositions of Plato, scattered throughout vol. iii. of his "Genuineness of the Gospels." The final cause of the spirit that wrote the preface to the "Statement of Reasons" certainly was not to be the expounder of the Greek Transcendalist.

cism, and thus our only method is a poetic abandonment of mind to the influence of the pictures, rather than a microscopic analysis of words. No two writers whom we have ever consulted agree in their abstract of Plato's views of immortality; scarcely can one be found who is entirely consistent with himself. The trouble has generally arisen from a false or too rash method of interpretation. It is a hopeless task, to extort the meaning of poetry by logic. "Spiritual things are spiritually discerned."

In passing, then, to a direct consideration of his views concerning the soul and its destiny, we must remark that the writings of Plato form an epoch in ancient philosophy. Socrates impressed a new tendency on speculation. He brought into use the psychological method. Before his time the philosophy of Greece was conversant with little else than physical inquiries, explanations of the origin of the universe. It was entirely ontological. Speculation seems to have been lawless, busying itself with the mysteries connected with the genesis of things, unrestrained and undirected by any rules of scientific thought. Philosophers were mostly physicists; no base had been laid for a moral system; science was dissipated into theories and hypotheses, based, however, on no facts, at the mercy of the next thinker, and held together only by the speculative ingenuity of the author's brain. Socrates swept it all away. He saw that it was aimless, profitless and barren. He brought back philosophy to its true starting-point, — the human soul. His motto, his method, the Alpha and Omega of his system was — "Know thyself." He made psychology the portal to the temple of science, and thus gave to speculation a moral aim. Socrates left no works. His greatest legacy to the world was Plato's mind. The scholar was thoroughly imbued with the master's method, and in his works for the first time do we find the true canons of philosophy observed, and a rigorous moral system raised upon the results of psychological analysis, and induction from the facts of consciousness and experience.

At first sight, we are struck with the spiritual character of Plato's system. He has no compromise, no sympathy with materialistic views. With him man was a living soul, the body merely an organ, instrument and slave. The natural order of things, reversed in most of the schools

of Grecian speculation, was restored by him. Spiritual interests in his philosophy are always supreme. So far from the spirit being dependent on material organization, it existed before the body, sustains the body, and is in its very essence immortal, indestructible. That Plato held to the prior existence of the spirit, no student of his philosphy can doubt. It is a fundamental point of his moral system. But when we go beyond this fact, and seek to define his view of its former state, and the manner of its passage into an earthly form, we are embarassed by a crowd of contradictory statements entirely insoluble. "To know the soul in itself," said he, "requires a divine wisdom, and dissertations without end." Plato seems clearly to have understood and recognized the boundary line between science and speculation. His mind was poetic but not mystic. Strange as it may seem, we see proof of this in his treatment of the question of pre-existence; and it is on this ground alone, we believe, that the contradictions, so perplexing to most commentators, can be explained. In establishing the fact of pre-existence and the superiority of the soul, his method is scientific. He draws his argument from the facts of our mental experience and the laws of bodily organization. The sources of this proof are found in the Phædon and the Meno. By an examination of the principal ideas of the mind, such as the true, the good, the beautiful, equality, &c., Plato discovered that their characteristics are such as to forbid the supposition of sensual origin. They cannot be traced to sensible impressions; they are beyond the reach of our bodily organs. The sight of material things awakens them immediately in the mind; and therefore, since their origin is not in this state of existence, they come into consciousness by reminiscence, and must have been acquired in some former state, and brought with us here as part of our mental furniture.[8] The ideas of science and duty also, both demanding free-

[8] Vol. i., Phædon, pp. 219–231. Vol. vi. Meno, pp. 174–191. In studying the genesis and comparative anatomy of philosophical schools, relationships and affinities quite unsuspected may be brought to light. Thus it was the existence in the mind of *certain* and *super-sensuous* knowledge which led Plato into his theory of reminiscence and *ideal realism*, Kant into his discovery of the categories of pure reason, and his system of *subjective skepticism*, and Cousin into the doctrine of *impersonal reason*, and the possibility of arriving at absolute, ontological science.

dom of the spirit from the ties of sense and matter, imply the independence of the soul, and hence its priority.[9] The evils of life, moreover, spring from too intimate union of the soul with flesh, and moral order is attained only as the soul acquires and feels its native superiority to earthly bonds.[10] The soul also is the principle and source of motion, and therefore prior to material organization, which is merely the channel and instrument of motion. The body dissolves at death; but dissolution is possible only with the composite. The soul is formless, substantive and simple, hence indissoluble and superior to all organization.[11] Neither can it be the harmony of the body, a result of the arrangement of its forces, dependent on matter like the music of a lyre upon strings. A harmony has no substantive essence; it exists only in the conditioning elements; — while the soul is conscious of substantive existence, can distinguish and separate itself from bodily elements and make war upon them.[12] Hence it is a prior individual unity.

All these arguments are based on psychology. The logic is wretched, but the method true. The fact of pre-existence, then, we believe to be a firmly established element of Platonism.[13] But beyond this mere fact, to the

[9] Vol. i., Phædon, pp. 200, 205.

[10] Ibid. 209, 210.

[11] Ibid. 283–300.

[12] Ibid. 263–271.

[13] Coleridge, (Biog. Lit. ch. xxii.,) in a note to Wordsworth's beautiful "Ode on Immortality," referring to the doctrine of pre-existence hinted there, remarks, that a competent reader, "will be as little disposed to charge Mr. Wordsworth with believing the Platonic pre-existence in the ordinary interpretation of the words, as I am to believe that Plato himself ever meant or taught it." If this refers to the mythic description of the soul's former condition, the remark is just; if applied, however, to the fact of the priority of spirit to bodily forms, the skepticism is too sweeping and indiscriminate.

Tennemann, (System der Platonischen Philosophie, vol. iii., p. 109,) makes a distinction between the *hypothetical* and *mythical* in Platonism, which, he says, must not be overlooked. Thus, "when Plato admits the pre-existence of the soul on account of super-sensuous knowledge, it is an hypothesis; when, however, he seeks to represent the *condition* of pre-existing souls, their dwelling in the stars, and their travels through various bodily forms, it is a myth." This *hypothetical* hypothesis, does not, we think, explain all the allusions to pre-existence in

manner of pre-existence, and the worldly origin of souls, induction could not reach; and then Plato designedly abandons himself to speculation and hypothesis, sporting freely in a poetic element, careless, of course, about the consistency and harmony of his fanciful plays. Accordingly, in the gorgeous imagery of the Phædrus, he shows us the cars of the original souls, moving in the train of the Deity, and borne around the heaven in contemplation of ideas. In the Timæus we see the elements of human souls, at the command of Deity, mixed by demi-gods from the remnant of the first creations, and scattered upon the stars, where they first become acquainted with ideas; while, in the Philebus, the souls are emanations from the great world-soul, the first creation of the Almighty.[14] Plato founds, however, no important doctrine on the tenet of pre-existence, and in all the poetic passages as to the circumstances of the soul's former state, he warns the reader against receiving them as truths or as anything more than fanciful guesses and badinage.[15] Holding fast to the *idea* of pre-existence, as a fact of his philosophy, a wise criticism, instead of trying to reconcile the irreconcileable, will transfer the *details* of the soul's former state, from the region of scientific to that of poetic Platonism.

Passing from a consideration of the nature, to the duration, of the soul, we may say, that Plato undoubtedly had firm and constant faith in immortality. It was with him, not merely a matter of speculation, but of science. The same arguments which decided his faith in a pre-existent state, were conclusive in favor of the soul's independence and enduring life. We read him with perfect confidence. There is no hesitation, no wavering, no insecurity of faith betrayed in any of his dialogues, where mention is made of immortality. The idea is involved and connected by numberless nerves and fibres, with the whole scientific structure of his philosophy. For aught in his writings to the contrary, it was as much a matter of certainty, as his

Plato, so well as our own theory, that the *fact* is scientific, the *details* mythical.

[14] We have made no allusion to the Tenth Book of the Laws, because there, evidently, the passages on pre-existence refer to the general priority of mind to matter, and not to individual pre-existence.

[15] Vol. vi., Phædrus, p. 96; vol. xii., Timæus, pp. 118, 203.

belief in God, or his confidence in present existence. To him belongs the honor of first placing the idea of immortality on a rational basis; to him alone, throughout the ranks of ancient philosophers, is due the praise of holding to it firmly, as the only solution to the mysteries of our moral nature, and the ever present sanction of the moral law. It is a difficult and quite unwelcome task to proceed to a critical analysis of his views, concerning the future condition and destiny of the soul. Could we collect and arrange the passages that refer to the subject, which would be the proper method for the treatment of most authors, and thus present the tenor of his views in his own language, we might hope for some success, notwithstanding the mass of materials it would be necessary to sift. But this is impossible. There is no outward unity or consistency in his statements. It would be comparatively easy to work the vast Platonic mine, and disclose to general view its rich veins of moral speculation, if they ran in any order. But a strange caprice governs their development. They break off so suddenly, and branch out in so many directions, and with such lawless irregularity, that there seems to be no possibility of tracing unity or plan. The impressions left upon the reader's mind, by a first and hasty reading of Plato's various passages on future life, are extremely confused and chaotic. Not only are we perplexed by different treatments and developments of one fundamental conception, as in the case of pre-existence, but different and entirely hostile modes of future life, are posited with equal freedom and seeming indifference. In attempting a solution, we must bear in mind, that it is this part of his philosophy, probably, which Plato treated with the greatest artistic liberty in his writings, reserving a clear and consistent development for the retirement of his school. Although the same distinction between the scientific and poetic, to which we referred in the remarks on pre-existence, may be equally applicable here, still there are many inconsistences and troublesome questions concerning Plato's conception of the soul's final destiny, which, we think, a patient examination can reconcile and solve. At any rate, we are confident that it is possible to establish a negative, to show what he did *not* believe, and thus to rescue his system from being

implicated with doctrines sometimes imputed to it, but for which it is not at all responsible.

The first difficulty that presses on us, relates to the tenet of metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls. From many passages in his works, it would seem, that he held to this theory as the mode and form of eternal existence. The dialogues which contain allusions to, or statements of, the doctrine of transmigration, are the Phædrus, Meno, Timæus, Phædon, the Tenth Book of the Republic, and the Tenth Book of the Laws. In the Phædon, which contains the last conversation of Socrates with his friends just prior to his decease, and where the subject is, the soul and its destiny, we find it alluded to in the following manner. After having argued for the independent nature of the soul, from conscience, the idea of science, &c., Socrates, in passing to speak of its eternal duration, commences[16] by referring to "the very ancient opinion, that souls in quitting this world go to the unseen state, and thence again come back to life after the passage of death." This gives rise to a discussion upon the law of contraries; all things spring from their opposites, as the colder from the warmer, smaller from greater, quicker from slower, night from day, &c. This ceaseless flow and change is the law of nature. Things are continually returning into, and reissuing from, their opposites. Circulus arterni motûs. Existence is an active circle, whose extremities perpetually return upon themselves, and thus, in order to maintain the stability of this universal order, death also must give place to life, birth must be the compensating opposite to dissolution, else all being would finally become stagnant and dead.[17] The natural complement and climax of this argument, of course, should be, that the number of souls is limited, that the series of earthly lives is continually refreshed by the spirits of the departed, and that natural birth in this world is the immediate return of the spirit to existence. But Socrates, as if conscious of the tendency of this theory, and recoiling from its logical results, artfully breaks the discussion, and passes immediately to the argument for the soul's independence from reminiscence, and after settling that, re-

[16] Vol. i., Phædon, p. 213. [17] Ibid. p. 218.

sumes[18] the consideration of its future condition. But here the demands of his rigid law of contraries are forgotten. The theory of metempsychosis has itself experienced a metamorphosis from a scientific necessity as before, to a moral condition of punishment. "The soul, which is immaterial, goes to an abode like itself, pure, excellent, and immaterial. If it pass pure, without dragging with it anything corporeal, it returns to the divine, immortal, and wise, and there is happy, delivered from error, folly, fears, dissolute love, and all other human evils; as they say of the initiated, it passes, truly, eternity with the Gods. But if souls withdraw from the body corrupted and impure, loaded with the bonds of the material envelope, they fall, and, dragged anew towards the visible world by terror of the immaterial, and of that world without light which is called hell, go wandering, *as they say*, among monuments and tombs as a punishment for their first wicked life, until the natural appetite of the corporeal mass which follows them, leads them back into a body, and then they re-enter, probably, into the same habits which made the occupation of their first existence."[19] Those who were abandoned to intemperance and sensual excess go into the bodies of asses and like animals; those who loved injustice and tyranny, into wolves and hawks; peaceable, mild souls, undisciplined by philosophy, pass into social and peaceful animals, as bees, wasps and ants, or perhaps return to human bodies and form good men. But to attain the rank of the Gods is permitted only to the philosopher.

A careless reader, unacquainted with Plato's method, and the license of his art, would at once conclude from the above cited passage, probably, that the tenet of metempsychosis formed an element of his creed. In fact, we have given the most perplexing passage first. Generally his allusions to transmigration are veiled in mythic dress, and form a rich embroidery, an ornamental fringe to his abstruser speculations, while here they seem to shoot like a golden thread across his logic. A thorough study of his works, however, is fatal to the theory. Not only, as in the very instance of the discussion in the Phædon, does he

[18] Phædon, p. 239. [19] Vol. i., Ibid. substance of, pp. 239–243.

artfully elude an implication of his argument with the natural consequences of transmigration, but he is so entirely inconsistent with himself in his different modes of representing it, as to force upon us the conclusion that he used it for an artistic embellishment, borrowed from his favorite, Pythagoras, and as a convenient vehicle through which to impress upon the imagination the moral results of sin. A careful examination and comparison of the passages where the theory is introduced, we are confident, will substantiate our position. In the Phædon, as we have seen, no notice is taken and no solution offered of the question — how the souls are united at birth or re-united at death with an earthly form. In the Phædrus, the most poetic and unscientific, as well as one of the most gorgeous and fascinating of the Platonic dialogues, the first appearance of the spirit in a body is ascribed to sin. The soul in its pre-existent, empyrean flight, become heavy and dull through forgetfulness or vice, loses its wings and falls to the earth. But it is forbidden to animate the body of any beast at the first generation. The fallen spirits consist of nine degrees, and make up, accordingly, nine different ranks of human character; the first and purest rank entering philosophers and men whose lives are consecrated to Love, Beauty, and the Muses. The others are arranged in the following order: — just kings and warriors, statesmen, athletes and doctors, priests, poets and artists, artisans, sophists and demagogues, and lastly, tyrants. After death, the souls return to the other world for judgment, and according to their improvement of the first probationary state, are punished or rewarded for a thousand years. At the expiration of this period, they make choice of a new earthly existence: each being free to select the condition which it prefers, whether of beast or man. And only through a circuit of ten lives and a disciplinary and retributory punishment of ten thousand years, can the souls regain their heavenly state; except the philosopher, who, after three successive virtuous lives, and a discipline of three thousand years, may recover his wings and resume his flight.[20]

All other reasons set aside, this passage would be valueless as a sober, trustworthy statement of Plato's belief,

[20] Vol. vi., Phædrus pp. 53, 54.

from the fact that it occurs in a discourse attributed to Stesichorus, a celebrated author of lyrico-epic poems, which Socrates recites to Phædrus while seated upon the banks of the Ilyssus, and yielding to the luxury of dreamy musing and contemplation. In accordance with Plato's mimetic art, the ideas and form of the address are suited to the imaginary author, philosophic severity being sacrificed to poetic license and consistency of character. No reader of Plato can fail to remark, besides, the discrepancy between this statement as it respects the fate of the philosopher, and his usual dogmatic positions on that point. Always in his dialogues and myths he allots to the lover of wisdom an *immediate* return to the life of the Gods; while here he subjects him to a probation of three worldly existences and a discipline of three thousand years. The nine lives and return to purity after the tenth cycle of punishment, shows us that he is using a Pythagorean doctrine, under their mystical veil of numbers. Almost all commentators are agreed that this is among the earliest, if not the very first of Plato's written works, marked by the luxuriance of youthful fancy, betraying throughout a lack of art in subordinating properly the poetic and mythical to the philosophical and scientific elements, and so ill balanced that the author found it necessary to warn the reader against an undue fascination with its form, with the twice repeated confession that it is a poetic myth, "a kind of mythologic hymn to Love who presides over beauty."[21]

The work most commonly cited to substantiate the theory of metempsychosis, is the Timæus, a composition which pretends to give a solution of the origin of things, and to embody Plato's speculations upon nature and the theory of the world. Here, too, the details of the statement are entirely different. After the creation of higher orders, the souls of men were mixed by demi-gods from elements furnished by the Almighty, and were then divided among the stars, one great soul to each star. Before the first birth, which is the same to all, the souls are made to mount upon a chariot, "that they may see the nature of the universe, and observe its inevitable decrees." After death, if the soul has lived justly, it returns immediately to

[21] Vol. vi., Phædrus pp. 96, 189.

its proper star. If it sin, it is changed into a woman at the second birth, and if then it does not improve, it passes through a lower round of change corresponding to its vices, until by discipline it becomes worthy to recover its first and excellent condition. The creation of lower animals is ascribed to this degradation of human souls by sin; each degree of evil and debasement manifesting itself in the creation of a new and appropriate bodily form. The apparent freedom of the passages in the Timæus from any mythic mixture, and the dogmatic form in which the doctrine is stated, have caused greater stress to be laid upon it as authority for Plato's faith in transmigration. Too much credit has been given, however, to the Timæus as an exposition of Plato's sober views. The whole structure and form of the work remove it from the category of his severe scientific productions. It is not cast in the dialogistic mould; the dialectic method employed in his other great works, such as the Thæetetus, Philebus, Gorgias, Phædon and Republic, and which Plato declares to be the only medium for conveying truth, is abandoned. Moreover, his usual mouthpiece, Socrates, is thrown aside; and the substance of the work is given as a long recital upon nature, from Timæus, a Locrian, and a celebrated teacher of the Pythagorean school. Consistently with Plato's usual aim after dramatic propriety, therefore, we discover in it much of a peculiarly Pythagorean cast, and accordingly, as in the case of the Phædrus, we find that Plato introduces a caveat, lest he be held responsible for the literal statement of opinions, confessing that all which he has said is a philosophical recreation, a wise and moderate amusement for the mind when it lays aside the study of what is eternal.[22] That the Timæus discloses many physiological views which Plato really held, we have no doubt; but its transcendental speculations bear all the incidental and positive testimony that can be given to prove that they were mere philosophic myths and jeux d'esprit.[23]

[22] Vol. xii., Timæus pp. 118, 174, 203. The passages in this dialogue which refer to metempsychosis may be found pp. 137–141 and 242, 243.

[23] Mr Norton (Evidences of the Gospels, vol. iii., p. 104,) calls the Timæus a mere work of imagination. Tennemann, noticing the inconsistency between the Phædrus and the Timæus relative to future life,

In the tenth book of the Republic, we have still another poetic statement of the theory of transmigration, clothed in all the luxuriant drapery of Plato's inimitable art. The details differ from those of all the rest. According to the recital, the information concerning the future state was communicated by Er, an Armenian, who had been slain in battle, but whose corpse was preserved from the funeral pile, until the twelfth day after his decease. When all

with a short-sightedness unusual in him, places greater stress on the representations in the Timæus as a riper and later book. The Timæus, it is true, is a later book, but lateness has nothing to do with the *veracity* of *poetry*. Afterwards, however, he refers to the Timæus for proof that Plato held his speculations to be mere guesses upon questions removed from knowledge. ("System der Platonischen Philosophie," vol. iii., pp. 96, 97.) And farther on, (p. 124,) speaking of Plato's statement that the soul, at its second birth, enters a female form, he adduces evidence from the Republic, where Plato allows an equal dignity to the male and female natures, for proof that he did not affirm the doctrine "in full earnest." Again, referring to the return of the wicked into the souls of beasts, Tennemann contends that Plato "held it not as rigid truth, but as a feasible mode of representing the moral condition of the soul after death." (See his "Lehren der Sokratiker über Unsterblichkeit," p. 478.)

Stallbaum, a German editor of Plato's works, and who has been called "one of the greatest living scholars in the Platonic writings," in criticising the mythical passages relating to metempsychosis scattered throughout the Phædrus, Phædon, Timæus and Republic, contends that a serious study of them all easily demonstrates that they are mere plays of fancy; to use his own words—"Philosophum in hoc argumento tractando ingenii lusui nonnihil indulsisse, ut in re quæ mentis humanæ intelligentiam superaret." (See Cousin's Plato, vol. xii., p. 345, note.)

Cousin himself is not committed to any decisive opinion. His criticism is remarkably eclectic, or rather *synchretic*. He touches both sides. In his preface to the Phædon, he hints the idea that the tenet of metempsychosis may be only a symbolic envelope for the dogma of the unity and incorruptibility of intellectual substance, (vol. i., p. 181.) This opinion is still more decidedly advanced in the notes to the Meno, (vol. vi., p. 480.) In the notes to the Timæus, however, he rejects Stallbaum's view, and inclines to the opinion that it is neither a jeu d'esprit, nor a doctrine Plato would be willing to endorse, but "a specious noted opinion, more or less true, borrowed from his favorite Pythagoras, and constituting his own mythology through which he addresses the imagination and the soul, after having arrived at the limits which separate the certain from the probable, and having exhausted rational demonstrations," (vol. xii., p. 346.) It is hard to define the difference between this view and Stallbaum's; and at the close of his notes on the Timæus, Cousin protests against the tenet of animal transmigration in good earnest, calling it mal à propos, and declaring that "we could very well have spared *an ornament* which degrades instead of elevating the majesty of Plato's ideas of the animal kingdom and the universe."

preparations had been completed for his obsequies, he suddenly revived, and related what had been revealed to him in the other world. We have not room to present even an outline of this statement, the particulars of which would fill several pages. The substance, however, is, — that immediately after death, all souls, according to their characters, are despatched by different routes to the abodes of the happy or the wicked. In these dwellings they remain a thousand years, each soul receiving tenfold reward or punishment for the deeds of its earthly life, and, at the end of this period, the spirits are permitted to make choice of a new existence. In working out this gorgeous picture, one of the finest gems of imagination which literature contains, and upon which Plato seems to have bestowed more artistic labor than on any other, he seems not to have restrained his fancy at all, by the desire to be consistent with his other statements, but rather to have constructed it without reference to them and from new resources. Accordingly, no moral distinction is made between the value of animal and human forms, as in the Phædon and Timæus, and they are selected not in obedience to spiritual necessity, but from considerations of convenience, or at the suggestion of arbitrary whims. The spirit of Orpheus selected the soul of a swan, from his hatred of women who had once caused his death, not wishing to be dependent again upon that sex for birth. Ajax, son of Telamon, disgusted with human life, and remembering the judgment which deprived him of the arms of Achilles, took the nature of a lion. Agamemnon, too, averse to the human race because of his past misfortunes, selected the condition of the eagle. Ulysses, cured of ambition by the memory of his severe reverses, chose the tranquil lot of a private man, which the other souls had disdainfully refused; while Thersites, very properly, concluded to reanimate the body of a monkey.[24] No difference is posited between male and female as in the Timæus, for sexes are changed at will. Atalanta had a strong desire to become an athlete, and Epeus, son of Panopeus, returned into the lot of an industrious woman. No peculiar fate is reserved for the philosopher, and not a

[24] Vol. x., Republic, Book Tenth, pp. 291, 292.

hint is dropped relative to the point, whether this return is part of a long system of purification, as in the Phædrus, or whether it is the general law of earthly existence and reproduction.[25] The beauty with which the whole myth is wrought out cannot be surpassed; art everywhere shines through the story, and we can imagine no more thorough cure for a tendency to believe, that Plato really held the doctrine of metempsychosis, than a study of this fiction in a proper attitude of mind.[26]

These inconsistences in working out the details of the soul's future condition, and the poetic license everywhere betrayed in the treatment of the separate myths, seem sufficient to condemn them as expositions of Plato's views. For surely he would have evinced more care, and would have shown more anxiety about the consistency of the outline and form of his pictures, although he might be

[25] Cousin thinks, that the substance of the whole fable is Oriental, embellished, but not originated, by Plato, (vol. x., p. 377.)

[26] The mythic passages in the Meno hardly require a passing notice. This dialogue, as we have before stated, is one of the chief sources for the doctrine of reminiscence and pre-existence. Before the discussion is introduced upon the question, that all knowledge is merely memory, Plato weaves in, as a sort of poetic prelude and preface, "the opinion of Pindar, and many other men skilful in divine things, that the soul is immortal, sometimes becoming eclipsed, sometimes re-appearing, but never becoming totally extinct. For Proserpine, at the end of nine years, returns to the light of the sun those souls who have paid to her the debt of their ancient sins; and from these souls spring illustrious kings, celebrated for their power, and men remarkable for their wisdom," — vol. vi., pp. 170, 171. The passage is left thus in its poetic form, the latter portion quoted, being, probably, a fragment of some lost ode of Pindar, and the scientific investigation into the nature of knowledge begins. The whole bears marks too plainly stamped to be mistaken, that it is poetic embellishment, an artful management of the transition in discourse, and a relief of dialogistic skill.

In the ninth book of the Laws, (vol. viii., p. 185,) occurs another allusion to metempsychosis, unimportant, however, in our examination, since it is a reference to the doctrine of the Eleusinian mysteries, and is introduced for illustration. Plato is speaking of the proper punishment for the crime of murder, and in a preamble to his legislation upon that point, remarks, that it is proper to include in it the doctrine of the mysteries, which many men religiously believe, that in hell are reserved punishments for these murders, and that the guilty man, commencing a new life, is condemned to undergo the same punishment, and thus terminate his days by the hand of another, and by the same kind of death. The design of the allusion, of course, is to strengthen the force of the law, by adding to it the sanctions of the popular religion.

arbitrary as to his materials, if he really intended to convey through them his decisive views as to the future state of souls. But it may be objected, that, although Plato might not have intended the myths to be clear and accurate expositions in detail of his religious views, and, therefore, in his treatment of them, very properly subordinated scientific precision to imaginative freedom, still they may be authoritative as expressions of his faith in the fundamental fact of metempsychosis, on which they rest, and which they reveal. That the myths may be received as hints of a progressive and ceaseless activity of spirit in its freer life, and that under the picture of continual changes, he may have intentionally veiled the theory of a moral cycle of conditions in the soul's future history, is a somewhat plausible, though we think an indemonstrable hypothesis. The allusions to future life in the Tenth Book of the Laws would seem to favor it. For there, a gradual progress of souls towards higher degrees of happiness, or lower degrees of misery, is hinted as the result of the experience "of this life, and of all the deaths we successively undergo." It is impossible, that a single soul can escape the established order of Heaven, "were it small enough to penetrate into the recesses of earth, or great enough to soar even to the sky; but it must bear the punishment awarded by the gods, either on earth, or in hell, or in some other and still more frightful abode." [27] The theology and theodicy of the laws, however, present so many inconsistences between the principles and the details; they are adulterated by so much that is palpably exoteric, that it is not safe to draw a conclusion upon such a point from their testimony alone.[28] But, that in such a cycle, a return to *earthly* life

[27] Vol. viii., pp. 266, 267.

[28] The Tenth Book of the Laws is a perfect riddle. No person can read it, without feeling elevated by its noble views of God's omnipresence, and the moral providence which reaches all men, and which is never withdrawn for an instant from the soul. The imagery often recalls passages from the Psalms and Isaiah, and the statement seems at times as clear and pure as the language of Paul. In its fundamental principles, the book is a complete system of Optimism, and recalls at once the Theodicy of Leibnitz. And yet before it closes, the popular worship is sanctioned; the evils of life are assumed to be greater than the goods, — just the reverse of what had before been definitely proved; and the hypothesis of two souls is introduced to account for evil, when the whole preceding argument had been directed to exhibit the com-

under a bodily vesture, was not really included, we think is evident on other grounds. A mind so critical as Plato's would not have entirely overlooked the physiological question suggested by transmigration, viz.: how is the return to mortal life effected, and what connection exists between departed souls and human generation? Even if no solution should be hinted in scientific form, a myth might easily have suggested to the mind some probable explanation. But Plato is entirely silent on this point. In the Republic and Laws, he treats at length of marriage and the true method of sexual union, and it would hardly seem possible, that, holding such a theory of birth as must necessarily be involved in metempsychosis, he should not even allude to it in such a treatise. On the contrary, all his directions and laws are hostile to the view of transmigration; the two theories cannot be reconciled; and since in such passages we may, of course, presume, that Plato unfolds his honest views, his silence with respect to metempsychosis may be taken as decisive evidence against the supposition, that he held the theory as a scientific dogma.[29]

As yet, however, we have left the main argument against metempsychosis untouched. It is not included in some of the most elaborate myths. In the two, which form the conclusion of his severest moral dialogues, the Phædon and the Gorgias, the idea of transmigration is not admitted. The mythical elements of the picture at the close of the Phædon, although artistically treated, are borrowed from the popular faith. The common distinctions between the realm of the blessed and Tartarus are affirmed; punishments are expiatory, except for offenders of the last degree; and philosophers are reserved for a purer life, entirely bodiless, in dwellings more beautiful than those allotted to innocent but less cultivated souls. Socrates

plete and ceaseless agency of God in the government of human life, to show that, "He, who directs all things, has disposed them for the preservation and good of the whole; that each part experiences or does only, what it is fitting it should experience and do."

[29] Schleiermacher, who seems to hold to the tenet of metempsychosis as a Platonic fact, mentions this difficulty in his notes to the Republic, and says, "we cannot suppose it escaped Plato." He attempts a solution of it, which is quite ingenious as a German hint, how the matter might have been reconciled, but which, unluckily, has no foundation in the Platonic books.

closes his description with the politic warning to his friends, that although things may not occur precisely as he described, still, the only wisdom is in piety during life, "for the prize of the combat is beautiful, while the hope is grand."[30] At the close of the Gorgias, which is the loftiest, the best sustained, and the most terrible of all his works, the same facts are used as a basis for a myth. Nothing can exceed the sublimity of the scene into which Plato introduces the disembodied soul. The chief topic of discussion in the dialogue had been justice, and its relation to rhetoric. It is a masterly attack on the ethics of the time. Socrates, in a personal conversation with three distinguished rhetoricians, had completely riddled the morality of the sophists and pleaders, and had shown that their whole art was false, having no relation to the moral wants of men. Justice, he showed to be the greatest good, and its administration disciplinary, and therefore the unkindest act which a wise man could commit, would be to save his friend from a punishment which he deserved. And at last, to prove the final impotence of the sophist's office, he shows, that if it be able to protect from righteous retribution in this life, it is powerless with the terrible judges of the lower world. The soul nor the body at the moment of separation — says he — is different from what it was as a living man. The body preserves its character, the well marked vestiges, both of the care it has received, and the accidents that have befallen it. If a person in life possessed a great frame, the gift of nature or the result of training, his corpse is large. If he were fleshy, his corpse is so. If he delighted in the cultivation of his hair, many locks remain. If, living, he bore upon his body scars of the lash, or any other wound, all will be found there after death. If any member were broken or dislocated in life, when dead these failings are still visible. And so with regard to the soul; when it is disrobed of the body, it preserves evident marks of its character, and of the accidents it experienced in consequence of the life which it embraced. When, therefore, men arrive before their judge, he examines the soul of each without knowing who he is; and often, having in charge the great king

[30] Vol. i., Phædon, pp. 312, 313, 314.

or some other potentate or monarch, and discovering nothing healthy in his soul, but seeing it all cicatrized with perjuries and injustice by the stamps which each action has engraven there; here the windings of falsehood and vanity, and nothing symmetrical, because it had been nourished away from truth; there monstrous deformities, and all the ugliness of absolute power, effeminacy, licentiousness, and debauchery; seeing it thus, he sends it ignominiously to prison, where it will no sooner have arrived, than it will undergo fitting chastisement. This punishment is proportioned to the offence, and sinners of the deepest die, who cannot be reformed, are used as warnings for the rest, and condemned to eternal pains.[31] The whole picture, which seems a dramatic transparency, lighted by the fires of the abyss, reveals no hint of the metempsychosis; punishment prepares the soul for more spiritual life, and the scene is closed without any reference to a return to bodily form and worldly state.

With regard to the much vexed question of transmigration, then, the whole facts are these. The theory is developed in a mythical form, dressed in the drapery of imagination; or it is introduced as an ancient opinion, in accordance with the usual license of Plato's dialogistic art, which induced him at times to quote Homer and Hesiod, as authority for moral truths; or it is communicated through the lips of some poet or Pythagorean, from whom it proceeds with dramatic propriety, and accompanied by a warning from Plato to the reader, against receiving it as anything more than a probable statement, devoid of scientific value. It is inconsistent in its details; is unsupported by any allusions to it, or any provision for it, in his physiological system; and is, moreover, entirely absent from equally elaborate myths, which are introduced to reveal the future condition of the soul. Besides, it is never connected, for a moment, with the idea of a pre-existent, bodily life on earth, as is said to have been the case with Pythagoras.[32] Many discrepancies in the Platonic dialogues

[31] Vol. iii., pp. 407, 408.

[32] Mr Norton, in the third volume of his "Genuineness of the Gospels," attributes this opinion to Plato. He quotes no passages, however, and makes no allusion to any; but nowhere have we discovered a trace of such a doctrine.

have been reconciled by reference to the time of composition; statements, in the earlier and less severely constructed works, being made to yield, very properly, to the more authoritative and careful passages of the later writings. But this solution is denied to us in the present instance; for the Phædon and Gorgias, whose myths contain no allusion to transmigration, are universally classed with the most trusty sources of his philosophy. Keeping in view therefore, the great freedom in the scope of the Platonic dialogues, remembering the poetic character of Plato's mind, and his artistic as well as scientific aim, and balancing, with an even hand, the testimony of all the sources, an impartial criticism must decide, that the theory of transmigration borrowed from the East and from Pythagoras, together with the details of the popular mythology of his country, were indifferent to Plato as poetic materials for the clothing of his views, and that he used both with a license which his followers could easily interpret, as media for impressing upon the imagination, by over-statements and highly wrought pictures, ideas which reason and dialectics could not clearly establish or convey.[33]

[33] Ritter, in his History of Philosophy, vol. ii., p. 373, throws his influence in favor of metempsychosis, as a clear and decided opinion of Plato, and not a merely figurative or mythical exposition of the soul's life after death. He thinks it in accordance with Plato's physical system. But he takes the details of transmigration entirely from the Timæus, without attempting to reconcile the conflicting forms of the hypothesis, and without previously settling the claims of that dialogue to credit as a scientific work. Moreover, in order to harmonize the theory, as stated in the Timæus, with what he calls Plato's physical system, Ritter is obliged to deny a fundamental ethical position of Platonism, viz., that the soul of the philosopher may expect an entirely incorporeal existence, and return to immediate communion with the divine. The license of criticism, which allows him to reject that, is not required to dissipate the whole theory of transmigration as a dogmatic element of Platonism. Fries, on the contrary, (Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i., p. 329,) contends for the symbolical treatment, and, without reference to Ritter, since his work was written first, asserts that there is no physical background for it in the Timæus.

No point of Ritter's exposition of Plato is more unsatisfactory than the pages on the future state. He fails as a critic of Plato, by reason of that quality of mind which fits him for an admirable exponent of Aristotle — a lack of imagination, and too exclusive reliance on words, without appreciating the forming spirit of a piece, which the words do not exhaust, but which pervades them magnetically, and gives them form. Platonism, in Ritter's pages, is like beauty anatomized — the flesh and

In criticising a system like Plato's, in which the scientific and poetic are so closely blended, considerable importance should be attached to the harmony of a tenet with the general moral spirit of the whole. Applying this canon to the two forms in which he has left his speculations on the future state, we should at once conclude in favor of that which speaks of a final, future condition, entirely separate from earth, and should therefore be inclined to accept the mythical statements of the Gorgias and the Phædon as the truer sources of his religious creed. It is rather dangerous, we know, to rely too confidently on such a rule; but the mysticism, which could hold honestly the tenet of transmigration, would be very apt to betray itself in moral speculation; and therefore. the clearness, the severity, the admirable purity of Plato's ethical code, furnish strong collateral testimony against his faith in a literal succession of bodily forms. Present to the mind of an impartial judge, acquainted with Christianity, but ignorant of Christian parties, the three parables — the prodigal son, the rich man and Lazarus, and the sheep and goats, and it would not require much critical rashness to decide their comparative value as expressions of the moral spirit of the gospel. The two last mentioned would be accepted, of course, as equally appropriate with the first to the object they were designed to illustrate; still the first is immeasurably superior as an exposition of the central idea of Christianity — the love of God, while the others contain elements designed merely for a local application, and are given in a form suited only to the culture of the time. And we cannot but feel that the same injustice is done to the symmetry of Platonic ethics, by fastening upon it the tenet of transmigration, as would be done to the purity of Christian theology, by literally applying the imagery of Abraham's

bones and nerves all there, but the *beauty* gone. From a note of Cousin's, (vol. vi., p. 480,) it would seem that Ritter, in a separate history of the Pythagorean philosophy, endorsed the view, that the metempsychosis in Platonism, was merely a symbolical statement of the persistence of intellect under the mutability of forms. We have never seen that work, but in Ritter's exposition of Pythagoreanism, (Hist. of Phil., vol. i.,) he intimates, that with Pythagoras, the theory was a holy myth, "much of it obscure, and indicative only of the soul's immortality." It is a queer freak of criticism to attribute the theory as a myth, to Pythagoras, and as a dogmatic tenet, to Plato.

bosom, and the impassable gulf, and the details of the judgment to the eternal world.

Great value, too, in an examination of this kind, mus be attributed to incidental allusions, and sideway hints, and unconscious intimations, with respect to the future state. For in these we are more apt to detect the real opinions, the stable faith of a mind like Plato's, than in more labored artistic passages. We observe his mind in its undress when it is not taking attitudes for display. And these allusions, which are very numerous throughout his works, are hostile to the view of transmigration. They refer always to a coming state of continued, but severer discipline. The form in which these allusions are conveyed belongs to the popular mythology, but the key-note to the whole is, the declared belief of Socrates in the Phædon, that "there is a destiny reserved for men hereafter, and which, according to the ancient faith of the race, must be better for the good than for the wicked." [34] In the discussion in the Gorgias, too, it is stated that "the greatest of misfortunes is to pass into the other world with a soul loaded with crimes." [35] The allusions to the future world in the "Apology of Socrates," all imply a disembodied being,[36] and in the Phædon, previous to the introduction of "that ancient opinion," as to metempsychosis, Socrates speaks of the occupations of the spiritual state, when, "freed from the follies of the body, we shall converse, I hope, with free men like ourselves, and shall know, by ourselves, the essences of things." [37] In the eleventh book of the Laws, also, the souls of the departed are spoken of as "taking still some interest in human affairs;" and in the twelfth book, speaking of the soul, he says that the body is its temporary image, its *simulacrum*, and that it passes at death into another state, to find other judges, and, "as tradition says, to render an account of its actions, an account as cheering to the good, as it is frightful to the wicked." [38]

[34] Vol. i., p. 198. [35] Vol. iii., p. 403.

[36] Vol. i., pp. 118, 119. [37] Vol. i., p. 206.

[38] Vol. viii., pp. 310, 376. See also Epinomis, vol. xiii., p. 2; Republic, book i., p. 9; Book iii., pp. 122 et seq.; Book vi., p. 33; Timæus, p. 143.

We cannot refrain from alluding in this connection, to a celebrated passage in the seventh letter of Plato, which is hostile to the idea of transmigration. As the letters have been suspected by many critics, and

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Our excuse for dwelling so long upon the point of transmigration must be the strange diversity in the judgment of commentators respecting it, the fact that no thorough examination of all the passages referring to it has ever fallen under our notice, and a desire to rescue the moral system of Plato from the stain of a doctrine so absurd, and so foreign to Plato's honest thought. As the review of this question has brought out nearly all the allusions in the dialogues to the future state, the nature of Plato's views relative to man's final destiny may be readily anticipated. We have no data to warrant the positive assertion that he held to the final purification of all souls from sin. It will be readily seen from the tenor of the passages we have introduced, that future conscious existence was not only with him a speculative belief founded on psychological analysis, but also a demand of our spiritual nature, to satisfy the claims of the moral law. Under whatever forms, or with whatever poetic license he depicted the circumstances and fixed the details of the soul's future condition, that condition itself was never arbitrary in his thought, but always a necessary result of the soul's moral development. The severity of his ethical views involved the idea of immortality as indispensable, not indeed to *restore*, but to *perfect* the order seemingly violated here. He looked upon the spiritual life of men as a circle, of which the present state is but an arc, but

rejected by some as spurious, we have hardly been willing to strengthen our argument by giving great prominence to their testimony. Our own opinion is in favor of their genuineness, and as we have before stated, Boeckh has thrown his ballot for the authenticity of the seventh, which is the only one we quote. The testimony of this document, if received, is the more valuable, as we may fairly presume that opinions expressed in the frankness of social correspondence may be more safely trusted as an honest expression of Plato's views. "Inanimate beings," says he, "can experience no good or evil; but every soul must experience them, both during its union with the body, and after it shall be separated from it. We must confide in the holy doctrine that the soul is immortal, that after its release from the body, it finds judges who are strict, and punishments severe, and consequently, that it is a more trifling evil to suffer than to commit injustice. . . . . Unhappiness is inseparable from all injustice, and a fatal law condemns the unjust soul to draw with it this impiety wherever it may sojourn, in this world, and during its wandering courses under the earth, providing for it, everywhere, the most shameful and miserable experience," (vol. xiii., letter 7, pp. 88, 89.)

whose full sweep requires and includes the progressive experience of futurity. It has been charged upon Plato that he held to the immediate efflux of all souls from God, and to a re-absorption of spirit into the Divine Essence. We do not know a single passage which gives even plausibility to such a view. Everywhere the future life is posited as a state of spiritual development, as personal agents, either in an upward or downward course.[39] This is the soul of his moral system; and it was to express this fact that the metempsychosis and the imagery of the popular mythology were used with such poetic freedom and complete indifference. Accordingly, whenever they are introduced, no matter what sacrifices may be made to the demands of dramatic propriety or to elegance of form, the idea of retribution and of continuous moral development is preserved as the central and stable fact. Neither can it be denied that generally he affirmed the punishments of the coming state to be disciplinary. His view of the relation between this life and the future was not that of modern orthodoxy. Nothing is farther removed from the spirit of his philosophy than the idea that life is a probationary state, and that the experience of the future is to the guilty an unalterable penalty for sin. Under the veil of transmigration, in the successive manifestations through forms, the cycles of whose changes would at last restore the soul to purity and spiritual freedom, was hidden Plato's view of the future as a disciplinary state. This reappears in every myth; and in the Gorgias and Phædon especially he shows the efficacy of punishment in reclaiming the

[39] Mr. Norton asserts (Gen. of the Gospels, p. 109, note,) that "as regards the generality of men, Plato's scheme was wholly inconsistent with a belief in their personal immortality." This is the most monstrous perversion of Platonism that can possibly be framed. There is no justification for the remark in the letter, or the spirit, of a single dogmatic or mythical passage throughout the range of Plato's works. In fact, the very next passages of Mr. Norton's note are inconsistent with the statement. Plato held firmly to the personal immortality of every soul, and to a graduated scale of disciplinary punishments, applied to individual sinners according to the nature of their crimes. Many other instances of misapprehension might be quoted from the allusions to Plato in the third volume of "The Genuineness of the Gospels." Mr. Norton, though apparently well read in the Platonic writings, very rarely seizes the spirit of Platonism, and, on the whole, is one of the least trustworthy of Plato's commentators.

great majority of souls to a life of purity. But in the last mentioned dialogues, he speaks of some who are too far gone to be reclaimed, and whose punishment is continued, not with the hope of benefiting them, but as a warning to other offenders. It is somewhat singular that it is tyrants mostly who are thus delivered over by Plato's justice to eternal woe as incurable. "I think," says he, "that the greater part of those, thus used for spectacles, are tyrants, kings, rulers and politicians. For it is they who, by reason of the power with which they are clothed, commit actions the most unjust and impious. Homer, too, is on my side. Those whom he represents as tormented eternally in hell, are kings and potentates, like Tantalus and Sysiphus."[40] In the Phædrus, too, as we have seen, the ninth and last degree of fallen souls become tyrants; and in the tenth book of the Republic, those whose crimes are remediless and who are tormented by devils, are said to be Ardys and others, "of whom the most part were, like him, tyrants."[41] When we bear in mind the frequent accommodations to the prevailing religious conceptions of the time which are scattered throughout the Platonic dialogues, it is somewhat difficult to decide the value of the few passages that speak of eternal punishment. The theory of transmigration, certainly, is more favorable to the idea of universal restoration; for in the mythic forms under which that is conveyed, although no picture is presented of a complete return, the language is generally favorable to the hypothesis, and no degree of corruption is spoken of as too stubborn to be cured. The idea involved in the metempsychosis is the one expressed in the Timæus, that condemnation to successive animal forms "will not cease till, governing by reasoning its grosser nature, the soul renders itself worthy to receive its first and excellent condition."[42] The power to amend is given to the soul even in its most degraded state, and a fair inference from the general language used in stating the theory of transmigration, would be that a return to virtue will finally be effected. Accordingly, it may be doubted whether — since punishment in the coming life is so

[40] Vol. iii., Gorgias, pp. 408, 409. [41] Vol. x, p. 283.
[42] Vol. xiii., Tim., p. 139.

generally stated to be disciplinary — the exception in the case of tyrants, while it was necessary in order to preserve the consistency of the myths as representations of the popular belief in eternal woe, may not have been intended to express Plato's horror at unjust and arbitrary government as the most heinous and least expiable of crimes.

And, certainly, if Plato really held the doctrine of utter perdition, there is a dissonance, an insoluble discord, between the outward artistic form and the inward moral spirit of his philosophy. Looking at his religious principles when abstractedly stated, they are pure and lofty, above, we must say, much of the theology of the Church to-day. Good, in Plato's system, is the fundamental quality, the essential character of God. He is the author solely of good. In his model state, Plato would permit no poets to ascribe the misfortunes and calamities of men to the design of Deity, unless they should maintain that chastisement is no misfortune, and that punishment has turned to the advantage of the criminal.[43] All natural phenomena are so ordered as to subserve some purpose of good. "There is a Providence which extends to all men. Thyself, mean mortal, insignificant as thou mayest be, art of some account in the general order, and related to it incessantly. If thou murmur, it is from lack of knowledge how thy private good is related at once to thyself and to the all, according to the laws of universal existence."[44] To a mind animated with such views of Deity, of course the problem of evil must have presented itself as a knotty subject of speculation. There is abundant evidence, in the dialogues, that it troubled Plato exceedingly, and that he grappled with it often, anxious to obtain a clear solution. His explanations of it are various, many of them visionary (such for instance as the myth of "the Statesman,") and destitute, doubtless, even to his own mind, of scientific value. But he always clung with invincible tenacity to the entire freedom of the human will. He is *ultra*, uncompromising on this point; and in no dialogue has he, to our knowledge, attempted to show the consistency of this entire freedom with a controlling Providence. It is always stated in the boldest form. Plato's piety would not suffer the character

[43] Vol. ix., Rep. p. 113. [44] Vol. viii., Laws, p. 263.

of Deity to be implicated for a moment with the question of evil. "God leaves to the disposition of our will the causes on which the quality of each depends."[45] "Virtue has no master: it cleaves to him who honors it and abandons him who rejects it. Each is responsible for his choice. God is guiltless."[46] And with this responsibility was connected the dignity of the soul. "No man," said he, "is willingly evil." This is a fundamental and continually recurring point of Platonic ethics. He borrowed it from Socrates, and was faithful to it throughout.

No man desires to be subject to evil. The end of every volition is not the act committed, but that for the sake of which the act is committed, and this in every undertaking is ultimate good.[47] In the last analysis, the true and the good are one. Evil therefore is moral ignorance; and since the soul is essentially reason, it cannot voluntarily be subjected to ignorance, and is not therefore voluntarily wicked.[48] The virtuous man is the true artist who has his aim and can attain it; and vice must be attributed, not really to the will, but to lack of art.[49] The only consistent theory of eternal punishment, then, for Plato, is eternity of sin, which is itself contradictory to the last mentioned view of the harmony of the soul with virtue. We see, therefore, that the idea of eternal punishment as depicted in the Gorgias and the Phædon, is entirely hostile to Plato's declared views of God and man, and moral order. It is contrary to his views of God, for he must not be charged with the commission of any evil, but arranges all things for the best; of man, since the very essence of the soul is free causality and natural harmony with good; of moral order, since to suppose that God removes from the soul this freedom, or that it loses this love of good, would not only violate his scheme of human nature, but would destroy the very principle which solved for Plato the origin of evil. Olympiodorus, one of the Alexandrian commentators of Plato, takes up the passage in the Gorgias which teaches eternal punishment, and attempts to account for its introduction there. "Punishment," says he, "cannot

[45] Vol. viii., Laws, p. 265.
[46] Vol. 10, Rep., p. 287.
[47] Vol. vi., Meno.
[48] Vol. xi., Sophist.
[49] Vol. iv., The Second Hippias.

be eternal; much better to say that the soul is perishable. An unending pain can do no good, for it is useless. But God and nature do nothing in vain." He accounts for the passage by contending that Plato used the word *eternal* with reference to the order of the heavenly spheres. The moral cycle of the world corresponds to the motions of the planets, and when the whole system shall have returned to the same relative positions from which they started with respect to each other and the sun, a new period will commence. The cycle includes many thousand years, and it is to this period that Plato refers in his use of the term *everlasting*. The criticism does honor to the benevolence of the commentator, who, with all the Alexandrine school, we believe, rejected the doctrine of eternal woe.[50] But it is entirely fanciful as a solution of the passage in question, and we must fall back upon the inconsistency of the tenet with Plato's ethics and theology as affording reasonable

[50] See the whole commentary quoted by Cousin in the notes to his translation of Plato, vol. iii., Gorgias. We cannot help contrasting this view of the ancient philosopher, with the glee which inspires a modern Christian critic, Dr. Tayler Lewis, in detailing the facts of Plato's myths. He seems quite delighted with the aid which Plato brings to his theology, and more than once forces him into the field against "modern semi-infidels and neologists." We doubt whether Plato would be elated with the honor of a Doctorate in Calvinistic Divinity; at any rate, when modern orthodoxy shall become Platonic, Christianity will have occasion to rejoice over her freedom from many a theological excrescence; and the world of woe, at least, may expect to be visited and cheered by some rays of mercy from the throne of Love. Dr. Lewis' admiration seems almost equally divided between Plato and the Bible. He defends some of Plato's wildest flights of fancy by the letter of Scripture, as in the case of the animation of the heavenly bodies. Plato at times seems to imagine that the planets have souls and are intelligent beings, which Dr. Lewis considers a very plausible idea, and seeks to defend from the Old Testament. "The Bible teaches us," says he, "that even the ordinary courses of physical events are under the controlling agency of angelic beings. *He maketh his angels winds, his ministers a flaming fire.* Why not an angel of the sun, of the moon, and of each planet? Was it simply a sublime personification, when it was said, *He bringeth out their host by number, he calleth them all by their name?* or when we are told that, at the creation of our earth, THE STARS OF THE MORNING *sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?*" And yet with all Plato's orthodoxy, Dr. Lewis' mind seems not entirely at ease upon the question of his salvation. Could he trace anything of the doctrine of the atonement "in the lives or writings of Plato and Socrates," he should "indulge more hope of their salvation from it than from any of those moral lessons — truly beautiful and sublime as they are — which have been left to us in their immortal dialogues."

proof that, like the whole myth in which it occurs, it was borrowed from popular superstition, and was preserved in obedience to the law of artistic consistency, as an embellishment to the severe moral discussion of the Gorgias.

It may easily be seen from the rapid survey we have taken of Plato's passages on immortality, that the task of criticism is no pastime. And so far as results in plain black and white, in dogmatic sentences, are concerned, it certainly is unsatisfactory. "Myths," says Cousin, "can never be translated." It is almost impossible to convey by analysis the fresh impressions produced by the perusal of an author like Plato. He is an artist. In his dialogues, as in his mind, the philosophic and the poetic, the beautiful and true, unite and blend. No author is less likely to be appreciated, or more likely to be misunderstood, by a cold, severe and unimaginative thinker. He must be read by an eye that can look beneath the words; he must be criticised by a spirit in sympathy with the author's aim, and which can resign itself to the influence of the dialogues, often trusting to feeling as its guide, rather than to a microscopic analysis of sentences. Such a mind, while from the diversity of the materials, and the various poetic developments of the thought, it feels the difficulty of stating with precision the form of Plato's views, will rise from the study of them, impressed with their power and elevated by their purity. It will no more impute to Plato the literal views developed in many of his gorgeous philosophic poems, than it would judge the theology of Phidias by his head of Jove, or the faith of Goethe by his picture of Mephistophiles. The results to which a criticism fitted to disentangle the Platonic dialogues would arrive as to their doctrine of immortality, would be immeasurably more accurate, we believe, as they would be more noble, than could be developed by any textual harmony. It would grant that concerning every thing connected with the soul and man's spiritual nature, Platonism is vastly superior to any other form of ancient, we may almost add, even of modern speculation. For Plato never faltered in his spiritual view of man. The superior principle and governing agency of the universe, was one infinite, controlling Mind, entirely independent of material forms. And so the spirit in man, with him, was superior to its

fleshly envelope, an indivisible, eternally subsisting entity. The proofs brought to establish this point may seem futile to modern logic; but the moral end and aim of existence, the relation of the soul to duty and the moral law, every where implied in Plato's system, compel us to rank it next to, though far enough removed from, the ethics of the Gospel. Plato keeps the soul ever in the light of eternity. His theory of life is based upon a consciousness of the enduring nature of the spirit and its nearer relation, in its disembodied state, to eternal justice, the discipline and retribution of impartial wisdom. The limit which divides the abstract theology of Platonism from the abstract theology of Christianity, is the boundary line which separates the intellectual principle of justice from the higher quality of love.

Looking about in modern times for some man with whose views to compare Plato's theory of the future state, we should say that it has a nearer affinity with the speculations of Swedenborg than with those of any other thinker; inasmuch as the central idea of most of the Platonic myths would seem to be that the soul creates its own objective circumstances according to its inner character, with the difference, however, that, with Swedenborg, the condition of the soul in future life is fixed and final from the beginning, while with Plato, there is a constant development of life, the successive cycles of its discipline promising at last to restore the soul to good. The man who reads Plato, expecting to find logical arguments for immortality, applicable to the present state of science, will certainly be disappointed. There is no danger that the Christian will be anxious to exchange the grounds of his belief for the supports of philosophy alone. Still, no man can become thoroughly imbued with the spirit of Plato's views, without being better able to appreciate the simplicity and purity of the Gospel; and it is a valuable and inspiring truth which Platonism sufficiently reveals, that the human mind, in proportion as it becomes more spiritual, and learns to live within itself, feels a witness of its dignity and destiny, and is elevated to a sense of certainty as to its enduring life, which logic, though it may not be able satisfactorily to establish, is entirely unable to weaken or remove.

T. S. K.

Art. VI.

Literary Notices.

1. The Statesmen of the Commonwealth of England; with a Treatise on the Popular Progress of English History. By John Forster, of the Inner Temple. Edited by J. O. Choules. New-York: Published by Harper & Brothers, No. 82 Cliff-street. 1846. 8vo.

We have seldom opened an historical work that so deeply interested us, as this of Forster's. With a style, sufficiently correct indeed, but of little beauty, and somewhat cumbersome, the author succeeds, to a remarkable degree, in placing before us the great characters of the Protectorate, in their living, speaking, and acting features. We feel, too, while reading, that he has not written in a spirit of adventurous generalization, but from a minute acquaintance with the facts of the time, and with the men themselves, after examining and weighing all the documentary evidence, now accessible, of the parts they acted. The character and course of the Earl of Strafford, in particular, were always an enigma to us, till we found them unriddled in the clear and natural account here presented, confirmed as it is, apparently, by the fullest proof. Sir John Eliot, on the other side of the great question, was almost unknown to us, though he was one of the earliest and most devoted champions of English liberty. Are not the portraits, in general, which Forster has filled up, truer to the originals than the dazzling sketches of Carlyle, who could not, perhaps, appreciate such a character as Hampden's, or recognize the perversities in such a powerful Titan as Cromwell. In the case of Sir Harry Vane, we must confess, our author seems to labor rather hard to clear away, from his religious speculations, the appearance of mysticism and extravagance. The value of this work, however, is, by no means, confined to the gratification of our curiosity with respect to the affairs of the Commonwealth, and the leaders of the parties in that age. It exemplifies, in a striking manner, the influence which faith in eternal principles exerts, at all times, on the destinies of nations and governments. Some of the noblest characters, in all history, belong to the times of Charles I. and Cromwell. They are such as we need, in our own country, at this day; such as our young men especially ought to study. After centuries of eclipse, their fair fame is shining out in its brightness.—Even the central figure in the group, if it indeed be that of one who eventually fell, appears not "less than an archangel ruined."

2. A Universal and Critical Dictionary of the English Language: to which are added Walker's Key to the Pronunciation of Classical and Scripture Proper Names, much enlarged and improved; and a Pronouncing Vocabulary of modern Geographical Names. By Joseph E. Worcester. &c. &c. Boston: Wilkins, Carter & Co. 1846. Royal 8vo. pp. lxxvi. 956.

In the neighborhood of Boston, Mr. Worcester's Dictionaries are becoming the standard, at least for orthography and pronunciation, in our common schools, as well as in the higher seminaries of learning. How they are regarded in other parts of the country, we know not. It seems probable, however, that they will be eventually received as the current authority, in those respects, throughout New England; unless, indeed, some new work of the kind shall appear among us, under higher patronage.

The present volume is a Critical Dictionary, as its title claims. It begins with an Introduction of nearly 80 pages, consisting of remarks on the principles of pronunciation, on orthography, some account of the origin, formation, and etymology of the English Language, its grammar, notices of its archaisms, provincialisms, and of Americanisms, and a brief history of English lexicography. The last 120 pages are occupied by a Key, enlarged from Walker's, to the pronunciation of Greek, Latin, and Scripture proper names, and by a catalogue of geographical names with their pronunciation. The Dictionary proper, which of course forms the bulk of the work, is very full. The authorities are generally named, for the sense that is given to the words respectively; and in cases of disputed pronunciation, the decisions of the different orthoepists are signified.

We are not qualified to pronounce on the merits of a critical work of this kind. So far as we can judge, however, Mr. Worcester appears to have performed his laborious task with great faithfulness, with discrimination and good taste. We hope that, in a future edition, he will give us a still fuller catalogue of geographical names; for, in this branch of reading we are often at a sad loss how to frame our utterance aright.

3. Sacred and Miscellaneous Poems. By William B. Tappan. Boston: Published by Benjamin B. Mussey. London: Chapman, Brothers. 1847. 8vo. pp. 332.

We admire the strong and thorough religious spirit, which is the distinguishing excellence of these poems. It is not of the effervescent kind, sparkling here and there, for the sake of effect; it is a steady, quiet and pervading vitality. On this account we commend them, notwithstanding a few occurrences of Trinitarian

ideas, in rather an offensive and even shocking form. What could make Mr. Tappan so far forget the reverence due to God, as to write thus, of the scene in the Garden of Gethsemane?—

"——— where its olive sheds perfume,
The *God lies weeping on the ground.*
. . . . . .
The great *Creator bows his might,*
A lowly *angel strengthens him.*
. . . . . .
And *God, the Maker, borrows power*
To bear the grief, and drink it up."
pp. 20, 21.

It is but seldom, however, that flagrant offences, like these, break the still current of piety, that runs through the whole of Mr. Tappan's volume. Generally speaking, we can commune with the heart of the writer, and feel the chastening spirit which breathes around him. But when we have mentioned this religious element, we have exhausted the praise that is due to the work. The poetry is seldom above mediocrity; shall we say that it is sometimes below it? The Muses have been sparing of their inspiration to the verse; there is hardly enough of imagination to give it life, or of poetic taste to preserve it from occasional awkwardness, and prosaic flatness. Though there seem to be some attempts at brilliance, we may observe, what is really favorable to the character of the whole, that they do not conceal the mediocrity, nor will they be likely to mislead the reader into an undue admiration.

The publisher has done his work better than the poet; the volume being one of the most tasteful, in respect to typography and binding, that, within our knowledge, have appeared this winter, from the American press.

4. Scriptural Temperance. A Sermon, delivered in the Hollis Street Meeting-House, Boston, on Thanksgiving-day, Nov. 26, 1846. By David Fosdick, Jr., Minister of Hollis Street Society. Published by Request of the Society. Boston: W. Warland Clapp & Son. 1846. 8vo. pp. 26.

Riding in the country, some years ago, we saw a church, a little out of the village. "Hallo, Friend, what church is that?" asked we. "It belongs to the Jug-Baptists, Sir." "Well, but who, in the name of Legion, are the Jug-Baptists?" "Why, Sir, they had a long fight with the old Baptist Church, down yonder, because it went against the rum-jug," said he, "and now they've left, and settled a minister of their own to preach against the temperance folks."

The Sermon, mentioned above, seems to have been addressed to a sister Jug-Church, and is valuable as the only theological ex-

position, we have seen, of the tenets of this tribe of our Israel.—*Logically*, its doctrine would be that temperance is moderate indulgence, and that we ought to practise this in all things, (pp. 8, 9.) —that we ought to indulge moderately in slave-holding, rum-selling, rum-drinking, war, and other evils. But *apparently*, its meaning is, only, that we ought to be moderate in condemning these sins, while, on the other hand, "we ought to speak out, against the intemperate demeanor" of those who are trying to check slavery, rum-selling, rum-drinking, &c. It is written in familiar style, with a fair appearance of scholarship; and is illustrated by a number of texts from Shakspeare's Plays, which would seem to be the Sacred Books of the tribe. We looked, in vain, for that very apposite passage, "If I had a thousand sons, the first human principle I would teach them, should be, to forswear *thin* potations, and addict themselves to sack." Is this an interpolation in our secular copies?

5. The Universalist's Assistant; or an Examination of the principal Objections commonly urged against Universalism, &c. &c. By a Believer. Boston: Abel Tompkins, 38, and B. B. Mussey, 29 Cornhill. 1846. 18mo. pp. 234.

Though we have not had leisure, as yet, to give this little book a thorough perusal, yet we are satisfied, by a cursory inspection, that it may be safely recommended, and that it will do good. Its brevity will be a convenience with such as are stinted with respect to time. The peculiarity which distinguishes its plan, from that of other works published among us with a similar purpose, is two-fold: 1. It takes Universalism, in its broad and true sense, as the doctrine of the ultimate salvation of all mankind through Jesus Christ, without confining it either to the particular theory of universal salvation at death, or to that of a limited future punishment; and 2, the subject is treated chiefly by way of answer to objections which have been made against the doctrine. So far as we have read, the work is written in a style of perfect candor, and apparently with a spirit of impartiality not always found in polemic treatises.

To our taste, there is rather too great an array, of cheap, second-hand Greek criticism, such as any body may write, who has learned the alphabet, and got a few current English works in point. We, Universalist authors, flourish considerably with this sort of learning, for want of better, and sometimes make whole Greek Indices to our books, no doubt to the admiration of the "natives." But for ourselves, having partially repented of some early misdemeanors of the kind, we intend, by way of expiation, to lash every one who yields to "the sin that doth so easily beset

us." We have a rod in pickle for some of our brother offenders, and are biding our time to lay it on.

We do not mean that the fault alluded to, is such as to impair the usefulness of this work; it only offends against what we call good taste. On opening at the last page, where we usually begin to read, and seeing in the margin, a word which we thought was never affixed but to Greek editions, what was our joy in supposing that some friend had sent us a clean and handsome copy of one of the Greek fathers! A little irritation may be forgiven us, in the disappointment of finding it an English book, after all.

6. A System of Moral Philosophy, adapted to Children and Families, and especially to Common Schools. By Rev. D. Steele, and a Friend. Boston: James Munroe and Company. 1847. 18mo. pp. 80.

This little work appears well to deserve the patronage to which it aspires. It is perfectly simple in its plan and execution, intelligible we think even to children, and yet written in a style by no means distasteful to persons of mature age. The striking illustrations with which it abounds, drawn from every day's experience and from universal consciousness, render it peculiarly interesting, and suggest, to all readers, some of the most important lessons of practical life. We cannot better describe its moral character, than by the following words from the commendatory notice of Rev. Dr. Bond, editor of the Christian Advocate and Journal, New York: "The authors base the whole system of morals on the one law of love, illustrating and applying this law to every feeling of the soul, and every relative duty of life. The code is complete; the obligation to obey it, and the benefit of obedience, are clear, and are cogently enforced, and the necessary, unavoidable consequences of disobedience to this law are shown to be suffering—mental or corporeal—in all cases. They cannot be prevented or evaded." We recollect but one word in the book, to which we should object, (p. 28.) But so great are its excellences, so thoroughly sound is its general doctrine, and so pure the influence it must exert, as to make us forget a single questionable expression. We earnestly commend the work to the patronage of all who feel an interest in the moral education of the young.

Art. VII.

Analogy between the Present State and the Future.

Our views, on this interesting topic, have been so well presented and argued by others, in former volumes of this publication, that we should be obliged to repeat much of what they have said, were we to go over the whole ground. We shall, therefore, devote a large part of our labor, here, to the general principles involved in the subject, and to some incidental questions that have been associated with it; contenting ourselves with a briefer statement, when we come to the central points in the case. For a more thorough illustration of these, it will be sufficient to refer to the articles in which the work has already been done, with so much ability and completeness.

Perhaps the term, analogy, has incurred some odium, in the controversies that have risen on the subject. Still, it seems expedient to retain it, here; because that, whether it be the best word that could be chosen for the purpose, or not, it has been so commonly employed in this connection, as to have become familiar to our readers, in the general purport at least that we have in mind. Its particular use, too, has been already explained, [1] as carefully, perhaps, as we should be likely to define that of any other term, were we to select anew.

A few words, however, to guard against hasty misapprehensions, may not be out of place. By analogy, we mean, here, not any merely casual resemblance between the two states of our existence, but the action of some principles and laws that must be common to both, such as are necessary to man in all possible circumstances, as a human being under the divine government. It is important to mark this definition, at the outset, because it appears to have been sometimes overlooked. For a like reason, it may be well to observe, also, that analogy must not be

[1] Universalist Quarterly, vol. ii. Art. xxii. pp. 255, 257.

confounded with sameness, or identity; the term never being used in this sense. We cannot say, for example, that a thing is analogous to itself; though we might say, if we had occasion for a sheer tautology, that it is the same as itself, — identical with itself. Neither, according to common usage, can we say that there is an analogy between things that are the exact counterpart of each other, — we mean in those particular respects in which they are fac-similes, — as between two houses built on one plan, and out of one material. It is a more distant relation that is expressed by the term. When we say there is an analogy, for instance, between truth and light, nobody understands us to mean, either that they are identical, or that they are alike in their details: that truth is a physical substance, as light is supposed to be; that it moves through space at the rate of two hundred thousands of miles a second; that it passes through glass, and not through boards; that it is reflected by mirrors, drawn to a focus by lenses, and separated into rays of different colors by prisms, &c. And so, in any other case, in which there is analogy. The term itself implies, and is always understood to imply, that the subjects are different from each other, just as clearly as it asserts that they have some property or characteristic in common. And the proposition that there is an analogy between our future state and the present, is, in other words, simply this: that, together with a difference of circumstances, and of modes of being, in the two, there still are some properties and laws of action common to our nature in both, and that the essential principles of the divine government are not changed in passing from one to the other.

Should we begin our inquiry into the general subject, with the bald question, Is there any analogy at all between our present state and the future? we presume that every believer in another life, would answer, Yes. For, to doubt this, would be to question whether there be any positive connection whatsoever between this and our next existence; whether our personal identity will remain; indeed, whether any element of our being will survive, as ours; in other words, whether it is we who shall live hereafter. If *we* are to exist there, no matter in what mode, nor in what circumstances, all that is really essential to our conscious being, together with all its primary laws, must, of course, pass

into the future state, and live and act there, under the same immutable principles of the divine government that operate here. Though we may there lose many of the simply accidental peculiarities we have here acquired; though we may be developed in different forms than at present; and be subject to new influences, and even to additional laws; still, to say the very least, the ground-work of our personality and character must re-appear, the same in that world as now. All these intellectual and moral idiosyncrasies, which constitute us human creatures, and which distinguish us from each other as individuals, must remain in active force; or else the future state is not for us, but for some other beings in our stead; in which case we neither have, nor shall we ever have, any concern with it, except in the way of curiosity, or of good-will towards that yet unknown race which is to enjoy it.

There is an unguarded manner of talking, on this point, which might seem to imply that we are, strictly speaking, to be created over again, hereafter; that our present being, so far as respects its peculiar intellectual and moral organism, is to be abolished or absorbed, and a new psychological constitution substituted in its place, without any self-conscious, vital connection with the old; that no element of the character which belongs to us will pass on from the present to the future; that the series of personal developements, begun here, is to be entirely cut off at death, and never to be resumed; that the whole process of existence, thought, purpose, and feeling, will commence absolutely anew, independent of all previous growth, and of all influences from the past; or, at all events, that such may be the case, for aught that we can judge of, to the contrary. We do not suppose, however, that this is actually what is meant; because it would be too obviously absurd to call such a future state, ours. We should have no more connection with it, nor interest in it, than we have in the future state of the fairies, if there be such creatures.

We see, then, that all which is essential to our nature, as persons, must be common to both states of our existence. Now, this constitutes a very wide field of analogy, in the case. Some of this field is doubtless beyond the reach of our ken, since we do not know all that is essential to our nature; but some of it, also, lies within the

sphere of our consciousness, as distinctly as any thing else does. And so much we may properly take as premises, from which to reason, and draw conclusions. To all this, we must add whatsoever we know of the immutable principles of the divine government; for as these never change, they are the same hereafter as here. In these two classes, then, of primary elements, human and divine, we have the grounds of analogy, from which we may, to a certain extent, make rational deductions. Indeed, wheresoever we recognize an analogy, we cannot avoid reasoning from it, after some fashion, if it once engages our attention. All men, who believe in their own future existence, do thus reason upon it. A very large part of their ideas respecting that state, are formed in this way. No one can wholly shut out the suggestions that flow in from this quarter. We shall see, in the sequel, that even they who, in words, disclaim the method of analogical deductions on the subject, do nevertheless employ it, as well as they who explicitly avow it. The chief difference between them, in this respect, is, that the former use analogy in determining a certain set of questions on the future state; and the latter, in another set of questions, of the same general nature.

The main subject of this article may be conveniently considered in two parts: 1. The difference, which the term analogy implies, between the two states; and 2. The relation it asserts in the case.

But, before we proceed to the discussion of these, let us mark the limits that naturally belong to all analogical reasonings, when employed on this matter. It should be distinctly observed, that, under neither of the heads just named, can analogical reasoning lead us farther than to conclusions of a very general kind. Though founded on certain permanent principles, it can nevertheless deduce only their general operations; it cannot fix the several stages through which they will pass, nor follow them out to the particular forms in which they will successively result. On the one hand, it cannot determine precisely the amount of changes that will distinguish the two states; nor on the other, precisely the degree of resemblance that will be preserved. How far the person will be influenced by the circumstances of his position, and how far by the forces of

his own mind and character; what new impulses will be given, with what power they will act upon him, and in what direction; how susceptible he will be to the motives bearing upon him, and how vigorously his nature will spontaneously unfold itself by its own energies—these are questions which analogy cannot decide with much precision. With respect to them, it can do little more than to dertermine that all the agencies of this kind, whatsoever they be, must work some effects, and that these effects must be such as agree with the laws of those agencies. So much however, it can determine with certainty. In other words, the general bearings alone can be ascertained.

And here, it is important to remark, that such is also the case, when we reason from analogy on the developement of individual characters, in the present life. We know, for instance, that what a man is to-day, will *help* to make him what he will be to-morrow; but, to what extent, we cannot positively decide. Neither can we tell what unforseen circumstances and motives will come in; nor, were these even known, could we anticipate exactly how they will combine with his previous tendencies and existing condition, to give his mind a new turn. The acting forces are infinitely too complex to be calculated in detail. And yet, nothing is more certain than that we can draw some conclusions from them; for example, that his present character will, somehow, affect his character for the rest of his life. The influence of the former is one of the elements—only one indeed, but a very powerful one—that will go to make up the latter. It may be overborne, it may be gradually transmuted, by a multitude of other elements; but there it is, nevertheless, performing its part among them, and making the result different than it would otherwise be. We know, too, that, as a general rule at least, the consequences will, for a considerable period, hold on in their original direction, and continue to be good or evil, accordingly as the man's habits are now right or wrong. Never, indeed, do their tendencies wholly change around, in a single instant. This is a work only to be accomplished by degrees. It might seem, at a cursory glance, that so much uncertainty rests on the developement of human character, as to involve the whole subject in darkness, and to set all reasoning at defiance. But it must be observed, that the

uncertainty rests only on the particular steps in the process, not on the permanent laws by which it is evolved. Nothing could be more absurd than to argue, from our ignorance of the former, that we are also ignorant of the latter. What should we think of one who should seriously contend that we can form no rational judgement of the *general* bearings which moral principles have on subsequent life! we mean, in the present world.

Keeping in view, then, the proper limits of analogical reasoning, in this matter, we may proceed to see how far it can be applied to the future, under the divisions in which we have proposed to consider the subject.

1. That there is a great difference in circumstances, and in the modes of being, between the two states, needs not be proved to any one who receives the Scriptures as authoritative. The disclosures which they make of the future life, though but few, leave no room for doubt on this point, notwithstanding the diverse interpretations given of particular passages. It is not our business, in this article, to enter into the controversy respecting the meaning of those passages; we take only the general and unquestioned Biblical fact, of a spiritual instead of a fleshly existence, hereafter, or of a resurrection to incorruption and immortality. Now, reasoning from analogy, we should conclude that this will materially affect the developement of our character. We know that changes of circumstances, and especially of constitution, though comparatively trivial, have an influence, here, on the intellectual, moral, and religious nature of man; and why not the far greater change, hereafter? It would be absurd to say that we cannot carry such an inference across the gulf from the present to the future, on account of the acknowledged difference of circumstances that intervenes; for, this argument would presuppose that the very cause which affects us, (namely, the change of circumstances,) may be the cause to prevent its affecting us; or, that our characters may be so changed as to be altogether beyond its reach, and still be not changed at all. It is one of the primary laws of our nature, that we are susceptible of influences from without us, and that these operate as motives to modify our character in some way. If we yield to them, they of course leave their impression upon us; if we resist them, the effort works with no less force

on our minds,—only in a different direction. So long as this remains the law of human nature, any important change in circumstances, and especially in the mode of our being, will somehow affect the nature of the person himself. Indeed, we cannot conceive of such a creature as man, so perfectly isolated in his being, so completely shut up within himself, and hermetically sealed, as it were, against all external relations, that the world in which he exists, be it the present or the future, should have no influence upon him. Even the isolation itself, were it possible, would make him altogether a different creature than he is, since it would destroy his susceptibilities, and the thousandfold agencies which they exert, together with their results.

The change, then, which death must introduce in his external condition, cannot, according to the nature of the case, fail of having some important influence on the developement of his character. This point, however, has been so clearly illustrated in a former article, by another hand, that we can do little more than to refer to it, for a satisfactory exhibition of the fact.[2] It appears to us unreasonable to represent death, or the change of worlds, as but a simple transition, if we mean that it is attended by no disenthrallment of our spiritual powers from the domination of our mortal senses, or if we imply that such a liberation will be followed by no moral effects. The implication is obviously inconsistent with every principle of analogy, and with all that we know either of the laws, or of the actual workings, of the human mind. Account for it as we please, it is matter of fact, that there is hardly any change whatsoever of our exterior condition, which does not have some bearing on our developement. And, in the case before us, there is an almost total shifting of circumstances, — one that is far greater, at least, than any that befalls us in this life; must not its internal consequences be proportioned to its magnitude?

Here, however, we must be careful to distinguish the point on which alone those consequences can bear. It is

[2] Universalist Quarterly, Vol. iii. Art. xxviii. particularly pp. 398—405, gives the most complete and satisfactory exposition we have ever seen of this part of our subject. Vol. ii. Art. iv. pp. 50, 51, also presents an important consideration with regard to the *ultimate* result of all the sin which divine providence here permits.

not that they will set aside the laws of our nature; but simply that they will affect the operation of them. It is not that they will make us morally better, without any voluntary and purposed action of our own, (for this would be a violation of those laws;) but only that they will give some impulses to our activity in this respect. It would be an enormous blunder to confound virtue, or holiness, with mere physical change, such as death, or to suppose it the *immediate* product of any possible combination of circumstances, such as attends that event. It can be produced only through the workings of the will and affections; which may indeed be gradually wrought upon by circumstances. It should be distinctly observed, of the brief illustration we have attempted, and of the more thorough one referred to, that neither goes on the absurd ground that death, with its accompanying change of condition, is itself a change of our moral character, or that it can produce such a transmutation simultaneously, or in any way but as occasioning certain processes of our voluntary agency, — in one word, that it can strip off our sinfulness, as we strip off the husks from an ear of corn. Whatever value the argument has, it rests only on the principle that the transition, from the corporeal to the incorporeal state, will loosen the hold of our fleshly affections, and that the new circumstances and influences, hereafter, will furnish new incentives to spiritual advancement; our moral nature still continuing to operate, under them, according to its own laws. This leads us to consider the second division of our subject.

2. Were it the case, as is implied by more than one hypothesis, that man is but a creature of circumstances, and his mind but the combined action of them, as music is the harmony of sounds, which have no abiding existence, — then, indeed, his character would, at once, be wholly shifted, on a total shift of circumstances, so as to begin absolutely anew; just as a new tune comes by a new combination of notes, without any connection with former airs. But man is a substantive agent, by himself; his mind is a living personality, instinct with power, and having its own centre of action, as well as its own laws. It is separate from circumstances, underlays them, and controls them at the same time that it is influenced by them. Through all external changes, it continues a distinct element; how-

soever influenced by them, it still runs on, with its active forces at work according to its own nature, — like a broad river flowing through darkness and sunshine, in pure or turbid currents, through meadows and quicksands, now in a smooth channel, and now over cataracts; but itself never lost, and never precisely what it would be, but for what it has been in some other stage of its descent. No really entire change is possible with man, while this personal element continues, — no utter annihilation of all its previous tendencies; for it is itself one of the agencies that work out the result, in every successive stage of its progress. At any given moment, the action of its vital forces must be produced by what itself is, at that moment, as well as by the extraneous causes then operating upon it; and what it is, is just what it has grown to be. After it has once begun to put forth its activities, each succeeding step communicates with the next, and modifies it.

Take man at the instant he enters on the future state; what do we necessarily find in him, of his former self? The same being, the same individual person; though on the point of beginning to act under new influences. Though less encumbered, perhaps, than before, here is the same nature, still, with its idiosyncrasies. So much of the elements in the case, is necessarily the same; so much of the agencies then about to operate, comes from the past, and receives its direction from the past. How is it with his moral character? we mean, at the instant in question. If he has any sin, or holiness, it must be substantially that which he has brought with him from the preceding state; for, both sin and holiness are the immediate results of personal acts; and he has not yet acted in his new state, though he is about to act there. For the same reason, if he has neither, it must be because he had none before. And then, as to his previous growth, both intellectual and moral; what has this to do with him in the state he is entering? Unless the universal chain of causes and effects is entirely cut off, at death, whatsoever he has become, up to this event, must influence the character which he now has, so as to make it different than it would otherwise be. Just how it will affect him, in *subsequent* stages of his developement, amidst the multitude of other influences, we may not be able so positively to determine; but the gene-

ral fact itself appears to be certain. Character is not as a garment that one may wrap over us, or strip off from us, without our own agency. It is integral with ourselves; it is the product of our mental growth; the result of a voluntary process of developement. Circumstances and influences may hasten or retard this developement, or be the occasion of its taking a new direction; but it is a *process*, still; an internal, not an external one; having its *immediate* cause in our will.

Having thus pointed out what we deem the general principle of the case, we refer, as under the former head, to the work of another, whose clear, forcible and thorough exposition, saves us the labor of pursuing the subject into details.[3] It is important, however, to remark, that the ground, occupied by the foregoing statement, will be found to leave room for any new revelations that may be given in the future world, and for all kinds of influences that may operate, there, on the individual, and even for all changes of his character that may be made consistently with the laws of his nature, and with the action of moral principles. These we have supposed to be eternal; for were they set aside, the identity, both of the creature and of those principles, would be destroyed. We should greatly mistake the purport of our argument, were we to infer that, because our present developement will influence the future, it must therefore influence it in but one direction straight on through eternity. Such a supposition would be against all analogy,

[3] Universalist Quarterly, Vol. ii. Art. xxii. pp. 255—278. We take this opportunity to express our admiration of the ability with which this part of our subject is discussed, in the pages noted by the reference. We do not refer to the introductory pages of that article; because we do not, perhaps, understand what is there said of the respective offices of Reason and Revelation. When once convinced that we have, in the Scriptures, a revelation from God on any point, we mean in the common sense of that phrase, the authority of that revelation is, of, course, the authority of God to us; and consequently paramount to every other. The truth revealed is a *fact*, established with us, and takes its place with other facts, which reason must receive as the *data*, from which it infers its conclusions, — not as hypothetical propositions, which still need to be verified. But if, on the other hand, the term, revelation, be used ambiguously—if it be meant that there is no other revelation than the action of our speculative reason, it is absurd to distinguish the two. Nothing is more prolific of inextricable entanglements, than an attempt to reason by means of a *double-entendre*.

as we have shown. Our tendencies, though always consecutive, are perpetually swerving from their previous course, now diverging, now returning, now deviating still more widely, and not seldom changing by degrees around to the very opposite direction. Evil itself, under the controlling economy of divine Providence, results eventually in good. We have sometimes heard it represented, in a stiff, machine-like way, that if any disadvantage attend us, hereafter, it must there operate forever as a disadvantage, keeping us so far back, eternally, from the stage we should otherwise attain. If two individuals, it is said, begin the future state, the one in advance of the other, they must forever continue just so many degrees apart; as if they were to be fixed in an iron frame, and to progress only by the movement of the frame onwards. This may be very good mechanics; it is not psychology. But let us return.

To us, the supposal of no intellectual and moral connection of the present with the future is so incongruous with all our forms of thought, that we never could bring it distinctly before us, and still retain the idea of another existence for ourselves. We do not know, indeed, that any one entertains the supposition, fully to this extent; but is it not sometimes implied, at least in a negative way? Let us not, however, be understood to impute it to others, in the form, perhaps exaggerated, in which we are accustomed to contrast it with the views we have offered. That death is a non-conducting medium, as it were, through which no influence whatever can pass from this world; that all our personal developments perish there; that God's dealings with us, here, in providence and even in the work of redemption, are absolutely shut up within the present life, and have no effect or reference beyond; that all the joys and sorrows, through which we are disciplined, bear no fruit but what we gather here, and that the seeds of this have no second growth; that the last hours of our agony, and so many other sufferings, are but waste pain; that our characters, good or bad, the product of so much toil, die utterly and forever, with our bodies, — all this is so abhorrent to our very nature, that we would give but little for a future being, under these annihilating conditions. Say, that what remains of us, will be clothed with inconceivable glory; still, so much of ourselves is taken away, that the

glory can hardly be regarded as ours, more than that of some other creature in our stead. More desirable to us would it be, that our existence should go on, with its characteristic properties to be regulated by continuous laws, even at the expense of some imperfection for a while, than to have it utterly broken asunder, cut off from all sympathy with our present being, stripped of all that is dear in our experience and growth, and resolved back again into its primitive elements. It is on the same general ground, that we would prefer another life, with some evil, to the horrible blank of annihilation.

If our reasoning, however, be correct, there must be an intimate and vital connection between the two states: the present communicating moral as well as intellectual elements to the future, to be there modified under new influences. To sum up the whole in few words, — there are two sets of agencies, which, from the nature of the case, we must recognize in the future; one of them, the same essentially as at present, namely, the inherent powers and qualities of the individual's own being, such as it has become; the other, different, namely, the new circumstances and influences that will bear on those properties. We say, these two sets of agencies; but, then, both of them must work under the same immutable principles of the divine government that operate here.

We can hardly suppose the objection will now be made, that we set up the evidence of analogy against the Scriptures; for, we neither know of a passage, or a doctrine, of the Bible, which interferes with our conclusions, nor have we ever heard, or seen, one allèged directly in support of such a charge. Were there anything of the kind, we readily grant that it would be decisive against our argument, either in whole or in part. In that case, even analogy itself, if loyal to revelation, must take the revealed fact as one of the unquestionable points, in its premises, and deduce its inferences accordingly.

A more plausible appeal against us, however, may perhaps be made, under the form of an enquiry, whether we are not *adding* to the inspired doctrine, and attempting to "fill up that which is lacking in it," by means of analogy. To this, we should answer, In no other sense, than as all be-

lievers in revelation do so, and are obliged to do so, on every general topic. We respect the motives of the enquirers; but the question seems to arise from an oversight of the character of the inspired testimony, or rather of all language, written or spoken. This is always supposed to be addressed to rational creatures, who, as such, have already forms of thought, by which one idea, when suggested, calls up a multitude of others around it, and who, when informed of a general fact, will of themselves analyze it, to a certain extent, and place it in natural relations, unless otherwise instructed. We have been told, for instance, of such a city as London, that there is an immense number of houses and people there. But nobody has, as yet, thought it needful to tell us, explicitly, that those houses and people are analogous to such as we have seen, here; that the former are built of physical substances, of the nature of other matter, with something to stand on, &c.; and that the latter have skin, flesh and blood, and souls, &c. All these, and a thousand other particulars, not expressed, we are expected to supply from analogy. Any important deviation from this rule, is usually specified; — as, the strikingly peculiar customs among the Londoners, or the malformation of feet among the Chinese. To say nothing of the grounds on which we affix any meaning whatsoever to terms; were we to allow no ideas to be suggested beyond the bare verbal statement, we should have but a dead, skeleton-notion of its import, even in case of the most elaborate and exhaustive description. To describe elaborately, however, and in detail, is not the method of the Scriptures. Whatsoever the subject, they usually announce but the leading facts, or perhaps give only some significant feature, and leave the rest to be filled up by suggestion. When they treat of our future existence, they presuppose that we have some conception of what is naturally implied by existence; some notion of its adjuncts and correlatives, — of the peculiarities that belong to the existence of man, as distinguished from other creatures, and to that of ourselves, as distinguished from other individuals of our race. They presuppose, on our part, a multitude of analogical ideas, which are associated in our minds, with the given fact; and therefore, they enter into no details, except such as are important to be known, and still are not likely to be otherwise

suggested to us. They do not assert, that man will, hereafter, continue to be but a finite creature, as he is now; shall we, therefore, abnegate all judgement on that point, lest we add to their doctrine? They do not assert that he will there retain his identity, his self-consciousness, nor his memory, nor that he will have any character at all, nor that he will preserve his reason. Nor was it necessary that they should go into the endless task of enumerating such particulars, when they had once given us assurance of his future being, under the conditions which they do specify. And to us it appears, that the general conclusions we have drawn from analogy, are but those which the mind naturally associates with the Scripture doctrine of immortality, and which would always gather around it, were they not argued away, in accommodation to some special hypothesis. We have, indeed, attempted to verify them, by such an analytical course of enquiry as the mind does not ordinarily pursue, on this or on any other subject; but every one will distinguish between the method of proof, and the ideas themselves.

We have said that even they who disclaim analogical deductions concerning the future state, do nevertheless use them. Passing over the notions which they, in common with others, entertain, that man will be but finite there, that he will exist as an individual, and not as a *syncretism* of the whole race, that he will preserve his personal identity, that he will have thoughts, desires, a will, &c., — all which inferences are from analogy; do they not contend that mankind will be happy, hereafter? Whence do they so confidently derive this conclusion? Not from any express assertion in the Scriptures, that we recollect. We may be told, It is the necessary inference, however, from what they do assert, namely, that man will be equal to the angels, be the children of God, incorruptible, in a spiritual body, that all will be subdued to God, &c. But how do we know that these conditions will, *hereafter*, produce happiness? They would, indeed, be attended with that effect, should the nature of things remain the same as in the present world; but the question now is, of the next world, which is supposed to be so different, that we cannot reason to it, by analogy with any thing here. If it would not seem like retorting, we should say, Bring us nothing but explicit

declarations of Scripture! It may be replied that reason itself determines the case, on the given premises. Indeed! but, on the grounds we are examining, what has reason to do with a future state? can it "go beyond the word of the Lord?" Suppose, now, that we should rigorously follow out, on this point, the exhaustive process of ignoring, which is sometimes pursued on other rational deductions concerning our subject, it would be easy to negative away the last vestige of proof. And so, on other points, too numerous to be mentioned. How confidently is it said, that if men be sinners, hereafter, they must be miserable; if righteous, happy. Such is, indeed, the case, here; but we infer it of the future, only by analogy, not from any direct testimony of the Scriptures. Nevertheless, it cannot, we think, be properly called an *addition* to their doctrine, — certainly not, in any bad sense; nor can any thing else, which is analogically involved in all that they explicitly declare. The truth is, that, for reasons already stated, we are obliged continually to fall back on the general grounds of analogy, in order to take in the import of language, and to recognise the principles involved in any discourse. In most cases, we do this as unconsciously as we supply an ellipsis in a sentence.

It would be too much, perhaps, to expect that our argument will be entirely satisfactory to all, with whom we should be glad to agree. Perhaps a perfect sameness of opinion, concerning the conditions in which we enter the future state, is not to be looked for. Generally speaking, too vehement an eagerness to secure unanimity on such points, only provokes to diversity. Nor can we flatter ourselves, that our several illustrations, embracing so many secondary questions as they do, are in every respect faultless. The general scope, alone, is what we regard as of much consequence. Even this, we are aware, is not, in its purely theological aspects, so essentially different from the forms of representation that have been current among us, as might at first thought be supposed. To us it seems to lay open the rational ground of connecting the present with the future, in accordance with the Scripture doctrine, and at the same time to avoid certain absurdities, of a moral and psychological nature, which we think are involved in

other expositions. On this account, chiefly, do we esteem it; not as a fundamental article of religious faith. It would gratify us, to see the general subject wrought over again, by a more patient and exhaustive process, and any errors, into which we may have fallen, detected, as well as the deficiences that we have left, supplied. H. B.[2d.]

Art. VIII.

John Foster.

1. The Life and Correspondence of John Foster. Edited by J. E. Ryland. With Notices of Mr. Foster, as a Preacher and a Companion, by John Sheppard, author of Thoughts on Devotion, etc. etc. New York: Wiley & Putnam, 161 Broadway. 1846. 2 vols. 12mo.

2. Review of John Foster's Life and Correspondence. By Rev. George B. Cheever. In the Biblical Repository, for January, 1847.

The first-named volumes give us the most real form of biography that can be obtained. They do not simply tell us where the subject of them was born and dwelt, how he dressed, and what he ate, and how he acted; but they lift the veil that hides the heart. The events of every brief period are followed by the letters written during that period — letters which are singularly suggestive of what the man was, that really anatomize his moral being, and reveal the mental struggles, the self-conflicts, which made life full as much "a battle" as "a march;" — letters written in all the varieties of moods to which the mind of the writer was subject; and, like the turning of a precious stone, new combinations of the primitive colors flash out upon the sight at every change. This is a form of biography which, we trust, will become popular; for letters written for one eye, are not the cramped and artificial things which Essays must necessarily be, that are worked out, and elaborately retouched, in mortal fear of criticism and the Reviews.

Till these volumes appeared, John Foster was known to us only through his Essays, his contributions to the

Eclectic Review, and some reports of Lectures. From these we had drawn a vastly different opinion of the real man — the living, breathing, and feeling thing, that moves the wires for the author — than is brought before us at once by his Correspondence. His style had much to do with this, possessing no flexibility, to give play to the really fine sympathies of the man. Dr. Chalmers was once asked, "What is John Foster doing?" "Why, sir, he is thinking, as intensely as ever he can, at the rate of about a sentence a week." Such fastidious precision does much for the redemption of language from abuse, and brings the reader to drink from the "well of English undefiled;" but it moulds and hardens the real substance so much as to make the literary effort like the ancient Briton's armor, — ponderous and impressive, but allowing the owner to reveal scarcely any other attribute than strength.

With this fact distinctly before every intelligent reader, the correspondence of Foster is made, by some of our theologians, to contradict his practical writings; and so this grand mechanism of mind, that was once so impressive in its operations, must now be less regarded, because "a screw is loose *somewhere*." But why is this? The simple answer is, — John Foster's letters reveal that he rejected, as at variance with every rational thought of God, the idea of endless punishment, and argued the case with all the vigor of his great mind. Religious prejudice warps the criticism; and, in order to promote a mere party purpose, the defective orthodoxy is attributed, in the face of candor, to a defective religious experience! This is the dogmatist's method of dealing. Error in the humble mind, is the result of ignorance, or inborn depravity; but in the great, it is the result of a defective religious experience. The idea, that a true virtue or holiness can exist under any other than their own received form, seems never to be entertained by these sapient critics. But "the wise shall be taken in their own craftiness;" for reflecting men will ask, — Why was the piety impugned, rather than the argument? Why attempt to prove the religious experience defective, rather than the reasoning? That which is now deemed a matter of dishonor, will yet be quoted to the praise of John Foster. It has been left for

Rev. Dr. Cheever, to take that view of this great mind which only religious bigotry could incline any one to take, by which every thing available is tortured into something suspicious, respecting the sanity of the intellect, or the genuineness of religious experience. The same confessions and lamentations, which in other cases would be lauded as proofs of humility and Christian abasement, are here treated as evidence of defects in the character, and mournful errors of life. Not long since, a review was published of a good man's life, whose orthodoxy was unquestioned, and what was the treatment of confessions of a far more fearful character than any which Foster, in his gloomiest or saddest mood, ever made? In the letters of that divine, were confessions of fierce struggles with doubt and unbelief; and boldly was it said, by the author, that he had arguments and questions against Christianity, in comparison with which all that was ever published was as nothing! Much of this and the like, was quoted in the review; and what was said of it? Why, the divine in question was a strong advocate of eternal misery, and therefore these arguments and questions, which seemed so formidable, were attributed to the agency of Satan, in tempting the good man's soul! It seemed strange to me, that Satan should have suggested to such a person arguments and questions against Christianity, in comparison with which all published attacks upon the foundations of faith were as nothing! The cunning and wisdom attributed to this personage, would lead us to expect that he would get these arguments and questions published. But the devil is forgotten, when Foster is criticised; which seems to imply, that the denial of the truth of endless sin and misery, is not presumed to be a suggestion of Satan's; for if so, how easily could the unbelief of Foster be accounted for, as the unbelief of the other great mind!

Dr. Cheever might have found an easier method than he has adopted, hinted in the good lady's remark; — a brother had renounced Trinitarianism, but no change in the goodness of his character could be insinuated; and, therefore, she was asked how she got along with that? "O," was the reply, — "Satan is so sure of him, because of his erroneous creed, that he takes no trouble to corrupt his morals." An ingenious evasion! though certainly im-

plying, that a rejection of the "essential" Trinity, does not positively involve a deterioration of moral character, and that it is easier for Satan to affect the faith in that doctrine, than to corrupt the man.

Dr. Cheever, in announcing his purpose, in his review of Foster's Life and Correspondence, says, — "We use the freedom of those who have followed Foster's intellect as a guiding star; who well remember the time when, as if some gorgeous angel had come to them to lead them on in paths of truth never before opened, they remained spell-bound, by the grandeur of the vision. And now, if the same angel beckons them on towards a tract of error, they are right, if they scrutinize most severely the elements of an intellectual and spiritual developement, assuming so unexpectedly such a direction; elements, every one of which they were prepared, at one time, *to take, even on trust, as well nigh perfect.*" This last expression admits much; it is an admission, that the impression of Foster's writings, and all that report and rumor had brought concerning him, united to assure the admirer of his genius, that a beautiful unity of heart and intellect, gave to his character an exaltation well nigh the highest. But what has given the "unexpected" turn, the "developement," that staggers trust, and bids the bewildered look about for evidence of "a defective religious experience?" Simply the avowal that he does not unite with the popular church on the point of endless punishment! This casts a shadow where all so late was light. And yet, as if contradiction was an inevitable element of the reasonings of such critics, it is said, that had Foster been consulted in respect to the publication of the letter in which he argues against endless punishment, he would probably have requested it to be consumed! Why state this, and then argue as if that letter was a part of his real being? Does the Dr. mean to imply only that Foster would have imitated the many preachers, whom he knew, who kept from publishing their cherished disbelief in the popular doctrine? Would he have us regard him as inclined to moral cowardice? He is an intellectual coward, who shrinks from following thought to its legitimate conclusions, who is ever "halting between two opinions," forgetting the homage due to truth, by the exercise of a

miserable expediency, in attempting to keep on the "safe side." He degrades God, by the idea that to use reason in the freest manner may endanger the eternal well-being of the soul. He slights and contemns the great lesson of the Master in the parable of the Talents. Moral cowardice is a shrinking from the avowal of conclusions carefully and legitimately drawn and entertained. It prevents conviction from finding utterance and being propagated. The light goes out under a bushel. John Foster belonged to neither of these classes of cowards.

Let us look into his Life and Correspondence, and mark the qualities of his character as there revealed, noting whether it was in a light and unthinking manner that he avowed disbelief in endless punishment, and what is the character of the argument he adduces to justify this rejection of an "essential" in the popular creed.

John Foster was born in 1770. Both his parents are said to have been persons of good minds, decided piety, and excellent in their intellectual tastes and judgment, well capable of instructing their sons in the right use of means for solid attainments. The eldest, John, was from the earliest period marked by great thoughtfulness, and so mature seemed the judgment he was wont to pronounce on things and events, that he was termed "old-fashioned." As early as in his twelfth year, he had "a painful sense of an awkward, but entire individuality," as he himself recorded. The gravity of his parents, who were wanting in that peculiar communicativeness and sympathy which can alone keep alive the heart of childhood, continually promoted the growth of his love of abstraction. He mingled not in the usual sports of childhood, and was that serious thing — painful at times to behold, because so out of the usual order of nature — a too exclusively thoughtful child. Timidity, so deep-felt as to be styled "an infinite shyness," characterized his feelings and manners. With antipathies strong, but never malicious, his associations were always intensely vivid, so powerful and often domineering was his imagination. Awful and terrific things met with, in reading, would afterwards haunt him, and "the time of going to bed was an awful season of each day," as he confesses. His reading powerfully impressed him, especially that which dealt with the super-

natural world. Even some words had a strange fascination over him, and their sound was as potent as the witchery attributed to a fairy's wand. His indifference to society seemed only to give strength to his sensibilities in communion with nature. The grand and beautiful had great influence over his imagination, and nothing was too minute among the tiny forms of vegetation, to fail of awakening sentiment and feeling. His susceptibility is well seen in the fact, that he could not bear to shorten the brief life of a flower, by plucking it, but chose to carry it home only in his mind. He was keenly sensitive to "the skyey influences," and often remarked on the value taken from time by inclement weather. Mournful and solemn music had great attraction for him, and whatever pleased him he was never tired of hearing repeated. How much is suggested in the single record, that "his favorite instrument was the organ."

To the filial affections he was faithful, uniformly so, notwithstanding the youthful heart was checked in the exercise of its freedom, by the undue gravity of his parents. He early began to assist them in weaving, and worked, till his fourteenth year, at spinning wool at the hand-wheel. For three years afterwards, he wove lastings and such fabrics; but, at this time, he felt a constant disinclination to the employment, possessed by a presentiment that it was not his sphere. He felt like "a foreigner in the place," and was painfully oppressed by a want of companionship or intellectual sympathy. When, under these circumstances, his work was subjected to severe inspection, and found fault with, he turned away his head, and quietly submitted to the ordeal. *Studiousness* was the marked trait in his character.

The influences of domestic piety were constantly around him. His parents' house was a constant resort for the devout, and a meeting was weekly held there for religious exercises. A petition in his behalf never failed to be lifted to the Throne; and, when just passed his seventeenth year, he united with a Baptist church. His pastor and others urged him to prepare for the ministry, and to such a preparation he was "set apart" by a special religious service. At that time he aided his parents in their weaving, a part of the day, and the rest was given to the

most intense study. Whole nights were devoted to reading and meditation; for which purpose he selected a grove in his pastor's garden. The expenditure of great labor, with slow advancement, marked his course. A favorite employment was selecting paragraphs from various writers, and attempting to remodel them into as many forms of expression as possible, — sitting with a hand on each knee, moving his body to and fro. This process he called *pumping*. He had a great aversion to certain words and forms of speech in use by religious persons, and would expunge them by act of Parliament. "We want to put a new face upon things," was frequently his remark.

Such a mind could not be contented with the surface of things, and was well training itself for the Essays on "Decision of Character." On one occasion he started off suddenly, in a heavy shower, to look at a waterfall in the neighborhood, of which he had often heard; and on his return, said, — "I now understand the thing, and have got some ideas on the subject, with which I should not like to part." When determined to examine any thing, he could not be deterred from effecting his purpose.

When he became a preacher, he was assiduous in visiting the cottages of the poor, endeavoring to encourage freedom in those whom he approached, that he might be welcomed as a friend and counsellor. The sick and aged received especial attention, and in addition to conversation and prayer, it was his usual custom to read the 145th Psalm.

In his letters, during the period he was at college, he asks for the prayers of his pastor, — urges upon a friend, as he would urge also upon himself, to make a noble use of time, — resolves upon cultivating intimate acquaintance with the Scriptures, rarely turning to any of the eight and twenty Commentaries at hand; and is anxious, above all things, to cultivate a warm and growing piety. "That character is the most dignified which reflects the most lively image of the divine excellence. Heaven is the proper region of sublimity; and the more we dwell there, the more we shall triumph in conscious grandeur of soul." He leaves the literary privileges of college, "firmly resolved" that "every scene into which he may be intro-

duced, shall witness him actively alive, in the cause of religion and of God."

We now find him a preacher, rigidly conscientious in condemning, in himself, an inclination to abstract thought and meditation, too often unproductive. He officiated at Newcastle and at Dublin; at the former place but three months, and at the latter a year. "Nothing can be imagined less interesting than the Baptist society in Dublin." He found relief, by familiarity at a charity school, composed of girls, where he talked with familiar gaity, gave many rewards for learning, and *daily* read many amusing books. Solitary rambles and the indulgence of his love of nature, were his chief recreation. At this time, he had little respect for ecclesiastical formalities, and after not a little deliberation, he changed, as he expresses it, "*very properly*, the cleric habit for a second edition of tail and colored clothes," and preached in this guise several times after his return to England. He confessed his sorrow that he was not at this time employed in preaching, because of the "infinite value of religion." He would fain build a church and preach freely to all who would come.

And now comes his first reference to his doctrinal opinion, by saying that the denomination of people with whom he had been conversant, had stronger causes of exception, than the color of the waistcoat; — "my *opinions* have suffered some alteration. I have discarded, for instance, the doctrine of eternal punishments; I can avow no opinion on the peculiar points of Calvinism, for I have none, nor see the possibility of forming one. I am no Socinian; but I am in doubt between the orthodox and Arian doctrines, not without some inclination to the latter. It is a subject for deliberate, perhaps long, investigation; and I feel a sincerity which assures me that the issue, whatever it may be, must be *safe*. In this state of thought and feelings, I have just written to Mr. David, of Frome, requesting to be informed whether there be, within his sphere of acquaintance, an Arian congregation in want of a preacher; expressing to him, however, that 'my preference of *such* a congregation does not arise from a conclusive coincidence of opinion, but from a conviction that there only I can find the candor and scope which I desire.'" Now, up to this time, we find him an inveterate

thinker, elaborating every subject, and exercising a most commendable decision. The only "transition" was from one church to another, as preacher; and his journal bespeaks a solemn earnestness towards all the great interests of the soul. He hated "priestly consequence and ecclesiastical formalities," and a "black coat" he is determined not to order, when he wants a new one. That this was not a mere caprice, is evident from his expression, in his letters, that he never has such freedom in speaking as in some humble place.

And how does the confession, in respect to his opinions, strike the reader? Does it breathe the true spirit of frankness, of that fervent desire to get at truth, which Christianity imperatively enjoins? But how is this matter treated by the critic who has made it his peculiar task to impeach the "religious experience" of Foster? Dr. Cheever says, — "We find, amidst all his uncertainties, one sudden and positive declaration, '*I have discarded the doctrine of eternal punishments.*' He adds, 'I can avow no opinion on the peculiar points of Calvinism, for I have none, nor see the possibility of forming a satisfactory one.' *The discarded doctrine seems to have been cashiered by Mr. Foster, with about as little thoughtful investigation, as if he had been laying aside an old coat.*" — Is this honest? — honest even according to the lowest code of morality? Was there any thing in the whole intellectual character of the man, that can warrant the insinuation? Yet the indignity is deepened by what is added, that "the sudden announcement of this negative position is almost the only positive thing to be found in these three or four years of experience!" What a contemptible thrust at an earnest and true mind! "This announcement of opinion," Dr. Cheever continues, "has an abruptness, an isolation, a dislocation from every train of association and employment, which intimates a hasty prejudice, rather than a deliberately formed conviction. He seems to have discarded the clerical dress and the clerical doctrine with about the same independence and indifference; but in neither case as an absolute conviction. If, however, his denial of this grand prominent feature in the Christian system, is to be traced back to this period, it is manifestly a denial not based upon any profound or protracted ex-

amination of the subject." Here is *the* point — the hinge on which turns the whole criticism. It is assumed without proof. It is taken for a party purpose, and the end proposed throws suspicion on the whole treatment of the subject. It reminds us of Dr. Barnes' statement in reference to the common use of the Scripture by quotation, that if the passage was referred to, it would be found to pertain to any matter rather than that in support of which it was cited! We find in Foster's letters a continual reference to the importance of religious subjects, the duty of study, and the deepest self-reproach for not persevering in putting forth the greatest efforts for advancement; and this too with a constitutional disposition to indulge in what he calls a "musing vagrancy." There is no evidence that such a doctrine as that which is deemed the "grand prominent feature of the Christian system," could have been otherwise than a matter of most profound thought. The vividness of his imagination, the strong and mighty power of association, the terrible visions that haunted him in youth, and made "the time of going to bed an awful season of each day," — all combined to render him a proper subject of deep impressions from the common administration of the doctrine of endless punishment. He was not a man to make such a request as he made to his friend at Frome, on a sudden impulse; and that the discarding of the doctrine in question was not a momentary affair, is proved by his remark concerning the denomination with which he was conversant, that they had but little fellowship with him on account of his opinions. This shows his opinions were matter of remark. It was on *this* account that he was led to express to his near and dear friend, Mr. Hughes, *what* the changes in his opinions were. There is nothing *sudden* about the matter, nothing isolated, and certainly nothing like "a dislocation from every train of association, and employment," intimating "a hasty prejudice, rather than a deliberately formed conviction." How much worthier are the comments of a more philosophical and candid critic, — "Like all who indeed *think*, and who muse painfully upon the mysteries of the system in which they find themselves placed, Foster early doubted concerning many things ordinarily held in his connection, to be true; and some such points of belief he continued to reject to the last. He wan-

dered not, however, from the precincts of serious faith — faith in Christianity; and no reader of the letters and journal, can hesitate to admit that a deep and solemn conviction of the reality of things unseen and eternal — a conviction meekly submissive to the testimony of Scripture — possessed his mind and governed it. Besides that the high moral tone of his character, and the grandeur of his imagination, held him ever near to the radiant centre of truth, his mind wanted entirely the scientific rudiment, and therefore he was never in peril of scepticism. If he disbelieved some things which others believed, it was not from *disbelief* that he did so; but rather from an overpowering belief — a vivid sense of certain truths which were seemingly incompatible with such and such articles of the orthodox creed. There are men, and many such, who believe every thing firmly, precisely because they believe nothing deeply. They doubt nothing, because they never ask themselves what their belief includes and implies; and if only they could, for a moment, get a glimpse of the interior of a mind like Foster's — if they could creep into his bosom, they would come away bereft of a third of their 'articles.' Foster believed, as superior natures in an upper world believe; and he, on earth, doubted, just where they in heaven, veil their faces with their wings."

In broad contrast with this is Dr. Cheever's low comparisons. "It is," he says, "as if we saw a Christian Diogenes in his tub. It is as if Job were before us on his dunghill, giving vent to the bitterness of a wounded spirit." "Aye; and it *was* Satan by the road-side in Foster's own mind. And instead of a bold unhesitating appeal in answer to the Word of God, we hear again the hiss of the serpent!" "Perhaps," (Foster's remark,) "there is some pertinence in a suggestion which I recollect to have seen, in some old and nearly unknown book in favor of universal restitution." Here is the real spirit of the critic, — the slightest thought of any pertinence being given to any suggestion in favor of Universalism, is "the hiss of the serpent."

Dr. Cheever institutes a resemblance between what he calls the scepticism of the Psalmist and John Foster. In the 73d Psalm, he represents the writer as oppressed by the allowed prosperity of the wicked, and the seeming

want of no adequate retribution; he was brought back by coming into the sanctuary, and there knowing what God *would do* in the eternal world. This is a gratuitous assertion, for what was there in the Jewish sanctuary, where "Moses was taught" to teach the doctrine of future retribution? By what rule of interpretation is "their end" made to mean "the eternal world?" But hear what is said of Foster's scepticism: it was "as to the goodness of God *because* of his justice, because of the undeniable looming up in the Christian system of the doctrine of *Eternal Retribution!*" .... "The Psalmist doubted of God's goodness *for want of retribution.* John Foster doubted of God's goodness *because of retribution.* The Psalmist was made submissive and trustful by what he was assured *would be* in eternity; but Foster was racked with distrust and doubt by what *he feared would be* in eternity. This does but attribute to Foster a sinful motive for his rejection of the doctrine of endless punishment. It is too frequently the fact, that the advocates of that doctrine can devine no other reason for doubting it, than a servile fear of its terror. May not their own weapon be turned against themselves, — may they not with equal force be told, that the fear of endless evil keeps them from questioning its truth, lest they be removed from the imagined "safe side." Foster was profoundly impressed by this doctrine, not because of its "justice," but its injustice — because it was so abhorrent to every principle of moral goodness — because it added to the awful mysteries of this life, the vision of an evil to which all the woe of earth is but as nothing. Admit the idea of evil becoming a *permanent* element in the universe, and all things, from the nature of the Deity, to the condition of souls in any portion of the future, become changed in a moment. No manifestation of a perfect God can be anticipated, and that which now blights and blasts the moral creation, must be contemplated as somewhere still operating with increasing energy. On no part of the domains of the Almighty can be inscribed a verification of the Scripture, "Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." And we must lie down in our despair with the questions unanswered, How can the endless punishment of sin, implying of course the perpetuation of sin, be a better manifestation of God's hatred towards sin, than

its utter expulsion from his universe? Will this fulfil the promise of crushing the serpent's head?

All the force given to Dr. Cheever's diffuse reasoning in reference to Foster's denial of the essential doctrine, lies in what Foster has written concerning the Atonement. There seems to be an inconsistency between what he says of the danger attendant upon a rejection of that provision, and his argument against endless punishment. He nowhere expresses himself fully enough upon the doctrine of the atonement, for us to form a judgement how the two co-existed in his mind, or which of the many theories he believed. If he regarded the economy of the atonement as the appointed means of human salvation, effectually secured for all, he might have looked to the future for its efficacy to be applied to those who pass from this world without hope because without faith. The common doctrine has entanglements enough for the believer, without his trying to show up any difficulties which exist where the idea of the Restoration of all souls is also cherished. If Jesus suffered the penalty which justice demanded, where is the reason for inflicting the penalty again on those for whom it was endured? If a debt is satisfactorily discharged once, by what reason is another demand pressed for the same? While here, in this life, we are said to be under the covenant of mercy made with Christ, in consideration of his sufferings and death, by which, as our vicar or substitute, he took upon himself the punishment due to all sinners; and why, if this be the case, is retribution spoken of as existing here at all? And yet we are told that "the *partial* flashes of justice in this world are but the *restraint* of the Divine indignation, under a system of mercy through the death of his Son." Is that a system of *mercy* where indignation is but restrained, where it is continually revealing its existence by partial flashes? It seems rather to bespeak an anger that is curbed and checked for a time, only to break forth in a thousand-fold greater fury hereafter. We must get away from these defiling views of God and the divine economy, ere we can see the perfect proportions of truth. We must read in a different light the apostolic declaration,—"God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them." Here are presented the origin, the spirit, the extent, and the re-

sult of the mediation of Christ. "*God was in Christ*," — not out of him, and needing to be placated, but in him, in the great purpose for which he was sent into our world; and here is the *origin*; "*reconciling*,"— here is the *spirit*; "*the world*,"— here is the *extent*; "*not imputing their trespasses unto them*,"— here is the *result*, — humanity at one with God, and God in the sublimest of all possible senses, "all in all."

The Letter to a Young Minister, against the doctrine of endless punishment, which is "the grand subject of interest in these volumes," can more easily be spoken of as "full of inconsistencies," than proved to be deserving of such cavalier treatment. When but twenty-three years of age, Foster deliberately avowed his rejection of the doctrine, and this letter was written in 1841 — forty-eight years after — and in no period between those ages, is there the slightest evidence that the writer entertained any other view. It is therefore to be considered of the highest value. Its author, at the time of writing it, was seventy-one years old; an age at which the most solemn and weighty thoughts have been matured, and when the words of John Foster, especially, were deserving of the best attention. They were "extracted from a world of thinking."

Every candid recurrence to the real character of Foster deepens the force of his argument — the moral argument, against endless punishment. His opinions affected him, and had he not rejected the horrible dogma, the pensive hue of thought would have deepened into an awful blackness. He who could not bear to see a spider entangle a fly, nor to pluck a flower because it shortened its brief life, must have been put upon a rack of perpetual torture by anything like a conviction of the truth of the doctrine of endless punishment. It is some comfort that even those who deem belief in this doctrine "essential," do yet admit the hope that John Foster is in heaven. A strong test that. After laboring with all possible vigor to maintain the absolute essential nature of this part of *the* creed, the tone of dogmatism is suddenly lowered, and it is admitted that "Christ was with him," in the expiring hour! Why not follow that doctrine to its legitimate conclusions? Simply because it would strike with horror every rational mind to shut Foster out of heaven. But when driven to

this point, they will have it, that Foster had in his soul a sense of "a vast, dread, illimitable retribution, in eternity," — "an ever brooding power," — "a master o'er a slave." Special reference is made to an Essay introductory to Doddridge's "Rise and Progress of Religion in the Soul," for which the publisher waited for years, while the edition lay in sheets upon the shelves, but which essay, it is admitted, was at last written "as a mere task, a piece of hard, unwilling, compulsory labor, throughout; *a perfect fag.*" How can such an essay be taken as embodying the real soul of the man? and after all what can be cited from it which will not reasonably bear an interpretation referable to a limited punishment? The strongest passages that can be quoted are easily paralleled by citations from writers strenuously devoted to the advocacy of the complete restoration of all men to holiness and God. The fact is too prominent to be veiled, that if a reference is made to eternity in an impressive and awful manner, and man is exhorted to use this world as an immortal being should use it, the cry is at once raised, that such a soul has "a sense of a vast, dread, *illimitable* retribution in eternity!"

The moral effect of Foster's practical writings falls far short of the power they would have exerted had he cherished more prominently, in its due relations, the *great hope.* His writings are wanting in that warmth and glow of the heart, which can only be given by fervent appeals to the better nature of man, and by presenting the higher motives which sway his being. The hell of vice is frequently opened, — the heaven of virtue, seldom. It is a grand subject for speculation, to consider what would have been the influence of such a mind as John Foster's, had it been deeply imbued with the divine influences of our faith; had his heart been more opened by trust in what is good in man, had he looked forth from his study upon society with a yearning to mingle there instead of continuing a recluse; and had he gone forth with an inspiring love, to feel and do as the philanthropist has felt and done. There would have been diffused through his writings a genial and hopeful spirit; its kindly influences would have blended with the impressions made by what he wrote; it would have been felt, where it was not seen. The desponding and despairing would have taken up his writings, as the

invalid goes forth amid the reviving influences of nature,

> —— "She glides
> Into his darker musings, with a mild
> And gentle sympathy, that steals away
> Their sharpness, ere he is aware."

But we take gratefully his gift as it is, and own its great value. We are grateful for the addition to his published writings by his correspondence. It opens another and more attractive view of the man. We see him gay with children, reading their amusing stories, and delighted with flowers. "But sweet nature! I have conversed with her with inexpressible luxury; I have almost worshipped her. A flower, a tree, a bird, a fly, has been enough to kindle a delightful train of ideas and emotions, and sometimes to elevate the mind to sublime conceptions." His married life, with a congenial spirit, was peculiarly happy; and tenderer tributes to departed worth are not to be found, than those which are contained in his letters concerning the loss of his wife. Yearning love went forth striving to explore the unexplorable,—to devine the precise condition of departed souls, and whether they were conversant with the affairs of this world. "She that loved me, and I trust loves me still, will not, cannot, must not answer me. I can only imagine her to say, 'Come and see; serve our God so that you shall come and share, at no distant time.'" But though the mysteries and vastness of eternity oppressed, and, many times, appalled him, as they could not a smaller mind, he still clung to trust in God. The last saying recorded as having been uttered by him in his fatal sickness, was "O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory? Thanks be to God, who giveth us the victory, through our Lord Jesus Christ." The day previous to his death, a feeling of confusedness in his head inclined him to relinquish the privilege of hearing some one read to him, and to desire to be left alone during the afternoon and evening. His family looked in from time to time, and earnestly desired that some one might be permitted to sit up with him during the night. This he steadily refused, though much exhausted by a long fit of coughing. When they went into his chamber in the morning, he was dead. "His arms were gently extended, and his countenance was

as tranquil as that of a person in a peaceful sleep." Thus true to his individuality, John Foster died, leaving the best memory in those who knew him most intimately; and by the impression made by his works, recalling to many souls with new force, the admonition, "I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus."

H. B—N.

Art. IX.

The Millennium; or the Golden Age to come.

1. A Treatise on the Millennium; in which the prevailing Theories on that subject are examined; and the true Scriptural Doctrine attempted to be elicited and established. By George Bush, A. M., author of 'Questions and Notes upon Genesis and Exodus.' New York: &c. 1832. 12mo. pp. 277.
2. A concise Exposition of the Doctrine of Association, or Plan for a Re-organization of Society, which will secure to the Human Race, individually and collectively, their happiness and exaltation. (Based on Fourier's Theory of Domestic and Industrial Association.) By Albert Brisbane, &c. &c. Fourth Edition. New York: &c. &c. 1843. 8vo. pp. 80.

Every one must be aware that several of the inspired writers appear, according to the literal import of their language, to look forward to a blessed period, even in the present world, when all oppression, violence, and wrong shall be done away, and when there shall be no more want, nor hardship, nor suffering, among men. Such is at least the form of representation given by some of the prophets of the Old Testament, and especially by Isaiah, — more frequently by him, perhaps, than by any of the rest. We may take the following as a specimen: "The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together, and a little child shall lead them, And the cow and the bear shall feed; their young shall lie down together; and the lion shall eat straw like the

ox. And the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the cockatrice's den. They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain; for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea." Here he foretells, if taken strictly to the letter, a time when there should be nothing to hurt nor destroy, in all the earth; when the wild beasts themselves should lose their natural ferocity, and dwell together in perfect harmony.

If we look into the context, however, and compare what goes before the passage, and what follows it, we shall see, at once, that, in all this, Isaiah is prophesying only of the introduction of the gospel into our world, in the days of Jesus Christ; though it is not improbable that he, at the same time, takes into view the gradual diffusion of Christianity down to the period when it became prevalent. But it is plain that this is all which he actually refers to, by these glowing descriptions, and that the scene, which he paints in such strong colors, is to be regarded only as so much imagery. In other passages, that are scattered through his prophecy, he represents the same period as a time when the nations should beat their swords into plough-shares, and their spears into pruning-hooks, and learn war no more; when a hundred years should be but the age of a child; when the people should never grow old, but live as long as the trees of the forest; every one dwelling in the house he had built, and enjoying the harvest he had planted; when there should be no more laboring in vain, no more trouble, nor sorrow; when the sound of weeping should never be heard, but all be universal joy. Such is the highly figurative manner in which the prophets represent the times of the gospel, from the birth of Jesus Christ, onwards. We need not particularize farther, as a great many passages of the kind, will readily occur to every one familiar with the Old Testament, and with the Apocalypse. Other periods, too, of general prosperity, are presented in similar colors, according to the usual style of the prophetic writings. The several images are woven together into one splendid tissue, by Pope, in his gorgeous poem of the Messiah. They bring before our imaginations, a state of things like that which the poets have fabled of the Golden Age, or

which fancy has ascribed to the Garden of Eden, in the morning of time.

Now, by these glowing representations, many have been ed to look for something answering to them, — not figuratively, in the past and present, where they obviously belong, but literally, and in some future generation, where they obviously do not belong. Many expect a period, perhaps not a great while ahead of us, at all events here on earth, when the state of men and of society shall correspond with the literal import of those descriptions: when there will be no diversity of personal interests, no contention, no more hardship, toil, nor anxiety; no more sorrow; nor scarcely any more old-fashioned death. People will live, we are told, some four or five hundred years, or even a thousand; and then fade away, as the flame on a lamp expires, without pain to themselves, or grief to their friends. Every thing will be changed into uninterrupted pleasure, so as to become perfectly agreeable to us, leaving no occasion to restrain our natural tendencies, nor to accommodate ourselves to our condition. Our condition, on the other hand, will be thoroughly accommodated to our likings. The seasons of the year will all turn bland and soothing. Not a breeze will be suffered to blow, till it has first been attempered down exactly to our senses. The world will be full of unmixed comfort, without want, or poverty, or even temptations to try us. We shall grow up great, and good, and pious, without any painful effort, but spontaneously, and as unconscious of opposing forces as the plants grow.

Religious people, or rather those Christians, who cherish these expectations, usually call this period the Millennium, or the thousand years' reign of Christ upon earth, and regard it as a special dispensation from Heaven. But some of the more independent and unrestricted speculatists, of our day, look for this condition of things to be brought about, at length, by what they call Human Progress, or the Progress of Society. They flatter themselves that mankind are improving so rapidly, increasing so fast in knowledge, reforming their vices at such a rate, and growing so spiritual and refined, that they will, ere long, become angelic, as we might say; at all events, that they will, of themselves, work out this happy condition of hu-

manity, — that they will grow up to it, in the natural course of their developement. Both classes, however, the religious enthusiasts on the one hand, and the speculatists on the other, agree in the general traits of the picture which their imaginations paint of the approaching Golden Age, whether they call it the Millennium, or the result of human perfectibility.

For ourselves, we look for no such state of things ever to take place, here on earth, and among mortal men. Desirable as it might seem, at the first glance, and as pleasant as it may be to contemplate it in the mood of poetic revery, most bitterly should we rue it, were it unfortunately to come, in this life, so that we were obliged to make trial of it, as a reality. It would unstring every noble faculty of our nature. The toil-braced nerve, and the strength of soul that triumphs over difficulties, would yield at once. We should be dissolved, as it were, into utter impotence and mawkish sentimentality. But, happily, there is no danger. The entire picture is nothing but a doting vision, that can never be realized in the present world; and God forbid that it ever should be. As to the fond expectations of religious enthusiasts, founded on certain texts of Scripture, we have already intimated that they misinterpret the passages, taking what is manifestly figurative, for literal. They apply, to an imaginary Millennium, what referred to the gospel in all ages; they explain, of outward circumstances, what was meant of the internal moral kingdom only. Let any one follow out their mode of understanding the prophetic language, on other subjects, and he would make the wildest work of the Scriptures, and of common sense, too. As to the other class, whom we have distinguished as the speculatists, it is easy to be seen that their course of philosophizing, or of fancying, runs directly against all the laws and essential demands of human nature, in our present state of being. They are imagining a state of earthly blessedness, founded on complete exemption from toil, and care, and danger, and from every thing that thwarts our will, or crosses our affections. They place it in boundless gratification. But no such thing is possible with us, in our present constitution; because our desires and caprices always multiply so fast, with indulgence,

that they outrun it in the ratio of Geometrical Progression. Nor, indeed, is free, unpurchased gratification the element for which man is adapted, even were it attainable. Man was made for an active, laborious, pains-taking creature; to get his strength from hardships endured, and to develope all his noblest powers by the experience of trial, suffering, privation, and exposure to danger. In his present mode of being, he cannot do without these rough and severe schoolmasters, to discipline him, to give him consistency, and to bring out his latent capabilities. What else did God place them here for? If we wish to see in what way human nature would actually work, in the condition supposed, let us take it in its simplest form, and try the experiment on a small scale. Take the little child, that is about to walk; subject him, as fully as possible, to the kind of experience that has been imagined for man. Save him from all necessity to exert himself. Do not put him to the effort of walking by his own strength and skill; move his limbs for him, hold him up; expose him to no danger of pain or inconvenience. Temper every thing just to his liking; gratify all his wishes, as soon as they are discovered; humor all his caprices, so that he shall feel no want, and have no care. Make it thus our business to teach him self-indulgence, and never give him a lesson of self-denial. Pursue this course, till he has grown up, and what will he be? A fool! and the most wretched of all fools; a creature of boundless caprices, which he could no more control than he could control all the winds of heaven, but which the whole Universe could not satisfy, were it his; himself utterly helpless, the slave and victim of them. This, we know, is the way that human nature would work, in such a condition; and men and women of maturer age, if subjected to it, would only verify the same results on a larger scale.

It has always been the case, that people have loved to amuse themselves with trying to conceive of a better arrangement of things, here, than God has actually made. No doubt, if our fond, languor-loving, sickly, sentimental taste had been originally consulted, in the fashioning and ordering of nature, we might have had a very delicate, genteel little world of our own, here, all flowers and sunshine, like a picture without shades, as fair as a smile, and

as shallow, too. We can only say that such is not the world which God, in his wisdom, saw fit to make for us. Can there be a serious question, whether his wisdom is to be preferred to ours? Men have always been dreaming of a Golden Age of unrestricted gratification and mere passive enjoyment; sometimes placing it back in the beginning of the world, and sometimes carrying it forward into the "latter days' glory." How many dreams of this kind have there been concerning the original condition of man, before what is called his Fall, in Eden! representing it as one continuous, uninterrupted holiday. No toil, no care, no trouble, nor anxiety was there. Young Spring reigned the whole year around. The winds never mustered their strength; the air never grew inclement. Earth spontaneously yielded her fruits and flowers. Man felt no conflict within himself; and there was none without. The happy, blessed creature — all that he had to do, was, to enjoy, and to make himself as quiet as possible. Such, with many, is the ideal of happiness. Such an exemption from all trial and strenuous exertion is, to them, an Eden! How little do they understand human nature, and its imperative demands. How little do they know of the real conditions of happiness, with us. The very state of things, which would make all excellence impossible, — which, in a short time, would destroy all virtue in its voluptuousness, and reduce us to perpetual infancy, put a stop to all progress, and finally become utterly intolerable to such creatures as we are, — this, they mistake for the supreme height of earthly blessedness!

We see, at once, that the common idea of a Millennium, or of a Golden Age to come, is nothing but the old idea of a holiday-kind of Eden, shifted from the past, and carried forward into the future. It is, in itself, the very same dream; it has only transferred the scene, from the beginning of the world, over to the latter days. And all the talk of its being realized, in the course of time, by human progress, is but reversing the natural order of things, and going back to the obsolete notions of the infancy of our race. We ought to consider that there are two very different movements, that we may conceive of, among men; one of which is backwards. And it is well for us to see that we do not mistake this for progress, merely be-

cause it is a movement. It is movement in the wrong direction.

We do not mean that there is no real progress, with mankind; though we must confess, that much which has been said, on this point, would better have been sung then said, and that not a little has found utterance, which was too extravagant and puerile to be either said or sung. Though the general state of society may, on the whole, rather improve, from age to age, and though it may even advance with great rapidity, in certain respects, while it falls back, in other departments; yet man, as an individual, has ever to begin anew, on his entrance into the world, and to start from the same point, notwithstanding all the improvements without. At the best, we can only say, that he starts under more favorable circumstances. And even society itself has always had its cycles of retrogression, hitherto, as well as of advance; now, a period of growth, and now of corruption and decay. The elements of imperfection, that belong to every thing human, have showed themselves here, as well as every where else, and have regularly taken their turn in dominating over the results; thus producing a series of revolutions, somewhat like the changes in the old geological periods of our globe. No doubt, however, that, on the whole, there is some real progress, in the one case, as there has been in the other. We have grounds to hope that Christian principles will be better developed among us, in the future, and that the conduct of men, and the laws of social existence, will be more conformed to their spirit. But we cannot too seriously consider, that, if this be true, as we trust it is, — if there be any real advance, it must be in a very different direction than towards the state of things that is often anticipated. Real progress will never bring about deliverance from toil, and hardship, and danger, and disappointment, and suffering, while we remain in this world, though it will give us strength to endure them better, and wisdom to use them to better account. It will never set us above the reach of temptation; it will only enable us to resist it more successfully. In spite of all the increased facilities that may be provided for human developement, our life, here, will forever be a strenuous warfare, or else it will be good for nothing. When we cease to contend against difficulties

without and within, we must degenerate. If we have any doubts of this position, let us look forth on the lessons that lie broadly engraved, all around us, on the actual experience of the world; let us look, and see what are the facts that obviously belong to our subject. Where is human nature the most fully developed, and brought to the highest degree of excellence it has ever attained? Where has man made the greatest progress? In those countries where the unfavorableness of the soil and climate, and other outward circumstances, were such as to force the inhabitants to exertion, obliging them to provide against evils, and to be perpetually on the alert; to face the storm and tempest, as well as to enjoy the sunshine. This was one thing that helped to make men of them, by calling forth their energies. Where have mankind reached the most elevated stage of moral virtue, and maintained, from generation to generation, the noblest character? in the soft, voluptuous, and indulgent South, where Nature herself seems to supply all their wants, spontaneously, and to give scope to their caprices? Has it not rather been in the hardy North, where man is obliged to war with the difficulties of his condition, and to overcome them, or else be himself overcome by them? It appears to us, that this question brings the whole matter home to the decision of facts, of positive reality, instead of leaving it to float along on the tide of idle fancy. We might ask, Which are the most vigorous and useful plants, — those which are reared in a green-house? or those that grow out in the open air, under all the changes of inclement skies, and that are subject to the thousand-fold strains and wrenchings of wind and tempest? Green-house productions, whether vegetable or human, will never attain to the dignity of being the staple for the essential purposes of life.

We have said, that real progress will never, in this world, release us from the necessity of suffering and temptation. To the Christian, this fact has already been demonstrated, in God's economy of redemption, so that it needs no longer be regarded as a matter of hypothesis. There has been One, here on earth, who was advanced immeasurably beyond all that mankind will ever attain to, in this mortal state, — Jesus Christ. And did his absolute perfection exempt him from a full share of the trials of

mortality? No. "He was tempted in all things as we are, but without sin;" "he was a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief." Notwithstanding the incomparable excellence that he maintained here, as "the brightness of God's glory," such was nevertheless, the condition that belonged to him. An apostle says that the Captain of our salvation was made "perfect, *through sufferings.*" And now, with this fact before us, shall we dream that any progress which mankind can make in moral excellence, will free them from their share of the trials that were necessary even in the case of their great Master? or that it ought to free them? or that such a liberation is even desirable? We must dismiss, from our minds, all dreams of an approaching age of holidays, on earth, when mankind will be virtuous without strenuous effort against temptation, and a rigorous, ever-watchful subjection of their own wayward propensities; or when they will be happy, by the accommodation of their outward circumstances to their likings. Our business, our great business, now and at all times, must be, to apply ourselves earnestly to the *work* that God has given us to do, and which he has fitted us to perform, in every department of life, secular, intellectual, moral, and religious. Let not our attention be diverted from this; for here is our true happiness, and our true progress, — here only. While we look for continued improvements in the moral and social condition of our race, let us be aware that they will not be effected without a long and tedious battle; and that when they are once accomplished, they will not, even then, be maintained, without the most vigilant care and unremitted labor. The world must always pay for every thing, of this kind, which it gains or inherits; or else it must lose it. While we expect a far more perfect manifestation of the religious life, among men, let us, above all things, remember in what direction this progress must tend; not towards a Golden Age of indulgence, but the contrary: that it will make life a far more earnest, laborious, self-denying one, than any which has yet been generally practised. Jesus Christ is its perfect type; and every real advance that men shall make, will be but an approach towards that "man of sorrows," who yet triumphed over his griefs by his confidence in God, and who was "without sin," while subject*ed to the temp*tations we endure.

Let no fond visions cherish within us, unawares, the love of indulgence, which grows so rapidly with use, and secretly unknits the vigor of the mind. Let no pernicious habit even of contemplating them, lower the tone of resolute self-control, which is the master-virtue in the formation of our character. Weaken this, and it is like loosening the cordage that supports the masts and sails of a vessel; all, then, goes into helpless confusion, at the first rising of the winds. Happy is he, who has learned the Christian life of self-denial and self-sacrifice; who makes the evils of our present state the means of improvement, and who can "glory in tribulation; knowing that tribulation worketh patience, and patience experience, and experience hope; and hope maketh not ashamed." H. B. 2d.

Art. X.

Recent Poetry.

The New Timon. A Romance of London. First American, from the Third London Edition. Philadelphia: Carey & Hart. 1846.

Poems by William Ellery Channing. Second Series. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1847.

Poems by R. W. Emerson. Boston: James Munroe & Co. 1847.

The volumes thus introduced to our readers are not connected in any nearer relationship than that of the common brotherhood of books. They are printed on white paper, and were composed in rhyme. But there is no family bond nor sympathy. One of them comes to us from a foreign soil; all of them differ in their spirit, views and aim. The only principle of association which can connect them even in thought, is the law of contrast. They are recent publications, however; and without attempting any thing like a review of either, a task for which we have neither opportunity nor inclination, we wish to introduce them with a few words of general comment.

We have no other knowledge of the genesis of "The New Timon," than the statement in the American copy that it is reprinted from the third London Edition. Its author is unknown. As a poem, it certainly is anomalous in our generation. Its appearance suggests the idea of transmigration;—an old spirit has clothed itself in modern dress. Without any sympathies of subject, views or treatment, with the prevailing school of the time, it possesses merits which, we think, entitle it to a distinguished rank among the poetic productions of the anti- (perhaps we should say, ante-) transcendental bards. The author makes no secret of his contempt for the modern taste, and for those who guide it.

> "No tawdry grace shall womanise my pen!
> E'en in a love song man should write for men."

His Spartan tastes are satisfied neither with the subjects nor the melody of the popular poets of the time. The old vigorous music charms his ear. It is from "the pure silver of Pope's ringing line," and "the frank flow of Dryden's lusty song," that he draws his inspiration, and to the masters of old English poetry, that he turns for models.

> "Rather, be thou, my poor Pierian maid,
> Decent at least, in Hayley's weeds array'd,
> Than patch with frippery every tinsel line,
> And flaunt admired, the Rag-Fair of the Nine!"

It is not only useless, but silly, to quarrel with a blind man for not seeing. And we are decidedly of the opinion that a taste for the poetry of Coleridge and Wordsworth and Shelley, depends upon a prior cast of mind, which forbids complete sympathy with former poets. It is absurd to censure and abuse a man for not liking them. Criticism cannot reason any one into an attachment, nor out of a hearty love. In spite of our pleas, men will talk of the babyism of Wordsworth, and the gaudiness of Keats, and the craziness of Shelley, till they see deeply enough into their claims to forget or to be ashamed to talk so. Their poetry is transcendental in the best sense of the term. Compared with Dryden and Pope and Scott and Gray, their best pieces will show a higher degree of poetic merit, because poetic merit of a higher kind. By the subjects with which it deals, by the aim which it proposes, by the feelings

which it addresses, by the effect it leaves, the standard poetry of our time is removed into a region which cannot be entered by any one who remains in the court of the Gentiles, whose taste is completely satisfied even with the excellences of the former school. It is adapted to a certain "hunger of the heart" which cannot find, in any other food, its proper nourishment. We may confess that the positive merits of the more spiritual school, in developeing its own elements and realizing its ideal, may not be equal to those of the other party; still, its range is wider, its aim is nobler, its success is sure.

The true representative of this school has not appeared. The works of Wordsworth exhibit its objective views — the poetry of nature. He is the hemisphere of a perfect poet. His genius is exquisite of its kind, but it is in *alto relievo*; it lacks strength of imagination, and that roundness which more creative, plastic energy would have supplied. The outward world speaks to us, through Wordsworth, in language pure and clear. "The pine tree waves through his thought." His mind is translucent, an achromatic lens, and gives no sickly tinge to the focal light, gathered from nature, that beams upon his page. But Wordsworth is merely an interpreter. Shelley is his other, and his better, half. He has developed the subjective side of poetry, — the creative influence of the soul. His eye is introversive. Nature is the statement of ideas, and he uses it for imagery to explain the mind. Abstractions, with him, took shape and color. As Macauley justly said of him, "the dryest terms of a mytaphysical system were no longer words, when he treated them, but intelligible forms, fair humanities, objects of love, of adoration, or of fear." With Shelley, the ideal, so fair as to make reality look mean, was a haunting presence, and he lacked that serenity and quiet repose which soothe us in Wordsworth like fresh intercourse with lakes and woods and hills. The promise of Keats' life was broken. His works reveal the outline of a great poetic genius which maturer years might have finished into a form of almost perfect grace. He needed only a more delicate and classic taste. "He never beheld an oak-tree without seeing the Dryad." The world was an Eden to his fancy, an angel in every walk, but the shrubbery untrimmed; and in his aromatic

delirium, he crowned himself with wild flowers, and, decked like a spiritual Bacchus with a too gaudy garment, danced, drunken with beauty, to an early grave. Tennyson is an amateur, a beautiful flower of the growing plant. His Œnone is a perfect gem, faultless in its line, but, like our own Longfellow, his circle is narrow, and he can hardly be classed among the masters of his school. Coleridge, had he been willing to undertake the office, might have been the great Artist of the new movement, combining the chief merits of its theory into a living whole. We cannot imagine a higher range, or a greater finish, of poetic excellence than might have been attained by Coleridge, had he concentrated his great powers, and commanded the nebulous and "luminous mist" of his fancies, which extended, it would almost seem, to the farthest region of human possibility, to condense into brilliant, solid and enduring orbs.

So long, then, as we believe that the taste by which the transcendental school can be appreciated must be a prior sympathy, and so long as the exhibitions of its excellence remain as now fragmentary, connected too with a vast mass of rubbish and nonsense, we can read with complacency the sneers, of such writers as the author of "New Timon," at "School-miss Alfred," and can even admire the energy of diction and admirable scorn which expresses itself thus,

> "Not mine, not mine (O Muse forbid!) the boon
> Of borrowed notes, the mock bird's modish tune,
> The jingling medley of purloined conceits,
> Out-babying Wordsworth, and out-glittering Keats,
> Where all the airs of patchwork pastoral chime
> To drowsy ears, in Tennysonian rhyme."

The New Timon is a poetic novel. The story is intensely interesting, and the complex elements are unfolded with great simplicity, thus exhibiting a practised and powerful hand. Besides, too, the dramatic excitement inspired by the plot, the poem is relieved by many passages of splendid satire upon the rulers of England, "the present helmsmen of the state." See especially the pictures of Peel, O'Connel, Wellington, Lord Stanley, and Lord John Russell, pages 34 to 39. We cannot do justice to the gorgeous rhetoric and the sustained, steady strength

of the work. Neither the interest, nor the power of execution flags for an instant from commencement to close. The current of the story sweeps on like a swollen torrent, and every line, in its brilliant terseness, bears marks of critical, patient polish. We may see in its pages the sinew and the fat, the vigor and the richness of the English tongue. We admire the Christian sentiment and hearty faith which give such a winning beauty to the closing pages of the narrative. Until the first catastrophe, the presiding genius of the poem is the Greek Nemesis. An awful fate, stern as that which rules in the Agamemnon of Æschylus, directs the course of the story. Clouded from the first, the very pages seem tinged with a gradually deepening gloom from an overhanging tempest, black and charged with muttering vengeance. But, as it seems about to burst upon the scene, the sunlight breaks through a sudden rift, and the poem closes amid the universal radiance of a triumphant Christian love. For us, at least, the charm of the piece is heightened by the exquisite contrast here afforded between the sources of classic and Christian dramatic inspiration.

It really would be pleasant to know the secret of the authorship of "The New Timon." It has been attributed to Bulwer. The pomp of the diction, the plumpness of the adjectives, and the general structure of the story, would seem to indicate his hand. One could almost swear to the parentage of the following lines, descriptive of a chamber enriched with works of art.

> "There, gleam the shapes in which, immortal still,
> Live the bright exiles from the Olympian hill;
> Still moonèd Dian from the breathing stone
> Haunts, with pure eyes, thy dreams, Endymion;
> Still on the vast brow of the Father-God,
> *Hangs the hush'd thunder of the awful nod.*"

And who but the author of "Devereux" could write this description of the Gypsies?

> "Aliens untamed where'er their wanderings are,
> High Syrian sires of old; — *dark fragments torn*
> *From the great creed of Isis,* — now forlorn
> In rags, — all earth their foe, and day by day
> Worn in the strife with social Jove, away."

The character of Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton's mind, too, would readily account for those tinges of rose-pink and saffron hues, which give a slightly unnatural and unhealthy air to the ideas of human nature which the piece developes. Bulwer's highest ideas of life naturally take the form and coloring of a gorgeous, classic melo-drama. And yet the literary judgements in the work and in the notes, together with many allusions to the circumstances and experience of the author, forbid the supposition, unless some wilful deception is intended. The poem is evidently the production of a rich, though not comprehensive, mind, and seems to be the impetuous utterance of an intense and deep, but not a healthy nor a spiritual experience; and whoever the author may be, we may say that he has produced a work, which, for vehemence and strength of passion, vigor of composition, and power in the portraiture of characters, not broad indeed, but strongly marked, and violent from their very narrowness, must be ranked with "Lara," and "The Corsair;" while it is elevated above such a companionship by a more Christian aim, and a healthier morality. Gladly would we linger over the "New Timon;" but to appreciate it, our readers must peruse it many times, as we have done, and, advising them to follow our example, we hasten on.

Of Mr. Channing's poems we can truly say that they do not meet our mental mood. And we feel the less restraint in expressing our honest opinion of them, since he has anticipated the worst that may be said by a heartily expressed contempt for all critics, real or possible, and has very generously quieted the fears of his reviewers by informing them that he is made of sterner stuff than the murdered Keats. With few of the deeper excellences, our poet's writings seem to possess most of the glaring faults of modern transcendentalism. They are characterised by sickly sentiment, by a diseased introvertive tendency of mind, by dyspeptic views of the world, by renunciation of objective trusts, and, in fact, by the general absence of those qualities of thought and dress, and melody, which are essential to constitute a tolerable poem. All the productions of Mr. Channing which we have read are misty. He seems to derive his inspiration from snuffing the east wind. The thought seldom shines clear and distinct through a transparent medium. The dress of a poet's words

> "Like to the Roman girl's enticing garb,
> Should let the play of limb be seen through it,
> And the round rising form."

But whether it be the fault of his diction or his mind, Mr. C.'s ideas do not present a clear, well marked disc, and their meaning is not accurately transferred to, and impressed upon, another intellect. Poetic genius is very unfortunately meted out to him. The staple of his being is poetic, but he is only a simulacrum, as Carlyle says. Thoughts bubble up from an undried spring in his soul, but the fountain is feeble, and, instead of sending any brilliant jets, or even producing a fertilizing rill, adorning its banks wtth the simplest verdure or the humblest flowers, merely oozes forth to sop the sand. This weakness seems to mark all the productions of his pen. From beginning to end of his volume, the words and lines are without nerve, and a general flabbiness characterizes every piece. Goethe complained that modern poets put too much water in their ink; Mr. Channing puts too little ink in his water. We should say that he is always musing, never thinking. Images seem to come and go through his brain like lazy ghosts, "whom a mosquito might run through," indifferent as to their separate identity, and often fading into each other as they flit across the poetic retina. Mr. Emerson, somewhere, illustrating the deceptiveness of the senses, advises a man to test it by looking at a landscape with head turned through his legs, and also, if we remember aright, speaks of the strangeness of the objective world as presented to a cat chasing her tail. Mr. Channing seems to observe nature in some such posture, probably the latter, since, in an address to critics, he declares

> "I ope my arms to them,—the world beside,—
> O awful God! who over verse dost sway,
> Thine eye does scan me, —*in the flowing tide,*
> *I, like a leaf, am eddying whirled away.*"

We should judge that the "Ode" and the "Hymn of the Earth," were written when the poor author was sporting in one of the giddiest vortices. Really, we have hardly found a strong line or thought in the whole compass of his book. And musical periods are quite as rare. What Mr. Channing might have done, had the time and thought thus dissipated upon so many pages, been expended upon a

smaller field, we cannot tell. A quick, smart thundershower is certainly more pleasant and reviving than an East wind fog, and if Mr. C. instead of letting his mind drizzle a weak and misty poetry, would condense his power into a more liberal and less continuous discharge of moisture, it would be more pleasant to his readers, more refreshing to himself, and better for his fame.

We pass now from the world of apparitions to that of realities, from Mr. Channing's to Mr. Emerson's volume. Here a very different office is imposed on us. As Americans, we can enjoy the gratification of the most thorough certainty that this volume cannot be matched in the literature of the world. Admirers and opponents of the author's views will unite their assent that it is *sui generis*; and Solomon himself would joyfully confess to the appearance of a new thing under the sun. A fair and exhaustive criticism of these poems would be one of the most desirable contributions to the world of letters, since it would involve a thorough discussion of the author's opinions, and a settlement of the vexing disputes as to his ability and genius. Mr Emerson's powers are so harmonious, and his mind is so unique, that a fair judgement upon one point implies an accurate measure of his literary and philosophical claims. There is not a verse in this volume of his poetry which is not stamped deep with his mental peculiarities. Any one would detect the authorship at a glance. The same freshness of thought; the same polished sharpness, expressive poverty and steely glitter of diction; the same keen insight piercing into the deepest and darkest shafts of consciousness; the same omniscience of the method of nature in the whole and in details; the fancy which catches the most subtile tint of beauty; the impersonal wit, smooth as the bee's sting, but unpoisoned by a drop of malice, which cuts through all the sham of institutions; the uncompromising Pantheism which unveils the action of the Deity at every point in space, and finds inspiration in every moment of history, and which, while it keeps him deeply and heartily religious, removes him from the sympathy of the whole Christian world; all the blemishes of theory and beauties of art which distinguish the prose writings of Mr. Emerson from the common products of literature, are equally apparent, and perhaps,

more distinctly relieved, in this collection of his poems.

Mr. Emerson is a pure transcendentalist. He lives only in an ideal world. The earth, to him, is a globed congeries of forces; nature, a pulsing activity; and the soul, immediately receptive of influences from God, an inexhaustive fountain of spiritual power. His eye spiritualizes every object within its range, as the touch of Midas turned the meanest thing to gold. And perhaps, like Midas, his genius may wither from the curse of an unnatural gift. Nature, society and man he judges by his imperious spiritual standard, and finds them all abased before that beauty, right and power, which they suggest, but in comparison with which they are fragmentary and mean. Were it not for the humor which pervades his spirit, and which is itself pervaded by a genial love, he would be an incurable misanthrope and misologue. He is a Brahmin, with a microscopic eye; he sees the animalcules in the purest water, but yet has no notion of dying with thirst. He will drink when it is necessary, quite temperately, with shut eyes, and a pleasant, sceptical smile. It is singular to observe how nature has mingled a character of child like purity and perfect sweetness, of elements which, if we abstract the nameless charm that neutralizes them, would have created a compound of Mephistophiles and Montaigne. We have heard his writings condemned as showing only a barren Pantheism, Divinity everywhere, but only as a retreating wave. There is no satisfaction for the spirit anywhere; it can find no fullness of the Deity.

> "As the bee through the garden ranges,
> From world to world the Godhead changes.
> * * * * * * *
> All the forms are fugitive,
> But the substances survive."

It is because he can see nothing perfect except in the All; and, by this continual change and constant renewal, the pulsation of life, through atom, globe and star, the meanest and the most sublime are linked in a union so intimate that they cannot be parted, or even disjunctively conceived, without destroying the value and the meaning of the whole. When he contemplates things separately, Mr. Emerson is as sceptical as Heraclitus; there is universal flux.

"the eternal Pan,
Who layeth the world's incessant plan,
Halteth never in one shape,
But forever doth escape."

When he contemplates nature as a whole, he is as firm as Plato; there is stubborn persistence. The very crags are beads of a rosary "on prayer and music strung." Thus, in his mind, the merits and the limits of ultra transcendentalism are fairly shown. It will be hard to draw a circle outside of the "Oversoul" and "Woodnotes." We rejoice that the revelation has been made to us, as well for the defects so clearly exhibited, and against which we can the better guard, as for the excellences, which we are happy to witness in our age, and in so pure a form. Thomas Carlyle alone excepted, whom our author touches as the extremes of circles meet, Mr. Emerson is the keenest and most original thinker, the purest and freshest writer, whom it has ever been our lot to know.

His chief merit lies in his power as the interpreter of the soul. He is a true psychologist. We have heard much in our day of the importance of psychology, of its position as the vestibule, the initiatory science, of philosophy. But its depths have not been sounded in any of the schools of modern speculation. Cousin's lectures on the ideas of time, space and substance, which he vainly thinks are solutions of the mysteries of human nature, are merely surface-sports and boyish plays compared with the treasures revealed by this new diver into the sea of spirit. Kant himself, in his list of categories and his laws of Pure Reason, detected only, as it were, the barren form, and revealed the dead anatomy of the soul; while Mr. Emerson has seen its working and its beating life. The essays on "Spiritual Laws," "Compensation," "Circles," "Oversoul," and "Experience," discover a purity of vision, and reveal profound results, which neither Montaigne's Confessions, nor Rousseau's Confessions, nor the "Religio Medici," nor Hazlitt's Table Talk, nor all of them put together, can parallel. His eye is microscopic. He detects the most subtile laws which regulate our most intimate and concealed experience, and states them in the most subtile terms. An unprejudiced mind will read in his essays truths that unlock and explain the mysteries of its own

consciousness and its relations to society, which from their delicacy, it should seem could only be felt, and which even if once thought, must baffle the power of language to convey. He has studied our nature with an eye, to which its structure is presented as a transparent flower; and thus, while he scans the leaves and petals, his clearer vision observes the delicate tracery of the finest fibres, and watches the process of the secret chemistry that colors the surface, and sustains the life. Every competent reader of his writings has, at times, been startled, we are sure, by the exhibition of that piercing moral vision, which draws from the most trifling experience, and which explains the most trifling experience, by the profoundest principles of human nature, and to which the commonest, unnoticed occurrences of life appear "bristling with a polarity which ranges them instantly under an eternal law."

For the secrets of nature, too, his eye is as keen, and for the appreciation of her beauties he has a taste, or rather a sympathy, the most delicate and refined. It is as though the universe, also, is transparent to him, that he may see the forces continually in play; so easily does he penetrate to the mystic sense of the outward world. And then, with what precision is that sense conveyed! Mr. Emerson's style is as original as Shakspeare's. His language is — what he describes all language to be — "fossile poetry." He talks by symbols borrowed from the freshest sciences. In his creed, matter and spirit are essentially the same, and so Chemistry, Botany, Astronomy, Geology, are dictionaries of the mind. His imagery, too, is always precise, without the slightest confusion of figures, or the faintest effort for display, and so exact and sharp, that oftentimes, we fail to see the beauty which is so sternly subordinated to use. Frequently, by going back to the pure philological value of a term, like the restorer of old paintings, he brings out the beautiful picture which it originally conveyed, but of which it had become the tomb, and thus animates his style with a figurative expression by the same word which is commonly an abstract, algebraic sign. This is, oftentimes, we are persuaded, the secret of what is called his obscurity. To a man who knows what language is, and who can appreciate the utmost purity which the English speech can attain, the charge of obscur-

ity will sound absurd. The difficulty is, he never deals with common-place. He is the sworn enemy of cant. A person must exercise his wits at every sentence, for every sentence contains a thought. You cannot prune a dry particle, or a sapless adverb, or a dead conjunction, from Mr. Emerson's fresh, blooming style. When we read through his eyes, the most familiar things appear as though they were not familiar. By an ulterior, intellectual perception, "he gives to words a meaning which makes their inaccurate use forgotten, and puts eyes and a tongue into every dumb and inanimate sign."

As we stated above, these qualities are all expressed in his poems. For beauty of imagery, correspondence and purity of form, and delicate precision of language, there are a few pieces which, we believe, defy the correcting hand. Where could a word be altered in that molten, liquid Saxon, the Humble-Bee? It is wrong to break the continuous, compact terseness of the piece, — but what a recurring, haunting melody in those lines —

"Insect lover of the sun,
Joy of thy dominion!
Sailor of the atmosphere,
Swimmer through the waves of air;
Voyager of light and noon;
Epicurean of June;
Wait, I prithee, till I come
Within earshot of thy hum.
* * * * * *
Thou, in sunny solitudes,
Rover of the underwoods,
The green silence dost displace,
With thy mellow, breezy bass."

And for accuracy of description, and perfect sweetness of measure, what can surpass the lines,

"Aught unsavory or unclean,
Hath my insect never seen;
But violets and bilberry bells,
Maple sap and daffodels,
Grass with green flag half-mast high,
Succory to match the sky,
Columbine with horn of honey,
Scented fern and agrimony,
Clover, catch-fly, adder's tongue,
And brier roses, dwelt among;
All beside was unknown waste,
All was picture as he passed."

Surely the only lines which can be compared with these, are the choice passages from "Il Penseroso," which, indeed, the "Humble-Bee" continually suggests. Many of our readers, probably, have read "The Problem." In many respects it is the most remarkable composition of modern times. The essence of Mr. Emerson's whole creed, the oil of transcendentalism is there, purified from every repulsive element, and made attractive by the splendid imagery and diction through which it is conveyed. The utmost limits of condensation which language can bear, consistently with a polish which destroys the least protuberance of roughness, are here attained. The secret lies in the compactness and energy of the thought, rather than in the closeness of the words. The lines seem like adamant ground smoother than a needle. The formula of the piece should be — the style of Tacitus raised to a higher power, and set to the music of "Christabel." Every couplet is loaded with a philosophy, and each proposition reverses the common laws of the world. We had the pleasure of conversing not long since with a friend who has thought and written much upon the spiritual laws of our nature, and who possesses an almost unrivalled power of felicitous utterance, which gives to his discourse the blended charms of Sidney Smith and Coleridge, and he confessed to us that six lines of "The Problem" had exactly uttered the secret of his best hours, and highest moods. Who will doubt the identity of art and nature after the authoritative annunciation:

> "Earth proudly wears the Parthenon,
> As the best gem upon her zone;
> And morning opes with haste her lids,
> To gaze upon the Pyramids.
> * * * * * * *
> These temples grew as grows the grass,
> Art might obey, but not surpass.
> The passive master lent his hand
> To the vast soul that o'er him planned."

The poem "The Sphinx," too, for original statement of a hackneyed theme, and for the subtile art of the structure, will repay continual study. We can only quote the closing verse, which exhibits the philosophy of the piece as well as the freshness and purity of the style.

"Uprose the merry Sphinx,
And crouched no more in stone;
She melted into purple cloud,
She silvered in the moon;
She spired into a yellow flame;
She flowered in blossoms red;
She flowed into a foaming wave;
She stood Monadnoc's head."
Through a thousand voices,
Spoke the universal dame:
"Who telleth one of my meanings,
Is master of all I am."

Mr. Emerson's genius is never more happily displayed than in his positive affirmations of the ideal as the groundwork and inherent cause of what is called the real. Whether in prose or verse, his style, under the inspiration of that topic, rises at once into an oracular, dithyrambic movement. He seems possessed with that mania which Plato, in the Phædrus, calls a beautiful delirium, and which without obscuring the thought, heightens the expression, by releasing it from the limits of personality, and by giving to it the authority of absolute truth. Take, for instance, that verse from the "World Soul," the very melody of which, to our ears, has a tone of the wild and supernatural.

"And what if trade sow cities
Like shells along the shore,
And thatch with towns the prairies broad,
With railways ironed o'er? —
They are but sailing foam bells
Along Thought's causing stream,
And take their shape and sun-color
From him that sends the dream."

And again in the "Ode to Beauty" —

"All that's good and great with thee
Works in close conspiracy;
Thou hast bribed the dark and lonely
To report thy features only,
And the cold and purple morning,
Itself with thoughts of thee adorning,
E'en the flowing azure air,
Thou hast touched for my despair."

We cannot omit to notice the "Dirge" and "Threnody" which introduce us to the secret sanctuary of the Poet's heart, and therefore interest us from another side. Both were suggested by the experience of grief, and both betray

inexpressible sensibility to the finer emotions and relations of the soul. They convey to us the gentle thrill of his spirit to the touch of bereavement, a thrill as spiritual and as pure as the longing melody awakened from an Æolian harp by the first melancholy sigh of the autumn air. We never read a more original poetic conception, or a fresher statement of the unity in which kindred hearts are bound, and which charges the most trivial memorials with the richness of spiritual associations, than the verse in the "Dirge," referring to the death of his brothers, —

> "I touch this flower of silken leaf,
> Which once our childhood knew;
> Its soft leaves wound me with a grief
> Whose balsam never grew."

We have heard the "Threnody" characterised as cold and cheerless, as being the musical utterance of anguish alone, not rising into a single strain of triumphant faith, its monotone of sadness unrelieved by a single note of hope or promise. Mr. Emerson, it is true, — and this is the only drawback from the pleasure which the frequent reading of his volume gives us — does not acknowledge the Christian sources of consolation, as they are usually and properly drawn from a supernatural and historical revelation. He cannot see the divine halo around the head of Jesus. In open language he will not speak of God, the Father. And even if he possessed a Christian faith, he would not be likely to receive its solace, or to express his peace, in any conventional and common form. Still, we believe this estimate of the "Threnody" is not fair. Christians read it without considering that the phraseology, so strange and cold to them, may cover a faith upon which another mind relies secure. The truths believed, rather than the manner of holding them, must give the mind repose. Mr. Emerson is more a Christian than his theory of universal inspiration allows him to confess. That is consolation which supports *my* mind, not yours. It is the constant sense of immortality, a spiritual experience which reveals the majesty of spiritual life, and a trust in the benevolence of an overruling power, which constitute the essence of true Christian strength in sorrow, and in its own Pantheistic dialect, the conclusion of the "Threnody" is eloquent with these impressive truths.

"What is excellent,
As God lives, is permanent;
Hearts are dust, heart's loves remain;
Heart's love will meet thee again."

It is, indeed, the poet's fault, if he will persist in translating the fresh language of the heart into the frosty clearness of the intellect; but it must be charged to the critic's prejudice if he will not read the process, and detect the secret of the written words.

In our hasty notice of this remarkable volume, we have not mentioned any of the longer compositions such as "Merlin," "Saadi," "Uriel," "Monadnoc," "Woodnotes," "Initial, Dæmonic and Celestial Love," which reveal more fully the elements of the author's poetic, philosophical, and religious creed. But, however valuable and interesting these may be as rhythmical expressions of his views, we are decidedly of the opinion that the real *poetry* of the volume is in the smaller and less pretending pieces. Indeed, the study of his longer poems impresses us with the firm conviction that there are peculiarities in Mr. Emerson's genius which are unfavorable to the attainment of the highest poetic excellence. To present all the grounds on which this judgment rests would involve a thorough analysis of those pieces themselves, and also a discussion of the question, what are the distinguishing characteristics of poetry; — a question which even a superficial acquaintance with modern criticism will teach us is not definitely settled.

We have stated that Mr. Emerson is a true psychologist, the interpreter of the soul. Here lies the secret of his power, and, we believe, also, of his incapacity to be a great poet. With an ear delicate enough to appreciate the finest rhythm and the purest melody; with a keenness and originality of thought which require and can command the utmost precision and freshness of language; with a view of nature which supplies him always with poetic conceptions, he is able to produce, as he has produced, some small pieces of exquisite beauty, and polished to the last degree of refinement and grace. But his genius is of too sharp and cold a structure to challenge a place among bards of the highest class. Poetry is not his native realm He cannot soar, but, in his own language,

"He shall aye climb
For his rhyme."

Notwithstanding his marvelous powers, nay, because of them, he must be ranked among the Amateurs and Artists on Parnassus; he is not a heaven-born heir. Poems like "the Humble-Bee" and "Problem" belong to that class which a true critic who knows the essence and the laws of of poetry, and can command the deepest resources of language, would produce. They are built; they do not grow. They are poetic and musical statements, rather than poems. They are not master-pieces of painting, but rather splendid specimens of mosaic. We do not desire to cancel a single expression in relation to "The Humble-Bee," either as to its beauty, melody, or compactness, but let any one compare it with Shelley's "Sky-Lark," or Keats' "Nightingale," and he will learn the difference between the natural gush of poetic inspiration, and the finest triumphs of an artist.

Besides a lack of breadth in his topics and a wearisome sameness of manner, Mr. Emerson's vision is too keen to write easily and at much length in verse. The natural expression of his mind is the prose of "Compensation" and "The Method of Nature." For the sharpness and brilliancy of his ideas require a pointed and epigrammatic dress. His imagery is created not to satisfy and appease a craving for beauty, but is held in strict subordination to the intellect, as a clearer medium of expression. It does not take the form of symbols as is the case with the highest poetry, but rather of foci for condensing the intellectual rays into an intenser stream. And thus, by his very mental constitution, Mr. Emerson is not a poet, but a seer. We cannot say that his genius is analytic, for there is no logical process in the movement of his thought. He never dissects; but his glance naturally detects the minutest mystery of every object on which it is thrown. By a more penetrative vision, he reports what other men can only disclose by digging and laborious meditative toil. In reading his pieces we feel as though we were for the first time quite wide awake. No man, probably, ever exhibited, in a higher degree, reach of intellect united with acuteness of vision. Subtile as sun-rays, his thought never discovers its track, but proves its power by showing you the distant

discs in the universe of mind, which its light discloses and upon which its beams impinge. In the intellectual world his eye has at once a space-penetrating and a magnifying power, uniting telescopic and microscopic virtues, as though Lord Ross's reflector could reveal the structure and the vegetation of Uranus. Instead of being creative and plastic, Mr. Emerson's power is interpretative and critical. It is an error, or an abuse of language, we think, to attribute to him great vigor of imagination. He has little imagination, using the word in the sense in which we apply it to Shakspeare and Milton. His power of language results from keenness of intellectual perception, and the charm of his style consists in the fresh analogies and natural correspondences through which his subtile conceptions are conveyed. Every figure which adorns his page has a sharp physiognomy, and is the natural body of a brilliant, nervous thought. The temper of his wit is so pure that it will cut through adamant, and its edge so fine, that, like the blade of Saladdin, it will sever gauze.

But we shall look in vain, throughout the list of his longer poems, for exhibitions of that fusing fire which solves the elements of experience and of nature, to recast them into purer shapes. They are all theories and statements; they are reports not poems. We recognise in "Uriel," "Saadi," "Monadnoc," merely rhymed expressions of many familiar views which are better stated, because more naturally and freely stated, in the "Essays." And besides, Mr. Emerson's volume does not display any signs of that unconsciousness which always characterizes a poet of the upper rank. Exact self-knowledge and a microscopic eye are essential to a great Essayist, are admirable for prose, but they are withering and fatal to the life of poetry. There is poetry in science, and poetry in philosophy; but it is not Herschel, nor Hazlitt that shall embody it in form. They may appreciate it better than others, and may dissect its structure, but it must come with a natural unconscious flow from a spontaneous fountain in an inspired breast. We may apppeal to our author for testimony that the "poet speaks adequately, only when he speaks somewhat wildly, or, 'with the flower of the mind;' not with the intellect, used as an organ, but with the intel-

lect released from all service, and suffered to take its direction from its celestial life; or, as the ancients were wont to express themselves, not with intellect alone, but with the intellect inebriated by nectar." This is a perfect statement, but we do not believe that Mr. Emerson's spirit is capable of this divine intoxication. His brain never reels, and the "fine frenzy" cannot unsettle the steady vision of his piercing eye. No one has stated better the omnipresent action of the "Over-soul," but it is through some peasant Burns, or modest Shakspeare, that the Over-soul flows freest, rather than through Schiller who counts and measures the pulses as they come. Mr. Emerson's volume more than any other poems we have ever read, is characterised by a lack of this unconsciousness. Like Uriel, the beauty of the bard seems parched by a "sad self-knowledge." Truth is always his aim; and the finest passages he has ever produced fall naturally into measured prose, like that at the close of the Cambridge "Address," and also at the conclusion of "The Method of Nature." And these passages move us because they are the powerful utterance of far-reaching moral vision. They come from a spirit quivering with a prophetic, rather than with a poetic, thrill. Poetry demands an unconscious calmness and more repose. But there is little of this repose in Mr. Emerson's volume. We find no relief of shadows in his poems, no rich and mellow radiance even, no healthy mystery, no religious gloom, but an all-illuminating, cloudless, burning glare, as of the sun in an Arabian sky. Even in dealing with the Infinite, he must reveal the whole secret; he must be an engraver, not a painter; he must express, not suggest.

And here, we think, lies the explanation of that enigmatic dress, in which his longer poems are enveloped. The highest poetic expression of beauty is symbolic and flowing. It would be robed in a mystic veil. "A beauty not explicable, is dearer than a beauty which we can see to the end of." And therefore its proper medium, as in Milton's descriptive passages, is analogous to the Autumn haze which softens, and spiritualizes, and throws a witching mystery around the commonest objects and the most irregular outlines. But Mr. Emerson has not this power. His convex eye would shave the twinkle from the star to

give us the disc; and we believe that the ambiguous and enigmatic statement of the "World-Soul," and "Merlin," and "Mithridates," is a resource of art, to conceal the angularity and unpoetic sharpness of the thought involved. As though the formulas of science acquired an æsthetic virtue by being stated in cipher.

But we have written double what we intended upon Mr. Emerson's volume, and must still regret that we have not been able to elucidate and defend our criticism by an analysis of some of his longer poems. Our objection to them is, not that they are not studded with splendid imagery, and sparkling gems, but that they lack the unction of poetry, and could better have been conveyed in his terse and brilliant prose. They were produced from the intellect alone. That inspiration from which they were created was not the "ebb of the individual rivulet before the flowing surges of the sea of life." And they suggest and illustrate, what we are confident is true, that the author has not one of those liquid souls, which, like Homer's and Shakspeare's, melt into, and mix with, and lose themselves in nature, but is rather a diamond gem, insoluble in any fire, which retains unharmed its stubborn personality, and flashes back the light at every angle, in a cold, but dazzling intellectual ray. We must close the volume, with the confession that, with all its faults as poetry, it contains some pieces of the highest artistic merit, and that we have derived from it more pleasure, and we may say perhaps, deeper views, than from any other literary production we have ever read. And it is certainly some compensation to ourselves for the estimate we have felt compelled, reluctantly enough, to make of the poet, that we have risen from the study of his verse with a higher reverence for the Philosopher, and a deeper love for the Essayist. T. S. K.

Art. XI.

Absurdities of Philological Hypercriticism.

Letter to the Editor.

Alt-Bauen, (in Hanover,) Dec. 4th, 1846.

Dear Sir,— . . . . . I add a few words on the queerest of all curiosities I have met with, in my tour, — that little company of monomaniac philologers, who have gathered, from various parts of Germany, into this wild, secluded village, among the Hartz Mountains, and formed a Society, called the Wörterklauber-Vereinigung. I forgot to give you the name, in my last; or, rather, I had not then learned it. My friend, honest Herr Ludwig, has since taken me to one of their sittings, in the old Amthaus. They meet here, every month, and read Essays, which are written by the members in turn. Never was I so amused, — diverted almost into convulsions, by the incredible mixture of great learning with stone-blind ignorance of things and of the world. You must know that their only science is that of words, and of verbal interpretation. Whithersoever this leads them, thither they go, as unconscious of any possible absurdity, as a machine would be. Their library (how they got it, with their scanty means, Heaven only knows!) fills five large rooms, one of which is wholly occupied by American books, pamphlets, newspapers, &c. I found about thirty members present, listening to a dissertation, by Prof. Schwärmer, on the government of ancient Athens, as gathered from the force of the Greek particles. Though astonished at the extent of the author's reading, and, I may add, ingenuity, I was often near bursting with suppressed laughter, at the whimsicality of the inferences which he drew, and which were proposed, and received, with an unsuspecting gravity that defies all description. The truth is, neither he, nor his associates, have an idea, but what they have derived through some philological process; and they are, therefore, incapable of comparing their ludicrous conclusions with facts or with general principles, which would serve to correct them. Straight-forward interpretation is their only guide. At the close, friend Ludwig introduced me, as an American, to some of the older Professors. Dr. Ausleger, the President, immediately inquired, "Which side do you take, my dear Sir, on the great question between the

Gegenwartists and the Zukunftists?" I told him that I unfortunately did not understand to what he referred. "Is it possible?" said he; "but you have, of course, seen the controversy that agitated our learned Society, concerning your American prisons?" "I have not had that pleasure," I replied. "Ach, mein Gott!" exclaimed half a dozen, at once, "he has not read Dr. Ausleger's Argument!"—"nor," echoed half a dozen others, "nor Prof. Spitzfinder's Refutation of the Dr.! Where can he have studied!" I leave you to imagine the scene that followed. I think I am not very easily abashed; but do not despise me, if I own that, never in my life, had I been so mortified at my ignorance, though I suspected, all the while, that "the great question" was one of their fantastic conceits. When we returned, friend Ludwig explained the matter. It seems that, about seven years ago, a fierce dispute arose between two parties in the Wörterklauber-Vereinigung, with respect to (you never would guess what!) — with respect to the place and duration of State-prison punishment, in America, — whether it were in the future world, and eternal, or in the present, and but temporary! You will hardly believe that I state it fairly; I assure you, however, it is but a just specimen of many of their questions. Among the voluminous publications of the Society, friend Ludwig showed me several Essays on the subject. They contain an immense number of passages in point, which are quoted from American works, — more than I should have supposed it possible to collect, even on your side of the Atlantic. I send you the concluding chapters of two of these Essays, that you may see what a philological monomania will bring men to. The first is from that of Dr. Ausleger himself.[1]

"Here, then, we have more than one thousand and two hundred passages, collected out of every class of American writers, from the highest to the lowest. They must, therefore, be regarded as expressing the universal opinion in America. If I mistake not, every sentence is here produced, that has appeared, on the subject, from the Transatlantic press. Should others be found, I shall be ready to give them due consideration; for it is truth, and truth alone, that I value. But of the passages now collected, what is the result, in respect to the place and duration of State-prison punishment?

[1] We, of course, give the "Extracts" in an English translation, instead of inserting them in the original Latin; in which, we suppose, all the papers of the Wörterklauber-Vereinigung are published.—*Editor.*

"1. One hundred and sixteen of them expressly assert that 'the wretched *souls* [i. e. of the State-prison convicts,] are shut out from the common blessings of life;' that 'these guilty *souls* are suffering the penalty of the crimes they committed when abroad in the world;' that they are 'obstinate *souls*,' 'perjured *souls*,' 'revengeful *souls*,' &c. &c.; that 'these once haughty *spirits* have lost all hope;' that 'their *spirits* are broken down;' that they are 'contumacious *spirits*,' &c. &c.; that they are 'but the *ghosts* of their former selves;' that they 'are hopeless *dwellers in the shadow of death;*' that they 'are utterly cut off from the world,' &c. &c. (V. Class i.) If the terms, souls, spirits, ghosts, do not denote the state of disembodied existence, I might safely challenge the learned (?) critics of the New School to produce any words in the Anglican language that will answer the purpose. Nay, it is expressly said, that they are 'cut off from the world,'—where the context shows the meaning to be, that they are cut off from *this* world, in their imprisonment. How, then, can it be pretended that their imprisonment is *in* this world? The state in which they suffer, is expressly distinguished from the world where they committed their crimes; and this, too, in repeated instances. Moreover, we are directly told, that they dwell 'in the shadow of death.' Is this in the present world? I have carefully read all, perhaps, that has been published among us, on the opposite side; but I must say that a conscientious man would fear to trifle with language, as it appears to me those writers do, who advocate the new-fangled hypothesis.

"2. Having proved that American State-prison punishment is in the world of disembodied souls, it only remains to inquire into its duration. Is it eternal? or but temporary? (*a*) We have seen that no less than five hundred and twenty-seven passages assert, at least of some of the convicts, that they are 'condemned to *perpetual* imprisonment;' to 'an *everlasting* confinement,' to '*everlasting* bondage,' &c., or speak of 'the *everlasting* walls of their prison,' the '*everlasting* bolts and chains,' the '*ceaseless* vigilance of their keepers,' &c. &c. (*b*) Also, in three hundred and four passages, we find it said that they 'are *for ever* excluded from the comforts of life,' and '*for ever*

cut off from all chance of escape,' and '*for ever* exposed to the merciless lash,' or '*for ever* dishonored,' &c. &c. (*c*) Besides these, in twenty instances, the stronger phrase '*for ever and ever*,' is used in similar connections. (V. Classes ii. iii. iv.) But as these latter cases occur, for the most part, either in poetical compositions, or in rhetorical language, we shall not insist on the evidence they furnish, but confine our premises to the expressions that are found in plain prose; for we do not wish to strain the argument. Now, if 'perpetual, everlasting, ceaseless' punishment, — a punishment that lasts 'for ever,' and even 'for ever and ever,' is not an eternal one, there surely is no meaning in language. I cannot but feel, that there must be some want of honesty in a mind, that does not acknowledge the conclusiveness of this proof.

"To a man who has a deep and pervading love of truth, nothing can be more painful than some of the cavils by which it is attempted to invalidate this proof; e. g. that those epithets and phrases are often used in a limited sense. I would gladly know if we have not always acknowledged this? Why, then, is it so obstinately repeated and re-iterated? Has not the fact been fully exemplified, even in this Dissertation? (V. Class ix.) Still, after all that may be said, our opponents never can make it appear, but that the Americans apply the same epithets and phrases also to Deity himself, and to other subjects of eternal duration. (V. Class viii.) If the language must be taken in a limited sense, when it refers to State-prison punishment, it must likewise be so understood, when used of those other subjects; for it will not be denied that it is the same, in both cases. Here we are willing to rest the matter.

"3. As to the plea, which has been recently *got up* (*conficta*), when all other resources failed, viz. that 'the State-prisons, in which this punishment is inflicted, are in the present world; and, therefore, the punishment itself must be here, too,' — its futility is easily shown. Two considerations are sufficient for this purpose. (*a*) From the genesis of language, all terms expressive of the future state, are borrowed from sensuous, mundane objects; e. g. heaven, from the visible firmament; hell, from a concealed pit; so, too, eternal *life*, eternal *death*, the New-

Jerusalem, Paradise, &c. And, therefore, if the Americans meant to express the future state of punishment, they were obliged, by the necessity of the case, to use some word that belonged, primarily, to things in this world. (*b*) 'State-prison' was, indeed, the name, originally, of a building, or of a set of buildings, provided by the civil authorities for the punishment of criminals, on earth; as we have abundantly shown in this Dissertation. (V. Class v.) But, by a very natural and easy metonymy, it became, in process of time, the name appropriated, in American usage, to the world of woe, after death. We refer the reader to the sixty-five passages, already quoted, (V. Class vi.), from the venerable and reverend Dr. Beecher,[2] who is President of an American College, and from other learned and popular divines of that country. So many times do they expressly call hell 'God's State-prison,' the 'Prison of the Universe,' the 'Prison of woe,' &c. &c. and the damned 'the spirits in prison,' &c. &c. They also indicate, plainly enough, the peculiar analogical process, by which the word passed into this tropical use; for they suppose that the number of the finally miserable will bear the same proportion to the rest of mankind, that the convicts in America bear to the whole population.

"In conclusion, I must be allowed to say, that, when I consider, on one hand, the clearness of the case, and, on the other, the sophisms and manifest evasions to which those resort who 'darken counsel with words,' I dread to think that the indignation of the learned world will not always slumber. I say this in sorrow, rather than in the pride of victory," &c.

Dissertationes, in Bavensi Philologiæ Arctioris Academia, habitæ. Tom. xii. p. 896—901.

Of this Dissertation, which at first made some noise in Germany, there was a Review published at Jena, in 1841, by a writer who took a more common-sense view of the matter. He showed that the author had strained words too hard, and had not allowed the usual license for language; that he had pushed the use of mere philology altogether beyond its province; had wholly

[2] The Latin is, "viro venerabili ac reverendissimo *Bietschero*, Doctore, atque Universitatis Præside," etc. We suppose there can be no question that the *name* is intended for that of our truly venerable Dr. Beecher.—*Editor.*

overlooked the obvious considerations which the case itself presented; and that even his authorities, though taken as his only guide, would have led him to very different conclusions, had he but suffered them to stand in their natural light and in their rational bearings. The learned Dr., he said, was like a farmer, whose proper business was, to gather up the harvest that lay out abroad on all the face of his fields, but who, instead of caring for their natural growth, excavated his grounds, especially the rocky portions of them, in search of gold and silver mines, — and thus came to some rather laughable results. A good figure! I shall not trouble you with an analysis of the argument (though it is very skillfully conducted,) by which the general elements, that really decide the case, are distinguished from the single words and phrases which the Dr. had so unconsciously perverted by his narrow, pedantic criticisms. The Review is, in substance, such as we might suppose an American would write, if we except a few theories that are too fine-drawn, perhaps, for our coarser intellects.

Would you believe it? This common-sense treatment of the subject gave offence even to Dr. Ausleger's opponents, in the Wörterklauber-Vereinigung, as well as to his own party. No true Wörterklauber could brook an argument that went beyond the domain of philology. In a short time, Prof. Spitzfinder prepared his own Refutation of the Dr., on the grounds of their favorite science. Here is the concluding Chapter; or, rather, that part of it which contains the recapitulation of his premises. I find that the whole would be too long to be copied, if not too tedious to be read.

"Notwithstanding the wide range, over which this discussion has run, we may sum up the whole in the following Synopsis; referring, however, to the preceding Sections, for a full illustration of each point.

"I. *Everlasting*, in the English or American (§1.) tongue, is a compound word, composed of *ever* and *lasting*: the latter being either the present participle of the verb *to last*, or else an adjective form of an adverb. (§'s 2, 3.) What are the definitions of these two simple words?

"1. *Ever* is thus defined by the standard lexicographer Johnson: 'at any time; at all times; for ever; a word of enforcement, (e. g. as soon as *ever* he had done it).' (§ 4.)

"2. *To last* is thus defined, by the same authority: 'to endure; to continue.' (§ 5.) Therefore, *lasting*, the present participle of this verb, means continuing, that is, continuing *now*, enduring *now*, or *at present.* (§ 6.)

"Now, put these two sets of definitions together, and we have the true sense of the compound *everlasting*, thus: *a*) now continuing or enduring at any time; or, now continuing at all times; or, now continuing for ever; or, now continuing as an enforcement. *b*) Only the first and the last of these, can be the signification; because, we must be careful to preserve the sense of present time, on account of the present tense of the participle *lasting*, that is included in the compound word; and it would be absurd to say that any thing is *now* continuing at all times, or is *now* continuing for ever. We must, therefore, set these aside from the list. *c*) We prefer the last signification, namely, continuing now as an enforcement; because, the condition of convicts in the state-prison, is obviously an *enforced* punishment, — and this is probably what is meant by calling it everlasting. *d*) If, however, our opponents choose the first signification, it amounts to what is nearly the same: that, *at any time* when the authors were writing, the convicts were *continuing* in prison, in punishment, &c. (See §'s 7–11.) This, then, is all that is implied by everlasting punishment.

"3. There is also another sense of the word *ever*, as we gather from some of its compounds. *Ever-green* is thus defined by Johnson: 'verdant through the year.' Here, *ever* means a year. *e*) According to this, *everlasting* would be, continuing through the year; that is, through the *present* year, because, the participle is present. (§ 12.) Everlasting punishment is, therefore, punishment for a year.

"4. The termination, *lasting*, may also be an adjective form, from the adverb *last*; which is thus defined by Johnson: 'the last time; the time before the present; in conclusion.' (§ 13.) In this case, (as no derivative can mean more than its primitive, § 14,) *everlasting* only relates to *f*) any time before the present, or to any time in conclusion; so that the American writers, when they use this word, mean to assert expressly that State-prison punishment is either past already, or is now coming to a conclusion.

(§ 15.) And, that this is really the fact, appears from the movements of the Prison Discipline Society. (§ 16–18.)

"We have thus given all the possible significations of *everlasting*. The world will judge, for itself, whether we have refuted the Dr.'s positions.

"II. 1. *For ever.* Taking the definitions, just recapitulated, this phrase can only mean, for any time; or, for all times; or, for a year; or, for enforcement, (§ 19.) — the last being the probable meaning, in the subject now in question, for reasons already given. Accordingly, to 'suffer *for ever*,' is literally to suffer by way of enforcement. This is all. If, however, it implies any duration, it may be only for *any* conceivable point of *time*, or, at most, for a year. (§ 20.) That it must be a limited period, is demonstrated by the following:

"2. *For ever and ever*, &c. Now, did *for ever* signify eternal, as our opponents contend, then *for ever and ever* would signify twice eternal; and *for ever more*, eternal and more still, — all which would be absurd. Obviously, the phrase means, literally, *a*) for any time and another time; in short, a period just twice as long as the former. (§ 21.) Or, more probably, *b*) for two enforcements, (§ 19); because, as we have seen, the phrase is often used of those convicts who are, for the second time, in enforced imprisonment. (§'s 22, 23.) In some instances, however, *c*) for two years, according to the signification of *ever* in the compound, *ever-green*. And this is rather confirmed by the examples we have detected of its reference to such as were sentenced to an imprisonment of two years, (§ 24)." &c. &c.

Diss. in Bavensi Phil. Arctioris Acad. habitæ. Tom. xiii. pp. 711—713.

I confess that one reason, with me, for sending you these Extracts, is that they seem to resemble, in some respects, certain criticisms that I used to be vexed with, among our American theologians. If, however, they serve to entertain you, that will be a better reason. I find the publications of the Society an exhaustless fund of amusement, as you may well suppose, when I tell you they amount to twenty-seven enormous octavo volumes. Should the state of my health make it necessary for me to remain here till Spring, I may select three or four other specimens, which I have marked for your diversion.

I am, &c. C. T. Y.

P. S. I have been told of a Society, in Eastern Germany, that would seem to be the counterpart of the Wörterklauber-Vereinigung. The members, it is said, discard philology altogether, and pretend to divine all facts, and the significance of all language, by means exclusively of their own self-consciousness. A friend assures me, that, in their examination of the "great question" concerning our State-prison punishment, they maintain that it is the sense of *constraint* which our spiritual nature feels, before it recognizes itself as the Infinite. I am promised the loan of their publications. Should I find any thing very amusing, look for it in my next.

Art. XII.

Destiny of the Human Race.

What are the prospects of our race? What are its current tendencies? What are the hopes which we may entertain for it? What is the temporal destiny that awaits it? In a word, what will be its position thousands of ages in the future?

I ask these questions, not with reference to any particular people or nation, but with reference to universal humanity, considered as a unit. They relate not merely to the progress of the race in the arts and sciences, in literature and knowledge, or in physical resources; but to its progress in what should be the end of all progress — virtue. Others have frequently detailed the rapid growth of particular cities and sections of country; the rise and progress of certain sects and parties; the unparalleled increase of light and knowledge, and the wonderful triumphs of Christian truth, during given periods. It is mine to inquire, Whither does all this tend? What are the final issues? Is the course of our race, in the long run, onwards? or, is it one of eternal vacillation and uncertainty?

Whoever, with a philosophic eye, scans the past, and rightly reads the present, will behold, in the temporal destiny of our race,

——— "a brighter, loftier life for man."

He will easily come to believe that a future will ultimately be reached, the glory of which, it has been given few to conceive; that the wearisome efforts, which have proved so many heart-burdens, and have saddened the hours of so many of God's spiritual noblemen, will surely work out a measure of redemption for man; that the philanthropic in the past, the benevolent in the present, and the thoroughly christian in the future, are all so many agencies in the successful moulding and attempering of humanity; that even the failures of the unsuccessful, are but advances in disguise.

I am aware that the past presents its retrogression and national overthrows. I am aware that the lost arts of Egypt, the exhumed treasures of Herculaneum, and the classic ruins of Greece and Rome — to say nothing of Nineveh, Babylon, Jerusalem, and their sister cities in ruins — I am aware that all these are eloquent in their stories of national reverses. And I may be pointed to these, as evidence of the necessary transientness of human good, and of the groundlessness of all high cherished hopes.

But I feel constrained to question this testimony. It is true, nations rise, and fall again. But a nation's fall is the world's advance. A given point in a carriage wheel, climbs its curve to its highest altitude, then descends a like curve to the ground again; but the wheel, in the meantime, is constantly rolling onward. So both individuals and nations are born, attain to their maturity, decay in their age, and pass away. Their experience, however, whether it be written in joyousness, or in sorrow, is so much added to the world's treasury of good — to the stock of experimental facts, wherein the world's wisdom lies.

In judging of the world's advance, we meet with a very serious difficulty in the outset. The greatness of the scale of measurement, transcends the limits of our powers of vision. The lessons of practical wisdom, taught us in the criminal, or virtuous life, of a single individual, may be easily understood. A large part of that life is before us. We behold, at a single glance, both cause and effect, as exhibited therein. But when we attempt to consider, in conjunction, the lessons drawn from many millions of in-

dividual lives — to observe, not the reflex consequences alone, which result to each individual of the whole number, but the effects they mutually produce upon each other, and especially upon the generations that shall come after them — to attempt thus to draw, from individual observations, the higher lessons of national experience, is a much more difficult task.

Besides; not only must lessons of national wisdom be deduced from the combined influence of many millions of cotemporary individuals, but that influence must be viewed in the phase it assumes when modified by the influence of several successive generations. Rightly to catch this phase, in the case of any nation cotemporary with the observer, requires a breadth of vision, and a depth of penetration, rarely possessed. Look upon any of the prominent nations of the earth, at the present moment. Who can read to us the ultimate lessons they may furnish? Take, as examples, England and the United States — the two great competitors upon the theatre of national experiment. They lie before us, both marred in their fair proportions, by the moral anomalies they present. The philanthropy of the one, in the freeing of its slaves, trumpeted the world around, contrasts strangely with its pauperism, its oppression, its immense national debt, and its unholy and cruel warfares. The civilized world has long stood amazed at the spectacle it presents. And its recent political movements, so far from removing the previously existing incongruities, serve but to make confusion worse confounded. Nor have I any thing more favorable to remark of the other. Its emblazoned declaration of Equal Rights, and professed love of liberty, fall upon the ear, in strange discordant tones, as they mingle with the cries of its three millions of slaves. Now we may define the various already operating causes of national growth, and decay; but who will attempt to unfold, in advance, the truths which the experience of these nations will finally illustrate? The long line of their national being, stretches out before us, reaching far on into the future. We behold but few points in that line — far too few, from which to determine the cycle of their national being. He who studied the history of the Roman Empire in the early part of the 12th century of its being,

could not learn therefrom the same lessons of national wisdom, that are attainable by the student of later times. The great national problem was then but half solved. Though eleven hundred years of its existence had passed away, even this was a period too brief, to enable one to pronounce oracularly upon the fate of the nation, or to anticipate the lessons of wisdom, which its history ultimately presented. Thus, while the individual cycle may embrace less than a score of years, the national round may include many centuries.

But when we have risen to an appreciation of the greatness of the scale of national experience and progress, we have not finished our labor. We have but taken the second step in our inquiry. A third remains to be taken. And as we have risen from the individual, to the national cycle; so, by a still farther advance, must we rise to the cycle of our race. But already is the reach too great for us. And if the advance, yet to be made, is not greater than that already made, it must still require a sweep of thought, to which we are altogether inadequate. Stated mathematically, our conclusion, thus far, would stand; — As the cycle of the individual, — in which is completed the individual destiny: is to the cycle of the nation — in which is completed the national destiny; so is the cycle of the nation, to the cycle of the race — in which is completed the temporal destiny of the race. We have already seen that the mean term of this proportion, the national cycle, is too great for our grasp. Much more, then, must the yet unknown extreme, the cycle of the race, be too great for our grasp. It is plain, therefore, that we can do no more than to become convinced of the fact of human progress, when judged on an extended scale, leaving the great cycle of that progress undetermined.

This point finds an apt illustration, in the question of the sun's revolution, with its attendant planets, around some great central orb of the universe. The secondary planets revolve in their several orbits about their primaries. The primaries, accompanied by their secondaries, revolve in their several orbits, about the sun. Now does the sun, accompanied by its retinue of planets, revolve in an orbit of its own, around a still greater centre? In the first place, analogy would seem to answer this question in

the affirmative. But, in the second place, the uncertain deductions of analogy are confirmed by phenomena actually presented in the heavens. In the direction of the constellation Hercules, the stars are apparently receding from each other, and new stars are bursting upon our sight. In the opposite point of the heavens, the stars gradually approach each other, and some of them entirely disappear. These phenomena are precisely those which would be produced by the sun's moving from the one portion, towards the other, that is, in the direction of the constellation named. Thus is the fact of the sun's revolution rendered extremely probable.

Now to determine the magnitude of its orbit, and the time of its revolution, is quite another matter. Far beyond the orbit of Uranus, at about twice the distance of that planet from the sun, or 3200,000,000 of miles, a new planet has recently been discovered. The diameter of this new planet's orbit must, therefore, be some 6,400,000,000 of miles. The diameter of the Moon's orbit, is less than half of one million of miles. Suppose we now assume, that the ratio between the orbit of the newly discovered planet, and the orbit of the sun, is only equal to the ratio between the moon's orbit, and that of the new planet. The proportion would then stand; — As the moon's orbit is to the new planet's orbit, so is the new planet's orbit, to the orbit of the sun. Though our ratios, in this proportion, are more than 13,000, the sun's orbit is, doubtless, many times the result thus obtained.

Indeed, the celebrated astronomer, Dr. Maedler, director of the Dorpat Observatory, Russia, has announced the discovery, by processes of his own, of what he deems the great central orb of the universe. It is the star Alcyone, in the group long known as the Pleiades; and is estimated to be at "34,000,000 of times the distance of the sun, or so remote that light, with a velocity of 12,000,000 of miles per minute, requires a period of more than 500 years to pass from the great centre to our sun" — so that, if this central orb were struck from the heavens to-day, it would continue to be visible to the generations that shall come after us, for more than 500 years. By this estimate, the diameter of the sun's orbit must be some 6,460,000,000,000,000 of miles; and the "period of its revolution,

with all its train of planets, satellites, and comets, about the grand centre, as deduced by Dr. Maedler, is 18,200,000 years." As we contemplate this vast period, and reflect upon the mighty round, which the sun, with all its attendant planets, has yet to run before it shall have completed a single revolution, we are forced to exclaim with Festus,

"The world is in its first young quarter yet."

Now, in this illustration, the secondary planets, revolving round their primaries, and constituting the planetary system, answer to the individuals which make up a nation. The primaries, in their revolution about the sun, constituting the solar system, answer to the nations themselves, which make up the whole family of man. And the vast, though unknown, period of the sun's revolution, which helps make up the sidereal system, answers to the equally unknown cycle of the race, which helps perfect the final plan of God. Were we to suppose that the period, in which the destiny of the race is completed, equals in duration the sun's great cycle as before given, our original assumption, though it may have startled us as with the idea of an eternity, would fall very far short of the truth. Whatever supposition we adopt, however, the difficulty, of which we have spoken, still remains. The cycle of humanity, which shall usher in its golden era, must extend through the lapse of so many ages, that we cannot grasp it. Compared thereto, the period of man's history already past, is but as a single ray of light, to the effulgence of the noon-day sun. Though we cannot, however, define the period, in which humanity, in its progress, shall attain unto its final condition, we can, by a careful analysis of passing events, determine the fact of such progress, and come to cherish hope in a glorious future.

Every moral achievement is one step in the progress of humanity. The discussion and settlement of a practical truth, elevates the community, in the midst of which that discussion is had, just so much higher in the scale of moral being. Such truth being wrought out, and made apparent, the next generation inherits it, among its household treasures; learns it, as one of the first truths of childhood; and incorporates it into its fundamental principles of action.

It has been supposed that every moral problem must undergo a re-solution in every successive generation. And, since every effort of fallible beings must be uncertain in its results, it has been thought to be, at least, doubtful, whether in the correct solution of any great moral problem, a permanent gain is secured; and, therefore, doubtful, whether there is, on the whole, good reason to expect the permanent progress of the race. To this I reply;— Though uncertainty may attend human effort in any given individual case, the same uncertainty will not attach to the aggregate of human efforts. There is great uncertainty attending the continuance of human life, with a given individual; but there is no uncertainty attending its continuance with reference to the great majority of mankind. So it is even probable that some individuals, though sincere inquirers, may err in relation to moral truths most clearly demonstrated, and previously exhibited; but it is not probable that the whole mass of sincere inquirers will err with them. Once fairly enthroned in the public mind, such truths can scarcely fail to hold their sway. Unlike some handiwork of art, which, depending upon a secret possessed by the few, has nothing to secure its continued existence, and which may therefore be lost — moral truths, once established, become premises in our daily reasonings, and the foundation of our daily acts.

Hence it is not correct to suppose that every moral problem must undergo a re-solution in every successive age. Once fully wrought out, it ever after stands as a polar star, shining upon the pathway of human progress. Instance the overthrow of witchcraft, among us, and the vindication of the right of individual judgment, throughout Protestant Christendom. The generation, now preparing for active life, will not be compelled to solve these problems anew. It is taught the right, in these matters, in childhood; and will grow up strong to practise it in after years. Its relation to truths thus exhibited, is not unlike its relation to the true system of Astronomy. Each successive generation is not compelled to travel anew the mazy paths, in which Ptolemy and Tycho Brahe journeyed, before they can approach the truths demonstrated by Copernicus. These truths are taught them in their primary lessons;

thus making the school-boy to stand by the side of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton.

The world is growing wiser, after this very fashion, in relation to the treatment of its criminals. Once we had few facts on this head, and all philanthropic speculations were denounced as visionary, if not revolutionary. But these speculations are evidently sustained by subsequent experiments. It is now even proved that mild measures are by far the most effectual, in controlling and subduing the obdurate outcast. His Excellency, the Governor of our Commonwealth, in his late annual address, gives us an important fact on this point. Having spoken of the excellent discipline in our State Prison at Charlestown, and of the increasing desire of the prisoners to obtain and read the books from the prison library, he says, " The benefits of a mild and humane treatment towards the unfortunate offenders against the laws of society, are more and more manifest. The credit of this experiment belongs to the present Warden. Thus far it has been successful." Similar testimony is furnished from a variety of other prisons; and the names of a Howard, of an Empress Elizabeth, a Mrs. Fry, and others, stand associated with facts, which, while they illustrate the foregoing truth, must gladden the heart of every philanthropist.

The punishment of death, also, against which all the better feelings of our hearts loudly protest, is similarly condemned. Speculations are arrayed against each other; but facts, though few in number, speak with a decisive voice. For two hundred and fifty years, during the brighter days of the Roman Republic, capital punishment was expressly forbidden, and seldom inflicted. The Russian empress, Elizabeth, abolished it a century ago, and the result fully demonstrated the wisdom of the measure. Seven years experience of the workings of the same measure in Bombay, under Sir James Mackintosh; seventeen, in Belgium; and twenty-five in Tuscany,[1] leave little room to doubt, that the measure is demanded both by the welfare of the criminal, and by the safety of the community.

[1] See Essays on the Punishment of Death, by Rev. C. Spear, pp. 76, 87.

Experiments upon this topic, and others, having for their object the removal of slavery, war, and all the great curses of our race, will continue to multiply; until the lessons they teach shall have inwrought themselves into the public mind, and shall be taught to successive generations, as their first principles of action. Thus, at length, will a step be gained in the progress of humanity.

I would not be understood to say, that any given position, once attained by any nation, becomes a fixed point, behind which neither that nation, nor any other, can ever again fall. But I would say that the fact that such position has once been gained, will exert ever afterward a recuperative influence. Nations may revolve around the point thus fixed, or recede from it; but the spiritual and philanthropic seers, of every age, will keep their eyes upon it, and strive not only to reach it again, but even to go beyond it. It will be regarded as a portion of elevated moral table land, *beyond* which, even, all future explorers will be expected to ascend.

In the examination of social or national evils, yet unremoved, like those to which reference has been made, the principle we have asserted does not so clearly appear. And yet even here the law of progress may be seen. Though the evil is not put away, the public mind is measurably enlightened; the public sensibilities are, in a good degree, quickened; and the public energy is gathering up, preparatory to the final struggle. The labor once completed — the problem once solved — the result becomes ever after a matter of history. Every succeeding generation, instead of renewing the struggle on the same ground, and solving the problem anew, will obtain its moral essence, in the general truth it has evolved. Thus does every successive generation stand upon the shoulders of that which preceded it.

In the present state of the arts and sciences, we find additional omens of coming good. It is true, there were many arts understood by the ancients, that are lost to us. But there are also many arts possessed by us, that were unknown to the ancients. And if we raise the question of their relative utility, the moderns will clearly bear the palm. What matters it that the Egyptians had a method of embalming and preserving the dead bodies of men?

We have a method of embalming their living, burning thoughts! The printing press has immortalized the wisdom of the last four hundred years, as well as of much that preceded it; and is, at this very moment, a more powerful engine, of good or evil, than all ancient human instrumentalities together.

I would not, in the slightest degree, detract from the true merits of the past. I feel too sensibly the amount of our indebtedness to that past. The wrong of those who commit this sin, (and I grant the number is not small,) is worthy of all reprehension. By them "covenant is broken with the mighty dead; and they, whose ever-living wisdom, whether it speak to us in books, or yet more impressively in the institutions which they have contributed to form, to sanction, to improve, are often set aside to make room for the new, capricious, dogmatical, untried authorities of the day; for partial interests, sectarian prejudice, and temporary fashion; for the despotic sway and idolatrous worship of the present; as if there were neither voice nor vision in the oracular past."[2] But while we acknowledge the wisdom of the past, and take a true pleasure in bringing to its altar our offerings of gratitude, we must still, on the whole, give our preference for the present. And in saying this, we but do the present equal honor with the past. We ought to occupy an advanced position. If we add but little to the treasury of good received from those who have gone before us, it must serve to swell the amount possessed. That much has been added, especially in the departments of science and of art, cannot be questioned.

The past has spoken to us in its literature and its institutions; the present is uttering its voice in the physical resources it is developing; and it will be given the future, I trust, to speak in those clear and distinct moral tones, which shall arouse the sleeping world to action; which shall break the bondman's chain; put an end to the evils of war; perfect the various philanthropic movements of our times; and remove from the face of the earth the thraldom of our race. It cannot be denied that in the rapidly developing resources of our age, there is a promise

[2] Arnold's Lectures on Modern History, p. 363.

of this coming good. There is growing up an interchange of thought and sympathy among men of science and virtue, of different nations, as free as it is useful. And this interchange is promoted by our growing facilities for intercommunication. Already are our railways and lines of steamships girding the world. The sails of our commerce whiten every sea; and, by the invention of the telegraph, the lightnings of heaven have conferred omnipresence upon man. Time and space are well-nigh annihilated; and night has become as the day, and darkness as light.

It is quite impossible, in such a state of things, to shut up the good a nation may possess. Yesterday a discovery was made in the remotest corner of the earth. To-day the world is in possession of the fact. Now a happy thought is developing itself in good in some country village. Anon the nations of the earth are repeating the experiment. A generous emulation, in the out-working of good for the race, is beginning to pervade all classes; and in the most politic wisdom, light is received from every source. Men of science and of art, are now permitted to dwell among us in quiet. Kings cherish them, and multitudes do them homage.

It is interesting to contrast the ignorant, self-wronging policy of the past, in this respect, with the generous liberality of the present. The name of a Herschell is welcomed at every fireside. That of Copernicus, on the contrary, on the publication of his principal work, which has laid all subsequent ages under a tribute of gratitude, was branded with infamy, by the highest court on earth. And it was near three hundred years before justice prevailed, and reversed the sentence. In our time governments give to men of science and literature, a living. In Galileo's time they shut them up in prison. We behold manufacturing cities spring up in a day; and our young men and women, from all the country round, with a patronizing spirit, throng together to tend the jenny, ply the shuttle, and make their fortunes. But a hundred years ago, we behold in England, even, mobs assembled for the destruction of as harmless things as saw-mills; and hear one Mr. Haughton laying before the nation the advantages of such mills; but expressing his apprehension that they

might excite the rage of the populace.[3] It is only four or five hundred years since the spirit of innovation has been permitted to give us glass in our windows, and chimneys in our houses. In changes like these, the world has evidently been the gainer. Experience has taught it wisdom.

Again; — In the manner, in which the discoveries of our times are announced, we find a farther indication of the superior moral elevation of the world. When Pythagoras invented what is known as the Pythagorean or carpenter's theorem, it is said that, in the fulness of his joy, he sacrificed seventy fat oxen to the gods. And it is well known that when Archimedes, who had been employed to test the purity of a golden crown suspected of alloy, hit upon the solution of the problem, and at the same time discovered a method of ascertaining the specific gravity of bodies, he leaped from the baths, in which he was indulging, and ran naked through the streets, exclaiming, Εὕρηκα Εὕρηκα — "I have found it! I have found it!" Contrast with these the dignity of Newton, when, after years of incessant toil at the great problem of the physical universe, laboring under every variety of discouragements, and seeing at last the happy consummation of his toils in near prospect before him, he was so overcome as to be unable to go on with his calculations, and was obliged to request a friend to complete them for him. Overawed by the greatness of the discovery he had made, he sat himself down in silence, as in the very presence of the God of heaven. Pythagoras and Newton were both men of devotion. Each, in this respect, may be regarded as a favorable specimen of his respective age. And as we turn from the bloody offering at a pagan altar, to the overpowering gratitude of a Christian heart, we feel that upon us has risen a light as of the unclouded Sun of Righteousness.

Another argument for a better day for our race, is found in the high moral aims of the best minds of the age. Not only has every age its peculiar mission and ideals of good, but there seems to be a necessary sequence in those ideals. For many centuries, the possession of power and the attainment of worldly greatness, was the end of human

[3] Beckmann's History of Inventions, vol. i. p. 229.

labor. This was the highest object of pursuit. To this end all energies were bent.. Warfares were carried on, and the inventive genius of the world was called into requisition, to improve the arts of war, and extend the domain of individual and national power. A history of those ages is little else than a history of warfares, with the usual train of accompanying evils.

The next beau-ideal, looking only to a very general mode of classification, was worldly possessions. Then the most active and leading minds were turned in this direction. The pursuit of wealth called forth all their energies, and the nations made to themselves golden gods, and fell down and worshipped them. Science and art were most valued when they most subserved this all-important end. The inventions of genius, and the developement of physical resources, were pressed into the service of the new deity, and made to offer acceptable sacrifices upon his altar. It is but just to confess that the reign of this god is not yet at an end.

But the best minds of the present age are beginning to seek something nobler — something loftier far than gold. They have perceived that the developement of our moral resources by no means keeps pace with that of our physical and intellectual. Many of the present results of this unbalanced action, are seen to be evil; but these are believed to be only temporary. They are the incidental attendants upon a transition state — a state that is tending to higher moral results. Those whose ideal is goodness, can therefore view them hopefully. They have looked upon the past, and turned away from the age of worldly greatness, and from that of corrupting gold, and are looking after, and yearning for the final blessing — Christian goodness.

These periods are not distinct, but overlap each other continually. And what we promise ourselves, is, that the supremacy of power and wealth shall at length pass away, and goodness set up its rule in the hearts of men. We see indications of this in all the alleged reforms of the day. I say, *alleged* reforms; for I care not, as it respects my present argument, if they shall all prove mere fancies and day-dreams. As existing facts, they evidence, not only a yearning for a better state, but a struggling after it.

And it is in this conception of something higher, and in the effort to reach it, that our hopes lie.

Let the present struggles, then, prove unavailing. Let Fourierism explode, and non-resistance die; let intemperance stalk abroad as ever of old, and the gallows continue, as a relic of barbarism, to lift up its arms in the face of high heaven; let the slave groan on in his bondage, and war continue to devour the nations, — and call it glory. Is there, therefore, no hope? Will these yearnings for a higher good all cease? Will the world sit down in despair? Believe it not. It will have grown wiser by its very defeats. It may fail in its present efforts. It may fail a thousand times in similar efforts. But, so far as good is involved in the end desired, it will succeed at last. And every failure will aid its final success. Dr. Arnold, in his "Lectures on Modern History," has somewhere remarked, that he "cannot conceive of a state of things so bad, that sincere efforts will not improve it." A long time, success may be deferred. Many a toiler may grow weary, and many a heart may grow sad. But those who have faith, can cheerfully wait the final issue.

The destiny of humanity must be wrought out in sweat and tears. The race cannot attain to its blessings without effort, and would not preserve them if it could. To be qualified to enjoy them, it must be able to acquire them. The prodigal son, in the beautiful parable of our Saviour, received his portion of his father's wealth, and how soon did he squander it! But, having toiled his way back from poverty and wretchedness to the joys of his childhood-home, it does not appear that he ever again wandered. A fit representative is he, of the race. Created in purity, it has fallen from its first estate, and is toiling on, in chains which sin has forged. There are many stages in its progress to its better destiny, a glimpse of which even, can scarcely now be had.

> "Earth-like, the heart must undergo all change,
> Ere the superior life be formed therein,
> The chastity of heart which loves but God.
> Life's sensuous warmth, the spirit's holy chill,
> Time's week-day work, have yet to be gone thro'.
> The *hortus siccus* of a Paradise
> Is all earth now can boast." [4]

[4] Festus, p. 342.

Let every toiler, then, take courage. As the coral insect, washed by the ocean's wave, is content to add his little portion to the sub-marine mountain reef, which shall one day uprise, an island in the midst of the sea; so ought we to be content to add our little portion, in working out the destiny of humanity. Besides, we shall not toil alone. There is an ever-present providence guiding the affairs of men. *We* are oft enshrouded in darkness; but the power above sits ever enthroned in light. We journey, we sometimes know not whither. God always moves the nations of the earth to a certain end. Amidst the sinfulness of man, he planted Christianity. Like a tender plant, has it been borne down to the earth by the winds of passion. Like an outcast, has it been driven from the abodes of men. Like a malefactor, has it been nailed to the cross. Yet from every estate it has returned again, possessed of new energy and power. By its silent, yet most effective influence, is it moulding the institutions, and subduing the hearts, of men. And, if I have not mistaken the temporal destiny of man, it shall bear him on to a gladsome state, in which the earth shall look green again; peace shall prevail; and Christianity walk forth in its glory.

I cannot better close this article, than in the words of the poet, ascribed to the angel of Hope, who is supposed to be viewing the regenerated earth, with the work of Christianity complete upon it.

"How sweet, how sacred now, this earth of man's!
The prelude of a yet sublimer bliss!—
I marked it from the first, while yet it lay
Lightless and stirless; ere the forming fire
Was kindled in its bosom, or the land
Lift its volcanic breastwork up from sea.
The deluge and idolatries of men
I viewed, though shuddering, and with faltering eye,
E'en to the incarnation of Heaven's Lord,
And dawning of His faith; that faith which was
An infant and anon a giant; was
A star, and grew a Heaven-fulfilling Sun;
Which was an outcast, and became, ere long,
A dweller in all palaces; which hid
Its head in dens of deserts, and sat throned,
After, in richest temples high as hills;
Which was poured out in mortal blood, and rose
In an immortal spirit; as a slave
Was sold for gold and prostrated to power;

And now that lowly bondmaid is a Queen;
And lo! she is beloved in earth and Heaven;
And lieth in the bosom of her Lord,
The Bride of the all-worshipped, one with God! [5]

A. A. M.

[5] Festus, pp. 389, 390.

Art. XIII.

Authority of Moses.

It is not our object in this brief essay, to give an extensive and minute delineation of the character of the great lawgiver of Israel. We aim rather at a few prominent traits. We have a higher object in this undertaking, than merely to survey the life of an individual, however interesting that life might appear. With the character of Moses, the credit of much that is found both in the Old and New Testaments, stands in no small degree connected. It is proper, then, that we seek for some adequate knowledge of this connection, and that we be able to maintain a proper consistency in our views of it. We have a single point in the character of Moses to make a matter of inquiry; and that is, whether it be good or bad, whether he was a true prophet of the God of heaven, or an impostor.

Many have become embarrassed on account of the discrepancies which they have found between the law of Moses and the gospel of Jesus Christ, as made known by the writers of the New Testament. Instead of endeavoring to reconcile the difficulties in which they find themselves involved, we learn that in many instances they lay aside the injunctions of Moses, as worse than worthless. They account a portion of them as absolute perversions of all that are or ever were good and profitable to men. Yet we find, of this description, those who profess to be Christians, and receive the New Testament as the rule of their faith and conduct. How far they reject the Old Tes-

tament in general, we are not able to determine. Probably, some embrace more of it, and some less. We should be ready, however, to conclude that most of those who embrace the gospel, would be willing to unite with it, as a part of the same inspired word, the books of the prophets. We have no peculiar attachments to Judaism. St. Paul tells us, the law "was added because of transgressions, till the seed should come, to whom the promise was made." (Gal. iii. 19.) The law seems, then, to form a part of the great chain that composes the system of divine revelation. If we strike it out, we may find ourselves in more difficulty in maintaining the divine authority of the gospel, than many are aware. Indeed, it is to be suspected that most who profess to embrace the gospel, thus disconnected from the Mosaic dispensation, embrace it more from its apparent consistency, than from the persuasion of its having any divine authority. They may acknowledge it to be divine; but it is only on the ground on which they would concede that any other thing which is good or true is divine.

We propose now to institute an inquiry respecting the character of Moses, as gathered from the New Testament. This will show us in what light, we, as Christians, should view our subject. It will so far open to our view the state of the question, as to make it plain, whether, in discrediting the character of Moses, we do, or do not violence to the very ground of faith we profess to respect. This is a matter in which every person ought to be informed who wishes to act consistently on the subject.

In Acts xxviii. 23, we find that St. Paul classes Moses with the prophets, and treats both as of divine authority: "And when they had appointed him a day, there came many to him into his lodging; to whom he expounded and testified the kingdom of God, persuading them concerning Jesus, both out of the law of Moses, and out of the prophets, from morning till evening." In view of this passage, we would ask, if the apostle held that the law of Moses was never of divine authority, why did he make use of it to persuade his hearers of the Messiahship of Jesus Christ? Why did he class the law of Moses with the writings of the prophets? Will it be said, in reply, that he did it to accommodate Jewish prejudices? If the

apostle's aim was merely conquest in argument, this course might be pardonable; but we conclude, and we think reasonably, that he was laboring to establish faith in Christianity, on a solid foundation. We cannot, therefore, believe that he would quote from an author, as a prophet of God, in whom he had no faith as a divine writer.

In the account that is given of the rich man and Lazarus, Christ puts it into the mouth of Abraham to say to the rich man concerning his brethren, "They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them." When the rich man, in his deplorable condition, offered a still more earnest plea for his brethren, he received for an answer, "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead." Our readers will do well to mark the bearing this last passage has on our subject. It attaches an importance to the teachings of Moses, which compares with the information that might be received from one who arose directly from the dead. It makes little difference, so far as our subject is concerned, in what light the account of the rich man and Lazarus is held. Interpret it as we may, its force is the same, in giving to Moses an authoritative character.

The testimony of St. Paul to the Hebrews, iii. 5, is much to our purpose. "And Moses verily was faithful in all his house as a servant, for a testimony of those things which were to be spoken after." Moses is called the servant of the Lord, in Deut. xxxiv. 5, and in Joshua, i. 1. In Num. xii. 7, we find very nearly the language of the apostle. We quote this with the preceding verse. God is there represented as saying, "Hear now my words: If there be a prophet among you, I the Lord will make myself known unto him in a vision, and will speak unto him in a dream. My servant Moses is not so, who is faithful in all his house. With him will I speak mouth to mouth; even apparently, not in dark speeches." We find here a double testimony to the high prophetic character of Moses. In the first place, we have the testimony of St. Paul, that he was faithful in all his house, which would include no less than the whole house of Israel. In the second place, the apostle quotes almost literally the language of Moses, as his own, bearing testimony that he was not only a ser-

vant of God, but that he was such in a pre-eminent degree. Thus the apostle establishes both the character of Moses and his writings, by the authority of his own inspired testimony. Hence, the character of Moses and that of Paul become so intimately connected, that he who receives the latter as divinely inspired, cannot consistently reject the former.

We proceed to notice another testimony, or rather another expression, from the same witness: "What advantage then hath the Jew? or what profit is there of circumcision? Much every way; chiefly, because unto them were committed the oracles of God." Here, we observe, that to the Jews, were committed the oracles of God. The question now occurs, Through whose agency were those oracles committed? The answer is apparent: Moses was that individual. But we have Scripture testimony to this point. "This is that Moses, which said unto the children of Israel, A prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you of your brethren, like unto me; him shall ye hear. This was he that was in the church in the wilderness, with the angel which spake to him in Mount Sinai, and with our fathers; who *received the lively oracles* to give unto us." Acts vii. 37, 38. It was certainly no small testimony in favor of the character of Moses from these two passages of the New Testament, that through him, the oracles of God were delivered to the Israelitish nation. Thus the language of the New Testament corroborates the statement of the Old, concerning the giving of the law at Mount Sinai, and with it the character of Moses, as the prophet of the Lord and the lawgiver of Israel.

The words of Christ, found in Matt. v. 17, in our estimation, have no insignificant bearing on the merits of our subject: "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets: I am not come to destroy but to fulfil." We conclude, it will not be here disputed, that the law referred to in this place, embraced the whole code of Moses. Christ fulfilled the ceremonial part, so far as his condition was concerned, in his own person, by performing the rites required of him. Its moral requisitions upon the Israelites, involving principles which extend to the whole world, receive their final accomplishment in the

effectual exercise of the reigning power of his kingdom. If the gospel dispensation was designed to complete what the law began, and so to fulfil it, instead of destroying it, it cannot be thrown away, as useless, in the general plan of the divine economy. The Jews acknowledged no other law than that of Moses as coming from God. And we should remember the above-named was such a law as stood connected with the prophets; it was "the law or the prophets."

In these remarks on the character of Moses, we have confined ourselves to the New Testament; and notwithstanding the instances we have quoted may appear more numerous than our subject might seem to demand, we can assure our readers that we have by no means exhausted it. The New Testament affords more declarations of a similar description. Besides all this, the testimony of the prophets, which few of the professed believers of the New Testament would be disposed to deny, might be added. Moses forms one distinct part of the Old Testament, and the prophets another. The loppers-off of the sacred pages usually make their first cut upon Moses. He is the hand that most offends them, and is, therefore, a fit subject for amputation. They look at him as an eye which sees not as they see; so they hasten to pluck out that eye, which so much offends them.

We have now another class of subjects, to which we would invite the attention of the reader. It comprehends those passages, in which the writers of the New Testament appear to oppose the law. But here we are to notice, what kind of opposition to the law we may expect from the New Testament. If it prove merely a repeal of some part of the Mosaic code, this will not touch the point in dispute; because it always presupposes that the law repealed, once had authority. That it once had authority is a position that we need, and all that we need, to maintain consistency between the Old and New Testaments. We do not by any means wish to maintain that the law of Moses is binding upon us, any further than it involves the moral principles, which are recognized by the gospel. We are aware that it is sometimes affirmed, that no law of divine authority can be subject to repeal. The objector alleges, that human laws are made subject

to repeal on account of their imperfection; but that this can never be true of a divine law, which cannot partake of the imperfection of the laws which are enacted by man. In reply, we remark, that St. Paul meets this very objection. After speaking of the inheritance embraced in the promise that was made to Abraham, which was older than the law, he asks the question, "Wherefore then serveth the law?" In answer he says, "It was added because of transgressions, till the seed should come, to whom the promise was made." Gal. iii. 19. The promise embraced the gospel dispensation; but that dispensation could not be introduced and put in practice, till the proper period arrived for the appearance of its author, Jesus Christ. The law was given then to occupy the intervening space between the time of making the promise and the beginning of its fulfilment. But the very expression of the apostle above, may be accounted as an approval of the law for the period for which it was designed.

If these remarks are correct, they will supersede the necessity of introducing many passages from the apostles, for the purpose of illustration, which otherwise might be considered as altogether condemning the law. When St. Paul tells us that "the law made nothing perfect," can we rationally suppose that he meant to condemn the law as wanting in divine authority? No law could finish what is comprehended in the extent of God's mercy to moral agents. It might make all necessary demands; but it could not render all the assistance which was requisite to a competent power for complete obedience to law. No law of commandments can give life, though it may demand it. It is the province of the gospel to give life by infusing that spirit that moves to the obedience which the law demands.

We sometimes hear queries upon the law of Moses, that surprise us. We are unable to perceive how a conviction can arise, from a careful study of the New Testament, that Christ himself was a transgressor of the Mosaic law. That he transgressed some of the Jewish traditions, we concede. But if Christ transgressed the law of Moses, how is it to be accounted for, that no accusation of this kind was preferred against him at the time of his trial? The Jews' only charge at this time was treason against

Cæsar, in making himself a king. The sacred historians inform us that the Jews sought for allegations against him, and expressly tell us, "they found none." In a few instances, on other occasions, they accused him of violating the law. In such cases he did not vindicate himself by passing a censure on the law, but by showing the Jews that they were partial and illiberal in their construction of it. In the instance of passing through a cornfield, and of the disciples rubbing the ears of corn in their hands and eating, the Jews made no complaint of theft, fraud, or any thing of the kind; but their complaint was merely a violation of the Sabbath. It is certainly somewhat singular, that any of modern times should be so fastidious, as to think of objections to the conduct of Christ and his disciples in the eye of the law, which his eagle-eyed opposers, who were under the law, and who were acquainted with the interpretations that were put upon it in their day, did not think of making. It has been shown by Mr. Paige, in his Commentary, and others, that the disciples in eating, for the then present necessity, on the Sabbath day, neither violated the law of Moses, nor any regulation of the Jews, except some of their false interpretations concerning the Sabbath.

We have one expression from the Saviour, which we will now introduce, that is thought by some to bear very strongly against the divine authority of the Mosaic law. It is found in Matt. v. 38, 39. "Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; but I say unto you, that ye resist not evil." We are here to consider what bearing the words of Christ have upon the quotation, which he makes from the law of Moses. In the first place, then, we have no reason to conclude that Christ made the foregoing quotation from the law, for the purpose of condemning it as having no proper obligation upon the Jewish magistrate; for, in this case, he must contradict every expression of respect which he has given us of the character of Moses. In the second place, we deny that he said any thing against the passage, except as applicable to the affairs of his own kingdom. Christ's expression, "that ye resist not evil," or, as we believe, more properly translated, "Contend not against an evil person," we do not think was ever designed to be adopted

as a rule in human governments. It was, is, and ever must be, a personal regulation for the subjects of his own spiritual kingdom, and can no more be carried elsewhere, than light can become darkness, or darkness, light. It is true, so far as the state of human society admits, the spirit of this injunction of the Saviour should be adopted in human governments. The most wicked society needs to be regulated by righteous laws; but different states of society require regulations under different modifications, though all should be on equitable and righteous principles. We may well conclude that it was on the ground that Christ would not interfere in the affairs of human governments, that he did not condemn the woman taken in adultery. He would not make himself a judge of what pertained to the affairs and governments of the world. But we now turn our attention more particularly to the quotation which Christ made from the law of Moses. This we have more at large in Lev. xxiv. 18–21. "And he that killeth a beast, shall make it good; beast for beast. And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbor, as he hath done so shall it be done to him; breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth; as he hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again. And he that killeth a beast, he shall restore it; and he that killeth a man, he shall be put to death." See also Ex. xxi. 23, 24, 25. Deut. xix. 21. Here we have before us a specimen of the law of Moses; and what do we see in it but equitable retribution? and what is equitable retribution but justice? Shall we look at this whole plan in the light of acknowledged principles? If a man sells and delivers to another a bushel of grain, is it not just that he receive the same amount from him in return? If the first man do not need the grain for his own use or consumption, does this invalidate his claim? And further, if the second takes his grain by violence or theft, does this lessen his obligation to return an equal amount? or weaken the first man's claim? Now this is all a very plain matter. Every person understands it. Let the reader, then, ask himself, what is there in the above *lex talionis*, as it is called, that differs in principle from this? The reader may answer this question to his own satisfaction, if he is able. And if he admits the principle embraced in one item to be just, let him

draw the line of distinction, if he can find the place, between that and any other item which he may be disposed to pronounce unjust.

But it will be said, if you put out one man's eye because he has put out another's, you will do the first man an injury without rendering any benefit to the second. This may seem to be true; but the depredator, by the loss of his eye, will be taught sympathy for the victim of his crime, by actual experience. Beside, if he inflicts a second wrong of the kind, he will know what kind of suffe ringhis victim must endure, and he may well anticipate a condition that will deprive him of all opportunity of ever committing a third offence of the kind. So with the man that loses a tooth, or suffers a blemish, as a punishment; he is made to sympathize, by actual and similar experience, with the victim of his crime. This does not follow, to be sure, in the case of death for death, because the victim of murder is beyond the reach of all human sympathy; but the doctrine of a just retribution is not at all weakened by the consideration in the case of death for death.

It is very evident that the doctrine of a just and equal retribution belongs to the divine government in all its departments, and in every dispensation. We do not see its penalties, in all instances, assuming the same forms, nor operating at all times under the same modifications. But still, we have no reason to believe they ever fail of carrying out their principles in the end. Human governments pertain to outward things; they must judge of crimes by outward actions; so with all their penalties. The government of Christ's kingdom is of a different kind. It extends its rule to the inmost recesses of the heart. It has no dealings with a man's outward eye or his literal tooth. Its province is internal. Its rule is with moral action. Although it deals largely in the work of forgiveness, and embraces for its final object the salvation of a world of sinners; yet it abates nothing of the rigor of the law in the equality of its retribution.

But to the *lex talionis*. We do not suppose, that in all human governments, retribution should be administered in the form of the Jewish law. Circumstances may require, and often do require, a substitution of other penal-

ties. Nor do we conclude that a penalty of the same extent, in all possible cases, and in every condition of society, should be inflicted for the same visible amount of crime. To inflict a penalty beyond the bounds of a just retribution, is to act the part of tyranny and oppression. To inflict a penalty that is less, leaving the remainder to moral influence, or rather to the providence of God, may in many instances be salutary, and, therefore, very proper. We contend that death for death carries in the very face of it, no more than a just retribution; that it rests not alone on the authority of the law, but has its foundation in the very same principle as the requisition that a man should restore a beast for one which he has maliciously slain. The reader will not necessarily draw the inference from these remarks, that we are opposed to the abolition of capital punishment, in our day and country. We say, and we believe consistently, that we should be glad to see the experiment tried. We are not among the number who are opposed to mercy, where mercy can be consistently shown. We love its benign influence, and would always hail with joy its salutary operations. Nevertheless, we do not deny that we are opposed to some of the arguments, we hear urged against capital punishment. If we do not very much mistake, we see in them the seeds of infidelity, an infidelity that will go in the end to remove the very scriptural authority, on which the doctrine of the abolition of capital punishment is built. If capital punishment for murder was ever founded on the principles of a just retribution, it rests on the same principles now. The state of society may have required it once, and may not require it now. Here is the difference, and the only real difference, in the state of the question. If death for death is exceeding the bounds of a just retribution now, it always was so, and, of course, could never form any part of the law of God. Moses's law, then, on this subject, was purely a work of his own, and completely destitute of any divine authority. The reader must very plainly perceive the consequence of such a conclusion, and its bearing upon the New Testament, as is made apparent in the preceding part of this article. We have said we do not like all the arguments which we hear used against capital punishment. We will name one, the cry of *legal murder!*

In many instances, we cannot but account this an abuse of government, and of every just principle of equitable retribution. The people of our country have the government in their hands, and when they see fit to abolish capital punishment, they will do it. Let every friend of its abolition use a just influence to hasten the day of mercy to the criminal, whose hands are red with the blood of his fellow, if such he feels to be his duty; but let him spare such epithets as the above, upon our present constituted authorities.

We return to the *lex talionis* once more. It is thought Christ strictly opposed the punishment of death, when he said, as our translators represent him, "Resist not evil." We have before said, we did not believe this was intended to apply to any earthly governments. Christ had nothing to do in regulating them, and did not design to interfere with them. But suppose, for instance, it was to be so applied. We are then to look for its bearing. It is apparent that the command, *resist not evil*, has the same force against every kind of punishment, that it has against capital. Those who would abolish the punishment of death for murder, are usually willing that the criminal should be imprisoned. But Christ has given them no more authority for this, than he has for the other kind of punishment. Indeed, if the expression was intended to apply to any kind of government over others, human or divine, it makes one general sweep of every thing that comes in the shape of penalty. It is very evident, then, that it ought not to be so applied. It cannot, then, be any condemnation of the sentence which Christ quoted from the law, nor of any thing that stands in connection with that passage in the law; but its language was designed to apply to individual conduct. If this conclusion is a fair one, as plainly appears, we may now consider this part of our subject disposed of; we may conclude that Christ never intended, by the quotation which he made from the law, to condemn it, as wanting either divine authority, or the true principle of retributive justice, as suitable to be exercised by legal authority.

We have one prominent passage more for the objector from the New Testament, as standing in seeming opposition to the Mosaic law; though we do not recollect

of ever hearing it proposed as such. It is found in Acts, xv. 10, and is related as being spoken by the apostle Peter: "Now, therefore," says the apostle, "why tempt ye God, to put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we were able to bear." This passage seems to refer more particularly to the rite of circumcision, but embraces an allusion to the ceremonial law in general. Circumcision, to which there seems to be the most direct allusion, was not of Moses, but of the patriarchs. But how are we to understand that this was a rite which the people were not able to bear? Did it expose them to sickness, uncleanness, or any other inconvenience, after the cure of its operation was effected? In all the records of the Old and New Testament, we find not a single complaint of its being a burden, or of producing any evil, or inconvenience, unless in this passage. The ceremonial part of the law, we know, had its burdens. In a barren country they might prove nearly insupportable. But was it so to the Israelites? Does not their history show that they were a prosperous and happy people, in proportion as they adhered to the ceremonies and spirit of their laws, as given by Moses? Moses affirmed to the people that "It shall come to pass that if thou shalt hearken diligently unto the Lord thy God, to observe and do all his commandments, which I command thee this day, that the Lord thy God will set thee on high above all the nations of the earth. And all these blessings shall come on thee, and overtake thee, if thou shalt hearken unto the voice of the Lord thy God. Blessed shalt thou be in the city, and blessed shalt thou be in the field. Blessed shall be the fruit of thy body, and the fruit of thy ground, and the fruit of thy cattle, the increase of thy kine, and the flocks of thy sheep. Blessed shall be thy basket and thy store. Blessed shalt thou be when thou comest in, and blessed shalt thou be when thou goest out." Deut. xxviii. 1–6. We live in an age in which we know, by the light of history, that these promises of blessings were not made in vain. They have been abundantly verified. The Israelites have been, in their day, one of the mightiest nations of antiquity. In view of all these things, and much to our embarrassment, our subject returns upon us, that they had a yoke imposed upon them, which they were not able

to bear. It will be asked, Is it reasonable to suppose that God ever imposed such a yoke upon his people? If we say, no; then what can we do with the law of Moses? We solve the difficulty, by understanding the want of ability to bear the yoke of Moses, to consist in a want of that spiritual health which is salvation. The interpretation may appear far-fetched; but by a recurrence to the original Greek word which is translated *were able*, this sense will be seen more clearly. The Greek word, ἰσχύσαμεν, properly signifies, *we were*, or *have been strong*, as the result of good health; *we were well.* The participle is used in Matt. ix. 12, in the sense of sound health, and is translated *whole.* "*They that be whole*, οἱ ἰσχύοντες, need not a physician; but they that are sick." The same word is translated *availeth* in Gal. v. 6. "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision *availeth* any thing, nor uncircumcision;" that is, does not produce spiritual health or strength. The common Greek word for *to be able*, is δύναμαι. And we may very well conclude the reason why the apostle did not use this word, in Acts xv. 10, was because he meant to convey a sense quite distinct from that of physical power, either wholly or comparatively, in what our translators have called *able to bear.* We all understand that the law has not the power of giving life. "For if there had been a law given that could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law." Gal. iii. 21. What we think was meant by St. Peter was, that the yoke, which the law imposed, did not lead to the spiritual health or salvation that was and may be obtained by the provisions of the gospel. This, we think, will appear by so correcting the translation as to give as nearly as may be, the true sense of the original word, or as we have it in the text. We think the correction should be nearly as follows: "Now, therefore, why tempt ye God to put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples which neither our fathers nor we were in vigorous health to bear?"

Of the propriety of the foregoing criticisms it is true the scholar alone is able to judge; but of the consistency of the result to which we have now come, any other person can determine. In coming to the conclusion of our subject, we have now only to say, if we are correct in what we lay before our readers, as we verily believe we are sub-

stantially, our way is plain, and the character of Moses as a prophet of God, and by a divine commission the approved lawgiver of Israel, is shown in the light in which the New Testament presents it. In maintaining this consistency throughout the whole range of the sacred writings, we might be presented with many objections to the character of Moses, from the Pentateuch, that are accounted formidable, if not insuperable. To engage in these, at this time, comes not within our present plan. The work would extend this article too far for our present convenience, and perhaps that of our readers. Still we think such an undertaking from some able and experienced pen, might render the public an essential service.

S. C. L.

Art. XIV.

Literary Notices.

1. The History of Civilization, from the Fall of the Roman Empire, to the French Revolution. By F. Guizot, the Prime Minister of France, Author of "History of the English Revolution of 1640." Translated by William Hazlitt. Volumes 2, 3, 4. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 200 Broadway, &c. 1846. 12mo.
2. An Exposition of a Book, published by D. Appleton & Co., called Hazlitt's Translation of Guizot's History of Civilization. By R. W. Haskins, A. M., &c. Buffalo: Steele's Press. 1846. 8vo. pp. 55.

Mr. Haskins's pamphlet contains a rather indignant censure of the American publishers, for having reprinted Guizot's work in the faulty translation of Mr. Hazlitt. But howsoever grave the offence may be deemed, we suppose it is easily enough accounted for, if we consider the adventure of Messrs. Appleton & Co. in what is probably its true light, — merely that of a business transaction. When they learned that a translation was about to appear in England, they announced the work in their "Monthly Literary Bulletin," in order to secure to themselves the chance of reprinting it; and when they, at length, received a copy, they put it to press, without knowing, perhaps, whether it was well or ill done. It proves, on examination, to be ill done. It is neither precise

nor elegant. But, after all, it is not quite so positively bad, as Mr. Haskins seems to think. His passionate complaint, too, of "the mental vassalage of this country to the British press," is, we think, equally exaggerating. It is not improbable that, to the sensitiveness he feels on this matter, we owe the vehemence of the censure he passes on the Messrs. Appletons. That the literature of England should have a greater influence among us, than that of any other foreign country, is both natural and proper, as she is the mother of our language, and the store-house whence the larger part of our reading is derived. And that this influence should be, in some respects, oppressive, is unavoidable, so long as we persist in refusing all arrangements for an international Law of Copy-right. If we will not be just enough to allow our grounds to be fenced, lest we lose the chance of appropriating ("*conveying*, the wise it call") the stray flocks of our wealthier neighbor, it would, at least, be manly in us, not to complain, when his herds come in and starve out our own. Still, we say, if we must have an irruption of foreign literature to trample down our native growth, let it be the English, rather than that of any continental nation.

Passing by the faults of the translation, let us look at the substance of M. Guizot's work. We formerly gave a notice of his first volume, "The General History of Civilization in Europe." The three volumes, now before us, are but a more extended and thorough development of that outline. As in the first, the subject is treated with reference chiefly to France, — the country which is regarded, by the author, as the acknowledged centre of European civilization, — the focus, as it were, where all its rays converge, and where they may be studied in their strongest light. In the execution of his vast and complicated task, Guizot shows the same wonderful reach of comprehension, as in the first volume, — the same coolness of judgment, united with extraordinary sprightliness of thought, the same clear insight of causes and effects, and the same familiar acquaintance with the principles and workings of human society. In addition to these, the more particular character of his present work brings out his thorough knowledge of the facts in detail that belong to his history, and gives scope to his remarkable tact at distinguishing the significant from the insignificant, in the mass of his materials. In one respect, Guizot is, to us, an enigma: a genuine Frenchman in his attachments, yet with nothing French in the structure of his mind, or in the character of his thoughts, except their activity. We are struck with admiration at the breadth of survey which he so naturally holds in view, and at the ease with which he simplifies a complication of details, and brings the chaos into order. In a

few metaphysical inquiries, that he has occasion to make, we think the French part of his nature betrays him into some hasty conclusions, which too much resemble the flippant, compromising philosophisms of Cousin. It is in the domain of social life and civil polity, that he is at home. For this, he appears to be singularly endowed and qualified, both as an historian and a philosopher. We cannot too earnestly recommend his work to all such as would study human nature in its social relations, and learn the origin, growth and tendency, of the various institutions, both civil and religious, of modern history. Of course, it is not a book to be read for amusement; it must be laboriously studied, if used at all.

We have marked the following, on the tendency of our present civilization, which we present in the translation of Mr. Haskins:

"The course of civilization, and in particular that of French civilization, has given rise to a great problem, peculiar to our own times, and in which the whole future is interested, — not our future, only, but that of humanity entire; and which we, that is to say, our generation, are, perhaps, especially called upon to resolve.

"What is the spirit which now prevails in the intellectual world, in its research after truth, for whatever object? A spirit of rigor, of prudence, of reserve; a scientific spirit, a philosophic method. It carefully observes facts, and permits generalizations but tardily, progressively, and just so far, only, as the facts themselves will justify them. For more than half a century, this spirit has prevailed in the sciences relating to the material world; and it has been the cause of their progress and their glory. The tendency of the same spirit now is more and more to penetrate the sciences of the moral world, — politics, history, philosophy. Everywhere the scientific method extends and confirms itself: on all subjects one feels the necessity of taking facts as a basis and a guide, persuaded that they are the materials of science, and that no general idea can have any real value unless it issues out of the womb of facts, and has its growth constantly sustained and supported by them. Facts now constitute, in the intellectual world, the accredited authority.

"In the real order, in the social world, in government, administration, and political economy, quite another tendency manifests itself. In these the empire of ideas, of reasoning, of general principles, of what is called theories, prevails. Such is evidently the character of the great revolution that has been achieved in our times, as of all the labors of the eighteenth century. Nor does this character belong solely to a particular crisis, an epoch of transient destruction. It is rather the permanent, regular and settled character of the social state, as established and proclaimed

on all sides. This state rests on discussion and publicity; that is to say, on the predominance of public reason, of doctrines and convictions common to all. On the one hand, facts have never before occupied so commanding a place in science; and on the other, never have ideas so fully swayed the exterior world.

"It was, indeed, otherwise, a century since, when, in the intellectual world, in science, properly so called, facts were but badly studied, and but little respected; theory and imagination had both full scope. Men delivered themselves wholly to the vagaries of hypothesis, and risked themselves without any other guide than the thread of their deductions. In the political order, on the contrary, in exterior affairs, facts alone predominated, and these were esteemed the only natural and legitimate authority. No one, on slight grounds, ventured to contest their legitimacy, even while they deplored them. Sedition was then more common than intrepidity of thought; and it would have ill become the human mind, to claim, for an idea in the name of truth alone, any part in affairs here below.

"The course of civilization has, then, reversed the ancient order of things; for it has established the empire of facts, where formerly the unrestrained movement of the mind alone prevailed, and the influence of ideas where the authority of facts has almost exclusively reigned.

"So true is this, that its results are impressed, and deeeply impressed, even upon the reproaches, of which the existing civilization is the object. What say the adversaries of that civilization, when they speak of the present state of the human mind, and the tendency of its labors? They accuse it of dryness, and contraction. This vigorous and positive method, this scientific spirit, degrades thought, say they, freezes the imagination, robs the intellect of its grandeur — its freedom; and contracts and materializes the soul. Has the question reference to the state of society — to what is attempted, to what is effected therein? Then it is said we pursue only chimeras, embarking on the faith of theories; while facts, alone, are necessary to be studied, respected and cherished — experience, alone, is worthy of faith. In this way existing civilization is accused, at once, of dryness and of reverie, of hesitation and precipitancy, of timidity and temerity. As philosophers, we are accused of crawling in the dust; as politicians, of essaying the enterprise of Icarus, and of meriting his fate.

"It is this double reproach, or, more properly, this two-fold peril, gentlemen, that we have to repel. Indeed, we are required to solve the problem that gives birth to it. Upon us is imposed the task of causing the empire of facts more and more to prevail,

in the intellectual order, and in the social order, the empire of ideas; with governing, more and more, our reason, in accordance with reality, and reality according to our reason; with maintaining, at the same time, the rigor of the scientific method, and the legitimate empire of the intellect. Nor is there, in this, anything contradictory — far from it. On the contrary, it is the natural and necessary result of the situation of man as a spectator in the midst of the world, and of his mission as an actor in its affairs. I assume nothing, gentlemen; I do not attempt to explain; I only describe what exists. We are thrown into a world that we have neither created nor invented; we find it as it is, we observe it, we study it; it is, indeed, very necessary that we should take it as a fact, because it exists without us, independently of us: It is upon facts, alone, that the mind can exercise itself; facts are its only proper material; and when it discovers in them general laws, these laws are, themselves, facts which the mind itself verifies. Such are the requirements of our situation as spectators, as observers. As actors we have very different duties to perform When we have observed the facts of exterior life, the knowledge of them developes in us ideas, which are superior to those facts: we then feel ourselves called upon to regulate, to reform and perfect the existing state of things: we feel ourselves capable of operating upon the world, and of extending therein the glorious empire of reason. Such is the mission of man: as a spectator he is subject to the facts that surround him; as an actor he possesses himself of these, and impresses them with a more pure and regular form. I am sustained, then, in what I just now advanced, namely, that there is nothing contradictory in the problem which we have to resolve. It is true that a double peril is linked to this two-fold task. In studying facts, the intellect may allow itself to be overwhelmed by them; it may be abased, contracted, materialized; it may be led to believe that there are no facts but such as strike us at a glance; such as are nearly in contact with us, and fall, as we say, under our senses; — a great and monstrous error, gentlemen. There are facts far removed, immense, obscure, sublime, exceedingly difficult to reach, to observe, to describe, but which are not the less facts, nor the less important for man to study and to know; and if he misconceives or forgets them, his thought will, indeed, be prodigiously abased and degraded, and all his science will bear the impress of this abasement. It is possible, on the other hand, that the ambition of the human mind, in its action on the real world, may be precipitate, excessive and chimerical; that it may be led astray, in prosecuting too far and too vividly, the empire of its ideas over that of things. But what proves this double peril, if not the double mission to which it gives

birth? and it is, indeed, necessary that this mission be accomplished; that the problem be resolved, because the existing state of civilization clearly requires it, and by no means permits that it be lost sight of. Whoever, at this day, in his research after truth, discards the scientific method, and refuses to study facts as the basis of all intellectual developement; or whoever, in the administration of society, holds not at a just estimate principles, general ideas, doctrines, will be unable to obtain durable success, or real power; because power — success — rational or social, are now indissolubly dependent upon a conformity of our labors with these two laws of human activity — these two tendencies of civilization."

These volumes suggest one consideration which naturally creates some anxiety. If France presents the highest type of our present civilization, as M. Guizot thinks is a fact generally acknowledged, the future, that lies before us, is rather disheartening. We are tending towards the social and moral state of France,— towards the corruption of her morals, the dissoluteness of her manners, the faithlessness of her religion, and the pruriency of her lighter literature. In this case, our civilization is a doomed one, and is destined to share the fate of former cultures, that have risen vigorously at first, flourished for some ages, and then rotted. At all events, our duty is, to do what we can to restrain such a tendency.

3. An Essay on the Credibility of Swedenborg; in which his claims as the Announcer of the Dispensation mentioned in Prophecy under the figure of the New Jerusalem, are briefly considered and defended. From the London edition. Boston: Otis Clap, School St. 1842. 12mo. pp. 45.

This essay is divided into three parts. Part i. "The argument against Swedenborg's credibility, drawn from his non-performance of miracles, not valid." Part ii. "Are there any reasons to expect a more perfect light on theological subjects, than Christians have hitherto enjoyed?" Part iii. "Swedenborg in reality the announcer of the New Jerusalem Dispensation."

Such are the propositions which this essay discusses, with considerable acuteness and ability, though in a manner quite unsatisfactory, we imagine, to all minds not enlisted in the author's views, and still accustomed to investigations of this sort. Still the discussion is managed in a way, well calculated to affect minds of some considerable intelligence, *not* accustomed to inquiries of this kind. In a brief notice like this, we cannot go into an elaborate analysis and review of this essay, arraign and show the unsoundness of its various positions and arguments. We can only *notice* its main positions.

We remark generally, that we regard this essay at fault logically, in blending together two entirely distinct propositions — the credibility of an individual's testimony in reference to religious subjects or matters, and his *authority* as a *divinely commissioned* and special messenger of God, for the announcement of new truths to the world. Without doubt, there have been a great many men who have brought to light very many new truths in theology, who never claimed any *authority* for them from God, other than that conferred upon them by the *natural* endowments he gave them, nor asked the world to receive them, except as they might commend themselves to their rational faculties. On *this ground* their teachings may be worthy of all acceptation; and we may regard their authors, in *one* sense, as messengers of God, providentially sent to enlighten and instruct mankind in religion — in the same sense as Newton and other eminent men were messengers of God, to enlighten and instruct men in the natural sciences, and thus contribute to the world's advance. They were bright and shining lights in the world; and so far as their teachings commend themselves to our rational faculties, they are worthy of credence; and what they affirm they heard, saw and felt, we are bound to believe they *supposed* they heard, saw and felt, from their unimpeachable honesty and integrity. But we are by no means bound to receive all they saw, heard and felt as *absolute truth*, unless they present us with evidence, to establish their claims, to an exemption from the common *infirmities* of our race, in this respect — the liability of all human beings to be *mistaken* in hearing, seeing and feeling. And here is just where the author of this Essay fails in his efforts relative to Swedenborg. He neither distinctly announces his propositions, nor discriminates between the *credibility* of a man, founded upon his acknowledged or established honesty and integrity, and his *authority* as an *infallible* announcer of *absolute truth*. Manifestly, what is sufficient to establish the first proposition, is utterly insufficient to establish the other.

In his remarks concerning the testimony of miracles, our author not only commits this fundamental mistake, but two others in connection with it. He assumes, that the Christian world maintain, that miracles are *direct* proof of the truth of an individual's announcements; whereas, if we understand the matter, they are regarded as *direct* evidence *only* of a divine *commission* — the *credentials* of the individual's *appointment* for his work — of his divine commission to enlighten and instruct mankind; thus making them only *indirect* evidence of the truth of his announcements, which materially alters their position and relations, in a logical point of view, at least.

The other mistake is on this wise. He mentions some of the

prophets to whom the performance of miracles is not ascribed; and hence infers, that the performance of miracles is not necessary to verify what they taught; or as his proposition should have been, to verify their *claims* as *divinely commissioned* persons; thus making an *absence* of a statement, the *proof* that they *did present* no *such credentials* — a position manifestly unsound. The prophets to whom allusion is made, must have presented, to their cotemporaries, some sort of *evidence* that God had *authorized* them to speak in his name, and to make annunciations from him, or they would not have been accepted as prophets. And we respectfully submit, whether any other testimony, than *miracles*, can establish a claim to *divine* authority — whether any other *credentials* are conclusive testimony in the case or can be. This we confess is our view. And that no mention of these *credentials* is made, in their *writing*, is no evidence that they did not possess them. The very fact that they were accepted as prophets, by their cotemporaries, is *prima facie* evidence that they had them, until the contrary is proved. Beside this, our author entirely overlooks the difference in the position of an individual who merely *explains* and *enforces* the truths of a dispensation *already established*, and that of one who claims to be the *announcer* of a *new* dispensation.

Moses claimed to be the announcer of a new dispensation, to take the place of the Patriarchal; and he performed miracles to establish his *authority* as a divinely *commissioned* person to do this thing. So Christ claimed to announce a new dispensation, to supercede that of Moses; and he performed miracles as *credentials* of his *authority*. The apostles claimed to be the *authoritative expounders* of the religion of Jesus, after his death; and they performed miracles to verify their claims to such *authority*, derived from God himself. These are the facts in regard to the past, and in reference to all who are or have been the *accredited* and *authoritative* announcers or expounders of new dispensations.

In the face of this, we ask, and we demand an explicit answer —If Emmanuel Swedenborg or any other man claims to announce, *upon divine authority*, a new dispensation, no matter whether it is merely explanatory, or an entirely new system of theology, are we to receive his simple and unsupported word or assertion as sufficient proof in the premises, with all the evidences of human fallibility we have, staring us in the face? On the other hand, we submit it to all candid and fair minds to say, whether we have not, as accountable beings, a right,* nay, whether it is not our imperious duty to demand of any and all persons who claim to be *authoritative* teachers of new truths from God, to produce the *same credentials* to establish this claim, that

God has granted to all he has before sent to enlighten and save mankind.

That Emmanuel Swedenborg was a great and good man; that he believed his own pretensions; and that he has inculcated many truths in theology, as well as in other sciences, to which the Christian world had been blind, we do not question. We freely concede all that is claimed for him as a mere man. We would not pluck from his brow, one laurel, as a profound scholar, a highly spiritual and deeply religious man, and a worthy, estimable and useful citizen; nor as the founder of a sect of religionists. And did his followers claim for him, no more than is claimed for Luther, Calvin, Arminius and others, by their friends, on the score of *authority*, we should not object.

If our New-Church brethren simply asked us to receive or reject the announcements of Emmanuel Swedenborg, as they commend themselves to our rational faculties, or fail to do this, the same as the followers of the individuals just named and alluded to, we should have no controversy. But when we are asked to receive the announcements of the founder of any sect, as absolute truth, and as those of a *divinely authorized* messenger of God, his friends must expect we shall demand his *credentials*, to verify his claim, and such too as God has vouchsafed to all others, who have been recognized as such. And here we beg leave to say, that in our judgement, the author of this Essay has entirely failed to produce any such credentials, in the case of Swedenborg. This is most signally manifest in his third part, where he undertakes to make out his case affirmatively. F.

4. Views A-Foot; or Europe seen with Knapsack and Staff. By J. Bayard Taylor. With a Preface by N. P. Willis, &c. &c. New York: Wiley and Putnam, 161Broadway. 1846. 12mo. pp. 393.

We have found this a very pleasant book, and have almost fallen in love with travelling "a-foot, with knapsack and staff." Are we too old to try the experiment? The title is no misnomer; for the larger part of the tour was actually performed in the manner signified, — a distance of more than three thousand miles, in Scotland, England, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and France, thus travelled over, in two years, with sufficient leisure to gain some acquaintance with the people of the different countries, to mark their forms of life, and to see the remarkable places and sights that lay in the route.

The peculiar interest of the book arises from the circumstances and personal enterprise of the young author. He was a printer's apprentice, in one of our cities, with two years of his time yet to serve. A small volume of poetry, which he published at this

juncture, introduced him to the notice of several literary gentlemen; he made an engagement to write letters from Europe, for which he received a small sum in advance; bought out the remainder of his time as an apprentice; and, in company with two friends, set sail for England, July 1, 1844. When he returned, his two years' tour had cost him $500, and no more! Incredible as this may seem, here is his schedule,—

"Voyage to Liverpool, in the second cabin,	$24 00
Three weeks' travel in Ireland and Scotland,	25 00
A week in London, at 3s. a day,	4 50
From London to Heidelberg,	15 00
A month at Heidelberg, and a trip to Frankfort,	20 00
Seven mouths at Frankfort, at $10 per month,	70 00
Fuel, passports, excursions, and other expenses,	30 00
Tour through Cassel, the Hartz, Saxony, Austria, Bavaria, &c.	40 00
A month in Frankfort,	10 00
From Frankfort through Switzerland and over the Alps to Milan,	15 00
From Milan to Genoa,	60
Expenses from Genoa to Florence,	14 00
Four months in Florence,	50 00
Eight days' journey from Florence to Rome, two weeks in Rome, voyage to Marseilles, and journey to Paris,	40 00
Five weeks in Paris,	15 00
From Paris to London,	8 00
Six weeks in London, at 3s. a day,	31 00
Passage home,	60 00
	$472 00

"The cost for places of amusement, guides' fees, and other small expenses, not included in this list, increase the sum total to $500, for which the tour may be made." p. 393.

All honor to the brave young poet!

5. "Hymns for Christian Devotion; especially adapted to the Universalist denomination. By J. G. Adams and E. H. Chapin. Boston: Abel Tompkins. 1847.

Judging from the rapidity with which successive collections of Psalmody are put forth among us, we should suppose the task of making a good Hymn Book none of the easiest. This is, indeed, the fact. To edit properly a selection of this species of poetry, requires delicacy of taste and devotional susceptibility rarely possessed by those who attempt it. Few men can write good *Hymns*. Few can appreciate them when written. Were it not

so, we should be at loss to account for the outrages of Editors who assume the responsibility to alter lines in the best spiritual songs in the language. We can forgive a man for *writing* a foolish Hymn, but our feelings towards him, who can place a line of his own in a stanza of Watts or Cowper endeared to us by years of religious experience, are similar to those with which we should regard a blacksmith mending a chain of gold with hammer, anvil and iron links. From this species of high literary misdemeanor, we believe the editors of the work at the head of our notice are free. Although at times, perhaps wisely, omitting a stanza in a long Hymn, we recollect no example of the mutilation we have condemned. The well known poetical taste and devotional fervor of these reverend gentlemen, was a pledge that the work they took in hand would be well done. We are not disappointed by the result. As far as we have examined their book, it bears undeniable marks of industry, good taste, and extensive reading in devotional poetry. Although coming from the Universalist denomination, there is in it nothing to which any liberal Christian can object. We hesitate not to pronounce it, by far the most complete and well-selected Hymn Book that has yet appeared among us. We will mention a few particulars in which it appears to us to excel former collections:

1. The number of Hymns upon the *moral and spiritual relations of Christianity* is much larger than in most books. We believe few clergymen do not complain of deficiency of this sort in collections now in use, often being compelled to read a hymn differing in sentiment from their discourse. If it be true, in the services of God's House, as Herbert says, that

> "A verse may find him who a sermon flies,"

then, this excellence in the present work which so facilitates the desired adaptation, will be accounted a great merit.

2. *The length of the Hymns* is another advantage of this work. There is fault in many of our books in this respect, making the performances of the choir tedious, from the number of verses sung, or forcing them to destroy sense by omission of stanzas. The selections in this collection are of moderate length.

3. *Many new Hymns* also appear, and many beautiful ones arranged from the early English Poets. Several of these must become standard productions in this department of literature.

4. But the most original feature of this work is its excellence in Hymns adapted to the *Reform movements* of the day. The newly aroused feeling in our churches, in favor of such operations, demands a medium of expression in sacred song as well as speech. And here is provided a large number of Hymns, fitted

to almost every occasion of the kind that may arise. Several of these are by the editors, and are characterized by unusual fervor and power.

We do not intend to speak disparagingly of the many excellent Hymn Books already in use. We only say, that this, in our estimation, combines the advantages of them all, as far as such an object can be attained in one volume. We would, also, mention with approbation the neat form given it by the publisher, alike creditable to him and acceptable to the public.

A. D. M.

6. True Patriotism. A Discourse delivered on Fast Day, in the Second Universalist Church, School Street. By E. H. Chapin. Boston: Abel Tompkins, 38 Cornhill. 1847. 8vo. pp. 19.

7. Might and Right. An Oration delivered before the Erosophian Adelphi of Waterville College, August 12, 1846. By E. H. Chapin. Boston: Abel Tompkins, Cornhill. 1846. 8vo. pp. 40.

On receiving the first-named of these pamphlets, we regarded the occasion as presenting an opportunity to atone, in some measure, for omitting to give a seasonable notice of the other. We therefore wrote out both titles, at once, as above, and sat down to the perusal. But on reading the Fast-Day Discourse, we changed our purpose. Though the Oration is the more highly labored performance, in point of literary execution, we have been so strongly impressed by the clear exposition, fearless but unostentatious plain-dealing, and just statement uttered in temperate language, which characterize the Discourse, that we wish, for the present, to direct attention solely to this. We have seen nothing, on our public obligations, as citizens, that so well corresponded to the demands of our conscience. It is a word fitly spoken, and in season. Unacquainted as we are with the details of national affairs, and especially of party-politics, we are nevertheless sure that there are some eternal principles of truth and justice, to which all these movements at the surface are amenable, and by which they will be led to issues favorable or disastrous, according to their moral deserts; and we are equally sure that all policy, patriotism, party-spirit, or passionate excitement, which overlooks this law, is blind to its direct results. We believe "there is a God who judges in the earth." It is into these eternal principles that the preacher enters; on these he bases our duties, both as patriots and Christians, in relation particularly to our present war with Mexico. Its well-known grounds are sufficiently indicated; the apologies for it, or, rather, that class of them which sets aside all moral obligation, are faithfully exposed, as well as that false and atrocious patriotism whose motto is, "*Our country, right or wrong.*" We hope this true-spoken Discourse will have an extensive circulation.

Art. XV.

Origin of Moral Evil.

In a preceding number of this work, [July, 1844,] the writer offered some thoughts and arguments on the "Origin of Sin," but left the subject, (as may be seen at the close of that article,) in an unfinished state. Circumstances, which we need not relate, have delayed the completion of the argument, till the present. This very long hiatus between the two parts of the subject, renders it proper that we introduce a brief recapitulation, that readers may see our starting-point, and be prepared to set out with us in pursuing our investigations.

It was maintained, in the previous article, that the popular notion concerning the origin of sin, viz., that the original cause of sin was itself sinful, is erroneous; since it would imply that moral evil originated the first moral evil. This is not possible; as a *sinful* cause could no more exist previous to the *first* sin, than sin could be committed before there was a sinner. The sinning and the sin must have begun at the same time, and in the same act. To contend that a being is a sinner previously to his sinning, or that he cannot sin till after he is a sinner, is an absurdity in theology as well as metaphysics. To say that *the* first of any given series of events or things is preceded by *a* first, — the first link of a chain, for example, — is equivalent to the assertion that the first is not the first, but the second, or something else! To use such language, or such reasoning, if reasoning it may be called, is to confound the very first elements of common sense.

Moral agency, or the capacity of the moral agent, must precede moral action, as machinery cannot be put in operation before it exists; and the first moral act of the moral agent commences his moral character, for better or for worse, for weal or wo. Previously to *that* act, "the moral agent," as the term is, had no personal moral character, properly so called; he had no personal desert, either

of praise or blame. Though constitutionally possessed of faculties capable of forming moral character, man is not virtuous or vicious, holy or sinful, before he exercises his faculties. He may be naturally endowed with the intellectual apparatus for thinking and reasoning; but he is not a *thinking* being, before he has thoughts, nor a *reasoner*, before he begins to reason.

If we adopt the tenable ground, that the action takes its character from the motive or intention of the actor, the result will be the same as to the position in question; because, the first *intention* to do wrong, could have no precedent of the kind. *The* first wrong motive or volition could not have been preceded by *a* wrong motive or volition. Pursuing the argument, therefore, upon any and every fair ground of reasoning, we come to the conclusion that moral agents, in the exercise of powers, faculties, or agencies, which are in themselves entirely sinless, transgress the law, or commit sins, and hence form a character of their own, and for which, just so far as that character possesses moral attributes or qualities, they are accountable. Men cannot, even if they would, be morally amenable for acts which are not morally their own. They may *suffer* in consequence of acts in which they have had no participation; as the most innocent often do, by reason of the conduct of the wicked; but they cannot suffer as *really* guilty, till innocence and guilt are synonymous. Should an unjust, or an erring tribunal, adjudge them as guilty, the wrong decision would not alter the facts of the case. Men are equitably responsible, on moral principles, for their own moral acts only.

We continue and conclude the investigation of this subject, from no spirit of vain curiosity — with no disposition to appear singular, or to boast of originality in these views; but we do it from a deep and thorough conviction of its importance, and of the salutary influence it will exert, when clearly understood. That it is a reasonable doctrine, and that it agrees with the personal experience and unsophisticated convictions of our readers, we have not a doubt. Can we suppose, then, that it is unscriptural? Are the revelations of the Bible at war with reason, and incompatible with the nature and fitness of things? Shall we, for the sake of adopting some sentences in that

good Book in the most literal sense, throw aside the knowledge which has been derived from long years of various experiments in things moral, discard the use of reason, and either disregard and overlook the plain and obvious tenor of the divine testimony in general, or make it conform, for theory's sake, to the few passages which divinity-manufacturers have consecrated to sectarian purposes? Shall we pursue a course of interpretation which will lead us, to be consistent, to adopt the doctrines of vicarious atonement, transubstantiation, and the like?

But that the Scriptures, though not composed for the accommodation of disputants and metaphysicians, abundantly warrant the positions here assumed, and the conclusions at which we arrive, we now proceed to show, "from the account of the sin of Eden, the temptation of the Saviour, and the meaning of Paul in the seventh chapter of Romans." It may not be improper to state that, after a patient and more careful examination of the whole subject, our serious convictions are strengthened and confirmed, that sin originates from sinless faculties, or the misuse of those powers, senses, appetites and passions, which, if properly employed, would contribute alone to virtue, usefulness, and innocent enjoyments.

The Bible account of the first transgression of our race, affords the fairest opportunity — as we might reasonbly expect it would — of testing the correctness of our views, of any part of that sacred volume. If the doctrine of original depravity be true, it will be found to have infected the nature of our first parents. But what is the substance of the narrative in Genesis, so far as the questions at issue are concerned? Why, it is simply as follows: — Adam was formed of the dust of the ground, breath was infused into him, and he became a living being, (Gen. ii. 7.) Nothing wrong — no depravity — so far. Having placed Adam in the garden to cultivate it, his Maker provided for him sustenance suited to his nature, his wants and appetites; giving him free access to the trees of the garden, save "the tree of knowledge of good and evil." (verses 15, 16, 17.) For wise reasons, the man was furnished with a help mete for him, (ver. 18.) The new born pair were innocent and unsuspecting as babes. They knew no moral wrong, (ver. 25.) They had appetites for

the fruit of the garden; no less for the forbidden fruit than for any other. But hunger and thirst were as sinless as they were natural. The serpent attempted to deceive the mother of our race, by misstating the divine prohibition, (iii. 1.) But Eve detected his craft, and stated the matter as it was in fact, and resisted the temptation to eat: showing that virtue is older than vice, and reverence older than irreverence; for she acted with reference to God's command, (verses 2, 3.) But the tempter, as is usually the case, persisted in his course; called in question the veracity of God, and held out the flattering delusion that to disobey, and partake the forbidden fruit, would render the sinless Eve wise, and god-like, and happy, (verses, 4, 5.) Gazing intently upon the enticing objects before her, the woman consulted appetite rather than duty, was deceived in regard to the direct consequences of her conduct, partook, and gave to her husband, (ver. 6.) The effects of disobedience to God immediately followed, as may be seen by the residue of the chapter.

We perceive, then, that Eve was naturally capable of understanding both the permission and the prohibition of her Maker and moral Governor. She knew it was right to obey God, and, of course, wrong to disobey. To succeed in his designs, "the serpent" did not deny what Eve knew to be true, but, like other tempters, changed the grounds of his address, and held out the fascinating pretension that, by gratifying her appetite on the interdicted fruit, she would acquire more knowledge, and become wise, like gods, knowing both good and evil. The moral evil consisted not in Eve's nature, in her wants, appetites, or temptations; but in yielding to the latter. Guilt, shame, fear and death, followed.

Though before possessed of precisely the same nature, nothing like this had been experienced. The first act of disobedience formed a new character, the character of a sinner, in a degree. There was nothing sinful in being made subject to vanity, with natural wants, appetites, and passions. Sin consists in that act of the mind by which "the law" is voluntarily transgressed. This, we believe, agrees with universal experience.

And it may be proper to remark here, that nothing would be gained by regarding the "the serpent" as a

personal being; a real devil. For if that be admitted, it will not alter the case, since, according to the Mosaic account, each actor was judged and rewarded with reference to individual character and desert; the woman, the man, and the serpent. Gen. iii. 3, 14—19. Besides, it were useless to consider the question of *personality*, &c., since our readers are not troubled about the old, antiquated dogma of the church on that subject.

As the two sinners in Eden exercised the same physical powers in partaking of the interdicted fruit, (calling it *literal*,) that they would have employed in plucking and eating any other fruit of the garden, so did they exercise the same intellectual powers, in deciding to partake thereof, that they would have used in coming to the determination to resist the temptation. All their natural appetites were as sinless, of themselves, as the apple's inviting appearance, which gave efficacy to the power of temptation. The abuse of faculties and passions, naturally destitute of moral character, by voluntary disobedience, produced the sin of Eden; whereas a firm and Christ-like resistance to temptation, would have been virtue of distinguishing degree. This Scripture account, therefore, of the origin of sin, perfectly agrees with our theory. It is corroborative of it in every respect, providing that the figurative language concerning the *serpent*, the *garden*, the *trees*, &c. have a rational interpretation.

The next example of temptation to sin, to be considered, is recorded in Matt. iv. Mark i. and Luke iv.. Any thing like a commentary on the account of our Saviour's trials in the wilderness, is entirely out of the question in this place. Nor is it perceived that, considering the importance of the subject, much need be said. Readers do not wish us to show, by laborious argument, that the Serpent—the tempter, was not "a fallen angel," a personal devil of heavenly origin and descent, or the very "old rebel" of whom so much has been said and sung; for, admitting the old theory were true, and the prince of angels had become a devil, it matters nothing for the better or the worse, in this case, since, as the *holy angels* were not troubled with "flesh and blood," "this body," we have a right to assume that they had no "sinful nature" to cause their fall; and hence, their sin must have originated in

sinless faculties. Hapless sinners! having neither "Serpent" nor "carnal nature" to heap *their* sins upon!

We proceed, then, upon the supposition that Jesus was a man — a created, dependent being, constituted of mind and body, or, of body, soul, and spirit, as are the members of the great family of which he is the "elder brother." He was made subject to wants, infirmities, and death. He experienced hunger, thirst, fatigue, pain, &c., as do others. His sensibilities were exquisite; his dread of sufferings and death, acute and awful. Like his brethren of the human race, Jesus was differently affected under different circumstances. His feelings — for no better word volunteers its service — his feelings were like those of other good men, to a certain extent. He had emotions of pleasure and displeasure, of love and anger, or of affection and aversion. Though possessed of faculties and attainments unequalled among all created beings, he was a moral agent, and accountable accordingly. His greatness excites our reverence, his benevolence and virtue our highest admiration. It would be difficult to describe the perversity of the heart, which did not desire to imitate his examples. But how could he be a pattern for others, and what test could he have given of his entire devotion to virtuous principle, so far as mortals could perceive and be benefited by it, had he not been subject to temptations, and liable, if unguarded and indiscreet, to be overcome by their influence?

Jesus acted as wise and prudent men should act, viz. with reference to his moral accountability; and "for the joy set before him, endured the cross, despising the shame." Indeed, he was made in the likeness of human nature, and constitutionally acted upon the same moral ground as do others, though in a manner peculiar to himself. To adopt the language of St. Paul, — "in all things it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people: for in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted." (Heb. ii. 17, 18.) "For we have not an High Priest, which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." (iv. 15.)

Now, though we would not strain the apostle's language to mean, that the blessed Jesus was tempted in as many different ways as men are, yet we do contend that, so far as the Son of God *was* tempted, he occupied substantially the same ground — the wide field of voluntary agency — as do all morally accountable agents. This being the case, his examples in temptation, though he sinned not, go to demonstrate, that sin may originate in sinless faculties. Jesus, as admitted on all hands, partook of the same "flesh and blood" that we do, but had no "sinful nature." Had the glorious Son of God yielded to the influences which beset him; had he so far distrusted or disregarded the ancient promise of his Heavenly Father (Matt. iv. 3, 4,) as to have attempted to convert stones into bread; or, relying inconsiderately upon Almighty preservation, (verses 5, 6, 7,) had he leaped from the dizzy heights of the temple, to gain the confidence of the people, who were looking for some awe-inspiring sign in the expected Messiah; or, to escape the horrors of a most agonizing death upon the cross, had he grasped the sceptre of universal dominion, dazzled and led astray by the magnificence of regal splendor, and, for personal ease and convenience, sacrificed himself to the world, (verses 8, 9, 10,) instead of worshipping God; if we even suppose all this to have taken place, no one will contend that such actions proceeded from a "sinful nature" — "corrupt passions" — "criminal appetites," in the Son of God. To say that Jesus was actuated by "the carnal mind, which is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be," is to deny the assertion of Paul, — that he was "without sin."

The whole account of the temptation goes to show demonstratively, and, as it would seem, beyond the reach of all cavil and objection, that the whole character of his conduct, whatever it was, or might have been, was attributable to his mind; his mental and moral capacities. There was no sin in being hungry and desiring food; no sin in wishing to exhibit some astonishing sign which should tend to convince the unbelieving Jews that he was the Messiah spoken of by their prophets; no sin in preferring to live, and sway a sceptre over the world with a view, perhaps, to its more immediate conversion to Christianity, to suffering a horrible death under the ignominy of

the cross. But, when all the circumstances were duly considered, and it was evident that a gratification of personal feelings and preferences would be inconsistent with moral obligation to God, and involve a transgression of his holy law; had the Lord Jesus still persisted in his course, his *intentions* would have given character to his actions, and *intentions* are never attributable, properly speaking, to "flesh and blood," or their mere animal adjuncts.

We come now to the seventh chapter of the Epistle of Paul to the Romans; but happily, the labor of exposition and illustration, had such a task been contemplated, has been anticipated, and performed in this work in a faithful and judicious manner. (See the number for October, 1845.) Those who have carefully read Articles xxxi and xxxii of that number of the Quarterly, will need no argument to demonstrate that the Apostle advanced no sentiments in the seventh of Romans, incompatible with the views advocated in these articles on the origin of sin. His language is highly figurative, and by no means remarkable for rhetorical precision. As if hurried along by the resistless current of the subject with which his great soul was divinely animated, Paul indulged in such figures and forms of language, as were most forcible and convenient; changing his metaphors frequently, and using the same word, or the same phrase, in different or opposite senses, in the same sentence. His personifications, as in other parts of his writings, are strikingly bold and original, including "the law," "sin," "righteousness," "the flesh," &c. The shapes assumed by this personification of subjects are various, and sometimes "hard to be understood," in different parts of his discourses. Hence, as said by the Editor, "we must be careful to draw out the main thread from its rhetorical entanglements, and to follow it through without being turned aside by mere tropes and metonymies." Those who do not heed this timely suggestion, would make the apostle appear inconsistent with himself, and contradictory in his argument in the most obvious manner. Using words in their common acceptation, it can not be true, that any man can, at the same time, "be carnal, and sold under sin," and yet "be free from the law of sin, through Christ Jesus." In other

words, he cannot be a wicked, unconverted sinner, at the same time that he is a devoted follower of the Saviour. If a man be really crushed and tormented with "this body of death" and sin, he cannot, during his sufferings, rejoice in "the liberty wherewith Christ has made him free," having "no condemnation" whilst in Christ Jesus. Much allowance should be made, for too strong or hyperbolical expressions.

If it should be said, as it often has been, that Paul was not speaking of himself, (and those of like condition whom he represented,) *as actually a sinner*, having expressly asserted, that "it is no more *I* that do it, but *sin* that dwelleth in me," our reply is ready, viz.: that being the case, there is no more to be said on the subject, in this discussion; because, we are inquiring after the origin of sin among human sinners — not the origin of *sinning* "sin"! But not being elated with the vantage-ground thus taken, we should like to be informed how the above can be literally true, in the broad and universal application made of that conscience-soothing position, providing the words of Paul, so emphatically used at the close of the seventh chapter, are also literally true, viz.: "So then with the *mind* I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh [I myself] serve the law of sin." Was not the same "I myself" responsible and rewardable, in both instances? both of obedience, and disobedience? Will any rational "mind" contend that Paul meant to be understood, that his flesh, literal *flesh*, could have a volition, an evil intention, and do a moral wrong? Impossible! Nor did he mean that he was such a monstrous compound of moral contrarieties as some have contended for, and constantly maintained in himself, the character of the saint and the character of the sinner, — an angel and a demon incarnate! He speaks of himself, or in the first person, to render the discourse more acceptable and impressive. Though the *doctrine* advanced was no more true of him than of all others in similar circumstances, and his meaning obviously is, that though with his mind he could but constantly approve, and, when consistent with his Christian profession, serve, the law of God, yet, when his mind became sensualized, or yielded to the impulses of wrong affections, he violated that law, or sinned. He sought no scape-goat

for his sins, but took the whole responsibility upon himself, when he speaks directly and plainly.

This view of the subject, then, is peculiarly important, because eminently practical in its tendencies. It shows that we are sinners — if sinners at all — in the obvious, every-day sense of the word; implying the transgression of moral law in such a manner, as to deserve punishment, or the infliction of pain, for a benevolent purpose.

To be conscious of such desert, we must also be conscious that in our actions we have enjoyed moral freedom, or acted according to our own moral choice. A sinner feels that he has done morally wrong — has voluntarily transgressed the law of God. Though his heart be not constantly alive to a conviction of guilt, he cannot effectually smother it. His sin may be hidden deep in secresy; but *he* knows where it is! It is recorded in his own bosom, in characters of fire. The record of guilt may be long suppressed, but it will ultimately be revealed and read. The hidden but living coals, fanned by circumstances, will break through their ashy covering, and burst forth. He that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong he hath done, saith inspiration. Sooner or later, the voice which cried in Eden, "Adam, what hast thou done?" will pierce the soul of the stoutest transgressors. They shall "eat of the *fruit* of their own doings;" "be rewarded according to their works."

Vain must be the attempt to prove, that God is the author of sin, in any sense of the term. Indeed, those who have undertaken the task, from Hopkins downward, have saved us the trouble of refuting their arguments in detail, by inadvertantly refuting themselves. They tell us that, "in the sense in which God is the author of an act, it is *not sin;*" not a moral evil! What possible "sense," then, can there be in saying, "God is the author of sin"? Is he the author of *that which does not exist?* so to speak. The idea is grossly absurd. "Sin is the transgression of the law." God cannot transgress the law. "The woman being *deceived*, was in the transgression." An all-wise being could not be the author of an act, which resulted from *deception.*

The mere visible effects of actions do not always determine their moral character. One of our most able authors

has said, "It will be granted, on all sides, that no action unconnected with design, ought to be considered sin. It is, then, an *evil intention*, which constitutes an evil action."[1] We call "evil intentions" *sin*. How can we say, then, that God is the author of those acts, which we call sin? Is he the author of evil intentions? By no means. Things which men have "meant" for evil, God has meant for good. So says observation; so say the Scriptures. We do not deny but that an overruling Providence may bring about benevolent results, by the concurrence of all human actions. Perhaps it may be safely assumed, that, in some possible sense, God works in all the agencies of the universe; in the saint and the sinner,—Moses and Pharoah, for instance,—both to will and to do of his great pleasure. But it would no more follow, as a consequence, that the *moral* character of their acts should be attributed to Him, than it would that He was wise and foolish, prudent and reckless, meek and haughty, kindly disposed and hard hearted, in proportion as the deliverer or the oppressor of God's people was so. Therefore, to call any act, of which he is the author, *sinful*, would be as unphilosophical, and more irreverent, than to call it *foolish!* With the most profound veneration, then, for the reasonable and scriptural doctrine of the sovereignty and all-pervading agency of Deity, we still contend for the moral agency of man, on the ground that he is the author of his own moral actions; and that this is the ground, and the only true ground, of moral responsibility. R. S.

Art. XVI.

The Connection between Natural and Revealed Religion.

The object proposed in the present article is this:—to point out the relations, and the reciprocal influence, between natural and revealed religious truth; between those

[1] Rev. H. Ballou.

ideas of God, the spiritual relations of men, and human destiny, which inquiry, research and reflection, have attained, and those ideas which are unfolded with authoritative clearness in the Bible. It does not come within the scope of our plan to refer at all to the preliminary question, so widely agitated in our time, whether the Bible itself contains a revelation, in our common understanding of that term, or whether its truths are merely the highest discoveries as yet attained by the religious nature in its natural and ordinary developement. Standing on the commonly recognized Christian ground, without reference to that point, we wish to trace the connection between the religious truths of the Bible, as they are clearly unfolded, whether supernaturally revealed or not, and the developement of philosophical and scientific researches in the same field.

And, in the first place, we must remark that the distinction between the two provinces of Natural and Revealed Religion, is founded not in a difference between *things*, but in the relation which certain truths bear to the laws and limits of human knowledge. By the terms "Natural" and "Revealed," we do not distinguish different *kinds* of religion, separate fields of investigation essentially distinct; we do not intend an intellectual partition such as, in the realm of science, is conveyed by the terms, Astronomy and Geology, Chemistry and Mathematics. Evidently, there can be but one religion, one absolute system of spiritual truth, as there can be but one science of Geometry, or one theory of light and of mechanic forces. And this absolute religion remains true, independent of human thought and culture, entirely unaffected by the faith or the ignorance of men. The difference marked and conveyed in common speech by the terms we have used, is a difference of relations solely; it implies, not a generic separation, but refers to a diversity in the methods of attainment, and the character of the evidence adduced. To the domain of Natural Religion belong all the features of this universal truth, which human reason, in its highest elevation, can attain. It includes all those discoveries, which, in accordance with the natural adaptation between our finite intellect and the laws of mental light, flow in upon us from the infinite depths of being; while Revealed Religion, supplying a higher instrument, and collecting and concen-

trating the rays into a powerful focus, *intensifies* — to use that word — our natural knowledge, at the same time that it extends the range of our acquaintance with the universe, and brings within the circle of our vision vast relations, which must forever have been denied to the most ardent researches of the unaided eye. The distinction in the terms reposes, then, not on *objective* peculiarities in *truths*, but on *subjective* powers of *discovery*.

Reasoning *a priori*, we cannot discover that, independent of the pleasure of the Deity, there need be, to us, any natural connection between the evidences for these two divisions. The Infinite cannot exhaust itself by any revelations, and there would seem to be no necessary relationship between the actual manifestations of the Deity in the mechanical arrangements of nature and the powers of the mind, and any further communications which He might choose to make directly through an accredited agent, and by super-ordinary means. It was within the option of the Deity to rest revelation on independent evidence entirely overwhelming, — to introduce it into the world like light borne suddenly into the midst of total darkness — to strengthen it with evidence that should command the belief of all times, not at all by the harmony of its truths with known or observed or supposed principles of Divine agency and action, but by the crushing exhibitions of supernatural interference, which establish, beyond all cavil, the communicated facts. Nature might have been constructed so meaningless, or the intuitive energies of the mind might have been so dull, that, for any practical knowledge of the character and will of the Almighty, we should be obliged to rely entirely on definite statements, endorsed by evidence addressed to the senses, — evidence which should always consist of historical and material proof. Beyond any attainable depths "a lower deep" still opens in the Infinite; and, as the scale of revelation, through common or uncommon means, is solely the arbitrary pleasure of the Deity, we can discover no necessary tie, which, in the nature of things, binds the truths of the two departments into mutual relationship and dependency.

But this, although it might have been the order of providence, is not the order of fact. It will not be pretended

by any — we think not by the blindest zealots against human reason — that there is no connection subsisting between these separate ranges. It is the plan of Infinite Wisdom not to overpower the mind by certainty, but to lead it, along the path of analogies and correspondences and probabilities, to faith. Nature is neither so empty of moral significance, nor the mind so devoid of heavenly attractions and spiritual instincts, nor is the dogmatic and extraordinary evidence of Revelation so irresistible, when examined by itself, as to require, on the one hand, or to permit, on the other, the introduction of a set of truths, claiming to be a revelation, and yet entirely beyond the range, and independent of the confirmation and support, which are given by the dim testimony of the outward universe and the soul of man. And thus, while we affirm a radical distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion, relatively to the powers of the mind, which must not be confounded, neither the actual weakness of the one, nor the admitted strength of the other, will allow us to deny that they do, in some way, mutually imply and sustain each other.

If the supernatural proofs of Revelation be not assumed to be in themselves entirely overwhelming, so as to repel the possibility of collateral aid, we may state, in the first place, that the truths of Revelation must be connected with Natural Religion, at least to this extent: they must be in harmony with it; they must not contradict it. For, with the present constitution of human reason, it can hardly be entertained as possible, that any pretended Revelation could win a general belief, even though seemingly endorsed by miraculous aid, if it contained a theory of God and Nature entirely opposed to the researches of science, and if it unfolded a system of morals from which the finest sensibilities of conscience spontaneously recoiled. Reason will not entertain the question of supernatural testimony, if it be vitiated by an association with absurdities. Men could easily evade any testimony to a miracle; they would distrust their senses if they saw a miracle wrought in support of a revolting scheme. Such a system, besides miraculous testimony, would find it necessary to induce a miraculous change on human reason, and, as an indispensable preliminary, reverse the laws of

the intellect. And thus, with the present structure of the human mind, the possibility, not indeed of a Revelation's being given, but of its gaining credence, involves the necessity of its being in harmony with the general laws, and what we believe to be the *possibilities*, of nature.

Farther than this, moreover, we may assert that Natural Religion is so far the basis of Revelation, that it supplies the antecedent probability that further and higher communications from the Deity will be made. The argument for a system of Revealed truth is essentially weakened, when no hints and no probabilities can be detected in the world and in the wants of man, which that system meets and confirms. The defences of Revelation are left open to the inroads of scepticism, when the outposts of natural analogies and confirmed anticipations have been stormed and beaten down. Before the full weight of miraculous evidence, even, can be appreciated, a certain prior purity in our conceptions of the unity and goodness of the Almighty is almost indispensable. Although we cannot excuse the wilful enmity of the Pharisees to Jesus, still, had the Jewish notions of God's unity been sufficiently precise to have excluded their belief in the power of Demons, and the hostile agency of Beelzebub, the miracles of Christ would have exercised a greater power over their unbelief. Wherever miraculous proof is obliged to meet this faith in the Duality of agencies which control the powers of nature, there must be some circumstances connected with the miracle, or its author, or its purpose, which determine the mind, from its prior natural associations, to ascribe it either to the one or the other of its preconceived Deities. And accordingly as these cirumstances harmonize with the supposed proper agency of the benevolent or malignant power, will the Revelation be accepted. And it was, perhaps, to the purity of the Jewish notions of the power and goodness of the Deity, and to the harmony of his own works and words with those higher views, that Christ appealed as an argument for the validity of his claims in that language, "Ye believe in God, believe also in me."

If we extend our inquiries beyond the field we have already occupied, into the connection between the doctrines of Christianity and Natural Religion, we find ourselves perplexed with many embarassing problems. The

truths of the Christian Revelation were above the attainments and capacity of the age in which they were given. There was nothing in the history or the tendencies of Religious and philosophical speculations that seemed to point to, or promise them. Besides, they came with authority, in a different way and with higher sanctions than truths attained by unassisted human culture. And thus they are forever separated from the same facts, if they should be developed by moral evidence alone. This cordially granted, and firmly believed, the question of the exact relation between the doctrines of the Gospel and of Natural Religion is still a question of speculative, if not of practical interest, but one which, from the difficulties which attend it, is, in our opinion, almost, if not entirely, insoluble. To receive a satisfactory answer, evidently we should first understand the limits of intellectual power in the domain of Religion. We must go back to the time when Revelation was given, and comprehend not only what men had learned of God and nature, and not only what they seemed likely to learn, but also what, by the sole aid of thought and culture, they could *ever* learn. We must see not merely the relation of the new doctrines to human attainment thus far, but also to the possible capacity of reason. We must understand the extent to which human reason, uninfluenced by the Bible, *can go* in the construction of a religious creed, and then look into the schedule of Revelation, and note the difference. No other method can be effectual. The mind of Christ was above his time; but we have no authority for asserting that, in the course of centuries, some spirit could not naturally arise, who should discover and reveal, by the power of spiritual intuition, and in a philosophical form, many of the truths which Christ revealed by authority, and as a religion. We can never prophesy the exact limits of intellectual power. History warns us against doing so. The genius of Plato was naturally evolved from the capacities of the Pelasgic race. But who, in Homer's time, could have conceived the possibility of Platonism! It would have been a revelation — strange enough — in the heroic age. Cultivation prepares the way for him, however, and Plato comes, the perfection of Grecian genius, and, by a singular law, at the declining moment of Grecian

inspiration. It would have been unwarrantable presumption in the time of Copernicus, or even of Hipparchus, to have denied the possibility of an intellect like Newton's. Every genius is an impossibility till he appears. There are never facts enough in human experience to serve as a basis for safe induction as to the mental capacity of men. We cannot reach the law that governs the developement of genius. Two centuries before his time, Shakespeare was a poetic miracle; he is a poetic wonder still. From the average powers of boys at ten, it would seem monstrous that there should be heads like those of Zera Colburn and young Safford. They appear like new planets, taking a wider sweep in the universe of mind, and the limits of human nature are carried out. And so it is now impossible to determine how far the *doctrines*, alone, of Christianity, separate from their *proofs* and the circumstances of the teacher, were merely anticipations of possible discoveries.

It may be urged, however, that the results of inquiry, the developements of research, *since* the introduction of Christianity, have extended the range of Natural Religion; and, therefore, a comparison of the results of the two systems *now* may aid us in settling the question of mutual influence. But here we are met by another difficulty. In order that this method should be effective, it would be necessary to assume that Revelation has had no influence in aiding this culture and unfolding these results. If Christianity has not been entirely inoperative as an intellectual aid, we can no more conclude, from the after tendencies and triumphs of thought, what the real extent of Natural Religion *is*, than from the former weakness and failures of thought, we could properly have concluded what its limits *must be*.

We cannot stop to discuss the question, whether Revelation has aided the *discoveries* of science; but we think it is evident, on philosophical grounds, that the *religious value* of those discoveries has been powerfully affected by the truths of the Gospel. And now, if this be so, instead of possessing the pure results of Natural Religion on the one side, and of Revelation on the other, we have both blended. The union is so intimate that no analysis can separate, and hold the elements apart, even as an experi-

ment. We have no moral prism to divide the rays. Like a current formed by the junction of two streams, the waters have mixed, until it is a hopeless task to distinguish the drops, and refer each one accurately to its original source.

Physiology, for instance, and an acquaintance with the mutual dependence of physical laws throughout the universe, have unfolded and confirmed the idea of God's goodness, and have transferred it to Natural Religion. But, unless that conception had been supplied beforehand so purely by the gospel, the conclusion could not be reached with so much ease, nor would it lie in the mind with so much certainty. The notion itself was ready, deeply impressed upon the faith of men, and applied *to* the facts to be tried, not reached from the facts alone as a purely inductive result. The force of the gospel was in it, as a *Christian conception*, when given: it lies in it after it is established seemingly on scientific grounds alone. The idea of God's spirituality and omnipresence has been immensely supported by inquiries into the essence of the laws of nature, and by the revelations of Chemistry and Astronomy. But they were pure ideas, present at hand, to be interpreted by science, offered as hypotheses immediately to Natural Religion; they were not, really, the suggested notions after the facts were all revealed, the key proposed by the guess of some shrewd thinker to explain the scientific phenomena. We must constantly remember that the Christian mould is ever ready to give the facts their form. Modern philosophy has drawn, from a profound investigation of the phenomena of evil, a beautiful, and, it should seem, impregnable argument, in confirmation of the unity and the goodness of the Creator. In this respect, the Natural Religion of our times is incomparably higher than the general spirit of the speculations in the ancient classic world. For, however, our faith may still be disturbed at times by the sudden and violent irruption of the thought of evil upon the mind, the question of a duality of agencies, or of any pure malignity in nature, is finally set at rest by the discovery that seeming evil grows out of the same root with good, is always the incidental, never the necessary developement of the same law, and that it thus points to the intentional agency of One who has included

it in the plan of human discipline, and inwoven it in the web of being for some design, — inexplicable as yet it may be, of ultimate perfection. Who can doubt that this discovery has resulted naturally from the pressure upon the mind of the sublime doctrine of Christianity, that God is the Father — a doctrine which has become so intimately a part of our religious cultivation, and which lies in the soul with such authoritative power, that the mind has felt impelled to probe the secrets of nature to their last hiding-places, in order to reconcile its cheering faith with the gloomy show of facts? The pure, unceremonial theory of worship, too, in Christianity — its ritual of deeds, is powerfully supported by the unfolded grandeur of the universe; that is, all which we have learned of nature is in harmony with such a view of God and piety. But we cannot know that the piety required by St. John — the law of love as the highest worship — would have been *evolved* from the facts which now give to it additional force. Christian cultivation, and Christian views of the world have infused themselves into the whole framework of education. Under Christian civilization, natural science, instead of being obliged to encounter the hostile influence of a degraded and impure system of religion, instead of being fettered by authropomorphic and physical notions of the Deity, established by a theological training from which it must work itself free, is aided by ideas so lofty and spiritual that they cannot be surpassed. And it is these ideas, commented on and unfolded by science, of which, for the most part, Natural Theology now consists. For, strictly speaking, induction cannot reach to the attributes of God and the elements of a religion. These can be known only from a complete survey of nature, from a knowledge of all the evidence furnished in her realm. But induction can never deal with more than a partial, limited range of facts. And thus, what is claimed in modern times to be Natural Religion exclusively, is merely a portion of Christianity given as hypotheses, and then translated into the language of nature, and interpreted by the facts of natural research.

We would insist upon this point as one of vital importance in the discussion of our present question. Every student of philosophy, and of the laws of scientific discov-

eries, knows that a vital portion of the process of discovery consists in the *a priori* application of the idea which is appropriate to the facts under investigation. The mind does not work mechanically, even in observing the rigorous rules of induction. With Columbus the causal step was taken, in his prophetic and firmly held conception of the roundness of the globe. The failures of Aristotle, and the fundamental error of all Greek physical speculation, consisted not solely, we cannot say *chiefly*, in a false scientific method, in a lack of sufficient observation and patient classification, but rather in the reference of facts to inappropriate ideas. In mechanical science the fundamental idea upon which all discoveries rest is the conception of Force as the Cause of motion; but Aristotle, in attempting the solution of mechanical problems, refers to Geometrical instead of mechanical ideas. Hence his whole system is confused, and even his correct conclusions unscientific and accidental. Had Kepler disctinctly conceived the mechanical character of the problem to be resolved, he would, perhaps, have worn Newton's laurels as the first discoverer of universal gravitation. The great obstruction in the way of the further progress of the sciences of Biology is, as scientific men inform us, the confusion of ideas relative to the principle of life, and a lack of clearness in the conceptions of assimilation, secretion, and voluntary motion. The possibility of any theology depends on the despotic demands of the idea of Cause, which will not suffer the mind to rest till it has solved the question of creation. And any one can see that an essential alteration, or a lack of clearness in the idea of *skill*, would disturb materially the domain, and alter the value, of Natural Theology. Seeing that every science is constructed of intellectual and *a priori* elements, as well as of materials given by experience, a modern philosopher, Mr. Whewell, has proved at length, in his "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," that the advance of knowledge depends as much on the clear "explication of conceptions," as on the proper "collegation of facts."

And thus, on rigid principles of science, we see the aid which Christianity has extended to Natural Religion. It has furnished to it those pure conceptions which have thrown light *on* nature, while, in turn, they have been

strengthened by the evidence *from* nature. In no case can it be claimed that the evidence of science has gone one jot beyond the proper interpretation of Gospel theology. Strike out the doctrine of universal moral Providence from the record of Christ's teachings, and, destitute of the prior unconscious aid of that conception, modern research would find it hard to restore it. The revelations of science, by showing us God's action to be seemingly omnipresent in outward nature, give to it the strong support of analogy, and help us to conceive it in its simple beauty. But they go no farther; and they go thus far by the aid of the idea of universal Providence, supplied in advance from the Bible itself. And even here, we may say that the essence of the argument was anticipated by Christ's figure of the lilies, and in his allusions to the esoteric theology of the sunshine and rain.

At all points, in the developement of what is called Natural Religion, the truths of Christianity have served as categories of our spiritual nature, which, by their positive influence, have assisted in the *creation* of Natural Religion. As, in Intellectual philosophy, the ideas of cause and substance and relation are furnished from the mind as part of the structure of knowledge, so the doctrines of Providence and immortality and omnipresence have been furnished from the gospel as the cement of rational theology. They are the unconscious forms, the Divine die, impressed upon the facts offered by science, and imparting to them a significance which they might never have acquired. Thus we see the utter impossibility of following the two provinces into any parallel developements for the purpose of comparing their value and unfolding their relations. The demand upon Natural Religion should be to furnish her positive and independent doctrines as to God, Providence and destiny; when in reality, the conclusions of another system have been interwoven and used as aids in unfolding the testimony of her facts. The two systems, to-day are inextricably involved. And so long as we have no moral calculus through which we can reason mechanically, by signs, upon questions which baffle the analysis of simple thought, we cannot hope to answer the question of their relation with much precision.

Of course, we must not forget that, so far as evidence

for the truth of the Gospel is concerned, this concurrent and corroborative testimony of science is of great importance. It should be a matter of the deepest joy to every Christian believer. It furnishes a powerful weapon against scepticism, and valuable assistance to a failing faith. The significance of Revelation itself, doubtless, expands in proportion to our acquaintance with the mysteries of the world. So that, other things being equal, the best Christian may be he who has drunk deepest at the fountain of wisdom, and who has seen the harmony between God's works and word. Science, also, may be valuable to correct errors which had arisen from a misconstruction of Revelation. And, as we said before, if the results of science positively contradicted the statements of Revelation, it would be impossible to preserve our faith. All this does not effect our position. We are seeking to determine, not precisely the religious value of the discoveries of science, nor what might have occurred had they been different, but how far they may claim to be the trophies of unaided reason. And so long as the truths of Natural Religion do coincide, so far as they go, with the truths of Christianity, it is improper, seeing the influence of Revelation in disclosing them, that they be attributed to the original creative power of the mind.

Setting aside, then, the endeavor to determine the exact relations between Christianity and Natural Religion as hopeless, we would define the general relations thus: — that it is one office of Revelation to aid human reason, and to assist it to see for itself. It does not follow, because the Almighty communicates a set of truths by supernatural means, at a time when the world is waiting for a new impulse in its march, that it was His intention those truths should always remain above the capacity and beyond the reach of reason. It does not follow that reason, once quickened and assisted, may not think *up to* them, at least, so far as to see their natural harmony. Revelation we believe to be a benevolent condescension of the Deity to the weakness of the race. It is intended not only to relieve a present darkness of mind, but also, in that process, to infuse greater strength of mind for the future. It is spiritual food to the famishing soul, appeasing want, and also strengthening the fibres for a greater

vigor. Thus many of the truths supernaturally revealed to the Jews are perfectly simple to us. To them, Christ's theory of spiritual worship, his doctrines that the Sabbath was made for man, and that all men are brethren, were new and startling. They were not only above their reason, but they shocked their reason. They were blasphemous, for they contradicted the laws of Moses. To our cultivated minds they seem plain and natural: the influence of the truths has purified and refined our spiritual nature until, to a Christian of to-day, these propositions seem religious axioms, hardly demanding the support of any proof. One great office of a revelation, one law of its coming, seems answered and fulfilled, when the faculties which it has awakened, by their expanding growth, embrace its leading truths, and make them part of the constitution of Natural Theology. A constant accommodation of the teachings of the Deity to the demands and capacities of the race is one of the plainest lessons unfolded in the Scriptures. Revelation is for human assistance, as well as for human satisfaction. Men thought up to the Patriarchal dispensation; it assisted the piety of the aged Patriarchs, but, as a whole, failed to satisfy the demands of reason and the necessities of a denser population; and the Patriarchal dispensation melted into the dawning light of the Mosaic economy. Men *thought up* to Judaism; its spiritual nutriment became absorbed, until, in a large party, the advanced spiritualists of the Saviour's time, the Simeons and Annas of Israel, a want was created which Judaism, with its spiritual commentary, the Prophetic dispensation, could not satisfy; and although it had been given from God's own hand to Moses, Judaism was withdrawn with a signal manifestation of the sanction of the Deity. It was withdrawn, not in the sense of being overthrown, but by being *fulfilled*, carried up to a higher law. Christianity we believe to be a final religious dispensation, not because it is a *Revelation*, but because it contains within itself an expansive power as a Revelation, able to quicken the capacities of the humblest mind, to satisfy the deepest spiritual desires which it calls forth, to aid the energies of the intellect, itself expanding with the discoveries of science, keeping ever in advance of the soul, and filling the loftiest mind with its ideal of excellence and its views of

God. Making allowance for the necessary difference in the nature of the case, we should say, that Revelation has done for theology what Newton did for science. It has introduced and established principles which were, and perhaps would always have remained, above the capacity of the intellect, but which, once developed, may aid the mind, at last, to see and comprehend their reasonableness and force. Strike the Bible from the hearts of men, erase the memory of it forever from their minds, leave them the cultivation it has infused, and though on far less satisfactory evidence, many of the tenets of Christian theology would be reconstructed. The light which the Gospel has kindled in the mind would reveal a vast significance in nature and in man.

Not comprehending this one office of Revelation as the *educator* of the Race, many in our time use the fact of the *education* as an argument against the necessity of supernatural aid from God. They cannot see its value, and deny the fact. But they stand in the unfortunate position of denying it, by virtue of the very assistance which from it they have insensibly received. To their enlarged capacity of mind the speech of nature is sufficient. Her language is articulate to them, and they can understand it. But their enlarged capacity of mind forgets to recognize the *cause* of its enlargement. They inherit the power by which they see. It is an endowment of the very revelation whose value they decry. They transfer their own capacity of comprehension back to the time when revelation was given, and imagine that men could easily have *originated* what they now so clearly *comprehend*. Because revelation has, for them, fulfilled a portion of its office, by aiding them to see the reasonableness and simplicity of all its doctrines, they talk of the intuitions of the soul, and wonder that men can be so credulous as to admit the former need of any revelation. By a too frequent ingratitude they forget, in their pride of power and place, the friend to whom they owe their elevation. While light is reflected back to them, in some one of its varied hues, from every object in the universe, while the whole air is inundated by a general flood of brilliancy, they calmly turn to their less philosophic neighbors, and, brandishing their torches, themselves kindled from the bounty of a Divine Prometheus, cry,

"foolish men, to think, that amidst this all embracing splendor, the radiance of our rush-lights, we need that distant sun!" Is it not as if school boys, because with their limited faculties and untrained thought, they can understand something of the symmetry, and take in the vast proportions of the universe, should, *therefore*, while they stand upon their shoulders, decry the value, and revile the useless labors of Newton and La Place!

Since our last article was written, we have met with such a calm and vigorous statement from the pen of Dr. Neander, of the truth which, in the last few pages, we have endeavored to present, that we cannot resist the temptation to transcribe it here. "Although Christianity can be understood only as something which is above nature and reason, something communicated to them from a higher source, yet it stands in necessary connection with the essence of these powers and with their mode of developement; otherwise, indeed, it could not be fitted to elevate them to any higher stage, otherwise, it would not operate on them at all. And accordingly, we see the evidence of this connection, whenever we observe how human nature and reason do, by virtue of their original capacity, actually strive, in their historical developement, towards this higher principle, which needs to be communicated to them in order to their own completion; and how, by the same capacity, they are made receptive of this principle, and conducted onward till they yield to it, and become moulded by its influence. It is simply because such a connection exists, because in all cases where, through the historic preparation, the soil has been rendered suitable for its reception, Christianity enters readily into all that is human, striving to assimilate it to its own nature, and to interpenetrate it with its own power, that on a superficial view, it appears as if Christianity itself were only a product resulting from a combination of the different spiritual elements it had drawn together; and the *opinion* has found advocates, that it could *thus* be explained."[1]

We return, then, to the idea that there is but one religion, by whatever means its truths be attained. So far as

[1] Neander's History of the Christian Religion and Church: recent Boston edition; page 2 of the Introduction.

they are developed by the natural operation of the mind, it is Natural Religion; so far as they are supplied by a higher power in advance of the capacity of the soul, it is Revealed; while so far as the elements of it are established or strengthened by physical and natural evidence, after the truths have been supernaturally communicated, it is the common product of Revelation and Reason, and cannot be considered to be exclusively either.

From what has now been said, it will be seen that an exact determination of the extent of Natural Religion, compared with Christian theology, cannot be attained. We cannot know how far the mind of Christ, in its authoritative disclosures, merely anticipated the future power of speculative reason, and thus foreclosed the possibility of their original and natural developement. We cannot say in what degree the religious results of science have been produced by the influence of Christian conceptions, applied to and aiding the discoveries of the mind. What might have been, had Christianity been withheld, precisely what has been done because it was given, we are equally unable to unfold. Enough, however, can be seen, not only in the apparent influence which the Gospel has exerted on the world, but also in the effect and the fortunes of former religious communications, to confirm the belief that it is one great office of Christianity to quicken reason and assist its growth, to aid it in seeing for itself the natural grounds on which its doctrines rest. And thus it seems to be the mission of Christianity to efface the distinctive line which separates Natural Religion, as an independent system, from its own revelations. The Gospel is continually absorbing it into its own sphere. What is called Natural Religion, to-day, whether founded on scientific or moral research, on inquiries into the world of nature or the world of man, is but the demonstration, on other grounds, of Christian truths, the commentary and exposition of the spiritual aphorisms of the Saviour.

We talk of the moral evidence afforded by the satisfaction which the Gospel gives to the deepest wants of the soul. One of the strongest natural arguments for Christianity is, that in proportion as we rise in spiritual excellence, and live in a higher sphere, a stronger sense of certainty in regard to its foundation takes possession of

the heart. This is right. But we must remember also that the Gospel has created many of those wants; it refines the spiritual capacities of the mind, and then satisfies them by its purity; it elevates us into the very sphere from which we derive this influx and inspiration of spiritual peace. Christianity is a "a well of water, springing up into everlasting life." And although it be true as an evidence, "If ye do his will ye shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God," it is the *Revelation* of the nature of the will which is the real condition of the promised proof. To the piety of Fenelon no doubts may come; but it is Christian education which nourishes and refines that piety. The overflowing compassion, the boundless love of the gospel, may be satisfactory proof of its Divinity to the benevolent soul of Howard; but Christian culture had much to do with preparing in his heart the capacity for that satisfaction. The mind of Newton, filled with the simplicity and grandeur of Creative Wisdom, may be sustained and strengthened greatly in its faith by the purity of the Christian ritual; but it was partly owing to the prior and elevating effects of that purity upon his religious nature, that he was enabled to see its harmony with the universe. And thus in the moral, as in the material world, Christianity has supplied the very means, which, in their operation, have returned so many proofs; it has planted the seeds which have rewarded the sower with such an abundant harvest.

It is a sign of hope for the permanence of the Gospel, that it sustains this relation to what is termed Natural Religion. For it is owing alone to the complete harmony between the statements of Revelation and the discovered testimony of Nature, that it becomes so difficult to analyze and separate them. Christianity furnishes the key by which to read the cipher of the world. The solution is fitted to all the difficulties of the enigma, else the elements would not yield so consistently to the interpretation. From the domain of Natural Religion is echoed back the voice of Revelation — an echo so distinct that it has been taken for an original tone. Were there a dissonance, not only should we hear it, but it would disturb the security of our firmly rooted faith.

And it is not to be forgotten, besides, that this sympathy

between the doctrines of science and Christianity, although complete in many instances, does not at all lessen the value, and the continual need of the assurances of the Gospel. Let Christianity quicken the faculties and exalt the energies of our nature as it may, it cannot discharge itself completely into the reason of man. At every stage in the great Academy, the authority of the teacher is needed still. On many points, and those, too, of the deepest interest, it is, and must always be, our only available instructer. Nature gives no definite proof that God is the Father, and so far as mere science is concerned, it removes objections to, rather than furnishes arguments for, a future life. By the strong confirmation it lends to other points of Christian theology, it strengthens our confidence in the truth of these, and thus leads the mind so far on the way of analogy as to give foundation for a faith that, could more be known of nature, they might easily be discovered there. It prepares us, in a word, to listen with deeper reverence to the prayer of Jesus, and to hear with greater joy the language, "*I am* the resurrection and the life."

And if, as the teacher of much of the Natural Religion we have, we discover the superiority of Chrisitanity to the whole scheme, we must also add, that the evidence which the Gospel brings removes it yet farther and higher. However we may legitimate the miraculous proof, when once heartily received, it gives us a repose different from the common results of moral probability. Let us feel that a truth is spoken from God, by his special sanction, and, although that sanction does not make the truth truer, it gives it greater intensity and force with our own minds. Men will not worship mathematics, and whatever religious ideas stand entirely upon the skill and logic of the intellect, are so vitiated by an association with the weakness of our nature as to stand as a system of philosophy alone. So that, whether it be honorable or derogatory to men, it is a principle of our constitution, dispute about it as we may, that when we have satisfactorily established the fact, by reason, that an idea comes *from God*, we have given it greater force than when, by simple demonstration, we end with the discovery that it is *true*. In some way the mystery of the Infinite hallows it, while science and

logic give to it only a clear, cold, icy lustre. This sanction which lends such a religious authority to truths, which quickens and impels the conscience to fulfil the moral obligations which they imply, Natural Religion cannot be expected ever to acquire. The halo which encircles the head of Jesus will never radiate, in the imagination of the world, from the sharp outlines of a metaphysician's face. The force, too, which the life of Christ has exercised over men as a revelation of duty, and of the beauty of a Christian life, must forever remain a distinct peculiarity of the Gospel. And thus, in many ways, the revelation in Christianity, from its peculiar nature and evidence, is placed above and beyond the reach of Natural Religion. Received in faith it is the key, published with authority, containing the answers to the problems of creation, duty and destiny. And though science and philosophy may go on, furnishing their demonstrations and their solutions on natural grounds, it cannot fail to give their answers additional weight, when we may look into the key, and find that they coincide with the the solutions offered there.

T. S. K.

Art. XVII.

The Resurrection.

Anastasis: or the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, rationally and Scripturally considered. By George Bush: Prof. of Hebrew, New York City University.

This work has now been before the public for some two years. Its general sentiments are not new. Its learned and able author, though in advance of most of his theological associates, has but developed truths, many of which are very common among the expounders of liberal and rational Christianity. With the exception of a few particulars, in which he has evidently labored to make his views more palatable to his Orthodox friends,

his work is executed in a very respectable manner. As a philological criticism, it is doubtless valuable. An an offshoot from the old evangelical tree, indicating its vitality and possible growth, it is still more valuable.

The two great leading points it establishes are, *First:* Men are to be invested hereafter with spiritual bodies, instead of the corporeal ones they now inhabit; and, *Secondly:* The judgment of Christ began when he set up his kingdom, and was parallel with it.

It should be observed, however, in relation to the first particular, that he makes some little distinction between what are termed the righteous and the wicked. The nature and effects of the resurrection upon the latter, he leaves little clearer than a fog-bank. His views, here, are extremely misty. Contrasted with their clearness on other points, the impression can hardly be resisted, that he was either blinded, to some little extent, by the film of former errors; or, what is worse, would conceal his fullest convictions from fear of imparing his standing and influence. From his displays of moral courage, in other respects, I am inclined to the former opinion. It is difficult to rend, at one effort, all the ties that bind us to long-cherished opinions; and he whose eyes are but just opened to the light, must be expected, for a time, to "see men as trees walking."

Ever since the allusion to Prof. Bush's work, that appeared in the Quarterly for Jan. 1845, I have waited in the hope of seeing from the Editor, or some competent person, a more thorough review of it. I do not propose to attempt it myself, but have placed its title at the head of this paper, chiefly for the purpose of offering a few suggestions on the general subject of a resurrection from the dead, as Christianity, rationally interpreted, would seem to represent it.

Perhaps there are few religious topics concerning which more crude notions are cherished in the popular mind, than concerning this. It is not often a matter of serious and labored investigation with the mass of men. A mere nominal assent to the general fact of a resurrection seems to content them. The common impression is, that it is a process which, in some way, effects some kind of change in its subjects: that as a consequence of it all men will

live again after death, and exist either in a state of happiness or misery to all eternity: and with an admission, of this simple character, it would almost seem that all clear and definite ideas upon the subject, terminate with most people. Much, therefore, as I think it needs discussion, there are still several considerations that have made me hesitate in approaching it. First: the New Testament gives us no minutely detailed account of the matter. With the best lights we can get from it, much is left to inference; something to conjecture. With a few great leading facts it furnishes, we are thrown back upon the efforts of reason, and the teachings of science and philosophy. Any discussion of it, therefore, that goes beyond the naked facts revealed, must be somewhat speculative. I do not think, however, that this should deter any one from its investigation. Absolute knowledge cannot be affirmed of a finite mind, in reference to anything. All we term matter-of-fact is open to cavil. Belief, however well-founded, is but an estimate of probabilities. And if we cannot have that evidence upon a subject, which we think amounts to certainty, it is at best but a poor reason for rejecting the kind and degree that is attainable. I would much rather gratefully accept the light God has seen fit to give us, and wait reverently and patiently the hour that shall bring a more full and perfect revelation. Secondly: The treatment of the subject becomes somewhat difficult, on account of its intimate connection with other topics, from which it cannot well be separated. Our views of it must be modified, more or less, by the peculiar opinions we may entertain in regard to other great cardinal features of moral and religious truth, with which it is interwoven. The immortality of the soul; the nature and duration of rewards and punishments; the philosophy of a future state; and the analogy between that and the present; — all bear directly upon it; and our views of these, as of some other topics, must give a tone and complexion to our interpretation of the Christian doctrine of a resurrection. While I shall endeavor, therefore, to embrace such particular features of these as are deemed essential to its true conception, I will also strive to avoid so wide a range as to lose either myself or my readers in the dim regions of uncertainty.

The end proposed in this brief inquiry is, *the Rationale of the Christian resurrection.* What is the nature, and what are the effects, of the process thus denominated?

The principal word used in setting forth this doctrine, by the writers of the New Testament, is *anastasis;* which denotes, primarily, *the action of standing or rising up.*[1] Doubtless this is the literal import of the term; and whatever the resurrection of the dead may really consist in, its principal feature must correspond to this idea. It must be truly a *rising up* of something. But of what? Is its principal feature the resuscitation of the dead animal body? Or the revivification of the soul which has perished? Or the transfer of one or both to an immortal state? Or is it a process by which an imperfect soul, freed from the mortal body, at death, becomes invested with a spiritual body suited to its new sphere, and attains to complete moral perfection; — the "perfect stature of a man in Christ," its true and only destiny? The latter is my own opinion; but to make it appear more truly, I will consider, briefly, the former questions.

I. Is the Resurrection physical?

In the popular view, or in the notion most current in the church, this is its principal element. The soul, it is supposed, being of itself undying, immortal, is not properly the subject of an *anastasis*, but the body only. The soul passes unchanged into the immortal state, and essentially remains so. The resurrection, therefore, chiefly consists in bringing together the parts of our decayed earthly bodies and reclothing the souls of men with essentially the same garments they wore while upon the earth. The only change which the soul experiences, by this whole process, is simply that of place and external condition. No change is admitted to be wrought in its character. This is most strenuously insisted on. "He that is holy," they tell us, "will be holy still," and "he that is filthy, filthy still." Or, as it is sometimes expressed in Scripture, a little more apochryphal, "as the tree falls so it lies, and as death leaves us so judgment will find us!"× The physical is the chief element in this notion. It merely contemplates the rising up of the old mortal bodies

[1] Anastasis: Page 144.

× often subbound (not it is not) Scripture.

from the grave, — the reinvesting of the souls of men with them, and, by the same strange and unexplored process, rendering them incorruptible and immortal.

I cannot assent to this notion. I do not believe that it is true. It seems to me that no unprejudiced mind can believe it, after examining the clear argument of Prof. Bush. There are a very few passages that seem rather to convey this idea, but, when interpreted carefully, I am confident they do not: while there are others that, I think, expressly contradict it, and that never can be rationally explained in harmony with it. This view will also appear utterly inconsistent with certain facts, the reality of which no one probably will deny.

I have intimated that there are a very few passages which might seem to favor this physical theory; such, for example, as the following: "This mortal must put on immortality," "this corruptible put on incorruption,"[2] &c. It is asked, with some apparent degree of force, if the idea is not clearly conveyed here, that *that* which is made incorruptible and immortal was not previously corruptible and mortal; and, therefore, to be affirmed only of the body? However plausible this question may seem, it is not unanswerable. A review of the preceding context will discover that the apostle was contrasting the *present* and the *future state* of men. He designates the two by these great leading characteristics: The one was mortal, the other immortal; the one corruptible, the other incorruptible. His meaning evidently is, therefore, not that these mortal bodies shall be made immortal, or that souls are now mortal, and shall become immortal; but that the race of beings, whose present state is designated by this prominent feature, — mortal, corruptible, — shall exist in a future state, which, in contradistinction to this, is also designated by its principal feature,—immortal, incorruptible. The terms mortal, corruption, immortal, incorruption, simply distinguish the present and the future state. Fuller proof of this, however, will appear in the sequel. Other passages of similar import might be noticed, which may be thought, perhaps, to indicate a physical resurrection, but my limits are too brief to admit of their exposition. I

[2] 1 Cor. xv. 54.

think that they are all susceptible of a rational interpretation, without involving any such idea.

There are also, as I have suggested, other passages which I cannot harmonize with this theory; some of which, indeed, appear plainly to contradict it. In this same fifteenth chapter of first Corinthians, — a chapter devoted more fully than any other in the Bible to minute instruction upon this great subject, — we find passages of this kind. Paul says "there is a *natural* body," by which, of course, reference is made to the one we now inhabit; and he adds, "there is a *spiritual* body"[3] also. These cannot surely be the same. They are spoken of as distinct, separate, unlike each other. The first is "that which is *natural*,"[4] — that in which we here live and die. "*Afterward*," adds the apostle, "that which is *spiritual*," that in which we are to be raised, and in which we are to live hereafter. That these two bodies cannot be the same, is clearly seen in the figure by which the inspired writer illustrates the subject. He alludes to the grain which we sow; and, as though he would combat this very notion, he affirms that the body which we sow is "*not* that body which shall be;" that is, when the grain comes up. "But God giveth it a body (evidently another and a different body) as it hath pleased him."[5] "So also," he tells us,[6] "is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; . . . . . it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body." I see not how to avoid the conclusion, here, that the writer intends to represent these two bodies as having no affinity, or likeness, to each other; indeed, that there is too radical a difference between them to admit of our supposing that the one is to be manufactured from the other. It seems hardly rational that a spiritual body, suited to the new and more glorious condition of the soul, should come from the gross mass of corruption which we deposite in the grave; and if the fact be admitted to this extent, that the material particles which go to make up our present bodies, will be so far changed, purified, or *etherialized*, as to form the elements of the resurrection body, still it will not be in any proper sense the *same* body, any more than that of the grain in the har-

[3] 1. Cor. xv. 44.
[4] Verse 46.
[5] 1. Cor. xv. 37, 8 et seq.
[6] Verse 42, et. seq.

vest is the same as that which we sow. And the difficulty is increased by the declaration that "God *giveth* it a body as it hath pleased him;" which hardly corresponds to the idea of a mere re-formation of the old one.

In addition to these considerations, there are several facts which it seems impossible to harmonize with this physical theory. In the first place, scientific men assure us, that the particles of matter which compose these mortal bodies are constantly passing off, from the period of our childhood, and new particles, extracted from the nourishment we receive, taking their place. And this change is admitted to be going on with such rapidity, as to furnish us with bodies entirely new and different every seven years. So that, if a person lives to the age of three-score and ten years, he must have possessed at least ten different mortal bodies. Now we are not told which of the ten are to be raised, or used in the construction of the new spiritual body; or whether it will require parts of each, or all of them. Indeed, it seems very questionable whether the whole will furnish suitable material for the composition of a truly *spiritual* body; and in the absence of any direct testimony to this effect, is not readily admitted.

Waiving this difficulty, however, suppose it be admitted that the body thrown off at the time of death is to be the subject of the resurrection; a far greater difficulty, it would seem, is still before us. That body which is laid in the grave, or from which we are separated at death, mingles with the common earth. It becomes decomposed; and then goes to make up the forms of a great variety of vegetable and animal being. If we go back a few thousand years, and select a single body that died then; had we the power to trace the history of its component particles down to the present hour, we should doubtless find that the identical material which constituted that body, has, some of it at least, found its way into the composition of numberless other human bodies existing since, which, in their turn, have gone, and may go, to make up parts of as many more in present and future time. We go to some ancient battle-grounds, or vast cemeteries of the dead. What a rank and luxuriant vegetation sprang up from fields where the blood and bodies of so many thousands of human beings were decomposed! Who can tell how

much of the essential elements of that human flesh entered into the structure of these vegetable productions? That vegetation, perhaps, was cropped by the lamb, or fed to the ox and the cow; and these animals were killed and eaten by men. The bodies of these men were finally laid in the earth, to go through another and perchance similar process; so that the very same particles of matter, that once formed the stalwart limbs of the soldier upon those battle-fields, or the citizen of those cemeteries, after passing through thousands of other human bodies, have at last come down to us, and, for ought we know, or can know to the contrary, are at this moment component parts of our own corporeal systems. How far this may be the case, God only can tell. We are authorized, however, to affirm that such changes are, to some considerable extent, going on, and must continue to run parallel with the present order of things. The matter that made up a human body living and dying a thousand years ago, has not been laid away and preserved in a distinct and separate mass to be used at some future period in the construction of a spiritual and immortal body. This cannot be affirmed of even the old mummies, that were embalmed in the catacombs of Egypt; how much less of the millions who have perished since: some by fire, some by the sword, and some killed and eaten by men,* whose bodies in their time have decayed, mingled with their primeval elements, gone to make up still other bodies, and passed through so many changes of organization and decomposition.

With these facts before me, I confess that the vulgar notion of a physical resurrection seems utterly absurd and impossible.

II. Is the resurrection psychical?

I use this word to designate a process confined to the soul itself, having necessarily nothing of a physical or moral character about it. Two somewhat similar views may be considered under this head. *First:* The soul is either material, or the result of material organization, and

* I have somewhere, recently, seen a doubt expressed whether there was ever any reality in the accounts of cannibalism. No one, it seems to me, can question it after reading Captain Wilke's Narrative of the Exploring Expedition, now in the Polynesian group of islands.

dies equally with the body. The resurrection, therefore, is, in its most essential feature, a *re-creation* of the soul, endowing it with the gift of immortality. *Secondly:* The soul does not actually perish at death, but passes into a state of unconsciousness, or sleep; and the resurrection is merely the re-awakening of it to active life and immortal vigor.

Assuming either hypothesis, it will be perceived that the whole subject turns on a question in psychology. Let us look at the first of these for a moment.

Can the process of *re-creating* a soul that has literally perished be supposed to correspond to the true idea of an *anastasis?* It would seem not. A resurrection implies the *rising up* of something previously existing. It is merely an *elevating* process, and can be affirmed of nothing which does not truly exist. This hypothesis also effectually destroys identity. Indeed, it does not admit a future existence for *us*, but for a new race of beings. If all that constitutes *me*, really dies, that is truly the *end* of *me*. Another creation may follow, to be sure, and the subject created may be called by my name; or it may bear as great a likeness to me as Almighty power and skill can produce: and after all, it is not *myself*. Continued existence seems essential to identity, and to the possibility of a resurrection.

It can hardly have escaped the attention of the most careless reader of the New Testament, that it speaks of a future state for *us*, for the same identical beings that exist here. "We know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, *we* have a building of God,"[8] &c. "For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven." Here the bodies we now inhabit are compared to a *house* we live in. In the future state, we are to inhabit a new house or body; but surely the *tenant* in both cases is the same being. Our present bodies, are likened also, to the clothes we wear. This illustration seems very inappropriate, not to say untrue, if we do not admit a continuity of existence between the present and future state. Neither of these

[8] 2 Cor. v. 1, et. seq.

figures bears the least analogy to the fact, if the resurrection is a re-creation of the souls of men.

How is it with the second hypothesis? Does the mere awakening of the soul, which we may suppose to have passed into a state of unconsciousness, or sleep, at death, constitute the chief feature of the resurrection? I cannot think so. There is nothing in such a phenomenon that seems to correspond to the essential idea of an *anastasis.* There is no *rising up* implied, any more than may be affirmed of the act of awaking in the morning from the repose of the night. Indeed the process, in both cases, is very similar, so far as the soul is concerned. So that even admitting the unconscious sleep of the soul, for an indefinite period, the true idea of a resurrection must embrace something more than the mere act of its wakening. It must be a higher and more important process than this. Even the additional consideration of its investment with a spiritual body would hardly seem to approximate its full reality. The soul must be *raised, elevated,* brought up to an essentially higher position, in order to realize a true *anastasis.* The simple act of wakening the soul, therefore, and clothing it with its new vestments, though it might be admitted to form a part, cannot constitute the chief, or most prominent feature of this great process.

It should be remarked here, however, that though I have, for the sake of the argument, admitted in part the truth of this hypothesis, I cannot say that I believe it. There are several passages of Scripture which I cannot harmonize with the idea of the soul's unconscious sleep after death. To my apprehension they clearly imply an active, sentient existence, to follow speedily the decay of this earthly body. Could Paul have contemplated any thing essentially different from this when he expressed a "desire to depart and be with Christ; which is far better," than "to abide in the flesh"?[9] When he spoke of putting off this body with which he was here clothed, "not for that we (he) would be *unclothed,* but be *clothed upon,* that mortality might be swallowed up for life,"[10] did he really believe that he was to remain for a long period unconscious and "unclothed" during this change of garments?

[9] Phil. i. 23, 4. [10] 2 Cor. v. 2. et. seq.

Or when he expressed his willingness "rather to be absent from the (mortal) body and to be *present with* the Lord," did he suppose that a long sleep of the soul must intervene? Was it not clearly his impression that the present was to be followed immediately by an active state of being? Again: How could Christ have exhibited the living persons of Moses and Elias at his transfiguration, if they had been doomed to an unconscious sleep till a future and general resurrection? Indeed, when he called his Heavenly Father the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, did he not expressly affirm that "*all live* unto him"? If, then, the soul does not sleep, it needs no *wakening;* and this, therefore, can form no part of the true resurrection.

III. Is the resurrection a process which merely changes the soul's external condition, leaving its moral character essentially the same?

Take the soul just as it may be at the hour of death; transport it into the eternal world; place it in a state of incorruption and immortality; invest it with a spiritual body adapted to its new mode of existence; surround it with all the means of progress and improvement, and still leave the moral character of that soul unchanged in every essential particular; will all this correspond fully to the principal idea conveyed by that term? Such seems to be the impression of quite a large class of liberal Christians. This life, they assure us, is a state of probation. At death the soul passes into the eternal world, and is there brought to judgment for the deeds it has done here. It is then surrounded with new circumstances; new sources of knowledge, truth, and virtue, are opened to it; and it lives on in that condition of happiness or misery which its obedience or disobedience has formed, and continues to form, for itself.

These general opinions are, doubtless, more or less modified, as they exist in different minds; but in whatever form they may be held, the resurrection is thought to consist chiefly in the transition of the soul from the present, or the state in which the death of the body leaves it, to a future and immortal existence, and the investing of it with the circumstances of spiritual being. Its external condition will in this manner be much improved, while its

moral character remains wholly unaffected, so far as this mere process is concerned. This view I have somewhere seen illustrated by the following figure. Man, in the present life, is, in many important respects, like the child in a primary school. He learns here the rudiments of knowledge; obtains some of the elementary principles of his great lesson. When this is done, like the child, he is taken from his primary school, and placed in a higher institution. The moral character of the child, however, undergoes no change by this transition. It enters the higher school the same child in this respect that it was when it left the primal institution. And though it is now surrounded by improved circumstances: that is, furnished with new means of progress and developement, under the operation of which it *may* ultimately become nobler, better, and happier; yet the mere transfer of itself effects no part of this change. Thus it is, we are told, with all men. A future state, like a higher school, will surround men with new and better facilities for advancement, and give occasion to greater progress. This advancement and moral elevation, however, forms no part of the work of the resurrection. The resurrection is a process which merely prepares the way for it, makes it possible. It leaves the spirit and character of the soul in the same state, morally, that it finds them.

I cannot think that this opinion corresponds fully to the true idea of *anastasis*. It is open to the same objections that were urged against a former hypothesis. Restricting the resurrection to this narrow process, seems utterly subversive of its principal idea. In no proper sense can it be termed a *rising up*. The child is no higher the moment it enters the high school, than it was the moment it left the primary school. The soul, it would seem, is no higher in reality, the moment it enters upon its immortal condition, than the moment it left this world and its mortal body. All this but makes a higher attainment possible; and I cannot therefore allow that this mere transfer of the soul from one world to the other — a transfer which does not elevate its character in the least degree, but merely endows it with the means of rising, is all that is embraced in the true meaning of *anastasis*. This transition may, as it doubtless will, form a small part of that great process, but it cannot be all of it, or even its most prominent feature.

IV. Is the resurrection moral!

I have already suggested it as my opinion, that this forms in reality its great leading characteristic. I will sketch a brief outline of the views I entertain in regard to it, and close this article with such proofs, drawn from Scripture and reason, as I have time and space to offer in its support.

It appears that God, in his universe, would have, not only *creatures*, but *children*. He would be not only a Creator, but a Father. Consequently, the race of men was designed; having not only intellectual powers, but a moral nature, constituting their great distinguishing feature, their crowning excellence, and their likeness to him. This peculiar constitution was evidently intended so that they might ultimately attain a truly higher and better destiny than could possibly have been realized without it. To have formed them essentially otherwise; to have placed them beyond the reach of sin, or ability to do evil, would of course allow them no moral nature or character; and thus have deprived them of what is to constitute their highest glory. In this case, they might have lived, to be sure, in light and beauty forever, like the stars that burn with a borrowed fire; and doubtless they might have been conscious and comparatively happy in such a state. But the fact justifies us in saying that God foresaw the present order of things as preferable; and therefore made them with a moral nature, with power to do good, and of necessity exposed to do evil, which has resulted in the mixed character which we all sustain; in the moral imperfection, more or less, in which all live and die. In this, however, does not rest God's ultimate purpose. He would have them perfect. In moral perfection only can they realize their true destiny. But this was impossible, otherwise than through their own active agency. Purity, holiness, and moral elevation are not something that can be made for us, as a tailor would fit us with a garment, but strictly personal qualities, possible only to moral agents. He, who made the moral nature of man, could doubtless destroy this nature, if he pleased. He might have taken his children, on the first introduction of sin among them, and by a miraculous exertion of his power, transformed them to a state of purity as stainless as characterizes the inhabitants of

heaven. There were the same reasons, however, opposed to this course of procedure, that induced him to adopt the present order of things in the beginning. It would have argued an oversight in his own calculations. To destroy a nature which he had seen fit to create, would imply an imperfect design. To change moral beings by such an exertion of power as we have supposed, would sink them to the condition of mere passive objects without will, or possibility of desert; indeed, to mere pieces of mechanism, curiously wrought perhaps, but utterly without the pale of moral existence. Considering the nature he had formed, he could not consistently do this. Were he to control mere inanimate senseless matter; were he to move a world in its orbit, or a comet on its path; such a mode of operation would be deemed appropriate. But to have a moral being like man, raised to a condition of holiness, purity, and love, demanded means essentially different in their nature and operations. They must be such as were appropriate to the human constitution. Man himself was to be an active agent, co-operative in this work. Endowed with means and capabilities divinely given, he was called to work out under God's blessing, his own moral deliverance. But he was weak, and frail, and ignorant. God sent him from time to time, such aid as he saw fit. Patriarchs, and prophets, and wise men were raised up to instruct and assist him. And in "the fulness of times" Christ came; surrounded him with new and better influences, cast new light upon his mind, and held up before his eyes a new and glorious example.

Let it be particularly observed here, that during this whole period of the Divine economy, previous to the establishment of Christ's administration, no attempt had been made by divine power, *to do man's work for him*, but simply to induce him *to do it for himself.* And the same principle was adopted by Christ, when the work of moral control was assigned to him. His government has now been in visible operation for nearly two thousand years. During this whole time, so far as we have any information, no exertion of power has been made by him to change miraculously the moral character of men, or to create for them, wholly without their co-operation, a higher moral condition internally. A great variety of means and

influences, however, have been put in operation enabling them to attain this condition by their own voluntary activity.

This work is said to be God's and Christ's, evidently in a sense similar to that in which a business would be called mine, though carried on by agents that performed the labor, with means and facilities which I had furnished for that purpose. I do not profess to give the *rationale* of this matter; perhaps I do not even understand it. It is sufficient for my present purpose however, to state what are evidently the facts in the case, leaving their philosophy to abler hands than my own.

Briefly, then, in the order of things I have sketched, men live out their days, and leave the world in a greater or less degree of moral imperfection. The period of their primary instruction and discipline is now past. God transfers them to a higher school, because his purposes are not yet accomplished, Christ's mission is not yet ended. The period of his government is not over at death; for the objects of that government have not then been realized. The gracious plans of his and our heavenly Father must be fully carried out; and these contemplate nothing less that the voluntary subjection of all souls to Him; their attainment of his spiritual likeness of purity and love; or, as the Scriptures express it, their coming to "the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ."[11] Hence a *moral anastasis* after death becomes necessary; a rising up of the soul to the glory of its true destiny. The principal feature of this process is purely moral. Men are to become by it, "children of God," that is, in their character, "being children of the resurrection."[12] It will be physical only in this sense, viz: God will give the soul, after death, a new body adapted to a spiritual existence, according to the testimony of Paul already referred to. This old mortal body, having accomplished its purpose, will be left to mingle with its primeval elements, and go to make up other forms of vegetable and animal life. The soul, freed from it, and invested with its new tenement, which the apostle terms its "house of God, not made with hands, eternal and in the heavens," will continue, as at present, under the administration of Jesus Christ. There, as we trust, it will be subject to higher and holier influences than surrounded it

[11] Eph. iv. 13. [12] Luke xx. 36.

here. Its temptations and trials may be also far less. New light and knowledge will be communicated by the Saviour, and under his guidance, instruction and discipline, it will finally attain to its true greatness; its moral glory and grandeur will be fully realized; his mission with it as Redeemer and Saviour, having attained its object, will terminate; his government over it will be resigned to the Father, and God to that soul will be all in all.

This entire process, to which every soul of man in the universe must be subject, which completes and winds up the mediatorial work of Jesus; a process extending over an indefinite period of time; which takes each and every soul at death and raises them to moral perfection and glory; this is the true *anastasis* of the gospel.

'Such is a brief outline of my own views on this important subject. It is a theory, to be sure, not wholly without its difficulties; but I find these less troublesome than those connected with other theories; and I must add, that to my mind the proofs of its essential truth are most clear and convincing. Some of these I propose now to suggest.

In the first place, it seems to me that, in the absence of all direct testimony, from the Scriptures, to the contrary, a fair presentation of the subject in this form would go far toward winning the assent of the reason where it was uninfluenced by prejudice. Be this as it may, I have other evidence of its reality to offer which I think is deserving of candid consideration. The language of Christ in reply to the Sadducean cavil, and the clear declarations of Paul to the Corinthians, appear to me like very direct and conclusive evidence in favor of the position I have taken. In regard to the first mentioned, it appears that the Sadducees did not ask Christ respecting the reality of the resurrection. Their question was founded on its admission. They did not ask if the woman and her several husbands were all to be raised from the dead. This fact was conceded by the form of their query. But "whose wife shall she be of the seven?" [13] that is: what will be the relation of these persons, in the resurrection state? Jesus told them, in reply, that these domestic relations would not exist there; in that world "*they neither marry nor are given in marriage*, but are as the angels of God in heaven." And the parallel

[13] Matt. xxii. 28.

passage in Luke seems to intimate that they were to attain this exalted moral and spiritual condition, by or through the resurrection: "are the children of God, *being* the children of the resurrection." [14] No doubt can exist as to the meaning of the phrase, "children of God," as used in the New Testament. It denotes *moral likeness*; and this is the process by which it is to be attained. It is the result of that moral elevation or rising up, denominated *anastasis*. This, I say, seems to be fully implied here.

The language of Paul to the Corinthians also appears strongly to favor this opinion. Speaking of the great body of mankind, he mentions the leading features of their condition in the present and future state. All men, in the former, are represented as "in corruption," "in dishonor," "in weakness," "in a natural body" and dying "in Adam." [15] Contrasted with this is their ultimate condition in the future state. There, they will be "in incorruption," "in glory," "in power," in "a spiritual body," and "made alive in Christ." The latter condition they are to attain through the *anastasis*. This is a process by which they are to come into the likeness of Christ, where, as Jesus said "they are children of God." When all souls shall have passed into the eternal world, and there, under the supervision and government of the Redeemer, become perfected in his spirit, and conformed to his moral likeness, then all will be *raised* in incorruption and glory; all will be "made alive in Christ."

Collateral proof of this view may also be found in the fact, that Christ speaks of the *moral change*, following the earnest reception of his gospel, by his followers, in this world, as a resurrection. "The hour is coming and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live." [16] Why should he apply this term to a process so purely moral, if the literal resurrection which the word is used chiefly to describe, bore not, in some important features, an analogy to it?

Leaving, however, the entire class of passages in which the scriptures allude to this subject, let us glance at a branch of the evidence, less direct, perhaps, but possibly more convincing and conclusive. The kind of proof I am

[14] Luke xx. 36. [15] 1 Cor. xv. 42. et. seq. [16] John v. 25.

about to offer may be explained by the following similitudes. If the fact were affirmed that a being was created, another fact would be inferred from it necessarily: viz: a Creator. The proof of the former must be equally proof of the latter. If the Bible should state, in clear and unambiguous terms, that at some future time I should find myself an inhabitant of the sun, or moon, or one of the planets; the fact of my passing thither from this earth, my present residence, would be a necessary inference. If the former fact was proved, the latter must follow as a matter of course. It is evidence of precisely this character that I would now submit in confirmation of my views of the resurrection.

No fact is stated in more unequivocal language in the New Testament, than is used in affirming these: — Christ has set up a kingdom among men; this kingdom is to embrace ultimately all mankind, "for he must reign," 'till "all things shall be subdued unto him"[17] then, "when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father;" "God will be all in all." He is repeatedly affirmed to be "the Saviour of the world;"[18] and this salvation no rational believer doubts to consist in a deliverance from sin;[19] a turning of every one away from his iniquities;[20] a bringing of all to a knowledge of the truth [21]; and, in short, enabling them to attain to Christ's image of holiness and love.[22] It is a well established fact that all men must attain to this exalted condition. God's plan in the beginning contemplated this. Christ's mission aimed to effect it. And that it will be fully realized ultimately, no Universalist pretends to deny.

Let me ask then, particularly all such, respectfully but earnestly, Is this work performed, for all men, in this life? I go further, and press the question, whether it is performed even in the case of any single individual? Is there any person who, at the hour of death, so far as we can discover, possesses all the purity and perfection of the angels in heaven? Is there one, that in any proper sense, Christ *fully* saves in this world? I should not dare to say it. I

[17] 1 Cor. xv. 26-8, also 24, vs.
[18] John iv. 42. 1 John iv. xiv.
[19] Matt. i. 21.
[20] Acts iii. 26.
[21] 1 Tim. ii. 4.
[22] 1 Cor. xv. 22. et. seq.

think no one will. What then, is the necessary inference? If this process is not perfected here, in reference to the best of men, much less in regard to all, and if Christ has affirmed that it should be done: that he "will draw all men unto himself,"[23] if he were "lifted up from the earth;" are we not driven from necessity to infer such an *anastasis* as I have supposed? The proof of the former, it would seem, should be regarded as sufficient proof of the latter. If the latter be not real, the former cannot be true. If God has promised to "gather together in one, all things in Christ;"[24] to bring all men, under the administration of Jesus, into a strictly *saved* state; a state of holiness and love; what other proof is necessary to show, in case it is not done here, that it must be done hereafter? Without this moral *anastasis* I have supposed after death, I see not how it is within the reach of possibility that the Divine promises should be fulfilled, how God's purposes in regard to the salvation of men are to be accomplished, or how it can be said, with any truth, as it is said, and as we all believe, that Jesus Christ is the Saviour of the *world.* If I admit these plain facts of the Divine testimony, I must claim them as clear proofs of a moral resurrection in the world to come.

The *anastasis* of the gospel, then, is a great moral work, with each and every soul after it has left the immortal body. It is that great process, carried on by human and Divine agency conjointly, by which every soul, commencing at death, in a state of moral imperfection, *rises* to the elevation of Christ's spiritual likeness, and attains the dignity, grandeur, and glory of its true destiny.

One query in particular naturally intrudes itself here. Admitting that all this vast moral revolution is embraced in the true idea of a resurrection, still it may be asked if we must suppose necessarily that it covers so great a space of time. Is an indefinite but long period really essential to such a change? Does it not occur with all men in a moment at the death of the body? Or, will it not, at some future time, be instantaneous to all?

No, I think not. I have already suggested the principal reasons. God, by a miraculous exercise of his power,

[23] John xii. 32. [24] Eph. i. 10.

in which men would be mere passive agents, might have created them in the beginning, in that high condition, and made it impossible for them to sin.

It seems, however, that he judged a *moral* existence preferable for them. Or, instead of adopting the great principles which have characterized his economy with man here, — instead of treating them as moral beings, sending prophets, Christ and his apostles, to teach, guide, and aid them on to perfection, he might have changed them instantaneously by the mere word of his power. But the facts of the case show that he did not attempt the former, and could not consistently attempt the latter. The mode of his moral government throughout, both before the christian dispensation, and under the administration of Christ, shows that he has ever adapted himself to the strictly moral existence of his creatures; and I cannot believe, upon slight evidence, that he will change essentially this mode of operation. I cannot think that in this world he would treat us with such scrupulous care as moral agents, and at the moment of death, use us as the potter does the clay; as mere inanimate substances, moulding us into a likeness of purity without our agency or co-operation. Indeed, if that glorious state of the soul, which we suppose must constitute the chief element of heaven for us, that high state of perfect purity and love, which is in itself our true destiny; — if this is to be wrought out *for us*, and in no important sense *by us;* if it is a work which God or Christ performs, and in which we have no hand at all; if we are all to be taken at death, as mere pieces of mechanism, and wrought into a new form and character, without our own active agency, then the chief element of our moral nature is destroyed; we are no longer strictly moral beings; and I see not why we should have ever been made or treated as such. The whole moral purpose of the present life seems to be thus cut off; our trials and temptations, our efforts and attainments, our struggles and sorrows; nay more, the whole of the dealings of God with us, in this world, seem to amount to nothing; and our present life, on this hypothesis, would stand related to our whole existence as the introduction to a celebrated play of Shakspeare's; a mere farce got up at its opening, but with the great

body of which it had no possible connection of any importance.[25]

In conclusion, it may still be asked, whether the scriptures do not speak of the resurrection as an *instantaneous work*, to be effected solely by the power of God? If they do convey this idea, when properly interpreted, then the general theory I have advanced must be given up. The revealed word, if clearly understood, must of course be final authority in the case. I know of no passage, however, of this kind. I have already shown that many scriptures seem necessarily to imply the moral process I have maintained; and I do not think these would force us to adopt a sentiment that other passages especially contradict. I can call to mind but one even, having an immediate bearing upon this point, that would seem to need an explanation. It occurs in 1. Cor. xv. 52. "We shall all be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye at the last trump," &c. I have no hesitation in admitting that these words do appear, at first sight, contradictory to the theory I have suggested; still I think it is possible, nay, even probable that their true import has been mistaken. The apostle, in this chapter, had evidently in contemplation the period of the final winding up of the present order of things. Many would be living at that time on the earth. What could be done with them? "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." "Would they also die like those who have gone before them? How would they become divested of flesh and blood?" "This problem the writer now proceeds to solve. As he had just intimated the impossibility of entering on the future life with the present body, he here advances to the explanation of a mystery, that is, the disclosure of a secret, the purport of which was, that those who should be alive at that day would undergo

[25] If the reader will turn to the first article in the Quarterly, for April, 1847, he will find several points I have suggested here, treated in a most profound and lucid manner. The propriety and necessity of analogical reasoning, on topics of this kind, is most convincingly argued; and especially is it shown with a discrimination and force seldom equalled, that no change of the moral and spiritual character of man, can possibly be anticipated, that is not gradual in its progress and the result of our own, no less than the divine agency.

a change that should fit them, as well as the dead, for entering into the kingdom of God." "We shall not all sleep (i. e. die,) but we shall be changed (i. e. all who are then living) in a moment." "This he calls 'the showing of a mystery;' by which is meant simply, according to scriptural usage, the explanation of an Old Testament type, symbol, or emblem. The allusion is probably to the translation of Enoch and Elijah, which the apostle would represent as a *mystical* foreshadowing of the fact of a similar change to be wrought on a large scale on those who should still be living"[26] at the final winding up of all earthly affairs. This *momentary* change then, that was to be as sudden as "the twinkling of an eye," was by no means the *anastasis*, but merely the fitting of those then alive for this process by a change equivalent to death. Then mortal existence would be finished. All souls alike would have passed from the earth, and the great moral process of *raising* them would follow in accordance with our foregoing representations. This interpetation, to my mind, seems more rational than any other. It appears to harmonize far better with the general tenor of the New Testament upon this subject, and is consonant with the teachings of sound philosophy.

I have not the vanity to suppose that my views upon this topic are perfect. Doubtless, like all others, they are liable to objections. I trust, however, that no one will reject them merely because they are not generally received. They are not necessarily untrue on this account, though it should subject them to a fair and full examination. I have designed to be modest in their assertions, for I have so often had notions that I thought were firmly established, swept away in the light of further investigation that I begin to consider dogmatism as rather premature.

Little more than one thing seems certain, and that is, we are, here, enveloped in a world of mystery, and can do no better perhaps, than gratefully to accept what little light we can gather, and wait patiently the promised period when we shall see as we are seen, and know as we are known.

M. B.

[26] Anastasis, Page 189, 190.

Art. XVIII.

The Elements and Results of the Social Revolution now in progress through our world.

That a new and better age is opening upon our world, is coming to be the belief of all thoughtful minds, of all who have carefully noted the signs of the times. We are slowly sweeping forth out of the shadows into the glory of a day brighter than has ever yet dawned upon the earth. Confessedly there is something nobler and more worthful for our race in the future, than past or present have revealed unto us. The evils, physical, social, moral, political, which have so long darkened our life, and hedged in the path of progress, are not in the nature of things. Ignorance, want, suffering, selfishness, dissension and conflict are not the hard necessities of our being. There is something above and beyond these, yet in store, for us.

If the prophecies of divine men; if the teachings of religion; if the instincts of our nature, and the moments of half-inspiration which come to us all, when we seem to catch faint glimpses of a far off splendor — if these do not all deceive us, there is surely before us an era of light and love, such as the poet saw and sung when

> "Love took up the glass of Time,
> And turned it in his glowing hands,
> And ev'ry moment, lightly shaken,
> Ran itself in golden sands."

when

> "Love took up the harp of Life,
> And smote on all its chords with might;
> Smote the chord of self, that, trembling,
> Passed in music out of sight."

As I have said, the world seems conscious of this approaching era. All men feel that one of those great changes is opening upon us, whose results are wrought out

in a gradual reconstruction of the social world, and the establishment of a new order of things, a new order of thoughts and principles, and individual and general aims. Such a change has already begun; and slowly passing over the face of the earth, it is destined to restore it again to its primeval beauty. It is destined to do more for our race than the wildest dreams of the enthusiast have ever promised. It is my purpose to ask attention to a brief investigation of the elements and results of this social revolution, now so manifestly in progress, and every day gathering greater and greater strength and importance.

1. *The first element in this regenerating movement, is the quantity and quality of Thought in the world.*

There never has been a period in the history of mankind which has presented a more general mental activity than the present; never a time when there was so much thinking, and thinking of the right kind. Hitherto the means, and almost the right of thought, have been denied the masses. Johnson says of the men of little more than a century ago, that such as did not profess learning, "were not ashamed of ignorance; and in the female world, any acquaintance with books was only distinguished to be censured." And a recent writer says, that "books, pictures, and statues, were prohibited, as calculated to mislead the multitude, and withdraw them from their prescribed province — so full of alarm were the privileged classes at the mere idea of educating the poor." And were it not so, the millions, who have always been at close struggle with hunger and cold and nakedness, could have had no time for thought of any thing beyond the narrow circle of their own physical wants. Of necessity, therefore, the masses have had no time, no means of thought. From age to age they have gone to their unloved tasks, silent and dogged; and at nightfall, have hurried, weary as an overworked beast, totheir straw pallets, and gotten such rest as might come to them.

But the last half century has brought about a great change in this respect, and has prepared the way for a still greater one. The diffusion of education among the people; the rapid increase of publications of all sorts, books, pamphlets, newspapers, reviews and tracts on every subject, and at a price which throws them into the hands of

the multitudes who have until now hungered in vain for mental food; the immense increase of the facilities of intercommunication among men and nations; the magnificent steamers that have brought Europe and Asia, and Europe and America so close that we can almost stretch out our hands and grasp those of our brothers across the waters; the railroad, the magnetic telegraph, the system of cheap postage — all these are like so many electric conductors of thought; the nerves that convey impressions to the common brain, and life to the common heart.

Everywhere, among the humblest and poorest, the leaven of thought is at work; and light is entering in to guide and bless, to instruct and elevate. The people are beginning to interpret the oft repeated saying, that "Knowledge is Power;" and to see that only through its agency, can they hope to rise up to the destiny which is shadowed forth as their God-given heritage in the burning pages of inspiration. They have learned the value and the blessedness of it, and seen how even toil and suffering may be beautified through its ministries. They are beginning to feel the pulse of a new and higher life. The soul within them expands daily beneath the sunshine of a large acquaintance with God, with man and nature. They are beginning to understand more fully the relations existing between themselves and those who have controlled their destinies; to see more clearly the great and momentous truth of human brotherhood, and equal rights; and that though "the world was made for Cæsar, it was made for Titus too." They are beginning to believe that this is God's earth; and that, some way or other, all his children, even the poorest and weakest, have a right to so much of its soil and water and air, as shall sustain life under such circumstances as to unfold and develope the attributes and faculties of the whole man, physical, religious, social, and intellectual.

All this is getting to be understood now in the outset; and with a fearless courage, and a patience and perseverance nothing can overcome, the people are investigating, studying and looking into the very heart of things. Nothing is taken on trust; nothing is believed now because it has been believed. Nothing that is not just and right and needful, is tolerated because it may wear the hoary rime

of age. Nothing now challenges the reverence of the present and the future, because it has been worshipped by the past. No logic, no metaphysics will get faith for themselves, unless based in the plain common-sense, and stern fair-play principles which hereafter will surely bear rule. Every thing which claims toleration in the new order of things, will be subjected to the severest analysis; and only what is useful and universal will have a place assigned it. Whatsoever is chaff will be scattered to the winds. Whatsoever is false, or unequal, or only a sham, will be set aside, or cast into the great deep of the past. Governments, laws, creeds, opinions, customs, all will be brought to the same test; and as they answer to the test, will be rejected as useless; or worked into the great social temple, whose cap-stone shall be brought forth amidst the rejoicings of all earth and heaven.

Yes, nothing is more certain than that the millions are thinking, and thinking wisely and effectively. The thought that dwelt with a few, has now flowed down into the minds of a host which no man can number. The physical and moral and spiritual worlds, are opened into their depths with the keenest search; and evermore in all places, the inquiry is heard, Why? Wherefore? For what good are ye here? Speedily give answer, or you cannot stay. The great gates of nature's sanctuary are thundered at continually for more and more of whatever is to be known. Governments are met with the bold question, "Who made you? By whose right are you here?" And law-makers are called upon in unmistakeable tones, for the reason and the right of the law, if they would have it live.

So is it with the quantity and quality of thought in the present age, which is so important an element in the renewing influence that is gradually moving upon the waters of society. Never so much thought before — never thought of such quality; thought on such things, and to such ends. And what cause for rejoicing, this universal activity of the mental world, directed to such mighty and beneficent purposes! So sublime a revolution, wrought out by instruments of so high character, the world has never seen before. It is the great achievement of this age, that it has discovered and is slowly bringing into the life

of the nations and the people, the truth that mind is omnipotent, greater than all things else. It is is bginning to be seen in the opening of this new revolution, that he who has a single truth in his soul, is mightier than he who has an army at his back. Thought is more powerful than cannon shot; and striking into the battle fields of this era, will do more for the victory of the right and the just. And it is because of this, that we have hope of it, and prophesy so confidently of its glorious issue, and of the Eden state, to which it will bring slowly, but certainly, all the tribes and kindreds of the earth.

Blessed is that age, which, made wise by the experience of the past, relies on the power of truth and progress to work out all reforms; to rectify all abuses and wrongs and bring all government and law and custom into harmony with the highest interests and the truest life of the people and the race. True, the age of violence is not yet gone over. The resort to brute force, to the bayonet and the torch, is not wholly abandoned; but gradually the faith had in these is getting weaker, and recourse to them less frequent aud easy. The millions will not consent so readily now to be made the tops and balls for the games that kings and cabinets play. They are asking *why?* in a tone greatly significant of unbelief. And sometimes it comes out bluntly, "we won't! If there is wrong let us get it removed in a way better than that which buries it up under a greater wrong." Though we may, and shall, have wars, and tumults and manifold violences for a season; yet nothing is plainer than that the world is gradually moving beyond these, into an age when thought, and moral power, and love, will be believed in, and employed, as the only certain agents of reform; as the only means of healing all social diseases, and restoring the body politic to vigorous and lasting health and strength.

To this the nations are coming with reasonable diligence. All great changes come slowly, but already the bow of promise is forming on the clouds which darken the heavens. There must, therefore, be sunshine somewhere.

But, as hinted, this progress of thought, and its triumph over brute force, is seen not only in the political and social world, but also in the moral and religious. Space and

time will allow me to speak of the last only, and that briefly. Centuries ago, or less, it was deemed right and wise to establish the truth of a creed, or an opinion, by dungeons and racks, by the faggot and the flame. The world has gotten beyond that now, and has no respect for a faith which cannot make its way by the power of thought and argument. And even the more refined persecution that takes the shape of excommunications, suspension of social intercourse, breaking of friendships, misrepresentation of motives, opinions and character, even this is getting to be regarded as unworthy alike of the spirit of Christianity and the age. Men and women, priest and people, creeds and churches, are coming now to be valued for what they are; for the fruits they bring forth. Nothing is counted of any more worth for its antiquity, or for the number, or the wisdom or goodness of those believing it. For whatsoever of real worth it has in itself — for this it is valued; and for no more.

There never was more thought in the religious world than there is now — never more fearless, and yet deeply serious thought. Formerly the few inquired and speculated in matters of faith and doctrine, and these only so far as the church allowed. The masses never investigated; but believed implicitly and blindly whatever the church or the few taught them to believe.

Not so now. The millions are beginning to ask questions; to think for themselves; and to feel, every one of them, that religion is not a matter between them and the church or the priest at the altar, but a matter between God and their own souls. They are beginning to feel that they have an individual life, and work, and responsibility; and not much longer will any one believe a creed, or follow a sect because his fathers did; or because tradition says, This is the way. It is fast coming to this: Show me the reason of this, and the proof; and I will believe. Show me that it is of God, in harmony with the perfection of his character, with his infinite and everlasting goodness; in harmony with the noblest attributes and holiest aspirations of human nature — show me this and I will accept it with a great joy and follow whithersoever it leads. But if you have no authority but the traditions of the fathers, or the dictum of the church so often wrong, I cannot accept it nor

obey — especially not when it outrages the reason, scoffs at the purest affections of the heart, and brings impenetrable night upon the serene beauty and parental tenderness of the divine character.

To this it is coming in the religious world. The signs of the heavens are not to be mistaken. The thought that is abroad is changing the whole aspect of things. The mighty impulse that has been given is gradually sweeping the entire mass of mind beyond the old land-marks. The boundaries so long restricting the limits of inquiry and belief, have already been passed, and faith has enlarged her possessions; and is daily making new conquests from the territories of ignorance and bigotry on the one hand, and of doubt and skepticism on the other. Creeds that were, awhile since, regarded as almost inspired, are now looked upon as having more of man than of God in them; more of earthly wisdom, than of that wisdom which is from above, pure, peaceable, full of mercy and good fruits. And again, doctrines that years ago were almost universally denounced as dangerous and anti-christian, are now openly acknowledged and honored of thousands; and are gradually, under one form or another, breathing their benign and loving spirit into all hearts; and directing all the great philanthropic movements of the age.

In this I rejoice greatly; because I am persuaded right religious views, a true apprehension of the christian doctrines and the christian spirit, are destined to exert a mighty influence in the great social regeneration that is approaching. And I know that, as the world goes, these can only come of thought, of the admission of every man's right to think in religious matters as in all others. I know that they are born only of that individuality of life and personal responsibility, which are the essential elements of all progress, improvement, and discovery; whether in the scientific and political, or in the social and religious world.

The philanthropist, and the true christian, one whom Christ has made free, have, therefore, much to hope for, much to encourage them, in the intellectual activity which is moving all classes and conditions of men, and shedding light into all the departments of knowledge and action. Truth cannot suffer in the end, though some of her followers may become bewildered and play strange antics.

Error and falsehood only will perish in the general fusion of philosophies, creeds and speculations. Old forms and institutions and faiths may pass away; but if there is any good in them, that will remain. The body, the outward frame-work may perish; but whatsoever of real life is in them, will disengage itself in the process of dissolution, and unite with other life, in new and more efficient combinations. Nothing true, nothing useful, will die.

Let us rejoice, then, in the tokens which come to us from all sides witnessing the presence of thought, of mental activity and freedom. Let us be faithful to our trust, and to the spirit and wants of the age. Let us encourage inquiry, and endeavor to enlarge this intellectual liberty; but at the same time be careful that we neither abuse it ourselves, nor countenance a licentious use of it by others. Put it to the noble work of universal emancipation for which it is destined. Under its guidance follow after truth, all truth; and labor to bring the nations through it, into "the glorious liberty of the children of God!"

2. *The Associational Element, or the tendencies of the age to organized efforts against evil and for good.*

This I regard as one of the most remarkable aspects of the times, and one of the most potent influences at work for the removal of oppression and wrong, and the evils growing out of poverty and unequal and unrequited toil. The great truth that union is power; and that by a well-regulated, combined action of the multitudes, steady, patient, persevering, any and all evils of the social and political state may be overcome and put away — this is rapidly getting into the faith of the people. And this organized movement, acting as it were through the dead weight and pressure of the masses, is taking the place of the mobs, and insurrections, and civil wars of the past; and combining with that other element of Thought, is slowly crowding whatsoever is false, and wrong, and injuriously unequal — crowding it to the very edge of the earth, and at last pushing it off into the infinite depths of the invisible and unknown.

There is no power in existence at the present time so tremendously strong as this of Association; nor one that is so silently, yet with such unparalleled speed, increasing

its strength, and directing it so steadily, and with so much system, to the great purposes for which it has been called into existence. There is no power of this age, which, if true to itself and its legitimate uses, can with such prophetic certainty, predict the final triumph of its labors and plans for human good.

History shows that the power of organized association has been partially known and appreciated in all ages; but never at any previous period has it been reduced to such system, or applied so universally to the reform of abuses, and the peaceful overthrow of all institutions and practices prejudicial to the physical and moral welfare of mankind. Association is not now confined to the higher classes, but has found a welcome among all classes, in all places, from courts and senates down to the workshop, the factory and the coal-mine. No evil shows itself now, but that it is promptly met by some organized phalanx which starts up in its path, and says with intelligible emphasis, "No! not this way without doing battle; back to your den again."

In our own land we see this principle of action, this element of reform, in vigorous operation; but it is not here alone that it is at work. All over the civilized world the system is extending itself with a rapidity and detail truly astonishing. The people everywhere are awaking to the knowledge of the power and influence they may exert in this way in breaking the yokes of those who oppress them; in casting from them the burthens which have so long borne them to the earth. They are seeking in this way to re-establish their right to life in such form as to make it a blessing; their right to liberty, to a fair proportion of the proceeds of their labor, and to the pursuit of happiness in every lawful way. To the correction of every kind of wrong, to the acquisition of every kind of good, this great engine is put in play; with the firm persuasion that, sooner or later, everything must bend before it.

Great Britain presents, perhaps, the best illustration of this. No one who has not looked into this, can judge of the extent to which it has gone among the people of this country. No one who reads the current journals and reviews only, will be able to calculate this power. He must go to the people's papers and journals, established expressly for the exposure of their wrongs, and the advo-

cacy of their just rights and privileges; for the circulation among them of information as to the methods and advantages of organization; for the promotion of education, religious, intellectual and physical; for the protection, encouragement and fair reward of industry; and in a word, for the general welfare and social elevation of the poor and laboring classes. To these sources he must go, who would know how completely the theory and practice of associational action has woven its net-work over and about the whole frame-work of society in this great country. And if he would know, with what gigantic power, and unbending energy, it can work and triumph, let him read patiently the history of the Anti-Corn-Law League, from its first conception to its final issues. This will show how association, guided by truth and justice alone, without bayonet or cannon shot, has already in its infancy, wrought out a political, commercial and social revolution, which has astonished the nations, and which, a little while since, would have cost the desolation of cities and provinces, and the strife and blood of a hundred battle-fields.

In other departments, the principle is carried out with equal vigor, and in some cases on an equally great scale. For the relief of the sick and distressed, the burial of the dead, the care of the widow, and the education of the orphan; and for the practical realization of the great doctrine of human brotherhood, we have the association of Odd Fellows, whose operations are really of a gigantic character. The extent to which this single organization for mutual relief, and the promotion of the general welfare, has been carried in Great Britain, is known to very few in this country. It embraces all classes of society from the noble to the bond-slave of the cotton-mill and coal-mine; from Lords Brougham and Landon, to the humblest servant in their households; from the wealthiest landholder to the poorest peasant; from those standing in the first ranks of literature, to the neglected operative who is gathering his first knowledge of letters in an evening charity school. It numbers some three hundred and twenty thousand members, including one hundred and thirty members of Parliament, more than six hundred clergymen, and about nine thousand honorary members, who have no claim to its funds; but have put their hands to the

work, for the great good wrought out by it. No one who has not specially examined the subject, has the least idea of the amount of money annually expended in the relief of the distressed and the sick, for the burial of the dead, and the protection of the widow and fatherless. The annual income of this one association is near one million eight hundred thousand dollars, and its annual disbursements for the objects named is about one million five hundred thousand dollars — while it has a fund to be devoted to the same noble work, of upwards of three millions five hundred thousand dollars! These statements will abundantly justify the remarks of Alison, the celebrated historian of Europe, who presided some three years ago. at a celebration of Odd Fellows, had in Glasgow. In his address on the occasion, he says: "When I reflect that two hundred and sixty thousand men (he speaks of the Manchester unity only) are now, in this age of profit, of enterprise and personal aggrandizement, associated for such a high and holy purpose; when I reflect that the relief given is so great, the benevolence so extensive — when I reflect on the vast and increasing numbers of the society, and on the small number convicted of crime (only twenty nine out of two hundred and sixty thousand being expelled in the year for bad conduct,) I feel that it will be a happy day in this country when, for similar objects and associations, not only two hundred and sixty thousand, but the whole twenty six millions of the population are united together."

These facts will show with what power the principle of association is employing itself in our father-land. And if we come back to our own country again, and note that this Order has risen up within the last six years from one hundred and fifty five lodges and less than twelve thousand members, to more than eleven hundred lodges and one hundred thousand members, with an annual revenue of more than nine hundred thousand dollars, and paying yearly near two hundred thousand dollars for the relief of suffering, and for education; we shall have some idea of what it is doing in this part of the world.

And then if we number over the thousands and tens of thousands who are banded together as Sons and Daughters of Temperance and Rechab, on the same principles of

mutual aid; Fourierites; Life and Health Insurance Companies; the disciplined hosts arrayed against Slavery and War; the societies for circulating the Bible, and christianizing the heathen; Evangelical Alliances; Prison Discipline Associations; combined operations for modifying all sanguinary and unjust laws; and all the manifold organizations for the overthrow of particular abuses and wrongs, for the removal or lessening of all the evils which darken the social condition of man, and keep him back from his heritage of right and blessedness — when all these are scanned with a careful eye, and their separate and aggregate influence on the progress of society fairly considered; it will be seen how immense is the weight of the associational element in the social revolution now going forward; and how almost omnipotent is the power it is destined, rightly guided, to exert in the establishment upon our earth of the reign of justice, peace and love.

It is this view of the matter which leads me to repeat, that this tendency of the times to associated effort; this readiness to meet all evil, and seek all good by united and organized action — is the most remarkable aspect of the present era. Every great movement becomes a sort of centre around which its disciples revolve in cycles and epicycles. Every needed reform, whether concerning the interests of a nation or a country village, resolves itself almost of necessity into an organization, with constitution and by-laws, and prescribed methods of action.

It was a favorite manœuvre of Napoleon's, rapidly collecting immense masses, to throw them upon a single point, and sweep down all opposition by the mere weight and power of numbers. This policy seems now to be adopted in the more peaceful contest against the evils and the hard necessities with which the millions have had to struggle for so many centuries. They have seen how little has been accomplished by single handed efforts, or partial union; and the great idea which moves and directs them now is, that they are irresistible in their associated strength; and, acting together with faith and patience, can accomplish any reform that is physically or morally possible.

And what a noble sight it is — these thousands and hundreds of thousands banded together on some great principle; together struggling for the establishment of

some great right; and moving calmly and steadily forward to the victory, by the might of associated moral power alone! It is an immense advance when those who, a little while since, would have sought their ends with torch and battle-axe, amid tumult and civil war, now, resting in the majesty of justice, fall back on organized effort, declining all weapons but those of truth and association.

There is no prouder passage in the history of human progress, than that which shows us a petition for universal suffrage, with three and a half millions of names, borne into the English House of Commons, on the shoulders of sixteen hard-featured, strong-handed working men, followed in solemn and silent procession by four thousand of their fellows — and when their petition was rejected with scorn and insult, this strong host retiring again without noise or violence to their homes, and their daily toil! and this because persuaded that there is no such thing as final defeat in a just cause — persuaded that this is God's world after all; and that, sooner or later, the right will triumph.

Yes, it is a great forward movement, in which any age may rejoice, when the mob resolves itself into a lawfully organized body, and exchanges the bayonet and cannon-battery for the mightier weapons of education, the printing press and public opinion. Through the influence of these the associational element will become stronger than all kings and governments; and will eventually exert a power which nothing can successfully withstand. It has been reserved for our time to begin this change in the method of revolution; it is reserved for the "good time coming," to bring it to perfection. It must be so. Already it has given prophetic assurance of the final triumph of good over evil. The great idea has taken strong hold of the millions. It possesses the people everywhere to-day. It has revealed to them the head-springs of a mighty stream, whose power is inexhaustible. It has opened to their keen search the sources of an irresistible force, before which all opposition must be swept away. Knowing this, they will not abandon it while a social wrong remains, or a needed reform is incomplete.

To this conclusion he who looks into the heart of things, and carefully studies the elements now in operation in the moral and political world, will surely come. Nothing

seems more certain than that we are only in the first stages of this action; and see the machinery working with all the friction and noise, the hindrances and breakages, incident to all new movements. As the world advances and the work goes on, these imperfections will be remedied; and those who come after us shall see the stupendous machine working with a smoothness, a precision and concentrated power, of which we in this age have little conception. We are in the grey of the morning — the full glory of the day is for the child of future years. When that comes, the associational element perfected in its strength and extent, shall have scattered its gifts and blessings, and left its shining foot-prints from the equator to the poles. And through its work our earth shall be belted all round with light and beauty, till she shall be as glorious in the sight of watching angels, as Saturn, with his shining rings, in the eye of the gazing astronomer.

Ah, one wishes to live till it comes to this. We half envy those whose happy lot it will be to live in that golden age.

"Still happier mortals,
Sons of the dawn now burst its portals;
Born where the light is stronger, bolder,
Whilst we are waning, dimmer, older.
Upon our dust come these to trample—
Of mould etherial, soul more ample.

Oh, to be young! whilst good is growing!
And Time is some new wonder showing!
Now Darkness past, the old, is waning;
And wide and wider Christ is reigning.
Far and near the Lord's Creation
Fast hastens to its renovation—
Till man, new-born, in Love's endeavour—
Heaven and the earth are one forever!"

3. *The Philanthropic Element; or the tendency of all the great movements of the time to elevate, improve and bless humanity.*

More and more mankind are coming into the belief that they are one, and that their highest interests and their truest life are identical. The great and beautiful truth of human brotherhood is getting deeper and deeper every day into the heart of the world. The distance between nations and classes is growing less continually. And though

the resort to violence is not yet quite given over, as we have said; yet the people everywhere are slowly coming into the faith, that it is better to love than to fight. These wars and strifes, these divisions and hates; this outward antagonism of interest to interest, of life to life, is unnatural and unnecessary. Men are growing weary of it, and are yearning for rest and peace. They are beginning to realize the great truth, that if the teeth wound the tongue, or the hand tear the eye, or one limb inflict injury upon another, the whole body suffers; and so he that doeth wrong, doeth it against himself as well as against his brother.

And that word *Brother*—it is getting for itself a meaning in this age, it has never had before; a meaning greater than a country or a belief, a meaning greater than the circumstances of birth or character. The divine idea embodied in it, is repudiating all national and sectional distinctions; all divisions growing out of religion, language, color, wealth, or any of the mere accidents of life. It insists on the common humanity which lies below all these, with its universal sympathies, and its holy bonds of mutual affection and interest. Lifting itself on the white wings of God's great truth, it sweeps above the loftiest mountains and over the broadest seas, proclaiming everywhere, to all men, "Ye are brothers — of one flesh and blood; Peace, peace forevermore!" And the genius of humanity responding to the heavenly utterance, has already caught up the golden chain of Friendship, Love and Truth; and following the path of the sun, will not rest from her glorious flight, until she has encircled the earth with its glittering links, and fastened it forever to the throne of God, the All in all!

The great movements of the age are all based on this growing conviction; and are, in one way or another, expressions of the unity of our race, the brotherhood of man, and the duty of seeking the welfare and blessedness of all and each, irrespective of the accidents of the outer, or the differences of the inner, life. Philanthropy, love of man, originates and directs them in every phase of their developement. It is the deep fountain, forth from which flow the numerous streams of mercy that are freshening and beautifying the world-wilderness, and gladdening the hearts

of the fallen and perishing wayfarers. Every reform that starts up now, strikes at this issue. Every step taken forward, is taken for the whole, and not a part. Every mighty movement which agitates the waters of society, demands the recognition of this sublime truth of One in All, and All in One; and seeks to make practical the family relationship, and to deepen and strengthen the family love.

The cry of the people of England for a National Reform, and a system of National Education, and the attentive ear given to this cry in the high places of rule and royalty; the coming Constitution of Prussia; and the introduction of the representative element into the Papal government, and into Turkish despotism — these are declarations of the great doctrine of equal rights; declarations that governments must be philanthropic, and are bound to seek the good of the people.

The Ragged Schools of Edinburg and Manchester and St. Giles, gathering up the young beggars and criminals from the streets, and clothing, feeding and teaching them, and the movements in the same direction which are beginning in our own land; the incipient efforts to prevent crime, rather than encourage it and then punish it — these also proceed on the same broad ground of the unity and identity of the common life. These children belong to the great family, and have a right to the possibility and the means of living virtuously, before they are chained and choked to death for living viciously. The old legal saying, "*Ignorantia legis neminem excusat*," is getting obsolete. It is beginning to be felt that ignorance of the law *is* an excuse; that before one can fairly be guilty, he must be told there *is* a law — and before he is crushed for his wrong, he has a right to know first that it *is* wrong.

So the earnest efforts making to humanize the brute discipline, and soften the horrors of the prison-house, and make the suffering of the transgressor curative, restoring him again to society and himself — this also comes of the solemn truth that the criminal is our brother, though degraded and stained with sin — and that if, through neglect, or want, or passion, he has become a wild beast; it is for us, through patience and love, to make him a man again.

The wide spread and noble labors of Missionary and Bible Societies spring up from the same great philanthro-

py; and are, in their way, a recognition of the one truth, that all are God's children, and those who have, are only stewards for those who have not.

And the voice that has been lifted up against war, and the settlement of national disputes by the sword and musket; which is growing louder and stronger every day, even in the midst of victories — and the increasing abhorrence of slavery, and the stern protest everywhere issued against its extension and continuance — these too are born of the same great truth, of the same great love of man; a truth which will not sanction wrong in the government, more than in the individual; a love which will not silently suffer an injury to be done to our brother.

In a word, these, and all the individual and associated efforts making to lift up the fallen, to educate the ignorant, to put away bigotry and religious strife and persecution, to remove the evils of poverty and disease, to secure for labor a fair compensation, and protect the widow and fatherless — all these spring from the fountain head of universal love, and together constitute one of the most potent and beneficent elements in the great social regeneration which is opening upon us. All these show that there is a better era approaching, that the world is slowly sweeping through the shadows of the night into the welcome sun-light, and the warm, grateful air of an everlasting day!

And to this, every thing is calling us with earnest speech. Every thing is beckoning us forward, and urging that, breaking away from old influences and habits and institutions; we let the "dead past bury its dead;" and, in the present, work, and suffer, and sacrifice for the future. And we feel certain that,

"Not in vain the distance beacons —
Forward, forward let us range.
Let the peoples spin forever
Down the ringing grooves of change —

"For I doubt not through the ages
One increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of man are widen'd
With the process of the suns.

"Men, our brothers, men, the workers,
Ever reaping something new —
That which they have done but earnest
Of the things that they shall do."

Yes, what has been done, and what is doing, is only the earnest of what shall yet be wrought out in the name of humanity. The elements of thought, association and philanthropy in the great meaning of the word, acting in combination, are destined to accomplish more, far more than has yet entered into our faith, or even imagination. As I have already said, we are only at the portals of the morning — the full glory of the day lies far out in the distance. Generations will come and go — yea, centuries may pass away before the sun is overhead. Slowly the shadows of great events pass over the dial of time. Slowly, changes that affect the destinies of nations and the race, get forward to their issues. Ages roll by while nature is gathering up her strength for some great physical revolution, reconstructing the earth's surface for a new race. So in the moral and social world, time is needful for the developement and combination of those elements of change which, as it were, re-lay the foundations, and re-build the whole frame-work of society; and renew the face of the earth till it smiles in beauty like the olden Paradise.

But, however long the way or the time, we shall come to this at last. It is the inspiration and the prophecy of the Present looking into the face of the Future. It was not all an idle fantasy, that golden age of the old poets, which floated through their visions like the glory of the coming sun. And those lofty-souled Hebrew bards — they saw afar off the radiance of this divine era, and caught glimpses of this moral Eden of the world, when they burst forth into those magnificent strains, those God-given utterances, which make the Bible so wonderful, so unequalled a book. So in all time and place, the loving and the divine ones have seen, in the distance, the splendor of this great day streaming up into the heavens; and in the light of it, have learned to labor and to wait!

And, in conclusion, I would add, that this is the lesson which we of this generation have need to take to ourselves. Learn to labor and to wait! Let us earnestly do what is in us to help forward this great regeneration. Let us with a patient faith, with a never-wearying, never-doubting love, work diligently in our day and place, knowing that the seed sown by us in tears, will spring up in future years unto a noble harvest. T. B. T.

Art. XIX.

The Archeology of the Earth and its Inhabitants.

The Ancient World; or Picturesque Sketches of Creation. By D. T. Ansted, M. A., F. R. S., F. G. S.; Professor of Geology in King's College, London, &c. &c. London: John Van Voorst, Paternoster Row, 1847. 8vo. pp. 408.

To a rational and moral inhabitant of our planet, desirous of finding his true place in the scale of being, and of comprehending his relations to the universe, few inquiries can be more natural or of greater interest than the one indicated by the title of this volume, and which has frequently presented itself to the mind of man before it became an object of scientific research; "What forms of organic existence preceded me on the globe? The stream of life, which now animates and beautifies the face of nature — has it forever flowed in a circle, without having had a beginning, and with no increase in its volume or force? or did it have its rise, first in little rivulets, at the bidding of an unseen Power, and afterwards receives fresh and repeated augmentations from the same Source, until it has reached its present state? And if it be true that the representatives of my own race have not existed eternally, and that the earth, previously to their introduction, was not an uninhabited solitude, what were the characteristics of the vegetable and animal structures which flourished on its bosom, from the time of its creation up to the period when my own species made their appearance."

In preceding ages, this inquiry has been made with little hope of ever obtaining a satisfactory answer; an impervious veil hung over the past history of the earth, shrouding from human cognizance every monument of creative power anterior to the dawn of human experience. Tradition and history, indeed, as well as revelation, have rendered their verdict in favor of the conclusion, that the race of man has been in existence only a few thousand

years; but, until since the commencement of the present century, he has been furnished with no materials from which to form an enlightened opinion respecting the nature and history of the organizations that preceded him on the globe. These materials have been furnished by the researches of Geology. So great has been the success of this science, within the last half century, in numbering the strata composing the crust of the earth, and in detecting and classifying the organic structures which have been found therein entombed, from the most recent to the most ancient containing fossils, that it has finally reached a degree of perfection when it boldly pronounces itself competent to restore the principal features in its past history, and to give at least a correct outline of the different forms of vegetable and animal life that have successively clothed and adorned its surface. These are disclosures, it must be acknowledged, which invest this branch of science with an interest not to be found in astronomy itself; for, though the latter has opened to our wondering view innumerable and ponderous bodies of matter revolving in the depths of space, it has not been able to prove them to be covered with organized and sentient products of divine power; while Geology has succeeded in demonstrating the earth to have been the theatre of life and animation thousands of years before man was permitted to tread its soil, and in detecting the character of the laws which presided over the organization and destiny of his predecessors on this mundane stage. "If it had been predicted a century ago," says Bakewell, "that a volume would be discovered containing the natural history of the earliest inhabitants of the globe, who flourished and perished before the creation of man, with distinct impressions of the forms of genera of animals no longer existing on the earth,— what curiosity would have been excited to see this wonderful volume! how anxiously would philosophers have waited for the discovery! But this volume is now discovered; it is the volume of Nature, rich with the spoils of primeval ages, unfolded to the view of the attentive observer, in the strata that compose the crust of the globe."[1]

Fossil organic remains, or the petrified forms of vegeta-

[1] Introduction to Geology, p. 18.

ble and animal bodies, have received the attention and excited the curiosity of philosophers, to a considerable degree, in nearly every preceding age. Zenophanes, who wrote something like five centuries before the Christian era, was struck with the sight of large quantities of petrified shells on high mountains and in deep places of the earth; he also affirmed the existence of the impressions of fish in the quarries of Syracuse and in a rock at Paros; from which facts he concluded, not only wisely, that these places were once covered by the sea, but rashly, that the earth has existed forever. Herodotus, about a century later, speaks of shells being found in the mountains of Egypt, and concludes, from this circumstance and the saltish emanations that injured the pyramids, that the sea had slowly retired from those places.[2] Two hundred years later, Erosthenes made very nearly the same observations in regard to shells; and his observations were not long afterwards repeated by Strabo and Zanthus of Lydia. Fossils engaged the attention of Epicurus; but instead of regarding them as relics of once living bodies, he appears to have ascribed their origin, as he did that of the entire universe, to a fortunate but undesigned concourse and concretion of small particles of matter. Pliny, who wrote during the first century of the Christian era, went so far in the study of petrified shells as to give names to several species which have descended to our times. During the Middle Ages, but little was done in this department of study. In the thirteenth century, much curiosity was excited at the discovery of a branch of a tree on which was a bird's nest containing birds, all turned to stone; but these wonders were accounted for by the disciples of Aristotle without supposing them to have been ever in a living state, conceiving them to have been produced by *equivocal generation*, or *the plastic powers of nature*. But it was not till the sixteenth century, that the subject began to command any considerable interest and discussion. In rebuilding the citadel of St. Felix, at Verona, it was discovered that the rock on which it was based was full of petrified shells. It was contended by Fracastoro and one or two others of that period, that these and other fossil

[2] Book ii., Section 12.

bodies had all belonged to living creatures, which had formerly moved and multiplied where their remains are now found; while the majority of those who gave them their attention were content to regard them as "the sports of nature." In the following century, cabinets and catalogues of fossils began to be formed; though little real progress was made towards a consistent explanation of their origin. While many still regarded them as "the sports of nature," some ascribed their origin to "a power latent in the earth," some to the seeds of fishes and shells, which had vegetated and grown in a productive soil; and in considering the fossil bones of Elephants, some, calling themselves profound philosophers, gravely argued that they had been produced by "the tumultuous movements of terrestrial exhalations!" while others, with equal gravity and wisdom, concluded that they were the bones of the fallen angels! There was an increasing number, however, who maintained that all petrified substances were the remains of bodies that had formerly lived either in the water or on the land; but the greater part of those who adopted this opinion, argued, for a long time, that they had all been deposited in the places where they now occur by the deluge of Noah, conceiving it impossible that the earth should have been inhabited by living beings any length of time prior to the creation of man. During the eighteenth century, this was the great subject of dispute between the students of geological changes and organic remains; some referring the deposition of all rocks containing fossils to the action of the deluge; others maintaining that the accredited influence of that event is insufficient to account for the facts in the case, inasmuch as the greater part of disentombed fossils bear evidence of having been deposited in a *tranquil* state of the elements, and as the remains of some animals had been discovered whose genera and species had long been extinct, and which must therefore have existed ages before the creation of the human race.

It was reserved for Cuvier, in the commencement of the present century, to reduce this difficult branch of study from a state of chaos to one of order and beauty. The wand of his power, through whose magic influence he called back to life, as it were, the dead of former ages, was his skill in comparative anatomy. After acquiring a

familiar acquaintance with the structure and habits of the existing races of animals, and applying this knowledge to the investigation of fossil bodies, he was able, from the examination of a single bone, or even the fragment of a bone, to reconstruct the whole animal to which it had belonged, so as to describe its form, size, habits, and the kind of food on which it had subsisted. In this manner he succeeded in restoring and describing upwards of a hundred and fifty distinct species of quadrupeds, whose bones had been found in the neighborhood of Paris; nearly one third of which he determined to have belonged to extinct races, that is, species which existed and perished before the introduction of the existing tribes.[3] In fact, he soon brought himself to the conclusion, from the most rigid induction, that the number of extinct species is far greater than the living ones; that the difference in structure between living animals and those found in a fossil state increases with the age of the deposits or strata containing organic remains; and that this difference establishes the reality and relative age of the several deposits or strata themselves, from the uppermost to the lowermost exhibiting traces of organic life. Finding no vestiges of plants or animals in the rocks called "primitive" or "primary," he at once inferred that there was a period, far back in the history of the earth, when it was a mere mineral mass, untenanted by a living form, and that between that remote period and the creation of our own species, several quite different and distinct orders or systems of organic life, each covering immense periods of time, successively flourished and perished upon its surface.[4]

These conclusions, at nearly the same time, were

[3] Revolutions of the Surface of the Globe, p. 66.

[4] An eloquent English writer thus speaks of the labors of this Newton of Natural History: "While our geologists were working in chains, [in consequence of their narrow views of the Mosaic chronology and deluge] the unfettered genius of CUVIER was ranging over the primeval ages, when the primary rocks rose in insulated grandeur from the deep, and when the elements of life had not yet received their DIVINE COMMISSION. From the age of solitude he passed to the busy age of life; when plants first decked the plains, when the majestic pine threw its picturesque shadows over the earth, and the tragic sounds of carnivorous life rung among her forests. But these plains were again to be desolated, and these sounds again to be hushed. The glories of organ-

confirmed and greatly expanded by the researches of Lamarck in fossil Chonchology, of Adolphe Brongniart in fossil Botany, and of Agassiz, in fossil Ichthyology; and, more recently, by the labors and splendid illustrations of Buckland, Sedgewick, Mantell, De la Beche, Murchison, Lyell, Owen, and others, until the study has at length reached the dignity of a science. It is called *Palæontology*, or the science of Organic Remains. "Pushing research to its limits," says one of the American cultivators of this great field of study, "we seem nearly to have reached the bounds of the accessible past, in the diminution, and at last the total disappearance of fossils in the earlier strata. Our science has reached the point just attained by geography. No conjectural continent is left for a geological Columbus to discover — no great region remains unvisited, and no principal boundary undrawn. The business of the present and future generations of geologists, is to establish with all the precision admissible, by science, the exact limits which divide the many districts of ancient time into which they have penetrated; to define the position, so to speak, of each known coast, and to bring to light such lesser districts as may yet lie undiscovered within their more conspicuous borders."[5]

The latest work that has reached our notice, presenting the embodied results of these investigations and discoveries, is the one whose title we have prefixed to this article. Although adding little to the stock of materials previously furnished to us, it is, in every respect, a most admirable volume, and one which few can read without interest and profit. It is simple and natural in arrangement, clear and graphic in its style, and at the same time cautious and philosophical in its generalizations and conclusions. Though dealing with the department of natural history lying farthest from direct observation, and teeming

ic life disappeared, and new forms of animal and vegetable being welcomed the dawn of a better cycle. Thus did the great magician of the charnal house survey from his pyramid of bones, the successive ages of life and death; thus did he conjure up the spoils of pre-existing worlds, the noblest offering which man ever laid upon the altar of its SOVEREIGN."—*Edinburgh Review*, Vol. lxv. p. 12.

[5] H. D. Rogers' Address before American Geologists and Naturalists, p. 16.

with the greatest wonders, and which the uninitiated are disposed to regard as entirely fabulous, the author, true to the spirit of his noble science, never allows his imagination to out-travel and distort the decision of his judgment, guided by the strictest laws of induction; and while he is truly successful in essaying to give "*Picturesque* Sketches of Creation," he has drawn no pictures the distinct monographs of which had not been furnished to his hands in the disentombed relics of former ages. But it is not our present purpose to review this book; and in fulfilling the object before us, in presenting our readers with as full a statement of the results of palæontological research as our prescribed limits will permit, we shall draw but little from its well-filled pages. In giving this statement, we shall strictly confine ourselves to the presentation of facts and conclusions which have been admitted into the pale of science, letting the *savans* of fossil geology speak for themselves, though taking the liberty to employ our own language, as little burdened with the technicalities of the science as possible. The relations of these disclosures to the principles of religious truth, especially as they bear upon the Scripture doctrine of creation, must be deferred to another time.

Of the amount of organic life that has prevailed on the earth, we may form some conception from the number and thickness of the strata which are found to contain its relics or impressions. The precise number of the fossiliferous strata, that is, of strata containing the remains of organic existence, is not satisfactorially determined; but it is so great, amounting, at least, to several hundreds, that it has been found convenient to arrange them into classes or groups, generally called *formations*, in order to render their explanation simple and intelligible. The most important of these groups, expressive of as many periods in the history of the earth, may be represented by the following:

Tabular view of the Fossiliferous Strata.

	Alluvium, or Modern.
	Diluvium or Drift.
TERTIARY.	Plioce.
	Miocene.
	Eocene.

SECONDARY.	Chalk. Wealden. Oolite. New Red Sandstone. Magnesian. Carboniferous, or Coal. Old Red Sandstone.
TRANSITON.	Silurian. Cambrian.

The lowermost or oldest grand division, including the Cambrian and Silurian deposits, resting on Primary or Non-fossiliferous rocks, embraces those strata which bear marks of having been formed while the earth was undergoing a *transition* from an inhabitable to a habitable state, and covers the first great period of organic life on the globe; while the *Secondary* and *Tertiary* series, as their names imply, indicate the *second* and *third* great periods of vegetable and animal existence in past time.[6] Each of these strata, it must be remembered, was once the uppermost, constituting the earth's surface, and covered, to some extent, with living and moving forms, which not only had their birth, but their entombment, for the most part, at least, in the same quiet manner as is the order of nature at present; as appears from the orderly and preserved state in which their remains are now found; and when it is considered, that these strata are proved to have an aggregate thickness of more than thirty five thousand feet, or upwards of six miles, we are overwhelmed with astonishment and wonder at a view of the amount of organic existence with which the face of our planet has been successively clothed and peopled, and of the length of the period which must have elapsed during this long series of creations and destructions, of growth and decay.

Our wonder is scarcely less, when we consider what has been really ascertained in regard to the comparative number of living and extinct species. According to the best authorities, there have now been discovered the remains of something like ten thousand distinct species of vegetable

[6] The names which we have employed to indicate the three grand divisions of Geological time, particularly that of Transition, are gradually going out of use among geologists, and in their place are substituted terms of a Greek origin,—*Palæzoic*, *Mesozoic*, and *Canozoic*, signifying the *first*, *second*, and *third* great periods of organic life on the globe.

and animal existence in a fossil state; not more than six or seven hundred of which have any representatives in the living creation. Far more than ten times the number of ascertained fossil species began and ended their career, before the existing races, with man at their head, appeared on the stage; and when we reflect, that what has been discovered in this field is but an approximation to the truth, and that each of the ten thousand ascertained species has had its legions of individuals as its representatives; and also, what is acknowledged by every palæontologist, that, in the lower or more ancient formations, the proportion of individuals to the species was vastly greater than in more recent organisms, we are led to perceive that the orb which we inhabit has been covered by a succession and an amount of organic and sentient existence, of which all that has existed on its face and been gathered to its bosom, since the creation of our own species, can give us but a faint and meagre conception.

In giving a sketch of the present state of knowledge respecting these pre-existing forms of animated nature, we begin with the vestiges of the vegetable kingdom. The remains of vegetable forms are detected in a great variety of conditions — sometimes as peet-wood and submerged forests, sometimes in calcarious and silecious petrifactions, sometimes in the form of coal and lignite, and sometimes in the impressions of leaves, stems and fruits in beds of rocks, which once constituted the soil in which the trees or plants grew. Many valuable minerals, found at different depths in the earth, are also traced to a vegetable origin. The amber which is dug from the clay beds in the eastern part of England, and brought so plentifully from the shores of the Baltic, is, with hardly a doubt, a *fossil resin*, being the preserved secretion of coniferous trees, such as pines and firs, which grew in former ages on or near those localities. The diamond, which is pure charcoal, in the language of Dr. Mantell, "is probably a vegetable secretion, that has acquired a crystalline structure from electro-chemical action." The traces of vegetable productions have been discovered in all the groups of the fossiliferous strata, except perhaps in the lowest or Cambrian; for though the vestiges of between twenty and thirty species of the lower orders of animal life, such as shells, corals

and zoophites, have been detected in this series of rocks, no distinct relics of vegetable forms have yet been discovered in them. It would be rash, however, to conclude that no plants existed at that early period, for not only is their existence acknowledged to be essential to the support of animal life, in all its forms, but they may have existed at the time without transmitting their relics to our times, as their forms are more volatile and perishable than those of animals. The first distinct traces of them are met with in the Silurian group, and they are plentifully scattered through all the subsequent formations. The number of known species of fossil plants is very nearly a thousand. Although this probably affords an insight into but a very small portion of the variety and extent of the vegetation that has successively flourished on the globe, it has given a clue to some generalizations of a most interesting character, as furnishing a key to an explanation of the ancient Floras of the earth. From the data here offered, Brongnairt, Lindley, and other eminent fossil botanists have considered themselves qualified to divide the history of the ancient vegetation into three great periods or epochs, each marked by somewhat peculiar forms.

The first begins with the earliest signs of vegetative matter in the lower fossiliferous strata, and extends to the top of the Carboniferous group. The plants of this period were chiefly remarkable for the simplicity of their structure, and at the same time for the general greatness of their size. The first vegetable forms that seem to have appeared to enliven the face of nature, and to serve as tubes of communication and support from the mineral to the animal kingdom, were marine plants, called algæ, fuci, or sea weeds, such as now grow at the bottom of deep seas in hot climates. This was the character of the vegetation through the Silurian and Old Red Sandstone periods, no traces of terrestrial or land vegetation having been detected in their deposits. But in the early part of the Carboniferous era, "the dry land" began to "appear" above the surface of a hitherto apparently shoreless ocean; and it seems not to have been long before it was covered with a most luxuriant vegetation. That our anthricitic and bituminous coal is the mineralized vegetable product of that period, is no longer doubted by geologists. Not only have the entire

trunks of trees, themselves turned to coal, with roots terminating downwards in underlying beds of clay or shale,[7] been discovered in the deposits of this ancient epoch, which have an average thickness of three thousand feet, but upwards of three hundred species of plants detected and described as having constituted the vegetation in which the coal had its origin. The greater portion of these restored or described plants were gigantic and arborescent ferns, and the principal part of the residue, *Lepidodendra*, *Equisetacæ* and *Sigillaria*, with corresponding dimensions. How greatly the vegetation of the Carboniferous epoch differed from that now covering the earth, will be seen from a few well attested facts. The ferns of the coal attained the height of from forty to fifty feet; whereas, at present, represented by our common brake, they rarely reach over four feet — except in southern or warm climates. The Lepidodendra, now known as club mosses and ground pine, rarely reaching three feet high, in the ancient world grew to the height of thirty and forty feet. The Equisetacæ, now represented by the scouring rushes of our swamps, and which rarely exceed three feet in length, with a stalk half an inch in diameter, during the Carboniferous era attained the height of from fifteen to twenty feet, with stalks from six inches to a foot in thickness. And it is worthy of special consideration, that this kind of vegetation, at once so simple and magnificent, seems to have prevailed over the entire surface of the earth at that remote period, at least over all its surface then above the water; the same species of plants being found in the coal of New Holland, Van Dieman's Land, various districts in Asia, eastern, northern and western Europe, and America, from Alabama to Melville Island; thus affording conclusive evidence, that the temperature of the atmosphere, in that period of the earth's history, was both higher and more equable, than it is at present. This seems an unavoidable inference from the preserved relics of the botany of that epoch, it having been analagous, all over the globe, to the existing vegetation on the islands and archipelagoes of tropical climates.

[7] Lyell, in examining the coal-beds in Nova Scotia, detected the existence of more than ten forests of fossil trees, lying one above another, with great regularity and order, between interveneing beds of clay and shale.—*Travels in North America*, vol. ii. p. 149.

The second great epoch of fossil vegetation extends from the close of the former one to the top of the chalk. The vegetation of this period is characterized by being less stately and magnificent than in the former one, but as supplying this deficiency by having greater variety and complexity of structure. Some families, as the Calamites and the Sigillaria, die out; the number of ferns decreases, and new families, as the Cicadæ, Zamiæ and other Comferæ, appear to fill their places. The flora of this period, it should be remarked, bears a close resemblance to that now covering the maratime districts of New Holland and the Cape of Good Hope, and therefore indicates a gradual reduction of the earth's temperature, or rather of its atmosphere, since the period of the growth of the vegetation of the coal.

The third great botanical epoch covers the period of the Tertiary deposits, and it varies from the vegetation of the preceding eras, chiefly, in an increased multiplicity of forms. Some of the more simple yet stately plants of those former eras disappear, and others, generally of a more complex organization, are called into existence. The grasses, so necessary to the support of ruminating animals, had appeared in small quantities in the Secondary great period of geological time, yet they receive their full developement only in the Tertiary; and it is not till during this epoch, that the willows, elms, sycamores, and other species that flourish in the temperate zone, make their appearance. A few palms appear below the Tertiary, but they are not fully developed till we reach our historical period, when a thousand species crown the vegetable world. The botany of this third period, it should be added, was like the vegetation now covering the continents of our temperate latitudes, indicating, of course, a continued gradual reduction of the temperature of the atmosphere since the earth first became habitable by living forms.

We now turn to a view of the fossil history of a more interesting department of animated nature,—the animal kingdom. All known animals were arranged by Cuvier, according to leading characteristics in their structure, into four grand divisions,— *Vertebrata*, (animals having a spinal column,) *Molusca*, (animals with soft bodies,) *Articulata*, (having an external crust, or hard skin,) and

Radiata, (having a ray-like structure.) The first great class is represented by fishes, reptiles, birds and mammalia; the second, by shells; the third, by worms, insects and lobsters; and the fourth, by the star-fishes and sea-urchins of our coasts. It appears from the researches of geologists, that each of these several classes, in some of their forms or modifications, has been in existence throughout the whole period of fossiliferous geological time, and their decayed and petrified bodies have contributed an amount of material to the now solid strata of the earth which may well fill us with wonder and at the same time with admiration. Commencing with the lowest and minutest in the scale of organization, and proceeding upward through the several grades of organic life, till we include man himself, we will now attempt to lead the reader through the vaults of the great charnel-house of the Past, and point out to him the principal forms of sentient existence with which the face of our planet has been successively inhabited.

Of the fossil remains of the *Radiata*, by some writers denominated *Zoophites*, about two thousand species have been determined; and although but few of them are large enough to be seen by the unassisted eye, whole mountain masses are found to be mainly composed of the relics of their once pliant and sportive forms. The principal classes of these animals are the *Echinoderma*, (or animals with a spiny skin,) the *Infusoria*, or animalcules, and the *Polypiaria*, or coral animals. The first class, whose remains are found among the earliest traces of animal existence in the earth's strata, though much larger in size than the representatives of the two latter classes, appear to have been the lowest in organization, having very much the form of a vegetable, with no powers of locomotion, being fixed to the bottom of the ocean, or to a piece of wood, with ability only to move as far as these curious animals could reach by bending a very flexible and somewhat long column, admirably adapted to their purpose. At least, this was true of the *Crinoidea*, a genus of this class which have attracted much attention, partly from their great beauty, and partly on account of their being almost wholly unknown in the living creation, only one or two existing species having been discovered; while the known fossil

species exceed a hundred and thirty. In form, they resemble the lily, and have long been called Stone Lilies; and low as they are in the scale of organization, the number of little bones or joints composing the skeleton of a single individual encrenite or stone-lily has been found to exceed twenty six thousand, and of single pentairinite,—one having a pentagonal stem, upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand. "We may judge of the degree to which these animals flourished among the first inhabitants of the sea, from the countless myriads of their petrified remains which fill so many Limestone beds of the Transition Formations, and compose vast strata of Entrochal marble, extending over large tracts of country in Northern Europe and North America. The substance of this marble is often almost as entirely made up of the petrified bones of Encrenites, as a corn-rick is composed of straws. Man applies it to construct his palace and adorn his sepulchre, but there are few who know, and fewer still who appreciate the surprising fact, that much of this marble is composed of the skeletons of millions of organized beings, once endowed with life, and susceptible of enjoyment, which after performing the part that was for a while assigned them in living nature, have contributed their remains towards the composition of the mountain masses of the earth."[8]

The recent discoveries in the history of fossil *Infusoria*, or animalcules, are still more astonishing. These infinetesimal animals, the most of which are too small to be detected without the aid of the microscope, were formerly regarded as the simplest of all creatures in organization, and were thought, in fact, to be little more than mere particles of matter endowed with vitality; but it has been ascertained, particularly by the labors of Professor Ehrenberg, that they are as perfect in their organization as any of the higher animals. He has discovered in them not only regular mouths, teeth, eyes, and stomachs, but muscles, nerves, glands, intestines, and organs for the perpetuation of their species; and yet, many of them are not more than twenty four thousandth of an inch in diameter! He has also ascertained that some are brought into exist-

[8] Buckland, Bridgewater Treatise, i. p. 323.

ence by regular birth, some by being hatched from eggs, some by the spontaneous multiplication of each other's bodies; and so great are their powers of re-production, he informs us, that from a single individual a million were produced in ten days, on the eleventh day four millions, and on the twelvth, sixteen millions. Their fossil ancestors, like themselves, were clothed as were the ancient warriors, in mail, having been covered by a shield, composed either of sileca, lime, or oxide of iron; and when their battle of life was over, they left behind them their shields as their only legacy to future generations. The weight of one of these shields has been found to be about one hundred and eighty seven millionth part of a grain, and it takes forty one thousand millions of them to make a cubic inch; and, surprising as it may appear, it has been discovered that these shields actually constitute vast masses of soils and rocks, extending over wide districts. A large portion of the sand of the Lybian desert, and the chalk hills of England, have not only been found to be chiefly composed of their remains, but a large number and variety of limestone and marble beds, of various geological ages. Several deposits of this character have been discovered by President Hitchcock in this State; but the most remarkable discovery of this kind that has been made in this country, and perhaps in the world, has been the detection of stratum belonging to the Eocene or Miocene epoch, in Virginia, by Professor W. B. Rogers, having a thickness of more than twenty feet, and covering many thousand acres, "consisting almost exclusively of the silecious shields of minute infusoria."[9] In view of these facts, the philosopher can join the poet in the exclamation,

"The dust we tread upon was once alive!"

Little less wonderful are the ascertained results in regard to the agency of fossil *Polyparia*, a large class of minute radiated animals, frequently called Zoophites, which have the power of secreting carbonate of lime, and of thus building up vast stony structures from the bottom to the surface of the ocean. They are now very numer-

[9] H. D. Rogers' Address before American Geologists, &c., p. 36.

ous in the seas of tropical climates, and build coral reefs frequently extending hundreds of miles. The known fossil species number three hundred and fifty, and their remains are traced, sometimes in immense beds of coralline limestone and marble, throughout all the periods of fossil geology. They appear to have been developed on a magnificent scale during the earlier formations, especially during the deposition of the Silurian rocks, as they enter largely into their composition; and as the corals of these ancient periods, now found fossil in northern latitudes, agree only with those at present living within the tropics, it appears quite certain that a higher and more equal temperature prevailed throughout the sea, during the remote epochs, than prevails at present,— a conclusion to which we were brought from a view of the Flora of those early chapters in our world's history.

The *Articulata*, the second grand division of the animal kingdom, so named from being covered by envelopes connected by annulated plates or rings, of which the lobster, scorpion and insects are good examples, though they have lived throughout all the periods of geological time, as appears from their remains, have supplied a smaller amount of fossil relics to the strata of the earth, than any other class of animals, owing, probably, to the frailty of their structure. Several species of worms, inhabiting tubes, have left their remains in the upper Secondary and Tertiary strata. Of fossil insects, nearly three hundred species have been discovered; of which about thirty occur in the Oolite, a few in the Wealden, and the greater part of the residue in a fresh water formation of the Tertiary group; though, quite recently, two or three species have been detected in the deposits of the Coal. Several species of spiders have been found in a fossil state,— two in the Oolite, the rest in fresh water Tertiary strata. A few years since, a *fossil scorpion* was discovered by Count Sternberg, in a remarkably unmutilated state, having twelve eyes, in a formation of the ancient coal, in Bohemia. But the most remarkable class of the fossil *articulata* was the *Crustacea*, — a class of animals characterized by a crustaceous external integument or shell; of which more than sixty species have been discovered in the Jura limestone, and upwards of thirty in the Isle of Sheppey in the Thames. The crab

and lobster tribes have been found fossil in the Oolitic and Chalk strata; and in a few instances, the king crab has been found in the Coal formation. But the most singular and notable crustacian that has been brought to light is an extinct animal, called the Trilobite, from having three parallel lobes or divisions in its body. Its remains have been found in almost every part of the globe,—all over Europe, in North and South America, and at the Cape of Good Hope. Upwards of sixty species have been brought to light, though it appears that the period of their existence was comparatively short, beginning their career in the early part of the Silurian period, and ending it in the Carboniferous, not a trace of them having been detected in any of the later formations. Their general length was from four to six inches, though one has been found in Ohio by Professor Locke, and described by him in the Report of the geology of that State, measuring twenty one inches in length! The most curious fact in regard to these long-extinct animals, is the discovered construction of their eyes, the form and size of which have been preserved in the mud, now fossil, in which their remains were deposited. Each eye was fixed in its socket in such a manner, that it was incapable of rolling on an orbit, in attempting to look from one object to another; but this apparent defect was compensated by their extraordinary number, amounting to several hundred in each individual, and by the manner in which they were disposed, being curiously arranged and set in little cones or tubes protruding from the head, so as to afford each animal hundreds of visual organs. This discovery has been justly adduced by Buckland as affording additional proof of the reality of design in the works of creation, and as showing that the eyes of the ancient inhabitants of the ocean were created with the same wise relations to the laws of light as the visual organs of animals at present existing.[10]

The third great branch of the animal kingdom,—the *Mollusca*, a name signifying *soft-bodied animals*, but which are mostly covered with shells, and are therefore getting to be called *Testacea*, have left a larger quantity of their re-

[10] Bridgewater Treatise, i. 299—304.

mains in a fossil state, than any other class of animals, excepting, however, the Infusoria. Beginning with the earliest traces of living forms on the globe, and extending through every age and formation to our own times, some being peculiar to the sea, some to the land, and some to fresh-water rivers and lakes, they have played a part in the system of organic nature which entitles them to the first rank, in the scale of importance, in the eyes of those who would read and interpret the hieroglyphics in which her past history has been written. On account of their existence in all the fossiliferous strata, and their great ability in resisting the decomposing power of "the tooth of Time," they have been styled by Lyell "the medals principally employed by nature in recording the chronology of past events."[11] Upwards of six thousand species have been discovered in a fossil state; not more than one third of which have been ascertained to have any representations in the living world; in other words, full two thirds of the known fossil species became extinct before the existing species were called into existence. To a diligent comparison of the living with the fossil species, by the distinguished geologist just quoted, we are indebted for the subdivision of the Tertiary period into three subordinate epochs, — the *Eocene*, the *Miocene*, and the *Pliocene; Eocene* signifying *dawn of recent*, in allusion to the first appearance of recent species, the author finding but about *five per cent.* of existing species in the shells of that epoch; Miocene, *less recent*, containing about *twenty per cent.* of recent species; Pliocene, *more recent*, embracing strata in which the shells are mostly of recent species, having only about *five per cent.* of extinct forms.[12]

Our limits not allowing us to describe the several ascertained families of shells that have become extinct, and the order of the occurrence of their remains in the ancient strata, we must be content with a brief reference to a few

[11] Principles of Geology, i. 283.

[12] Principles of Geology, i. 244, 283. Elements of Geology, i. 281. In 1833, the number of shells found in the Tertiary strata amounted to 3,036 species; of which 1,238 were determined to belong to the Eocene group, 1,021 to the Miocene, and 777 to the Pliocene; and out of the whole number, only 568 were found to be identical with existing species.

interesting facts derived from the study of their fossils. The most remarkable class of these long-extinct forms, was the *Cephalopoda*, or chambered shells, which began their career in the Transition period, flourished in vast numbers during the long epochs of the Secondary, branching out into many large families, but receiving a check in the Tertiary, and so dying out, until, in our own times, they are known to have but a single surviving relative, which is the Nautilus, and of which only two species are known to exist. These shells, like the Nautilus itself, were constituted with numerous and curiously-wrought divisions, forming beautiful internal cells or chambers, into which the inhabiting animals, by the aid of fitting membranes and muscles, could throw, at will, either air or water, and so rise to the surface or sink to the bottom of the seas in which they lived and on which they sailed, ages before man was permitted to learn and imitate their skill. Such was the Nummulite, whose remains constitute entire mountains, and whose forms are thickly found in the limestone of which the Sphynx and some of the Pyramids of Egypt are composed. Such, too, was the structure of the Belemnite, of whose remains nearly a hundred species have been discovered, but of which no traces have been detected in any period later than the Chalk. This animal, with many of its ancient relatives, was furnished with an apparatus which has been called an *ink-bag*, charged with a very black fluid, with which it could color the water, when approached by its enemies, and thus make good its escape; and it is a remarkable circumstance, that the substance of this fluid, called *fossil ink*, has been discovered in some of the limestone rocks in England, in such a state of preservation, that the paint formed from it cannot be distinguished from the best now prepared by artists! Of the same construction, also, with the exception of the ink-bag, was the *Ammonite* family, the remains of which not less than three hundred species have been discovered. They varied in size from half an inch to four feet in diameter. They were exceedingly abundant during the Oolitic and Wealden periods, but appear to have died out with the Chalk, leaving us only its somewhat distant relative, the Nautilus, with "its palace all of pearl," from which we might imagine what must

have been the appearance of the ocean when it was thickly peopled and covered with its myriad and larger ancestry.

We are now brought to notice the fossil history of the fourth and highest division of the animal kingdom, — the *Vertebrata*, — animals having a spinal column, with its chord or marrow terminating in a brain; embracing four well-marked tribes, — Fishes, Reptiles, Birds, and Mammalia, with man at their head.

Fishes, the lowest class in this division, have left the proof of their existence, either in their petrified bodies, their impressions, or their teeth, in all the fossiliferous rocks, at least from the Silurian to the latest deposits; and as this is not true of any other class of vertebral animals, the fossil remains of fish are of great geological importance, as means of interpreting the past changes in the history of life on the globe. This field of investigation was consigned by Cuvier to M. Agassiz, who has shown himself worthy of the confidence reposed in him by his preceptor. He has classed all fishes, existing and extinct, into four orders, according to the difference in their scales; and so great is his skill, that he has been able, in numerous instances, from the examination of a single scale, or impression of a scale, to describe the principal features or characteristics of the fish to which it had belonged, and to assign it its true place in the system of nature. He has succeeded in the discovery and classification of something more than fifteen hundred species in a fossil state; and from a comparison of them with the living species, he has come to the same general conclusion, in regard to the extinction of species, and the gradual departure from existing types, as we penetrate downwards into the earth or backwards into time, which has been reached by the students of other classes of organic remains. In fact, he has decided that all the fossil fishes whose relics he has examined, are extinct; for though those of the Tertiary approach in their character the living genera, "with the single exception of one small fossil fish, peculiar to the clay-geodes of Greenland," he remarks, "I have found no animal of this class in all the Transition, Secondary and Tertiary strata, which is specifically identical with any fish now living. In the inferior Tertiary formations, one-third

of the fossil fishes even belong to genera that are wholly extinct; below the Chalk there is not one of the genera of the fishes of the present time to be found;"[13] and from the Oolite downwards, almost to the Silurian strata, he finds the remains of enormous sharks and sauroid fishes, with heterocercal or long upper-lobed tails, which must have made sad havoc with the smaller and less predaceous inhabitants of the ancient deep. We will only add, in regard to fossil fishes, that the two most important deductions drawn from their study are, — first, That the general course of nature has been one of quietness and repose, only a very small number of their remains and the strata containing them exhibiting marks of deposition by violent agencies; and, secondly, That the theory of the progressive developement and transmutation of species has no foundation in nature, inasmuch as the earliest fishes were as perfectly organized as any now sporting in our rivers and oceans.[14]

Probably no geological revelation has excited greater curiosity and incredulous wonder, than the discoveries in the history of fossil Reptiles. We are carried back to a long period in the early history of the globe, when these most repulsive of animals attained gigantic dimensions, and swayed the sceptre of universal dominion over created beings. Some were inhabitants of the ocean, some of rivers, lakes and estuaries, some of the dry lands; while all appear to have lived at a period when the earth enjoyed a considerably higher temperature than at present. A few traces of their existence have been detected as far back in the history of the globe as the Carboniferous epoch, though their remains make no figure till we ascend into the Magnesian system, and then not on a large scale, except in the size of the animals exhumed, being enormous Lizards and Saurians. In the strata of the New Red Sandstone, the fossil foot-prints of several species of an animal have been discovered which are supposed to have been made by a class of the ancient reptilian broods, having the form of a frog, and hence called *Batrachians*,

[13] Cosmos, by Alex. Von Humbolt, p. 82.

[14] Buckland's Bridgewater Treatise, i. p. 222. Lyell's Principles of Geology, Chap. ix.

but with the dimensions of a common-sized bull. But in ascending to the Oolite, the lizard and saurian tribes appear in vast numbers and huge proportions, entitling this period in the history of the earth, including the Wealden, "The Age of Reptiles." Among the most remarkable of these now extinct forms of animal existence, were the Ichthyosaurus, the Plesiosaurus, the Mosasaurus, the Megalosaurus, the Iguanodon, and the Pterodactyl. The Ichthyosaurus, a fish-like lizard inhabiting the ocean, of which ten species have been found, had the snout of a porpoise, the teeth of a crocodile, the head of a lizard, the vertebræ of a fish, and the paddles of a whale; and sometimes attained a length of thirty to forty feet. But perhaps the most wonderful feature in its organization was its eye, being of enormous size, and having both telescopic and microscopic power, enabling it to see its prey by night as well as by day, and at immense depths in the water. The Plesiosaurus, of which sixteen species have been brought to light, had a very similar structure, the principal point of difference being the length of its neck, more than thirty vertebræ having been found to belong to it; and it is supposed to have been used in seizing fish beneath the water and flying creatures above it. The Mosasaurus had the general structure of the living monitor, though it was more than five times its size; more than a hundred and thirty vertebræ have been counted in the bones of its frame. The Megalosaurus was a carnivorous terrestrial reptile, from forty to fifty feet long, having much the aspect of the crocodile. The Iguanodon, so named from its resemblance in shape to the living Iguana, a reptile of South America, appears, from the structure of its teeth, to have been herbivorous, and its discovered relics show it to have attained a length from thirty to eighty feet. But the most wonderful of all was the Pterodactyl, of which about a dozen species have been discovered. It was wonderful, however, less for its size than its form and structure. It had the head and neck of a bird, the mouth of a reptile, the wings of a bat, and the body and tail of a mammifer. There has been much dispute among naturalists as to the character and habits of this strange creature, but it is now generally acknowledged to have been a walking, swimming and flying reptile. "Thus, like Milton's fiend," says

Buckland, "all qualified for all services and all elements, the creature was a fit companion for the kindred reptiles that swarmed in the sea, or crawled on the shores of a turbulent planet.

> 'The Fiend,
> O'er bog, or steep, through strait, rough, dense, or rare,
> With head, hands, wings, or feet, pursues his way,
> And swims, or sinks, or wades, or creeps, or flies.'

With flocks of such like creatures flying in the air, and shoals of no less monstrous Ichthyosauri and Plesiosauri swarming in the ocean, and gigantic Crocodiles and Tortoises crawling on the shores of the primeval lakes and rivers, air, sea and land must have been strangely peopled in these early periods of our infant world." [15]

The fossil remains of Birds have been discovered less abundantly than those of any other class of vertebral animals, though enough have been brought to light to show that they have inhabited the earth from a remote period in geological time. Some twenty species have been discovered in the deposits of the Diluvium, ten, in the Tertiary strata, and one species of Grallæ, or waders, in the Wealden formation. This comprehended all that was known of fossil birds, until, a few years since, the attention of Dr. Deane and Professor (now President) Hitchcock was drawn to the notice of the tracks of what they conceived to be birds in the strata of the New Red Sandstone, in the valley of the Connecticut. The idea that these foot-prints were really made by feathered tribes, at a period when this valley was an estuary of the sea, and when the stone in which they occur was soft, yielding mud, on which these creatures walked at low tide, was at first thought quite incredible, even by those scientific geologists who had given full credence to the more wonderful discoveries in regard to the existence and history of fossil Reptiles; and it was not until numerous specimens of these tracks were sent to the cabinets and museums of Europe, that the opinion was generally adopted, that they were really the impressions of the feet of birds. Mr. Hitchcock has succeeded in numbering upwards of two thousands of these impressions; and in classifying them, he has already made out

[15] Bridgewater Treatise, i. 174.

and described about thirty species of birds, which greatly varied in size, from that of a small sand piper to feathered bipeds larger than the African ostrich.[16]

We now come to the Mammalia, the last and highest class in the animal kingdom. All the fossil animals of this family that have been discovered belong to strata in and above the Tertiary, excepting two species of Marsupials, or *pouched* animals, (as the kangaroo), which have been found as low down as in the Oolitic group; from which facts, it has been concluded that animals with pouches, in which to conceal and carry their young, were the first Mammals, or animals which suckle their young, that inhabited the face of the earth. The fossil remains of all the other mammalian tribes are confined to the deposits of the Tertiary and the Diluvium; and it appears, upon investigation, that, reckoning from the Eocene period up to the Alluvium, or our own epoch, there is a gradual approximation in species to those now existing, and that the more ancient of this class were chiefly remarkable for the greatness of their size, indicating a higher temperature or climate, even at a period no farther back than the Tertiary, than obtains at present.

The fossil remains of marine mammalia, such as the whale, the dolphin, the seal and walrus, occur in the Tertiary deposits, — in strata now lying considerably above the level of the ocean, showing what changes, in the relations of land and water, have taken place, since the animals of that period flourished. Of Ruminating animals, the most remarkable that have been discovered fossil are the ox, the deer, the giraffe and the camel, the remains of which indicate them to have been enormously large for animals of this class. But the most gigantic of all animals that appear to have walked the earth were the *Pachydermata*, or thick-skinned animals, as the elephant, the mastodon, the tapir, the hyppopotamus, the rhinoceros, the paleotherium, the megatherium, and the dinotherium. Only two species of the elephant are now living, — one of Asia, the other of Africa. A third, much larger in size, and therefore called the *mammoth*, has been found in a

[16] Hitchcock's Geology, p. 153. Lyell's Travels in North America, i. 201.

fossil state, in America, Europe and Asia. Their fossil teeth and tusks occur in immense quantities in the northern parts of Europe, especially in Siberia, where they probably found a congenial home at a period when a higher degree of temperature prevailed there than obtains at present.[17] Of the mastodon, differing somewhat from the mammoth, seven fossil species have been discovered, — three in Europe, two in South America, one in the United States, and one in India. The skeleton of one, exhumed some two years since in New Jersey, measured twenty-two feet in length and eleven in height. The Megatherium was a gigantic quadruped, which, like the mastodon, is now known only by his bones. It had a head and neck like the sloth, while its legs resembled those of the armadillo and the ant-eater. Its fore-feet were a yard in length, and more than twelve inches wide. His feet terminated in gigantic claws, which Buckland supposes were used in digging roots for its food; and the strength of the animal will be imagined, when it is added, that it measured five feet across its haunches, and that its spinal chord was a foot in diameter! The Dinotherium is regarded as having been the largest terrestrial animal which has ever inhabited the earth. Its remains have been found, in the Tertiary strata, in France, Austria and Bavaria. The most striking peculiarity that has been remarked in its organization, consists of two enormous tusks in the lower jaw, terminating downwards. As its general structure indicates its adaptation to the purpose of digging, and there being evidence that it lived principally in the water, like the hyppopotamus, and subsisted on vegetables and roots, it has been ingeniously imagined that these downward and inward-turning tusks were employed by the animal in tearing up the aquatic plants on which it lived, and also as an anchor for fastening itself to the bank of a river or bay, while he swung in the water and slept.[18]

[17] The idea, so long entertained, that these and other remains of the mammoth were formerly carried from southern and tropical regions, and dropped where they occur, by diluvial action, no longer receives the credit of scientific geologists. — *See Principles of Geology*, i. 136 — 152.

[18] Bridgewater Treatise, i. 109.

Of the *Rodenta*, or Gnawers, the remains of several genera have been discovered in a fossil state, such as the Hare, Mouse, Water-Rat, and Beaver. The same is true of the *Carnivora*, including the Bear, Tiger, Lion, Hyena, Cat, and Dog; and it is worthy of remark, that the remains of these two classes of mammals principally occur, confusedly mingled together, in the gravel-beds and caverns of the Diluvium, — a stratum bearing marks, over the whole of Northern Europe and America, of having been formed by a violent rush of waters from the north, closing the long and tranquil reign of the Tertiary epoch. The fossil relics of Marsupials, which are now mainly confined to New Holland, and wholly to warm latitudes, are found in the deposits of the upper Secondary and Tertiary periods, as far north as France and England; thus indicating a reduction of temperature since this class of animals inhabited these latter countries. But notwithstanding the success of geological research in restoring the fossil history of all these classes of quadrupeds, no remains of *Quadrumana*, comprising the monkey and ape tribes, were brought to light, until within a few years. They have at length been discovered in France, England, India and Brazil, though not in large numbers. Several species have been made out, all of which, with perhaps a single exception, are ascribed to races now extinct. Some of them are ascertained to have been exceedingly large, measuring four feet in height. The remains of this class are found in the lower Tertiary strata, and they were therefore contemporaneous with the more colossal quadrupeds which we have seen to have been inhabitants of the globe during that epoch.

But where, it will be asked, was Man during the long periods into which we have penetrated, and whose chronology has been kept upon the exhumed relics we have described? The answer is, *he was not!* he had not yet been introduced upon the face of the earth. In the counsels of the Divine Mind, he existed from before the foundation of the world, but his palace was not yet ready! Up to this period, all had been a series of preparation and developement, fitting the globe, by a benevolent succession of revolutions, for his residence and subsistence; in due time, the divine mandate goes forth, and he appears!

We are obliged to ascend a step above the age of the Diluvium, below which we have seen the remains of so many forms of organic life, before we can detect any traces of his existence, either in the relics of his frame, or in the works of his hands. It is only in the superficial deposits of the Alluvium or Modern epoch, that his remains have been discovered, and in these deposits never in a fossil state, at least never in the solid materials — the rocky masses in which are entombed the remains of other races of organic beings. The fossil history of the genus *Homo* remains to be written; it is an order of animated nature which has but just commenced, as it were, its existence. "Man must be regarded by the geologist as a creature of yesterday, not merely in reference to the past history of the organic world, but also in relation to that particular state of the animate creation of which he forms a part;" is the language of the most profound living expositor of this science. "I need not dwell on the proofs of the low antiquity of our species, for it is not controverted by any experienced geologist; indeed, the real difficulty consists in tracing back the signs of man's existence on the earth to that comparatively modern period when species, now his contemporaries, began greatly to predominate." [19]

[19] Lyell, *Principles of Geology*, i. 249, 282. It is worthy of notice how completely all attempts have failed to prove, from discovered organic remains, that man has existed on the earth as long as the other beings whose remains are found in and below the deposits of the Diluvium. About half a century ago, great excitement was occasioned by the discovery, in Germany, of a set of fossil bones which were thought to be those of a human being. Under the inspection of Cuvier, they proved to be the relics of a large salamander. But the most remarkable case was the discovery of human skeletons in a limestone rock on the shores of Guadaloupe. On being examined by scientific men, however, this limestone was determined to be a hardened concretion of sand, lime and shells of a very recent formation, containing the remains of animals at present existing in the vicinity of Guadaloupe, and is classed by all geologists with the Alluvial deposits. About a year since, much curiosity was excited by the announcement of the discovery, in one of the Western States, of the bones of a *fossil human giant*, in connection with the remains of the enormous animals of the Tertiary epoch, measuring upwards of thirty feet in height! On a scientific examination, they have turned out to be the bones of a young mastodon!

Availing ourselves of the materials furnished us in the labors of the most distinguished cultivators of this new field of science, we have thus presented, as fully as our limits would permit, a view of the results which have been reached by geological research, in counting the strata of the earth, and in classifying the fossils which they are found to contain. That the facts and discoveries, here brought together, are sufficient to enable us to read the entire annals of the earth and of its inhabitants, is not pretended; but no one who duly considers by what painstaking labor and through what severe methods of induction these results have been attained, will be disposed to treat them with neglect, much less with contempt; while, to him who has joined to this knowledge a diligent study of the phenomena of nature, they will furnish the not incredible means of restoring, by enlightened inference, the principal features in the past history of that part of the universe which he is permitted to inhabit. Could we carry ourselves back to the time of her origin, we should probably first meet the earth in a nebulous and perhaps igneous state, just beginning to rotate upon her newly-made axis, and accustoming herself gracefully to move in her appointed orbit. It is probable, too, that she remained unproductive for quite a long period after she began to dance her mazy round with her sisters of the heavens, owing to her immaturity and the undeveloped state of her productive powers. But, in due time, through the influence of "the Spirit" that "moved upon the face of the deep," she brings forth: the waters, the land, the air, teem with myriad and joyous forms of existence. For a while, at least for the most part, they are more simple in their organization, and at the same time larger in size, than those which appear at a later date; yet, considering the theatre into which they were born, and the objects of their being, all were equally perfect, each having a definite and benevolent part to fulfil in the system of organic nature. On account of the prevalence of a higher temperature in the early ages, the earth was not adapted to the support of the more complex forms which were subsequently introduced; and it was the manifest design of the Creator, without whom there is neither law nor purpose in the universe, by the introduction of different and successive orders of vege-

table and animal existence, each with a higher organization, as the earth and its soil became capable of yielding them support, gradually to prepare it for the residence, not only of sentient, but of intellectual and moral beings, — a period which it actually reached about six thousand years since, when our own race appeared upon its fair and fertile bosom, endued with the sublime consciousness of being delegated with a rightful "dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the beasts of the field, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth." M. S.

Art. XX.

Crown of Thorns.

The Crown of Thorns: A Token for the Sorrowing. By Edwin A. Chapin. Boston: Published by A. Tompkins. 1847.

The value of this book is not to be estimated by the unpretending form in which it is given to the world. From the miniature size and the type, we presume it is intended to be, what it truly is, a companion to the author's "Hours of Communion," and like that invaluable book, it will, we doubt not, be the means of confirming the faith and of removing the doubts of many a troubled and anxious heart. The precise design of the present work is indicated by its symbolic title. It aims to present the Christian view of sorrow; to open to the mourner's spirit the sources of consolation which are to be found in the Christian idea of life; to show the influence of affliction in moulding and developing religious character; and in the light of Christ's experience to reveal the truth, that the thorns which are hidden amid the elements of human discipline, and which wound and pierce our finest sensibilities, may still be woven into a spiritual "Crown."

Habitually as ministers mingle with men in their seasons of grief, frequently as they are called to the service of consolation, it is a remarkable, and an unpleasant fact, that there are few good books which may be profitably taken as companions and instructers in times of sorrow. Christian literature is yet very meagre, not in volumes, but in volumes which deserve to be called tokens for the sorrowing. The trouble is, that such books are not fresh enough, and therefore are not winning. The themes are old and hackneyed, the pages are heavy, and the sentences are cold with the formal language of custom and cant. It is too apparent that, for the most part, the thoughts are not animated by the personal experience of the writer, but are dictated rather from memory, and in accordance with rule. And so, where we most need it, Christian books lack the spirit, unction and purity of the gospel, and in consequence become "weary, stale, flat and unprofitable." It is not surprising that popular theology has not been prolific in valuable consolatory works; for it is only from the inspiration of liberal Christianity that they can be produced. To whatever creed a man may have subscribed, the true theory of life which has practical efficacy in reconciling him to the misfortunes and bereavements of experience, must be founded on the doctrines of God the Father, Christ the model of humanity, "made perfect through suffering," and a constant Providence whose law is love. The spiritual beauty of the best pietistic writings of the orthodox school is generally marred by their faith in the Deity of Christ, while the influence of the Saviour's life is prevented from bearing as an example upon the daily experience of the world by the same irreverent homage. And it is, therefore, to the heretical sects, to works like "Martyria," and "Endeavors after the Christian Life," and "Greenwood's Sermons," that we must turn for the best expressions of the spirit of the gospel as the comforter of humanity.

It is sufficient praise, to say of Mr. Chapin's book that it deserves its title, and may justly challenge a place among the works we have named. It is a fresh book. Its philosophy comes from a mind enlightened by Christian doctrine, and from a heart mellowed by personal acquaintance with the power of the Gospel in assuaging

grief. Every person will be impressed, in reading it, with the originality of the subjects and the thoughts, and with the ease by which, through the author's mind, the central light of Christianity is thrown upon new features, and is made to reveal new phases in human life. The first sermon treats of the "Christian View of Sorrow," and is really one of the finest statements of that view we have ever seen. It is from the text — "A man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief," and the opening passage for the beauty of the conception and the calmness of the style we cannot forbear to quote.

"There is one great distinction between the productions of Heathen and Christian art. While the first exhibits the perfection of physical form and of intellectual beauty, the latter expresses, also, the majesty of sorrow, the grandeur of endurance, the idea of triumph refined from agony. In all those shapes of old, there is nothing like the glory of the martyr, the sublimity of patience and resignation, the dignity of the thorn-crowned Jesus.

It is easy to account for this. In that heathen age the soul had received no higher inspiration. It was only after the advent of Christ that men realized the greatness of sorrow and endurance. It was not until the history of the Garden, the Judgment Hall, and the Cross, had been developed, that genius caught nobler conceptions of the beautiful. This fact is, therefore, a powerful witness to the prophecy in the text, and to the truth of Christianity. Christ's personality, as delineated in the Gospels, is not only demonstrated by a change of dynasties, an entire new movement in the world, a breaking up of its ancient order; but the moral ideal which now leads human action, which has wrought this enthusiasm, and propelled man thus strangely forward, has entered the subjective realities of the soul, breathed a new inspiration upon it, opened up to it a new conception — and lo! the statue dilates with a diviner expression, — lo! the picture wears a more lustrous and spiritual beauty.

The Christ of the text, then — "A man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief" — has verily lived, for his image has been reflected in the minds of men, and has fastened itself there among their most intimate and vivid conceptions. Sorrow, as illustrated in Christ's life, and as interpreted in his scheme of religion, has assumed a new aspect and yields a new meaning. Its garments of heaviness have become transfigured to robes of light, its crown of thorns to a diadem of glory; and often, for some one whom the rich and joyful of this world pity — some suffering, struggling,

overshadowed soul — comes there a voice from heaven, 'This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.'"

After this introduction the author discusses the question of the mission of evil, and shows that while we may never solve completely the problem of its *origin*, its *uses* no Christian can deny.

"When we take the Christian view of life, we discover that not happiness merely, but *virtue*, *holiness*, is the great end of man — though happiness comes in as an inevitable consequence and accompaniment of this result. And in the light reflected from this view, evil assumes a powerful, and I may say, a most beautiful office. It is just as necessary for the attainment of virtue, as prosperity, or any blessing. Nay, in this aspect, it is itself a great blessing, and

> "Every cloud that spreads above
> And veileth love, itself is love."

It is evident that, without the contact of sin and the pressure of temptation, there might be innocence, but not virtue. Equally evident does it seem that, without an acquaintance with grief, there would be but little of that uplifting tendency, that softening of the heart, and sanctifying of the affections, which fit us for the dissolution of our earthly ties, and for the communions of the spiritual world. Beautiful is this weaning efficacy of sorrow. By the ordinance of God, youth is made to be content with this outward and palpable life. The sunshine and the air, the flow of animal pleasures, encircled mysteriously with the guardianship of parents and the love of friends, are sufficient for the child. But as we grow in years, there springs up a dissatisfaction, a restlessness, of which we may be only half conscious, and still less know how to cure. With some, this may subside into merely a fretful and worldly discontent; others may heed the prophecy, and lay hold on a celestial hope, an immortal possession, as the only remedy. In this secret sense of want, which nature nor man can fill, they will hear already that low, divine voice — "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." But, generally, another and more emphatic missionary is necessary. It is the veiled angel of sorrow, who plucks away one thing and another that bound us here in ease and security, and in the vanishing of these dear objects indicates the true home of our affections and our peace. Thus, by rupture and loss, we become weaned from earth, and the dissatisfaction and discontent which sorrow thus induces are as kind and providential as the carelessness of youth."

The sermon "Consolation in Loneliness" is a powerful exhibition of the solitary condition of man in the light of the duties and destiny revealed in Christianity. As a composition it contains many vigorous and elegant sentences, and, in its structure, suggests to the critic, a striking peculiarity of the author's style — we mean the breadth of treatment which his sermons manifest. Logical precision and patient analysis are not the characteristics of his method; but rather comprehensiveness and largeness of view. This is the natural method of a vigorous imagination. It goes by leaps and not by steps; it catches the whole outline, but does not always work up the details. Mr. Chapin will bring together the most widely scattered truths and reveal the natural attractive influence which his special subject has upon them, like the sun over his attendant planets; but he does not always stop to examine carefully the orbits of his different topics, and may not, therefore, arrange them at times in their precise order, but occasionally will pass, as it were, from Mercury to Jupiter, and from Mars to Saturn, unconscious and indifferent as to the intervening orbs. His discourses are characterized not so much by linear directness as by lateral breadth. More facts are presented than a mere reasoner would be likely to see; but they are perceived in a different light and are thrown upon the same plane, while the reasoner would dispose them more accurately, perhaps, in a logical perspective. We have seldom read sermons, indeed, which are so slightly tinged with the formalism and method of the pulpit as those now before us. Fresh, earnest and suggestive, they can bear the loss of that artistic symmetry which the severe critic loves, on account of the redeeming traits of thorough sincerity and gushing fervor which give them such an effective charm with the popular mind. The naturalness and heartiness which distinguish these discourses characterize the arrangement also. The thoughts flow on like serious and earnest conversation; the sentences seem enforced by the tones of the author's voice; and the introduction of a new topic or branch of a subject frequently depends, as in familiar talk, upon some apparently accidental term which has suggested an unpremeditated evolution of the central idea. This freedom from topical formality has

always been to us one of the powerful charms of Dr. Dewey's style, with whose sermons, moreover, the best productions of Mr. Chapin present many points of similarity.

The Discourse on Resignation, we should say would be the most effective for pulpit delivery of any in the volume. There is great vigor of statement and many sharp antithetical passages and strong discriminations of character, which always arrest and hold the attention of an audience. As an instance of this rhetorical coloring and strength of diction, we have marked the following paragraph: —

There is a time when "the humblest disciple of Christ may weep as he also wept. But let him also strive as Christ strove. Let him not dash his grief in rebellious billows to the throne; let not his groans arise in angry, resentful murmurs; let the remembrance of what God is, and why he does, be with him, and let the filial, reverent trust steal in — 'Not my will, but thine be done.' That reference to God, that obedience to him, rising from the very depths of sorrow, and clung to without faltering, is RESIGNATION. It shall bestow peace and victory in the end. Oh! how different from that sullen fatalism that lets things come as they will. To such a soul things *do* come as they will, and it hardens under them — they *do* come as they will, but it sees not, cares not, why they come. No thought goes up beyond the cloud to God, — no strength is born that shall make life's trials lighter, — no love and faith that will seek the Father's hand in the darkest hour, and shed a serene, enduring light over the thorny path of affliction, and upon the bosom of the grave. Look at these two. Outwardly, their calmness may be the same. Nay, the one may evince emotion and tears, while the other shall stand rigid in the hour of calamity, with a bitter smile, or a frown of endurance. But in the one is strength, in the other rigidity; in the one is power to triumph over sorrow, in the other only nervous capacity to resist it. The one is man hardened to indifference, sullen because of irreligion, upon whom some sorrow will one day fall that will peel him to the quick, and he will not know where to flee for healing. The other is man contending against evil, yet not against God, — man with all the tenderness and strength of his nature, impressible yet unconquerable, walking with feet that bleed among the wounding thorns, and a heart that shrinks from the heavy woe, yet, all lacerated as he is, able to walk through, because he holds by the hand of Omnipotence.

The one is the unbending tree, peeled by the lightning and stripped by the north wind, lifting its gored and gnarled head in sullen defiance to the storm, which, when the storm does overcome it, shall be broken. The other is rooted in strength, and meets the rushing blast with a lofty front. But as 'it smiles in sunshine, so it bends in storm,' trustful and obedient, yet firm and brave, and nothing shall overcome it."

To a bereaved and spiritual mind we can easily conceive that the sermon on "Our Relations to the Departed" will be peculiarly dear. There is a vein of sober and Christian speculation in it which suggests the most consoling views in regard to the dead, and which affliction, if it does not convince the head of their soundness, always prompts the heart to entertain and cherish. "The mission of little children," too, besides the interest which personal bereavement has infused into it, deserves, we think, the praise of being the most complete and rounded discourse which the author ever published. But with our strong attachment to these discourses, and the ready confession of their pre-eminence in particular points, our favorite, on the whole, is the first, on the "Christian view of Sorrow." And on one trait which, however, does not distinguish this from other sermons in the work, we would confer the heartiest commendation; we mean the prominence given to the life and character of Christ as the best channel and fullest expression of our religion. Throughout the work we find manifestations of that entire reverence for the Saviour, and that constant appeal to his experience, which attest sufficiently the author's acquaintance with the source and heart of the power of the gospel. From whatever point we view it, Christ is the centre of Christianity; the relation of discipleship to him as the purest manifestation of religious life, constitutes, we believe, the true theory of Christian fellowship and union; the influence of his spirit touches humanity on every side; and as an argument for the divinity of the gospel, or as an aid in attaining its ideal of life, the Saviour's history, and the assistance of his personal experience are almost invaluable. Nothing would be more efficient in quickening the spiritual life of Christendom, or in healing the dissensions of the Church, than a just appreciation of the office of the personal Re-

deemer, and therefore books like this of Mr. Chapin, are calculated to fulfil a doubly beneficial mission by awakening Christians, in connection with their primary view, to a proper estimate of our dependence on the Saviour's life.

We cannot close this hasty notice of "The Crown of Thorns," without a word upon the style of the composition. It is decidedly superior, as a literary production, to any volume which the author has published hitherto. There is more repose in the style, more compactness in the sentences, greater precision of language, and a muscular energy of expression, which characterize the practised and cultivated writer. The vigor of Mr. Chapin's imagination is suggested by every page, but it is held in check by his reason; and we have not noticed a single instance where it has been betrayed into any insubordination to the subject under discussion. There is not, we believe, one *flowery* passage in the book. The luxuriance of the author's fancy manifests itself not so much in rhetorical passages, and highly wrought imagery, as formerly, but in richness of statement and freshness of thought. He uses his poetic power not so often to adorn, but more frequently to vivify his page. His present style is marked by less violence of passion and more depth of feeling; less turbulence and more power; a less frequent effusion of sparks, but a glowing and fusing mental heat. In his earlier productions we see the stormy strength of an imagination, at times a little lawless in its play, like the ocean in a tempest, while now, under the more equal and serener light of his reason, it has less billowy foam but more of the calm ground-swell of the peaceful sea. It is rarely that we meet with a finer statement of a truth in published discourses, than the following passage from the sermon, "Our Relations to the Departed:"

"A great peculiarity of the Christian religion, is its *transforming* or *transmuting* power. I speak not now of the regeneration which it accomplishes in the individual soul, but of the change which it works upon things without. It applies the touchstone to every fact of existence, and exposes its real value. Looking through the lens of spiritual observation, it throws the realities of life into a reverse perspective from that which is seen by the sensual eye. Objects which the world calls great it renders insignif-

icant, and makes near and prominent, things which the frivolous put far off. Thus the Christian, among other men, often appears anomalous. Often, amidst the congratulations of the world, he detects reason for mourning and is penetrated with sorrow. On the contrary, where others shrink, he walks undaunted, and converts the scene of dread and suffering into an ante-chamber of heaven. In this light, the apostle Paul speaks of himself and others, 'As sorrowful, yet always rejoicing; as poor, yet making many rich; as having nothing, and yet possessing all things.' Indeed, all the beatitudes are based upon this peculiarity; for the true blessing, the inward everlasting riches, are for those who, in the world's eye, are poor, and mourning, and persecuted. Jesus himself weeps amid triumphant palms and sounding hosannas, while on the cross he utters the prayer of forgiveness and the ejaculation of peace.

No wonder, then, that the believer views the ghastliest fact of all, in a consoling and even a beautiful aspect; and death itself becomes but *sleep*. Well was that trait of our religion which I have now suggested illustrated at the bed-side of Jairus's daughter. Well did that noisy, lamenting group represent the *worldly* who read only the material fact, or that flippant *scepticism* which laughs all supernatural truth to scorn. And well did Jesus represent the spirit of his doctrine, and its transforming power, when he exclaimed, 'She is not dead, but sleepeth.'

Yes! beautifully has Christianity transformed death. To the eye of flesh it was the final direction of our fate — the consummate riddle in this mystery of being — the wreck of all our hopes —

> "The simple senses crowned his head,
> Omega! thou art Lord, they said;
> We find no motion in the dead."

Ever, though with higher desires and better gleamings, the mind has struggled and sunk before the fact of decay, and this awful silence of nature; while in the waning light of the soul, and among the ashes of the sepulchre, scepticism has built its dreary negation. And though no mother could lay down her child without taking hints which God gave her from every little flower that sprung on that grassy bed — though the inexhausted intellect has reasoned that we *ought* to live again, and the affections, more oracular, swelling with the nature of their great source, have prophesied that we *shall;* never, until the revelation of Christ descended into our souls, and illuminated all our spiritual vision, have we been able to say certainly of death, it is a *sleep*. This has made its outward semblance not that of *cessation*, but of *progression* — not an *end*, but a *change* — converting

its rocky couch to a birth-chamber, overcasting its shadows with beams of eternal morning, while behind its cold unconsciousness the unseen spirit broods into higher life. 'He fell *asleep*,' says the sacred chronicler, speaking of bloody Stephen, 'Our friend Lazarus *sleepeth*,' said Christ to his disciples—and yet again, as here in the text, the beautisul synonyme is repeated, 'She is not dead, but sleepeth.'"

While this improvement in the tone of Mr. Chapin's writings is very grateful to a critical taste, it is still more pleasant from the fact that it is connected with spiritual growth. Compared with former sermons of the author, this volume shows more spiritual insight, a deeper and more intimate acquaintance with the soul, and the finer provisions for its life contained in Christianity. If we may venture a judgment as to the influences that have moulded and directed his feelings and thought, we should say they were books like "Martyria," and the writings of Martineau; and that while their healthy spiritualism have harmonized with, satisfied, and strengthened his own view of the gospel, the mellow purity of the one, and the deeply shaded, ethical grandeur of the other, have united to educate his taste, and to give the chastened glow and earnest energy which now characterize his composition. Most heartily, then, would we recommend this little volume, and express our conviction that the Universalist public owe a debt of gratitude to its author for the influence which all his published writings have exercised in directing attention from doctrinal disputes to those spiritual elements of Christianity, a practical interest in which alone will give life and vigor to a sect, or peace and happiness to the individual soul. T. S. K.

Art. XXI.

Literary Notices.

1. General History of the Christian Religion and Church: from the German of Dr. Augustus Neander. Translated from the Second and Improved Edition. By Joseph Torrey, Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy in the University of Vermont, &c. &c. Volume the First, comprising the First Great Division of the History. Boston: Published by Crocker & Brewster. London: Wiley & Putnam. 1847. Royal 8vo. pp. xxiii. 740.

When we gave a notice, three years ago, of the American edition of Rose's Neander, we added, "It is said that Professor Torrey, of Burlington, Vt., is preparing, or has already prepared, a new translation, which, in many respects, excels that of Rose." This work has at length appeared, and it fully realizes all that was expected of it. The original is in the most *untranslateable* style of German; the sentences long, involved, and, though vigorous, winding through a complicate series of thoughts, with their various modifications. But Professor Torrey has succeeded to render the whole into good English, with a precision that surprises us, and with an ease that makes us forget the difficulties of the original. Were we to select the best example we are acquainted with, of mastery over intractable German prose, we think we should fix on this. No one can compare it with Rose's version without perceiving its great superiority in clearness and point.

As we formerly gave our views of the general character of Neander's History, it only remains for us, at present, to mention, that this translation is made from a recent and much enlarged edition of the original; and that the second volume will soon appear. We confidently recommend it to all such as are prepared to use it, by a sufficient study of the elements of ecclesiastical history. When the translation shall have been completed, we hope to have an opportunity of speaking more at large on the merits of the work.

2. A Blind Man's Offering: by B. B. Bowen, &c. &c. Boston: Published by the Author. 1847. 8vo. pp. 432.

A book by a blind man! He will not thank us, however, for that note of admiration; for he tells us, in his preface, that "those who are acquainted with the extent to which the blind are

now educated, will have no difficulty in conceiving that one, without the aid of sight, could write a better work than this claims to be." It is, nevertheless, a creditable production, even if we lay out of our estimate the disadvantages under which it must have been composed. Several of the essays, of which it consists, treat of the blind, of their experience, peculiar character, and education, and of remarkable persons who have belonged to that class. One of these articles, that on the celebrated Sanderson, may be found in our No. for last January, and may be regarded as a favorable specimen of the author's work.

3. Review of the Life and Writings of M. Hale Smith; with a Vindication of the Moral Tendency of Universalism, and the Moral Character of Universalists. By L. C. Browne, &c. &c. Boston; Published by A. Tompkins. 1847. 12mo. pp. 360.

Whatever we may think as to the need of a defence against the Rev. Mr. Smith's representations, no one can deny that the work has been very thoroughly done in the book of which we have given the title. It is executed, too, in a style of moderation, that we hardly looked for in a review of such a "Life and Writings." Mr. Smith is an anomaly in the moral kingdom, and therefore a proper subject of study for those who are curious in their observation of human character. To all such we may recommend this Review, as pourtraying one of the most remarkable specimens that can perhaps be found. From our acquaintance with Mr. Browne, as well as from our knowledge of many of the facts he has reported, and from the documents with which other facts are sustained, we believe that all the material statements may be fully relied on.

Art. XXII.

Restoration.

"And he said, So is the kingdom of God, as if a man should cast seed into the ground; and should sleep, and rise night and day, and the seed should spring and grow up, he knoweth not how. For the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear. But when the fruit is brought forth, immediately he putteth in the sickle, because the harvest is come." Mark, iv. 26—29.

It seems plain that our Saviour intended, in these words, to illustrate the gradual and imperceptible growth of his religion in the heart of man. Seed cast into the earth does not vegetate and come to maturity in a moment. It requires time, favorable influences and suitable culture, to bring it to perfection. The husbandman, whether he rise by night or by day, witnesses the growth of his grain, but knows nothing of the process. Still he perceives that the plant is gradual in its growth. The tender blade is first seen shooting up from the earth. At length the ear is formed upon the stalk. And, last of all, the full swelling grain is ripened in the ear, and the time of harvest comes.

Thus it is with the progress of divine truth in the human soul. A man is not made perfect in Christian knowledge and righteousness in a moment. The apostles of Jesus, though true believers as far as they had been taught, prayed, "Lord, increase our faith."[1] And St. Peter exhorted his brethren to "grow in grace, and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ."[2] These passages, and a great many more of like meaning that occur in the Scriptures, manifestly show that the Christian's course is progressive; and they also teach us the importance of nourishing and cultivating all the graces and virtues that belong to the Christian character.

Nothing could be more absurd than the notion that a man is, all at once, by a sudden and mysterious influence,

[1] Luke xvii. 5. [2] 2 Peter iii. 18.

made perfect in Christian knowledge and righteousness. As well might we expect to see the whole process of vegetation, from the first sprouting of the seed in the earth to the full corn ripened in the ear, accomplished in a moment. We do not doubt that Saul of Tarsus was instantly and miraculously converted. But the age of miracles is past; and in these days we need look for no other genuine conversions, than such as result from the gradual acquisition of Christian knowledge, and the growth of Christian righteousness in the heart and life. Some good resolution, it is true, may be formed in a moment, and a man may instantly abandon all his more vicious habits of life. But to know anything of the gospel, requires some continued mental exertion; and to bring forth any of its excellet fruits, patient labor and diligent culture are indispensable. And hence the declaration of our Saviour, with reference to the ministry of his truth in the heart of man, "First the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear."

These considerations exhibit a principle that may be of service in correcting certain mistakes touching the doctrine of Restoration. When we look abroad upon the works of creation, we perceive that so far as we are capable of understanding them, they all bear the marks of progression. And instead of rising at once to the perfection of their nature, and then falling away into a low and miserable condition, from which they need to be recovered or restored, they start from apparently small beginnings, and steadily advance towards the accomplishment of that Divine pleasure for which all things were created! The work of creation itself was not completed in an instant. The great mass of matter was at first a confused and shapeless void, and darkness covered the face of the deep. Next we find that the spirit of God brooded over the chaotic heap, and in process of time shed upon the profound gloom the cheerful light of day. The first productions of the earth were herbs and grass. Afterwards the waters moved with living creatures. Then beasts and creeping things appeared upon the earth. And last of all, in the order of progression, man, the great and finishing work of the whole, was moulded into form and inspired with life.

The same common law is still at work, pervading every

department of creation of which we have any knowledge. Not only does seed cast into the earth first exhibit the tender blade, and afterward the ear, and last of all the full corn in the ear; but the same is true of the beginning and growth and maturity of animal life. Every living creature has its infancy, and unless cut off by untimely death, passes through various stages of progression until the maturity of life is attained; when, agreeably to a law that governs all earthly things, it begins to decay, and at last dies. And the natural growth of everything gives an increase of power, beauty and excellence; thus showing that *onward* is the order of nature, and that progression is written upon everything.

Many creatures, known to us all, pass through various stages of existence. One of the most familiar, and at the same time one of the most appropriate illustrations of this fact, is exhibited in the butterfly. The eggs of this insect at first produce mere grubs or caterpillars, such as we frequently see in great numbers devastating the foliage of shrubs and trees. The grubs next pass into an insensible state, called the chrysalis, in which they continue for a time, having neither legs, wings nor motion. At length the case is burst open, and the disgusting caterpillar is changed into the gorgeous butterfly, that gaily sports in the sunbeams and sips the nectar of flowers. The law of progression is here strikingly exhibited. And we cannot wonder that poets have made the change from the chrysalis into butterfly typical of man's last great change from death and corruption into life and immortality.

The succeeding stage of existence, it may be well to remark, is never inferior, but always superior to the first. The blade rising from the seed shows a state of advancement; the ear formed upon the stalk developes something still more excellent, and exhibits a higher stage of progression; and the full corn in the ear presents to our view the perfection of the plant. The caterpillar marks a great advancement from the egg out of which it springs; and the chrysalis is a mere state of preparation, from which the same creature at length rises to the perfection of life, and exhibits all its glories and beauties. Nothing goes backward in passing from one state of existence into another. Progress is the order which God has established. And

we shall yet attempt to show that the gospel teaches, in regard to man, just what nature teaches concerning all things else; thus exhibiting the perfect consistency between the teachings of nature and the instructions of revelation.

It would be useless to mark the progress of man in his earthly existence, from infancy to youth, and from youth to the maturity of life. We are subject in this respect to the same common law that governs the growth of vegetation, and marks the gradual progress of all animal existence. But in view of the universal law of which we speak, let us endeavor to contemplate man in the two estates for which his Creator at first intended him; namely, the earthly, in which we now exist, and the heavenly, in which we hope hereafter to live. The apostle Paul, in speaking on this subject, says, "The first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. Howbeit, that was not first, which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and afterward that which is spiritual."[3] And this order is not only in harmony with the declarations of our Saviour, at the head of this article, but it is also perfectly analogous to all that we see and know of the doings of the Almighty.

The first man, or man in his first estate, was made subject to vanity; and was intended in this world to be the creature of hope, and to live in the expectation of enjoying another and a better life beyond death. True, it has been supposed that the first man of our race was created immortal, and perfect in holiness and happiness; but that he became mortal, corrupt and miserable, by reason of sin. And as a consequence resulting from this strange supposition, it has been thought that the salvation promised in the gospel will be a restoration, or a replacing of man in his original state, though in another world. This view of the subject, the reader must perceive, entirely reverses the order of things, and represents, if we may refer again to the figure used by our Lord, that "the full corn in the ear" is first produced; and afterward the ear appears, and then the blade comes,—and then by a backward movement the process is carried up from the simple blade until the full corn is produced again as in the beginning! So

[3] 1 Cor. xv. 45, 46.

that the whole round of operations results just where it began! And this supposition also takes the ground that "the first Adam" was fully equal in his original estate to the last Adam, even the quickening spirit; and it leads to the conclusion that to be made alive in Christ, is to go back and be made alive in Adam, as Adam lived when he was first created!

Tacitus, the Roman historian, says, "In the early ages of the world, men led a life of innocence and simplicity. Free from irregular passions, they knew no corruption of manners; and void of guilt, they had no need of laws. In the natural emotions of the heart they found incitements to virtue, and rewards were unnecessary. Having no inordinate desires, they coveted nothing, and pains and penalties were unknown."[4] This is indeed a beautiful picture. But fancy and fact are not always found in the most perfect harmony. And on this pleasant passage the translator of Tacitus has been captious enough to say, "It may be made a question, whether a period of pure simplicity and innocence ever existed. Seneca expatiates in praise of those times, Epist. xc., and the poets have been lavish in their description of the golden age; but the history of mankind has no proofs of the fact. An ingenious writer says, "Who were those men who lived in so much innocence? The first man who was born into the world, killed the second. *When did the times of simplicity begin?*" All this is but a form of the doctrine which teaches that man was at first created in the full perfection and glory of his spiritual nature, and that he now needs to be *restored* to his primeval estate.

But all such confusion disappears in a moment when we turn away from the mere vagaries of worldly wisdom, and consider the subject in the light of reason and of revelation. It certainly seems unreasonable, as well as opposed to all analogy, to suppose that a creature destined to exist in two distinct states of being, should be made perfect at first, with every power and capacity fully developed; and afterward brought back and restored to the original state, by being introduced into a second state of being! And surely the Scriptures teach nothing of the

[4] Annals, Book iii. § xxvi.

kind, but the reverse. They declare that man was *made* subject to vanity, as the creature of hope; but hope never looks *backward!* They tell us nothing about the original holiness, perfection and immortality of the first Adam. And instead of representing that our final condition in the spiritual world will be a state of *restoration*, or a return to some former condition, they plainly show us that it will be a state of advancement and progression.

The reader will please notice another declaration of the apostle Paul:—"And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly"[5]—that is, as we now exist in the nature of the first man, who was made of the dust of the ground, and created with a mortal constitution, we shall also live hereafter in the spiritual nature of the second man, our vile body being changed by the resurrection, and "fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto himself."[6] No intimation is given that the first Adam was *created* in the spiritual nature and immortal constitution of the second man; that he lost his original nature by sin; and that to be made alive in Christ beyond death will be a restoration to the state in which Adam at first existed! But the Scriptures plainly show us that our condition in the resurrection, so far from being a state of restoration, will in fact be a state of the highest advancement. And instead of looking backward and expecting to be restored to a former estate, we should look forward to the time when man shall have advanced to his high and holy destiny as the child of God! Jesus has assured us that the subjects of the resurrection shall be equal unto the angels. Man will attain this equality with pure and spiritual existences in heaven, not by a retrogade movement, but according to the law of progress, in passing from that inferior state of existence in which he was created, into the higher, holy and heavenly life brought to light through the gospel!

But the reader may be ready to ask, does not the writer, in view of the final destiny of the human race, believe in *universal restoration*, a doctrine of which Universalists have so much to say? He answers, No, nor even in *par-*

[5] 1 Cor. xv. 49. [6] Philippians iii. 21.

tial restoration. If we have any correct understanding of the word restoration, it signifies "the act of replacing in a former state"—and such, we believe, is the meaning which this word is commonly understood to express. And surely we do not believe that the whole creation will be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God, by being replaced in any former state. Such a notion stands utterly opposed alike to reason, analogy, and the word of God. It is indeed a mere conception of the imagination; and though very clearly set forth in Milton's Paradise Lost, and Paradise Regained, it entirely lacks the warrant of Scripture authority. And the reader will understand that it is not the mere *word*, restoration, to which we object, but the very *idea* expressed by this word. This idea has been very generally received in the Christian Church, not excepting our own denomination.

Dr. Good, in speaking on the subject of Materialism, says, "There seems a strange propensity among mankind, and it may be traced to a very early period of the world, to look upon matter with contempt. The source of this has never, that I know of, been pointed out; but it will probably be found to have originated in the old philosophical doctrine we had formerly occasion to advert to, that "nothing can spring from, or be decomposed into nothing;" and, consequently, that matter must have had a necessary and independent existence from all eternity; and have been an immutable Principle of Evil, running coeval with the immutable Principle of Good; who, in working upon it, had to contend with all its essential defects, and has made the best of it in his power. But the moment we admit that matter is a creature of the Deity himself, that he has produced it in his essential benevolence, out of nothing, as an express medium of life and happiness; that in its origin, he pronounced it, under every modification, to be "very good;" that the human body, though composed of it, was at that time perfect and incorruptible, and will hereafter recover the same attributes of perfection and incorruptibility, when it shall again rise up fresh from the grave,—contempt and despisal must give way to reverence and gratitude."[7]

[7] Series iii., Lecture 1.

Here the reader will perceive that the doctrine of restoration, or the notion of man's recovery of his original "attributes of perfection and incorruptibility," is made the grand solvent of the mysteries of Materialism! And Dr. Adam Clarke has been merciful enough to suppose that even the brute creation will be restored in common with man; yea, that all brutes will be restored, while many men will be lost. (How much better is a sheep than a man!) For he not only says, "Thou hast lost thy God, thy paradise, thy soul,—look about thee, leave no stone unturned;—there is no peace, no final salvation for thee till thou get thy soul *restored* to the favor and image of God;"[8] but he also says, "It does not appear that the brute creation are incapable of this choice; and it is evident that they are not placed in their present misery through either their choice or their sin; and if no purpose of God can be ultimately frustrated, these creatures must be *restored* to that state of happiness for which they have been made; and of which they have been deprived through the transgression of man..... Hence it is reasonable to conclude, that as from the present constitution of things, they cannot have the happiness designed for them, in this state, they must have it in another."[9] But the merciful doctor could not say as much of *man.* ("*Pain is for man.*") He says in the notes referred to, "God has decreed that they shall be happy, if they will; all the means of it being placed within their power; and, if they be ultimately miserable, it is the effect of their own unconstrained choice;—therefore his purpose is fulfilled, either in their happiness or misery; because he has purposed that they shall be happy *if they please*, and that misery shall be the result of their refusal." Behold again how much *happier* a sheep is than a man! Oh! that *we* were sheep! We can go astray like sheep[10]—but, alas! we cannot be so easily and certainly *restored* again!

The reader need not be informed that even the preachers of our own faith have attempted to prove their doctrine by referring to Acts iii. 21, which declares that the heaven must receive or retain Jesus Christ, "until the times of *restitution* of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began."

[8] Note on Matt. vii. 7. [9] See Notes at the end of Rom. viii.
[10] Isaiah liii. 6.

We have, however, seized upon many *words* without much judgment; and in our talk about the doctrine of the Restitution, we have put forth some very questionable proofs. But without attempting anything like a thorough examination of this passage, we think it may well be doubted, 1st, Whether it has any direct reference to the final destiny of the human race; and 2d, If it has such reference, whether it actually means what the word *restoration* properly signifes; that is, that man will be brought *back* to a former condition. For speaking of John the Baptist, who came in the spirit and power of Elias, our Saviour said, "Elias truly shall first come, and *restore* all things. But I say unto you, that Elias is come already, and they knew him not, but have done unto him whatsoever they listed. Likewise shall also the Son of man suffer of them." [11] Now here we find the same expression that is rendered "restitution of all things" in Acts iii. Doddridge renders the passage in Matt., "*shall first come and regulate all things*," and the one in Acts, "*times of the regulations of all things.*" And he adds, in regard to the passage last named, "This *apokatastasis* may so well be explained of regulating the present disorders in the moral world, and the seeming inequalities of providential dispensations, that it is surprising to find Dr. Thomas Burnet, Mr. Whiston and other learned writers, urging it for such a *restoration* of the paradisiacal state of the earth as they on their different hypotheses have ventured to assert, without any clear warrant from Scripture, and amidst a thousand difficulties which clog our conceptions of it." And the Rev. Albert Barnes also says of the word in question, "The word has also the idea of *consummation*, *completion*, or *filling up*. Thus it is used in Philo, Hesychius, Phavorinus, and by the Greek classics. (See Lightfoot and Kuinoel.) Thus it is used here by the Syriac. 'Until the *completion* or *filling up* of the times;' that is, of all the events foretold by the prophets, &c. Thus the Arabic, 'Until the times which shall establish the perfection or completion of all the predictions of the prophets,' &c."

Now the idea of *regulating* all things, or of *completing*

[11] Matt. xvii. 11, 12.

and accomplishing all that the prophets have spoken, does not necessarily imply the return to a former state. But it is perfectly consistent with the doctrine of progression for which we contend; which all nature teaches, and which the word of God has most fully sanctioned. We are well satisfied that the notion of a final *restoration* of man is altogether without foundation in truth. But we rejoice to believe that in the great order of progression which God has established in his works, the vast race of humanity, who here bear the weak and corruptible nature of Adam, will be made alive in the resurrection-state, in the spiritual, glorious and heavenly nature of Jesus Christ!

We do not fear that any man in passing from the present into the future state of existence, will fall back into a worse condition than that in which we now live. The future state will be a state of advancement; and, what is true even of the insect, that developes new powers and beauties in passing through its successive stages of being, is alike true in regard to man. In the present state of existence man is sinful, suffering and mortal; in the future state he will be pure and holy as the angels in heaven, and will be alike immortal and the child of God, *being* the subject of the resurrection. And although we know nothing of the times and the seasons which the Father hath put in his own power, and pretend not to determine *when* all the purposes of divine wisdom and benevolence shall be accomplished, we devoutly bless the name of the Lord that we are permitted to believe without a doubt that the time will come when every man shall truly and joyfully say, "In the Lord have I righteousness and strength."

A. M.

Art. XXIII.

The Present Inequalities of Life consistent with a Present Retribution.

In this article we propose to explain some difficulties, connected with the doctrine of a present retribution, furnished by the apparently unequal condition of mankind *in this* world.

The good and evil of this life, it is said, are not meted out with much reference to human desert. The wicked and depraved seem to revel in enjoyments, while the virtuous and good are deprived of the common comforts of life; and in many cases of crime, the largest portion of the attendant evil falls upon the innocent and unoffending. A brutal husband is the occasion of lasting misery to an innocent wife. An unnatural father abuses his unoffending offspring. The rich knave oppresses the poor and wrenches from the hand of want the only means of subsistence, while he himself revels in abundance and enjoys every temporal good. If we compare the pious members of the Church with the irreligious and profane men of the world, the latter seem to be the more prosperous and happy of the two. It not unfrequently occurs, also, that some of the basest criminals escape from justice, while others are arrested and made to suffer the full rigor of the law. These and similar cases (and the world is full of them) go to show that a just retribution does not take place in this world.

This is the language of the objector to our faith, and it is worthy of respectful attention on our part. The following considerations will serve to remove the difficulties which are here presented.

1. Many of the outward temporal blessings of life, and much of its evil, proceed from other causes than the merit or demerit of human character. With the present constitution of man, and of the world in which we live, a diversity in natural endowments and a variety of human condition are necessary. That outward temporal good should be modified to suit the respective merits of men, is obviously no part of God's design. It was never intended that men should be rich or poor, wise or foolish, well favored or deformed, sick or well, promoted to places of honor or left in private life, according to their merit or demerit. These things may depend, to some extent, upon character, but they are mainly to be referred to another cause, and are to be explained on other grounds than that of reward and punishment. And whatever difficulties belong to this subject, no theory of reward and punishment is adequate to explain them. The objector requires of us more than he would be willing to take upon himself—

more than he or any one else is able to perform, when he demands the reason why the present diversity exists upon any system of retribution, either our own or his. No one will deny that men, of equally good characters, are found in outward conditions that are very dissimilar. That they must be equally wise, honored, healthy or prosperous, no one supposes necessary to a just retribution. And if this is the case with good men, may not a similar diversity exist with bad men, and with all men, and the principles of a just retribution still remain unimpaired?

The only way to make these diversities a part of retribution is to suppose that the more highly favored men are in this world, they will be the less so in eternity, to adjust the balance of desert, when they are equally good or bad in this life. Is any one willing to adopt this theory? Is the good Christian who is born with superior natural faculties to degenerate when he enters the spiritual world; and his neighbor who is as good and no better than himself, to arise up at once to a higher degree of intellect, because he has been destitute of it in this state of existence? Are the rich, the robust, the men of renown, to forfeit by their present advantages some portion of the bliss of heaven; and the poor, the feeble, and the unhonored, to occupy a higher seat on this account? No one, I presume, will be willing to adopt this theory; and yet it is the only one that will enable us to reconcile the present diversity in the gifts of fortune with a just retribution, allowing such diversity to constitute a part of the system of reward and punishment. If all the outward blessings of life, and all its calamities are embraced in this system, they must somewhere be "worked in" to adjust the balance of merit and demerit.

The truth is, they do not belong to this department of the divine administration, and cannot be explained on such grounds. God has wise and benevolent designs to accomplish by the present arrangement, but it is plainly no part of his intention to make all this world's goods or misfortunes to square with the merit or demerit of his creatures.

2. It is generally conceded that the amount of human happiness does not depend on outward circumstances. All admit that the rich man may be very miserable, and the poor

man be very happy—that the same is true in respect to other conditions. But though this is admitted, it is remarkably strange, that in arguing against us the inequalities of life, this plain truth is commonly left out of the account. On the contrary, it is usually assumed that the unprincipled miser is as much happier as he is richer than the honest poor man. It is assumed that the man who is highly prospered in business, and the man who is subject to repeated disappointments and misfortunes, are as wide apart in point of happiness, as they are in worldly success. This is wrong. What is universally acknowledged as true, prejudice and theory aside, ought not to be denied, in order to oppose Universalism; and on the other hand, what no one believes, ought not to be assumed as true, though it be to accomplish an object so worthy of one's zeal and perseverence.

We do not pretend that all men are alike happy, whatever their outward condition — neither do we believe that, including their outward condition, they are happy in proportion to their deserts. It is no doubt otherwise to some extent; and it is wise and benevolent that it is so; but there is not that difference which external signs would indicate. Wealth has its cares, and talent has its difficulties, and health its toil and conflicts; and poverty, ignorance, and sickness are not without their advantages. It is the temper of mind with which the one condition is enjoyed, and the other suffered, that has the principal agency in determining the amount of happiness on either hand. If base and unholy passions are indulged and wicked designs are cherished, misery is the certain and unavoidable result; and no degree of wealth or temporal prosperity can hinder or prevent it. And the man whose heart is pure, and whose conscience does not condemn him, has a source of enjoyment within that no earthly changes can disturb.

3. Another consideration that may be of service in removing the difficulties of our subject, is, that we may be deceived as to the true character of our fellow beings. We look at those whom we have been in the habit of regarding as the best of men; and notwithstanding their goodness, they are more or less unhappy; while, on the other hand, those who are apparently less deserving, en-

joy a high degree of prosperity. This appears to us to conflict with the principles of justice. It may however be nothing but appearance. There may be strict justice in this after all. Those we regard as eminently good, may not be as good as they appear to be; and the bad, so called, may be better than we are accustomed to regard them; and, with this allowance, their true condition may be precisely what justice requires. It is not to be doubted for a moment that there are many great pretenders to religion and piety, whose *appearance* may indicate that they are truly good, who are, notwithstanding exceedingly corrupt; and if such men are unhappy they obviously deserve to be so, while those who arrogate to themselves no peculiar goodness, and really appear less meritorious, are truly better men at heart, and are happier in proportion.

I will add here another and very important consideration. The limits of human duty are generally too much restricted—in other words, we have adopted a wrong standard of character; and an error has grown out of this circumstance that affects materially our present subject. The good man, according to the common estimate, is one that attends strictly to the duties and ceremonies of religion, and has a fair outside moral character. He may be guilty of a thousand wrongs, connected with his business, health or social arrangements, and still pass for a Christian and truly pious man. This is a wrong estimate of character. It is a too limited view of human duty. There are laws of business, and laws of health, and laws of social life, that are to be observed, as well as the laws of religion. Indeed religion in its proper sense embraces all this. Hence the man who obeys the laws of business, health, and society, but does not observe the ordinary religious ceremonies, and may indeed despise and reject them, is, it may be, a better man than he who regards the latter and neglects the former. He may not be considered better, and probably by most men, will not be so considered; but in point of fact, he is better, and doubtless he is and ought to be happier. It need not be thought strange, therefore, that he who has the name of irreligious is many times more prosperous than the pious professor; for he not unfrequently deserves to be so, since he studies more attentively, and applies more faithfully, the means of suc-

cess. He is less religious, and religiously he is less happy, or, it may be that the thoughts of religion render him miserable; but he is more prosperous in his business, because, in that department, he is more faithful to his duty. This principle is of very extended application; and it serves to reconcile many existing inequalities with a righteous administration in the present life.

That our remarks may not be misapprehended, it will be necessary that the reader call to mind the distinction, before noticed, between temporal prosperity arising from natural endowments, and that which depends on the discharge of duty.

The subject may be illustrated thus, — a man may enjoy better health than his neighbor, because he has a better constitution of body. He may prosper better in his business, because he has better natural faculties. He may possess more wealth, because he had richer ancesters. And in these instances, we must have recourse for explanation to other principles than those of justice. But when, with equal natural endowments of body and mind, and under the same circumstances, one man is more healthy or prosperous than another, it is because he renders himself worthy of his superior advantages, by the faithful performance of duty.

He may not be, in the popular sense, religious, but he is faithful to his secular and social duties. And though he pay not tythe of mint and annis and cumin, he attends to the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy and truth.

4. The diversities that exist in this world, in respect to human happiness, will receive farther elucidation, by considering that many of the external inflictions for the outward conduct of men, depend on human agency, and therefore may be imperfectly applied. There are certain offences against society that are left to society to punish; and if the punishment is not inflicted, or inflicted improperly, that fact does not militate against the equity of the divine administration. That human governments are imperfect is readily conceded; but the divine government does not admit of imperfection. The laws of men, and even the laws of God of which man is the executor, may be violated in external act with impunity. Under these laws, too, offenders may be punished with undue

severity; and even the innocent may be subjected to unmerited stripes. But these things do not conflict with the doctrine of a righteous retribution, as administered by God himself. Men are imperfect beings, and all that is submitted to their hands will be imperfectly managed. Not so with God. His law is perfect, and all its sanctions are in harmony with his infinite character. It is important that we consider the difference between the *motives* and *conduct* of men. The man who forms a wicked design, or cherishes an unholy passion, has already sinned against God, and receives his punishment in the mental suffering thus endured; and from this there is no escape. But he who commits a sinful act, sins against society, and it is left to society to punish him, or allow him to escape all outward infliction. It may be proper to add here, that though the administration of human governments is imperfect, there is a tendency in society toward a righteous retribution. The existence of laws and penalties proves this. For most men, in all ages, vile as they have been, have felt the necessity of opposing crime, and raising barriers to its progress. They have therefore made laws to prohibit what was deemed wrong, and instituted penalties to restrain and prevent crime. These have all been imperfect; but still they indicate a righteous principle within man, and a tendency toward the execution of justice. The same is seen in the tendencies of society, irrespective of law. The man who sets himself against the interests of his fellow beings, will find himself not a little incommoded by those whose rights he disregards. This is the tendency of society. If one man's hand is against every man, every man's hand will assuredly be against him. And there are a thousand ways by which such men can be reached and made to suffer for their crimes. It will not do to say that many such men are rich and powerful. They are not as rich and powerful as the rest of the world. And in most cases, if we could strike the balance between the evils they occasion others, and the evils they themselves suffer in consequence of their oppressions and injustice, I doubt not that we should discover a near approach to a just retribution. It is right that it should be so. But as men are the agents in bringing about the result, much that is wrong may be expected to mingle in its execution.

These remarks, however, are not essential to our present discussion. What I would fix in the reader's mind is, that the divine system of retribution, or that part of God's administration that relates to rewards and punishments, is not responsible for the imperfections of human governments. Men, and all their ways, are doubtless under the divine administration, and are controlled with a view to a glorious result; but this does not oblige us to fix the divine sanction to the various measures of men for rewarding and punishing human conduct, much less to regard these measures as a part of his own perfect system of retribution.

5. Finally, on the inequalities of this life, it may be safely affirmed, that, if our system fail to explain them, it will be in vain to seek for a satisfactory explanation from the opposing theory. I know it is said that the irregularities of this world are to be adjusted in eternity; but on examining the grounds of this belief, and the manner in which it is affirmed the adjustment will take place, we are constrained to confess that the subject is involved in incomparably greater embarrassment and difficulties. There are two things worthy of being noticed here. First, the common ground for expecting the alleged adjustment is wholly fallacious. The reason why God will adjust these matters in the future is, it is said, that he does not adjust them now! It is maintained that all the good and ill that checker life belong to the system of retribution, and that because there is now an inequality that does not accord with human merit, in other words, because strict justice is not now done, it will be hereafter.

A little thought, it is believed, will convince any one that this reasoning, so far from being favorable to the idea of a future adjustment, is directly opposed to such an expectation. If the good and evil of this life are meted out with an uneven balance, a greater inequality will exist hereafter.

To use examples before refered to, as often employed against us — if an innocent wife is not unfrequently the subject of abuse from an unfeeling husband, she need not flatter herself that it will be better for her in the future world. God is able to torment her worse than her husband can; and unless she repent and become the subject of his grace before she dies, she will meet with a severer

fate than she found on earth, and wish herself again under her more merciful oppressor. The son whose unnatural father has subjected him to undeserved abuse, may yet find still more cruel treatment, from a Father more unnatural, in the abode of despair. The poor and needy, the widow and fatherless, who have been reduced to poverty and want by dishonesty and oppression, need not expect relief hereafter; for though they *may* be delivered from their suffering, they may, on the contrary, be rendered inconceivably more miserable. And on the other hand, those who have been the occasion of these abuses and oppressions, may escape, both from the stripes of civil law, and from the inflictions of divine justice. This, reader, is the way that the inequalities of this world are to be adjusted in the future—nor can any one say in truth that this is not a fair representation of the subject. The doctrine of future misery for the sins of this life, is wholly inadequate to explain the subject of present inequalities, as connected with a just retribution, besides possessing other insuperable difficulties. W. E. M.

Art. XXIV.

Relation of the Christian Miracles to Christian Faith.

That faith in Jesus of Nazareth as *the Christ*, the Son of God, is essential, nay indispensable, to a true profession of our holy religion, seems to me too obvious to be denied or questioned. He who does not thus believe in him, whatever else he may be called, can with no propriety be called a Christian.

The evidences of the Messiahship of Jesus are various, but may be conveniently considered under the twofold division of *external*, embracing prophecies and miracles; and *internal*, including a large and miscellaneous class of proofs, drawn from the character of Jesus, the nature of his gospel, its adaptation to the condition and wants of man, &c. &c.

By the almost universal consent of the Christian world,

external evidence, i. e. prophecy and miracles, has been regarded as the only direct and positive proof of Jesus' Messiahship, and consequently of the divinity of his religion. Still the internal evidences have never been despised or neglected. They have been deemed highly important as strengthening the external, though by themselves they are incapable of proving that Jesus was the Christ. One may very well acknowledge that such a person as Jesus existed; that he lived a pure and beautiful life, and sustained an interesting and noble character; that he taught an elevated morality, and proposed a very reasonable system of religious faith; and yet he may be far from being convinced that he was the Son of God, and his religion therefore authoritative and divine. And it is a remarkable fact that many intelligent infidels do actually allow much of this; but, rejecting the external evidence of prophecy and miracles, they never embrace Christianity.

It becomes a question, therefore,—and a question which some indications in the theological atmosphere around us, urge upon our attention at the present time,—what relation the miracles have to our faith as Christians. To one who sincerely believes in the Scriptures, the New Testament, it would seem, must be conclusive proof that, in the time of Christ and his Apostles, miracles,—in which, so far as the general fact is concerned, we may include prophecy, for prophecy is only one form of miracle—constituted the leading and most satisfactory evidence that Jesus was the Messiah, and consequently that his religion was worthy of all acceptation. Among the Church Fathers, so called, it is clear that while they insisted much, as their circumstances required, upon internal evidence, they also appealed with the greatest confidence to prophecy and miracles. The great Origen, in his reply to Celsus, says, "Our doctrine has a peculiar proof which is far more divine than all the demonstrations of the Greeks, viz: *the demonstration of the Spirit and of power*, as the Apostle calls it, — of *the Spirit*, through the prophecies, which are sufficient to render credible to every reader whatsoever has happened to Christ, — of *the power*, through the extraordinary miracles, whose historic certainty shines forth from many grounds, and among others from this, that some traces of them still remain among those who live according to the will of

Christ." This mode of thinking, and this estimate of the external evidences of Christianity, prevailed, with few and unimportant exceptions, from the beginning, till after the Reformation. There is always, perhaps, a tendency in minds touched with mysticism, to overlook the outward, and to attach a disproportionate importance to the inward; to rely more upon the feelings, than the clear deductions of reason; and it might, therefore, be expected that such minds would sometimes express themselves in a manner apparently inconsistent with the fact stated above. Deeply impressed with the truth of Christianity, feeling in their own souls its pure and elevating influences, they are apt to forget the manner in which they were brought into this very state, and to look upon all external proofs as comparatively poor and unsatisfactory. It is in this way I would explain many careless remarks scattered up and down in theological writings, such as that of Luther, for instance, when he represents that miracles are worthless in exciting faith, and speaks of "spiritual miracles," by which he means nothing more than the sanctifying power of the gospel, as the "true, heavenly SIGNS." In another passage he speaks in a similar manner, saying, that God "was obliged to lead men on by external miracles, and to throw such apples and pears to them, as to children." It was not till long after Luther's time, however, that miracles fell into general disrepute in Germany; nor is it probable that such trifling remarks as these, and standing in so clear contradiction to his well known and deliberate convictions, exerted any influence, either during his life or afterwards, upon the public faith. Only about a century ago the subject of miracles was brought up in Germany, and made the topic of a protracted controversy, which has in some measure extended to the present time. At one period, it seemed as if the whole of Protestant Germany was ready to deny all prophecy, all miracles in relation to Christianity, all inspiration, and indeed every thing in our religion of a supernatural character. Yet those who did this, still claimed to be Christians, and at least *rational* believers in the Scriptures. They sought industriously to place Christianity on other grounds, and a world of ingenuity was expended in the most unavailing attempts to clear the Bible of every thing miraculous. A history of German theology

for the last hundred years would be one of the most astonishing, as well as the most interesting works of the age. It would exhibit a revolution in the religious world of the most remarkable character, and fraught with some most deplorable, and other most hopeful consequences.

It is unnecessary to enter here into any inquiry respecting the causes or the occasion of this singular revolution; but it may be well to give, under a few specifications, the materials for a general view of the opinions on the subject of miracles to be found in German theology during this *Neologic* period. The same table will also serve for the latitude of the United States, so far as German Neology has exerted its influence.

1. There are some professed Christians, if I mistake not, who, like Hobbes, Spinoza, and other mere *naturalists*, adopt the atheistic opinion that miracles are impossible. They ascribe a mechanism to nature and to human life, which operates on fixed and unalterable principles, and which God himself cannot break in upon. Of course they deny all immediate revelation, or revelation, properly speaking, in any sense whatsoever.

2. There are others who virtually deny the miracles, by representing them, some, as *allegories*, and others, as *myths*, or as merely ordinary events, which, by a great love of the wonderful, were converted into miracles.

3. There are others who acknowledge miracles indeed, but who allege that they were wrought by, or in accordance with, the laws of nature. Christ, therefore, was a sort of *natural Magician*, and applied his wonderful knowledge to all kinds of subjects. Some have been so fortunate as to find in *Animal Magnetism*, the key to all his miracles.

4. There is another class who acknowledge the miracles, but deny that they have any power to prove the divine mission of him who works them, or to prove any thing indeed whatsoever. There are others of the same class who think they might have proved something, originally, and to those who witnessed them, but are useless now, or worse, mere dead weights, as some seem to consider them, which severely try all the evidences of our religion which they can adduce. Perhaps I ought in courtesy to mention some who imagine that miracles might be of use as proofs,

if one could well determine whether they are wrought by good or evil beings, by God or the devil!

A glance at this list of opinions will suggest the necessity of a word or two on the definition of *miracles*. Many speak of them as *natural* events, or events produced by natural laws. Bonnet suggested, and others have adopted, the notion that miracles, so called, make a part of the course of nature; they are *preordinations* of the Creator, which were to be exhibited each in its appropriate time; or, as I would express it, are threads in the great web of temporal events, which rise only at intervals and then disappear; yet are they really parts of that web, so that in bringing them up, God does not "alter or disturb the course of things which he himself directs, or counteract the laws which he himself has established." Against this hypothesis, — for Bonnet expressly stated it as such, — it may be objected that it represents the whole course of nature as *miraculous*, or else it reduces the miracles to merely *natural* events. If miracles make a part of the great series of causes and consequences linked together in the natural world, I see no means of separating them, nor can I perceive any reason for calling one event *natural*, and another *miraculous*. This reasoning may be applied in its full force to all those who represent miracles as produced by natural laws, whether high or low, common or uncommon, known or unknown, and whether existing in the physical, the intellectual, or the spiritual world. On this subject, I am free to confess, I sometimes hear remarks which surprise me, not by their novelty, but by their unintelligible character, their intrinsic self-contradiction. When men talk of miracles produced by natural laws, or in accordance with such laws, I cannot avoid respectfully but earnestly inquiring what they mean. Why do they call one event natural, and another of the same character, i. e., produced by the same class of causes, miraculous? Do they recognize no difference between a natural event and a miracle? If they do, they should carefully and clearly point it out; if they do not, do not the proprieties of language, as well as the cause of truth, require them to omit the word *miracle*, which on this supposition has no significance, or stands quite synonymous with *natural event*. No one can be ignorant, that, whether right or wrong, with reason or

without it, men do attach very different notions to these terms. Now he who confounds them, and calls an event miraculous when he means that it is only natural, either abuses himself, his hearer, or both, and justly exposes himself to the suspicion of ignorance, or the charge of dishonesty. I believe that if men would but carefully define their terms, they would either deny miracles altogether, or they would confess them to be events which stand without the domain of natural law.

Were I asked what I mean by *natural laws*, and by *miracles*, I should explain myself thus. By natural laws I mean a certain order of sequence, or of cause and consequence, in which natural events uniformly take place. In the spring-time, for instance, I drop a seed into the earth; the shower and the sunshine fall upon its lowly bed, and it soon vegetates. Leaf after leaf is put forth, and soon it blossoms, and then in due time presents its ripened fruit. Without the earth, the air, the sunshine and the shower, this result would not have taken place. The vegetation of the seed, and the growth of the plant, then, is conditioned by these laws. I may increase the size of the plant, or I can prevent its growth. I may hasten or retard its progress. Yet the means of doing all this, are as really conditioned as the rest, nor can I swerve a hair's breadth from them without destroying my work. Indeed I cannot free myself for a moment, in the whole process, from the laws of nature, and whether I succeed or fail in my labors, the result will be *natural*. But when I enter the domain of miracle, I find no conditions whatsoever, and can calculate no results. I recognize here no fixed and uniform order of sequences. The miraculous power needs none of the laws of nature, is subservient to none of her rules, but accomplishes its will directly, instantly, without any intervention of natural means, and contrary to all the ordinary experience and observation of the world. According to the laws of nature, the sick are healed by curative means, more or less understood; and time, and frequently a concurrence of favorable circumstances, is necessary to effect the cure. By a miracle this is done at once, if so the miraculous agent wills, at a word, and under every variety of time, place and circumstance.

It is obvious enough that an event is not a miracle be-

cause it is *rare* or *uncommon*, because it is *remarkable* or *astonishing*, or because it is *strange* and *unaccountable*. There are phenomena in nature which are all this, and which yet no intelligent person would dream of calling a miracle. There are events resulting, it may be, from laws utterly *unknown* to us, which still are not miracles. Some speak of the *higher* or *highest* laws of nature, as being engaged in producing miracles. Perhaps I do not clearly understand what laws are thus indicated, and possibly those who thus speak do not themselves; but allowing the words to express any meaning of which they are capable, I cannot perceive how the height of the law can effect the nature of the result. If the *cause* be natural, so must the *consequence*. It may be vastly superior to others, but it is still natural. Were it supposed that there are powers lodged in our moral or spiritual nature, immeasurably surpassing all the wonders of animal magnetism and clairvoyance, — powers governed by the highest laws in nature,— and were these powers thus governed to make a revelation as far transcending the recent disclosures of the "Seer" Andrew Jackson Davis, as his revelations do the Bible and all common sense, still if their action were natural, according to their own laws or the laws of nature, the result like the action would be as perfectly natural as the swimming of a fish or the falling of a stone. I confess, therefore, that it moves my wonder to see with what facility some, otherwise reasonable, men, can manufacture miracles out of the most unmiraculous materials in the universe. That old amusement by which the venerable alchymist transmuted all baser metals into gold, bears no comparison with it. For myself, I am fain to acknowledge it is not so. I behold no miraculous agency in nature. I recognize no miracles among the products of nature's laws. To me, in the domain of nature all is natural, nor can I even conceive of a miracle's arising out of any of her operations.

It has been suggested that it must be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish a miracle from a natural event. One learned author declares that it is impossible, and must remain so till we become perfectly acquainted with the whole range of nature, with all its powers and laws. If this be so, it must effectually bar miracles from appearing in proof of any cause whatsoever, for as we are

not yet perfect masters of all nature's secrets, and the race is not likely to become so immediately, it follows that we are unprepared to judge whether the pretended miracle be real or counterfeit, a true miracle or a mimic product of natural laws. It has seemed to me that this opinion is hardly well founded. That we shall ever become perfectly acquainted with all nature's powers and laws, is improbable if not impossible; but sometimes without knowing all that one *can* do, it is enough for our purpose to know what he can *not* do. It is quite unlikely that we are yet acquainted with all the properties of iron, for instance; but there is scarcely a child in all christendom, which does not know that a wedge of it cannot swim on water. So we may be ignorant of many of the properties of wood, but there is no one who does not know that it has no attraction for iron, and least of all such a degree of it that a stick of it thrown upon the water would draw up a woodman's axe from the bottom of a river, and cause it to swim like itself. Perhaps we are yet quite ignorant of many of the powers of the human voice, but who is not certain that its utterance of a word or sentence, has no power to hush the winds, or calm the sea, to heal the sick, or raise the dead? And this leads me to remark, what is too often overlooked, that real miracles are not appeals to *ignorance*, but to *knowledge*. If there be a doubt whether the powers or laws of nature are not adequate to produce the given result, that very doubt must thwart the most important purpose of the miracle. Hence the miracles recorded in the Scriptures are universally of such a character as to leave no doubt on any fair mind that they are not effects of the laws of nature.

Much has been said respecting the value of miracles as credentials of a divine commission. Some can see no connexion between the power to work miracles and the proclamation of divine truth. On this subject it is much easier to speculate and deny, than to convince even one's own heart. We know that, in all ages, men have readily believed those who have pretended to work miracles. The miracle has been regarded as direct proof of the divine interposition and favor. If it be assumed that the miracle is effected by the laws of nature, I confess it proves nothing, or nothing more than any other fact. Then it

can have no significance beyond what it thus silently teaches of nature and her uniform laws. No one imagines that M. Alexandre is to be believed, simply because he performs a thousand curious and astonishing tricks of *legerdemain*, — tricks that seem to the vulgar eye miraculous, but which are wrought by the regular laws of nature.

Some have supposed that miracles did actually mean something, and were adequate grounds of faith to those who witnessed them, but that to us they are of no value, but rather drawbacks upon the Christian religion. It seems scarcely necessary to remark, what is so obvious to the dullest reader of the New Testament, to any one in the least acquainted with the history and condition of Christianity, that the Christian miracles are so inwoven with our religion, they stand so connected with its origin, its early promulgation, its progress, and whole history, that it is impossible to separate them. I never saw miracles performed, but they have come to me as strongly vouched as if I had witnessed them with my own eyes. They were *facts*, and facts everywhere are capable of being proved by testimony, and this is the only manner in which it is possible to prove them. I have the testimony of the evangelists, and they, after an examination of eighteen centuries, stand unimpeached and credible witnesses. I have these evangelists and their associates under circumstances, which forbid my distrusting them; they give me and the world the highest pledge of their honesty, for they consecrated their lives to the truth of what they asserted, and many of them died as martyrs to the cause. But this is not all. The existence of Christianity itself is a perpetual witness to the reality of miracles. They introduced this religion, and paved the way for its progress. They made a deep impression upon the age in which they occurred, and the traces of that impression are visible still. I see them all around me, and I can no more deny their influence over my convictions than I can deny the light of the sun.

It has been lately suggested, in this country, that miracles could no farther prove divine commission than they themselves could be shown to be wrought by God. This is reasonable, though a shallow remark. Does any one need to be convinced, in this age, that miracles originate in no inferior power? If it be so, I would earnestly

recommend a reprint of that masterly work of Hugh Farmer, a "Dissertation on Miracles." But the writer to whom I refer believed the miracles of Christ to have been wrought by *animal magnetism!* and hence very justly concluded that they could be no proof of the wonder-worker's virtue even, and much less of his Messiahship.

The very notion of a miracle, then, implies something *not natural;* or, as Bishop Butler expresses it, a miracle is "relation to a course of nature, and implies somewhat different from it." It is not easy perhaps to say in a few words what a miracle is, but there can be no hesitation in any one who has duly considered the subject, in affirming that it cannot be a natural event, i. e., a result of natural laws. I could hardly express my own notion of it better, then, than by saying, that a miracle is not the product of any of the powers of nature, but is an immediate effect of the power of God, and beyond the limits of nature. I am aware how many shrink from this conclusion, and am acquainted with nearly every attempt to avoid it. Many men seem to feel that there is something intrinsically unreasonable and absurd in the supposition of any departure from the laws of nature or any suspension of her mechanical course of operation. Yet this feeling is not native to the human heart, but springs from a superstitious awe of the *philosopher*, or an unworthy dread of his sneer. Let me ask the philosopher, then, if nature is something above God. If it is not, then miracles are possible; God can control nature, which is but his ordinary minister, and, breaking through its uniformity and fixedness, can speak to men directly and authoritatively by miracles. And here let it be remarked, that this very uniformity of nature is one of the conditions under which miracles become subjectively possible. Without this uniformity, i. e., were the course of nature irregular and fluctuating, did the same causes fail to produce the same results, there would be no means of determining when a miracle occurs, for no extent of observation could assure us that the witnessed phenomenon was not a legitimate effect of natural laws.

It will naturally be inferred that I do not sympathise with those Christians who exhibit so much anxiety about the epithets by which miracles are distinguished. There may be many grounds of choice, yet I confess that I

should without hesitation call a miracle supernatural, præternatural, contrary to nature, a suspension, or a violation of natural laws. Neither of these terms expresses all that constitutes the distinguishing characteristics of a miracle; but they all seem to me to express some fact in the case. Take the resurrection of Lazarus, for instance, and is it not plain that to the fact you may properly apply each of these terms? For dead men, four days in the grave, to come forth at the command of a man, and to come forth "bound hand and foot," alive and well, is *not natural*, if the world has any notion of what is meant by nature. It is supernatural, præternatural, contrary to nature, — marks a suspension of natural laws, or is a violation of them.

Having said so much on the subject of miracles generally, I shall now proceed to exhibit their relation to faith, as they are presented to us in the New Testament. And I am the more anxious to do this, because in most cases, Neologic views of the miracles betray a melancholy ignorance of the Holy Scriptures, or a deplorable disrespect for their authority. The general tendency of this whole mode of thinking, whether in Germany or in the United States, has indeed universally been toward loose opinions respecting the inspiration and validity of the Bible. I would by no means insinuate that many who indulge this mode of thought and these opinions, are not in their own estimation very sincere Christians; but I am bold to avow my convictions that the principles on which they are made to rest, would, if thoroughly carried out, lead to an utter rejection of the Bible, to bold infidelity. I am willing for myself, and I trust I may speak in behalf of the great mass of Christians of all sects — I am willing, nay more, I am anxious to know how this subject, lies in the New Testament. What does that volume teach respecting miracles,— how do they there stand in relation to nature, — to what agencies or powers are they ascribed, and finally what use does our Saviour and his apostles make of them? It becomes us as Christians to understand this matter, that if we must renounce the divine authority of that book, we may do it intelligibly. I shall begin then, by remarking,

1. That the Jews in the times of our Saviour confidently expected that Christ, or the Messiah, would work miracles in proof of his mission; or, in other words, that he would

manifest himself to them by the exhibition of miraculous power. This point I hardly need argue, for there is no one to deny it, and we meet it everywhere in the Gospels.

On a certain occasion the Jews said to Jesus, "What shall we do that we might work the works of God? Jesus answered and said unto them, This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent" — i. e., on Jesus himself. "They said therefore unto him, what sign" — i. e. *miraculous proof*, — "showest thou, then, that we may see and believe thee? What dost thou work?"[1] They then immediately proceeded to speak of their fathers having been miraculously fed in the wilderness, under Moses; which shows conclusively what they meant by the question, What sign showest thou? What dost thou work? Nothing can be clearer than the fact, that these persons expected that every one who should come to them claiming a divine mission, should exhibit his credentials of miraculous power. In other words, they expected their Messiah to work miracles. On another occasion, we hear "many of the people" saying, "When the Christ cometh, will he do more miracles than these which this man hath done?"[2] This implies the universal expectation that he would work miracles, and that these miracles would constitute the proof of his Messiahship. The scribes and Pharisees are represented as frequently demanding "a sign," or "a sign from heaven,"[3] from him; by which I understand that they, not in a spirit of earnest seeking, but maliciously "tempting him," solicited some magnificent, but useless display of power, as if such an exhibition would answer their doubts, and convince them of his Messiahship. They saw miracles enough, but they consisted in healing the sick, or other benevolent works, often performed upon the poor and the despised. They insisted on prescribing the kind of miracle which should satisfy them, and he must work it for their special gratification. In this spirit they followed Jesus to Calvary, and at the very foot of the cross, repeated their unreasonable, their insulting demands. "He saved others," said the chief priests, with the scribes and elders, mockingly, "he saved others; him-

[1] John vi. 28-30. [2] John vii. 31.
[3] Matt. xii. 38. xvi. 1. Mark viii. 11. Luke xi. 29, 30.

self he cannot save. If he be the King of Israel"— another name for the Messiah — "let him come down from the cross, and we will believe him." [4] It is as clear as sunlight that the Jews, in the time of Christ, did confidently expect miracles from the Messiah. Let us inquire whence this expectation arose? To this question, there has been many an ingenious answer given, the pure invention of the answerers, because they preferred the veriest dream of their own imaginations to the truth of the Scriptures. He who reads the Bible with candor, cannot fail to find this question answered there. The Old Testament foretold their Messiah, and many of the circumstances of his life, and features of his character. And nothing is more certain than the fact, that they represent him as the worker of miracles. Even Moses announced him as a *Prophet, like himself*, whom God should raise up among them. [5] If he was to be like Moses, he must possess miraculous powers. He was to heal the sick; to open the eyes of the blind; to unstop the ears of the deaf, and make the dumb sing. So well was this understood, that when John the Baptist sent to inquire whether Jesus was the Christ, the latter, we are told, "in the same hour cured many of their infirmities and plagues, and of evil spirits, and unto many that were blind, gave sight. Then Jesus answering, said unto them, Go your way, and tell John what things ye have seen and heard; how that the blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the poor have the gospel preached to them." [6] These miracles were the proofs of his Messiahship, and so must John, either from prophecy or immediate inspiration, have been instructed. I am not ignorant of the efforts of the German Neologists to root out every thing like prophecy, and especially of prophecy relative to Christ, from the Old Testament. This was necessary to complete their theories concerning miracles; but their labors have never been distinguished for success, and so long as the New Testament retains any degree of authority, the point must be considered as settled, that the Old contains clear prophecies of the Saviour. It is a well known, and an interesting

[4] Matt. xxvii. 41, 42. [5] Deut. xviii. 15. Acts iii. 22.
[6] Luke vii. 20-22.

fact, that even the Samaritans, who were separated from the Jews by an impassable gulf of prejudice and ill-will, and who are generally believed to have possessed no part of the Old Testament but the five Books of Moses, still sympathised with the Jews in their expectations of a Saviour, and of his miraculous character. So the Samaritan woman, who met him at Jacob's well, returning to the city, said to the men, "Come, see a man who told me all things that ever I did! Is not this the Christ?"[7]

2. Having thus seen that the Jews, in the Saviour's time, expected their Messiah to work miracles, and also that they derived these expectations from the prophecies of the Old Testament, I now proceed, in the *second* place, to show that he did really perform such miraculous works. That the Gospels record many miracles, and some with great particularity, lies open upon their very face, and never has been, nor ever can be, denied. We have not only a large number thus described, but there are many expressions of a most general character, which undeniably show, that while a few were specially mentioned, very many others were grouped together under some comprehensive term. Thus we are told that "they brought unto him many that were possessed with devils; and he cast out the spirits with his word, and healed all that were sick."[8] And it is significantly added by the evangelist, that this was done "that that might be fulfilled which was spoken by Isaiah the prophet, saying, Himself took our infirmities, and bore our sicknesses." So again it is recorded that Jesus went about all Galilee, preaching the gospel of the kingdom, and healing all manner of sickness, and all manner of disease among the people. "And they brought unto him all sick people, &c. &c., and he healed them."[9]

It admits of no doubt, that the miracles of the New Testament are related as *facts*. The evangelists and apostles always spoke of them as such, always appealed to them as what they and others had seen. In this light they have been received by the whole Church, if we except the German Neologists, and a few followers of them in this country. Nor need I say to those at all acquainted with their writings, how pitiful, and often beneath contempt, are

[7] John iv. 29. [8] Matt. viii. 16, 17. [9] Matt. iv. 23, 24. xiv. 14.

most of their efforts to explain the miracles in any other manner. Learning they may have, and talents, but neither learning nor talents, nor both united, avail to destroy the truth. Some attempt to explain the miracles as *allegories*, i. e., as if the New Testament writers intended to set forth, in these narratives of the wonderful works of Jesus, the *spiritual* consequences of his labors. Others represent them as *myths*, or a sort of ancient fable, with some truth at bottom, but dressed off extravagantly by the narrator. The aim, in all these efforts, is obviously the same — to rid the New Testament of miracles, by reducing every thing miraculous to the simple course of nature. It is easily seen, that he who can make an allegory, or find a myth in the miracles of Christ, can do the same wherever he pleases. Christ's life may become an allegory, and his religion an allegory, or the whole may be one splendid myth. Professed Christians would do well to remember, that we have the same authority for the miracles, as we have for the existence of Christ himself, or a single doctrine he ever taught; and for aught I can see, they must stand or fall together. I cannot shut my eyes upon the fact, that they who disclose to me that wonderful life of Jesus, so full of goodness and beauty, so fresh and original, so pure and divine, that infidelity itself stands awed and charmed by its power, have also made me acquainted with the fact, that this same Jesus wrought stupendous miracles. His works and word, his life and doctrine, are completely felted together in the New Testament, and standing as they do, the miracles seem to me not merely credible, but necessary; for without them that spiritual life could never have been credibly manifested. "He himself was the WONDER," says Olshausen, "and his *miracles* the natural works of his nature." I cannot separate the one from the other, nor do I believe it possible for any one to reject or explain away the miracles, without at the same time, and to the same extent, destroying the credibility of the New Testament writers.

3. Regarding it, then, as a *fact*, that Jesus wrought miracles — real miracles — it becomes us next to inquire how, according to the New Testament, they were produced. To what power or agency are they ascribed? I hardly need say, what is so obvious, that Jesus always represented

himself as *sent of God*, and as standing in the intimate relationship of Son to him. He dwelt in the bosom of the Father, he lived in the Father, and revealed the Father. He constantly claimed that the doctrines he taught, and the works he performed, were the words and works of God. "My doctrine is not mine," said he, "but his that sent me."[10] "The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do."[11] So he spoke of the works — alluding to his miracles, — which his Father gave him to do.[12] On a certain occasion when he had performed a miracle, some said, "He casteth out devils through Beelzebub, the chief of the devils." He replied, "If Satan be divided against himself, how shall his kingdom stand? because ye say that I cast out devils through Beelzebub. But if I *with the finger of God*, cast out devils, no doubt the kingdom of God is come upon you."[13] The term "finger of God," is expressed in the corresponding passage in Matthew, by *Spirit of God*. The phrase occurs in Exodus, where the magicians of Pharoah, overwhelmed by the miracles of Moses, exclaimed, "It is the finger of God." It clearly expresses an immediate work of the divine power. It is unquestionable that Jesus himself always claimed, that his miracles were wrought immediately by God, and that they were, therefore, in the highest sense, divine works. He charged the Jews with blasphemy, for ascribing these miracles to Beelzebub, and said, that although their blasphemies against himself personally, should be forgiven, yet this against the Holy Ghost, should not be forgiven.[14] Had these miracles been wrought by any mediate or secondary means, as by natural laws, with what reason could such a charge, and such a denunciation, have been levelled against the Jews? It is only on the ground that Jesus claimed for these works, the immediate and properly miraculous interposition and power of God, that his language possesses any force. But this passage, which is in itself so conclusive on the subject, stands in perfect harmony with his whole discourse, with his whole life.

What the Master thus uniformly taught, was constantly repeated by his apostles. Always and everywhere, they

[10] John vii. 16. [11] John v. 19, 30. [12] John v. 36.
[13] Luke xi. 14 — 20. [14] Mark iii. 22 — 30.

claimed that the miracles of Christ were wrought immediately by God, and those which they performed themselves, they ascribed to the same source. On the day of Pentecost, Peter said to the Jews, "Ye men of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you by miracles, and wonders, and signs, which God did by him, in the midst of you, as you yourselves do know," &c.[15] Here it cannot escape the observation of every fair mind, that Jesus was approved of God, and that he was approved, or that his approval was made manifest, by the miracles which God did by him. Nothing can be more obvious than that, in the opinion of Peter, these miracles could not have been performed by Jesus without the immediate aid and power of God. In other words, God did the works by Jesus. So on the occasion of healing the cripple at the Beautiful Gate, Peter said to the people, "Why look ye so earnestly on us, as though by our own power or holiness we had made this man to walk?"[16] He then proceeded to show that this miracle was performed by God, to whom he directly ascribed the mission of Christ, and the whole work of salvation. Subsequently, when this miracle had involved them in difficulty with the Jewish rulers, we hear them praying, "And now Lord, behold their threatenings; and grant unto thy servants, that with all boldness they may speak thy word, by stretching forth thy hand to heal, and that signs and wonders may be done in the name of thy holy Son Jesus."[17] At the first council held in Jerusalem, we are told that "all the multitude kept silence, and gave audience to Barnabas and Paul, declaring what miracles and wonders God had wrought by them."[18] So of Paul it is declared, that "God wrought special miracles by his hands."[19] In like manner, Paul himself speaks of "mighty signs and wonders" which he had performed, "by the power of the Spirit of God."[20]

But I need not pursue this subject farther. The representation is the same throughout; and I may safely challenge the world to adduce from the New Testament, a single passage, a word, a syllable, that even hints, or that

[15] Acts ii. 22. [16] Acts iii. 12 — 16. [17] Acts iv. 29, 30.
[18] Acts xv. 12. [19] Acts xix. 11. [20] Rom. xv. 18, 19.

can be fairly construed to imply a hint, that these miracles were wrought otherwise than by the immediate will and power of God. This is manifest on the first perusal of the New Testament; and the fact is only made the more prominent, the more striking, as the attention is directed particularly to this subject. Nor is there any exegesis under heaven that can avoid this conclusion.

4. I proceed to inquire, in the fourth place, what use the Saviour and his apostles made of the miracles. In other words, did they employ them as proofs of any truth or doctrine — did they appeal to them for the purpose of establishing their own claims to a divine commission, or of confirming the religion they promulgated? On this point, too, the New Testament is full and decisive. They show as clearly as words can express, that the miracles were wrought as proofs of the Messiahship of Jesus, and of the consequent truth of his religion.

Speaking of John the Baptist, Jesus said to the Jews, "Ye sent unto John and he bare witness unto the truth.... But I have greater witness than that of John; for the works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me."[21] By *works* here, as commonly in John's Gospel, I understand miracles. They constituted the chief, almost all the works ascribed to Jesus in the Gospels; and he declares in so many words that they bore him witness, i. e., they proved him to be the Messiah; for on this subject was he speaking, as the connexion conclusively shows. On another occasion, "The Jews came round about him and said unto him, How long dost thou make us to doubt? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly. Jesus answered them, I told you, and ye believed not. The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me."[22] Again he said, "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not, but if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him." I see not how this language can be interpreted in a manner to avoid the meaning which stands out so plainly on its very face, that the miracles were regarded by Jesus himself as a proper and ample proof of his claims to the Mesiah-

[21] John v. 33—36. [22] John x. 24, 25.

ship, and that he boldly appealed to them for this very purpose. St. Mark, at the close of his Gospel, tells us, that after the Apostles had received their great commission to go out into all the world and preach the gospel, "they went forth and preached every where, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with signs following."[23] What signs are here meant, the connexion fully shows; they were miracles, — casting out devils, speaking with new tongues, etc. It is alleged by the Nologists that miracles are not necessary to commend the Christian doctrine, and that they possess no power to do it even if they were. But the evangelist before us declares, that the Lord did work miracles, and by these miracles confirmed the word of the apostles. St. John also, near the close of his Gospel, after relating several miracles, adds these emphatic words, "Many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book; but these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, and that believing, ye might have life through his name."[24] Words could not be more express. These miracles were wrought to establish faith in Christ, and for the same purpose were they recorded. Their use did not end with those who witnessed them. It extended to others. So persuaded were the evangelists that miracles were a sufficient proof of the Messiahship, that John mentions it as a remarkable fact, that though "Jesus had done so many miracles before them" — the Jewish people — "yet they believed not on him!"[25]

This mode of representing the miracles, this assumption that they were proof of the immediate aid and guidance of God, runs throughout the New Testament. At the grave of Lazarus, Jesus thanked God publicly for hearing him, yet he added, "I know that thou hearest me always, but because of the people who stand by, I said it that they may believe that thou hast sent me."[26] Here Jesus, on this great occasion, thanked God for the miracle he was about to perform in accordance with his prayer. "By this public appeal, answered as it was in a most remarkable manner," says Paige, "he would fix their atten-

[23] Mark xvi. 20. [24] John xx. 30, 31.
[25] John xii. 37. [26] John xi. 42.

tion not only on the miracle itself, but on the evidence it afforded of his divine mission." Peter on the day of Pentecost commenced the promulgation of the gospel by declaring that Jesus of Nazareth had been "approved of God by signs and miracles." [27] So Paul speaks of Christ's making "the Gentiles obedient through mighty signs and wonders." [28] Before the court of Areopagus, Paul announced the fact that God had appointed a day in which he would judge the world by Jesus Christ, and that he had given assurance of the fact to all men by raising him from the dead. [29] The resurrection of Jesus was a great miracle, and to this did the apostle appeal in confirmation of his universal reign over the world. But, not to cite other proofs, let me add one from the Epistle to the Hebrews. "How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation, which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him, God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost." [30] The proof is conclusive indeed, beyond all cavil, that both Jesus himself and his apostles regarded the miracles as a direct attestation from God of their divine mission, and consequently of the truth of their doctrine; and that they appealed to these miracles as such attestation, not occasionally but constantly; not diffidently but with great boldness; not in doubtful or ambiguous terms, but in language at once clear and decisive — language which as it cannot be misunderstood, must be either acknowledged as true, or denied as false. Without this claim on the part of Jesus and his apostles, many passages of the New Testament bid defiance to any rational interpretation.

5. It only remains for me to consider what effect the miracles of Jesus, and his ministers actually had. Events, such as the works of Jesus were, could appear in no age, among no people on earth, without producing a powerful sensation. They stood out so clearly from the whole course of nature and everything belonging to her domain; they were so strongly, so emphatically marked as miracles,

[27] Acts ii. 22. [28] Rom. xv. 18, 19.
[29] Acts xvii. 31. [30] Heb. ii. 3, 4.

that the public mind could not remain passive under them. But what impression did they make? Did they produce the effect which Jesus himself, as we have already seen, intended and expected? The New Testament furnishes an answer full and conclusive.

In the first place it is certain that the miracles excited great attention, and called multitudes to listen to the gospel. After relating the miracles which Jesus wrought in Galilee, in the very commencement of his ministry, St. Matthew informs us that "his fame went throughout all Syria," and "there followed him great multitudes of people from Galilee and from Decapolis and from Jerusalem, and from Judea and from beyond Jordan."[31] When he healed one sick of the palsy who took up his bed and walked forth before the multitude, "they were all amazed, and glorified God, saying, We never saw it on this fashion."[32] And immediately as he went forth again by the sea side, "all the multitude resorted unto him and he taught them." Indeed these miracles brought such a crowd around him, and the diseased pressed upon him so greatly "for to touch him" that it was necessary to have a ship wait upon him lest the multitude "should throng him."[33]

But in the second place, it is equally certain and incontestible that the miracles did actually convince many that Jesus was the Christ. This was the great purpose for which they were wrought; and as a means of supporting his claims and demonstrating his Messiahship, they were well chosen and efficient. In that "beginning of miracles," the conversion of water into wine at Cana, the evangelist tells us that "Jesus manifested forth his glory," i. e., declared or exhibited his power and dignity as the Messiah, "and his disciples believed on him," or were confirmed in their belief.[34] The woman of Samaria, as we have before seen, was brought to believe in him as the Messiah, by his telling her "all things she ever did," i. e., by his miraculous knowledge of her history and character. There was a certain nobleman whose son was sick, and who came to Jesus desiring him to heal his son, for he was

[31] Matt. iv. 23—25.
[32] Mark ii. 12.
[33] Mark iii. 8, 9, 10.
[34] John ii. 11

at the point of death. "Then said Jesus unto him, *Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe.* The nobleman saith unto him, Sir, come down ere he die." Jesus said "Go thy way, thy son liveth." His servants met him, saying, "Thy son liveth. Then enquired he of them the hour when he began to amend." They informed him, and "then he knew that it was at the same hour in the which Jesus said unto him Thy son liveth, *And himself believed, and his whole house.*"[35] Again, "Now when Jesus was in Jerusalem at the passover in the feast day, many believed on him when they saw the miracles which he did."[36] Again; after feeding the multitude with five loaves and two small fishes, we are told that "those men, when they had seen the miracle that Jesus did, said, This is of a truth that Prophet that should come into the world;" i. e., the Prophet foretold by Moses, in other words the Christ.[37] And so convinced were they of this fact, that they were about to take Jesus by force and make him king. In like manner afterwards the same evangelist assures us that many of the people believed on him, and said, "When Christ cometh will he do more miracles than this man doth?" The case of the man born blind, and his exclamation "Lord, I believe," will not be forgotten by any reader.[38] So when he abode beyond Jordan "where John at first baptized," "many resorted unto him and said, John did no miracle, but all things that John spake of this man were true. And many believed on him there."[39] When he raised Lazarus, the evangelist says, "Then many of the Jews which came to Mary, and had seen the things which Jesus did, believed on him."[40] So afterwards it is said that by reason of Lazarus whom Jesus had raised, many of the Jews went away and believed on Jesus."[41] If we pass now from the Gospels to the Acts of the Apostles we shall meet with the same fact. The miracle of tongues on the day of Pentecost, with Peter's exposition of Christian truth, added three thousand to the church in a single day. The healing of the cripple at the Beautiful Gate, produced another harvest of faith.

[35] John iv. 46—53. [36] John ii. 23. [37] John vi. 5—15.
[38] John ix. 38. [39] John x. 40—42 [40] John xi. 45.
[41] John xii. 11.

The miraculous death of Ananias and Sapphira, with the "many signs and wonders" wrought among the people by the hands of the apostles, caused that "believers were the more added to the Lord, multitudes both men and women."[42] So when Philip went down to a city of Samaria and preached Christ unto them, "the people with one accord gave heed unto those things which Philip spake, hearing and seeing the miracles which he did."[43] The conversion of Saul of Tarsus was clearly the result of a miracle, and miraculous was the whole series of events by which the gospel was first preached to the Gentiles in the person of Cornelius. At Antioch "the hand of the Lord was with" the preachers of the gospel, "and a great number believed and turned unto the Lord."[44] When Elymas the sorcerer was smitten with blindness, "the deputy, when he saw what was done, believed, being astonished at the doctrine of the Lord."[45]

Notable objections may, as Bishop Butler has suggested, be urged against miracles as a proof of religion, when they are considered as a matter of speculation, but, "considered as a practical thing, there is none at all." There is no one who would not feel their force, if exhibited to himself, or fairly considered as facts substantiated by testimony. The Lycaonians[46] and the inhabitants of Melita,[47] acted and judged in a manner perfectly accordant with our nature, when they recognized the apostles who worked miracles before them as gods. The young man born blind, but still with a clear and discriminating intellect, and Nicodemus, one of the rulers of Israel, reasoned in a more enlightened way, but in the selfsame direction, in relation to the miracles of our Saviour. They saw in them the proofs of a divine interposition, and the unquestioned token of the divine favor and guidance. "Here is a marvellous thing," said the former to the cavilling Jews, "that ye know not whence he (Jesus) is, and yet he hath opened my eyes.... If this man were not of God, he could do nothing."[48] So Nicodemus said, "Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God, for no man could

[42] Acts v. 14. [43] Acts viii. 6. [44] Acts xi. 21.
[45] Acts xiii. 12. [46] Acts xiv. 11 [47] Acts xxviii. 4—6.
[48] John ix. 20—33.

do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him." Even the enemies of our Saviour plainly recognized miracles as proof which their fellow men could not but receive of his divine mission, and in their malice urged their persecutions the more vehemently on this very account. After the resurrection of Lazarus, the chief priests and Pharisees gathered a council and said, "What do we? for this man doeth many mirales. If we let him thus alone, all men will believe on him."[49] In like manner after the miracle at the Beautiful Gate, we hear the same council reasoning with themselves, "saying, What shall we do to these men, for that a notable miracle hath been done by them, is manifest to all them that dwell in Jerusalem, and we cannot deny it; but that it spread no farther let us straitly charge them that they speak henceforth to no man in this name."

We have now seen the manner in which miracles are presented in the New Testament. All the proof on the various points here exhibited I have not attempted to introduce; and perhaps the order adopted is not the best that might have been chosen. I might have enlarged our sphere of vision by embracing the whole Bible instead of the New Testament, and the result would have been, if possible, still more decisive. But as it is, and imperfect as may be my exhibit of the proofs of the New Testament, I think no fair mind can avoid the conclusion, that the Jews in the time of Jesus, expected their Messiah to work miracles, and that they derived this expectation from the prophecies of the Old Testament. This is acknowledged by the hardiest Neologists of Germany, however they may attempt to show that these expectations and these prophecies were inappropriate or groundless. The fact of such expectations is beyond all cavil, and it is equally certain that the Jews referred them to these Scriptures. I have also shown conclusively, or rather the New Testament itself shows, on almost every page of the Gospels, that Christ did actually perform miracles,— not the illusions of legerdemain, not the results of natural laws which ignorance or hypocrisy might palm off as immediate works of God, but real miracles, which no man with ever so

[49] John xi. 47, 48.

large a knowledge of nature — which no man, magnetised or not magnetised, ever did, or could do, *except God were with him.* And I wish our *Neologists*, and *Rationalists*, and *Magnetists*, could for one moment stop and consider these miracles of the New Testament. I wish they would do themselves and christianity the justice to reflect, that more than eighteen centuries have passed away, since these miracles were performed, during which time the world has made an immense progress in knowledge of almost every kind, and especially in every department of natural science; and yet with all our light, with all our progress, we have not taken one single step towards, I will not say the *working* of miracles, but even towards a *rational conjecture* as to the mode of their performance. There they stand, as far above all our philosophies, as they did above the natural science of the Fishermen of Galilee, or of the Scribes and Pharisees of Jerusalem. There is not one of them, from the beginning to the end, explained, or explainable by any knowledge which we possess, or of which we can ever dream. All that we know, or shall ever know on the subject, is simply that God *willed* them and they *were done.* In him alone we find a sufficient cause, and beneath him there is none for them. And I confess it excites my pity, when men and professed ministers of the gospel practice upon themselves or others the miserable deception, which would make animal magnetism, or any other natural power, the mighty agent of these astonishing, these stupendous miracles. We have one natural magic, the fruit of much science, and our mesmerism, of which as yet there is no science at all; and I would respectfully ask what either of them has done, or is capable of doing, which compares in any degree with the works of Jesus and his apostles. Where are the sick which they have instantly healed; where are the lepers they have cleansed; where are the blind to whom they have given sight, and the dumb whom they have made to sing; and where, where are the dead whom they have called forth from the grave? Of all human follies that seems to me the most intense, and I had almost said the most hopeless, which, grasping at the idle dreams of the clairvoyant, or the strange, disjointed, misunderstood, or as yet not half understood influences of animal magnetism, thinks to find

in them the clear eye of prophecy, and the irresistible energy of miraculous power, exhibited to us on the immortal pages of the Holy Bible.

I have also shown, that both Christ and his apostles, in perfect accordance with every just conception of a miracle, uniformly ascribed them to Almighty God, and represented themselves only as the agents through whom he exhibited them. They never alluded to any laws of nature, or to any natural energy, to any power belonging either to themselves, or to the world around them, physical or spiritual, as the source of their miracles, but referred them directly, expressly, emphatically, to the great Creator himself, and to him alone. They were, as they declared, his work, and all but the prejudiced, the corrupt, the hardened, so regarded and received them. If now any one is pleased to assume, that miracles are wrought by any natural law whatsoever, I must suggest that he is bound to explain to himself and the world, this his hypothesis, in connexion with the character of Christ and his apostles. Were they ignorant, and themselves deceived? Did they suppose themselves favored by God with these miraculous powers, while in fact they were powers actually belonging to all men, or within the reach of every human hand? Behold, then, the great moral and religious Reformers of the world, the sources, from which were to stream forth beams of divine light, and whose words, like winged angels, were to traverse and enlighten the whole earth; behold them, I say, crippled and palsied in the very outset, by a fundamental deception and error! Ignorant who wrought these works, they might well be ignorant of every thing else. I can accept no such divine teachers. Yet, on the supposition we are now considering, they were either *grossly ignorant* of the very first fact they should have known, and without knowing which they can give us no assurance that they know any thing relating to their great work, or else, — for there is no alternative, — they purposely, in the beginning, set forth, and pertinaciously maintained throughout, a rank and graceless *lie!* The advocate of natural or mesmeric miracles, may choose which horn of this dilemma he will seize. Either of them, if true, is fatal to Christianity.

But this is not the worst of the case. Jesus not only ascribed his miracles directly to the divine power and will,

but also, as I have likewise shown, represented them as the proper proof of his divine commission, his Messiahship, and the truth of his doctrine. For this purpose he appealed to them, as the witness and testimony of God in his behalf, and threatened the Jews with divine punishment, with wasting and destruction, if they did not believe him. Was this all true, I ask? Then Jesus is true, and Christianity is also true. But if these miracles were not thus from God, if they were the result of any natural laws, then are they no proof of the divine interposition or favor, and bear no witness to the truth of our religion. Then Jesus rested his religion on false grounds through *ignorance*, or alleged these false grounds for it through sheer *imposture!*

Perhaps I shall be told that the laws of nature, by which Jesus wrought his miracles, were very high laws, then unknown, and still unknown to the world, but which he perfectly comprehended. To this I have two answers. And first, if Jesus knew that he performed his miracles by these high natural laws, he was not only guilty of false and inconsequent reasoning, in attempting to prove his divine commission by them, but he was also guilty of the most unblushing effrontery and falsehood, in uniformly ascribing them to God. Common honesty required him to tell us the truth, and the pretensions to a divine mission carried this obligation up to its highest point. But secondly; this shallow attempt to rid the New Testament of every thing like real miracles, accomplishes its work, as far as that is possible, by assuming a miracle, not inferior to the most stupendous which the Bible records. Jesus perfectly comprehended these high, and, to all the world beside, unknown laws of nature! And who was Jesus, thus to get the start of the whole human race in the domain of natural science? A poor mechanic of Nazareth of Galilee; a Jew by birth and education, without learning, without advantages, ignorant of the great world of literature and science which Greece and Rome opened to the student, ignorant of every thing that could enable him to dive into the mysteries of nature, and draw forth her wonderful powers. And yet, if we must believe our new fledged philosophers, this man, thus conditioned, actually knew more of nature, saw deeper into her bosom, and grasped more of her energies, than the whole scientific world, from the days of

Tubal-Cain, that primitive "instructer of every artificer in brass and iron," down to this present moment. Nay, he strode on so immensely before the ages, that our lynx-eyed science of this very day cannot even catch a glimpse of his footsteps. Of all miracles ever exhibited on earth, Jesus of Nazareth, on this supposition, is the greatest; for by what "law of nature," I would humbly ask, did he, or could he, attain to such vast and astonishing knowledge? I should sooner expect to meet the highest reach of European science and art in a nation of savages, than such transcendant knowledge in any citizen of ancient Galilee. Possibly, I shall be told that this miraculous power is the fruit of moral or spiritual developement; but were this granted, which of course it cannot be, how would it relieve us of the difficulty? How came Jesus of Nazareth by such an immense moral developement? What natural causes conspired to raise him to such an immeasurable height above his whole nation, his whole race? And how, on this hypothesis, did it happen, that the fishermen of Galilee, so suddenly afterwards came to tread in his footsteps? Besides, Peter denied that it was by "any power or holiness" of their own, that the apostles wrought miracles.

In all these vagaries — for they deserve no better name — we are only passing from miracle to miracle, in the absurd attempt to avoid all miracles. To him who can sit down meekly, and with a teachable spirit, to the perusal of the New Testament, these difficulties all vanish. According to that, *God sent Jesus*, and accompanied him with all necessary wisdom and power. The doctrine was God's, the miracles were his also.

In the foregoing presentation of the New Testament doctrine of miracles, it has been shown, that not only did the Saviour represent his miracles as properly divine works, and as legitimate proofs of his Messiahship, but that they were thus received, and that great multitudes did believe in Jesus as the Christ, on account of these works. Whether they acted with reason or otherwise, may perhaps be disputed by some, and is likely to be, by that class of thinkers, or no-thinkers, who speak of the miracles as objections and hindrances to Christian faith. We meet with some German divines, who imagine that the doctrines of

Christianity must recommend its miracles, rather than miracles confirm its doctrines. I shall have little dispute on this point. If, as I maintain, and as the New Testament constantly teaches, miracles are the direct works of God, I shall take it for granted, that in working so many of them in the first planting of our Holy Religion, infinite Wisdom had some important purpose in view. That purpose, according to the New Testament, was to prove Jesus' mission and Messiahship; and to say that the means were inappropriate or insufficient, to effect the end proposed, is modestly to charge God with folly! I may perhaps be told, as it has been repeatedly asserted in this country, that this means, if it were the means, actually failed — that the miracles did not bring men to a faith in Christ and his gospel. If by this it is only meant, that the miracles of Jesus did not convince *all* who saw, or heard of them, it is readily conceded; but if it be supposed that this is any objection against the validity of this kind of proof, it should be remembered that it lies equally against every kind of proof, and indeed all proof of every kind which was granted to recommend and confirm the Christian religion; for both external and internal evidence was insufficient to convince some of the stubborn and malicious Jews, to whom the gospel was first preached, and some Gentiles, to whom it was afterward carried. Nor is there any kind of proof, except demonstration, properly so called, which does command universal belief; and this, from the very nature of the case, is not applicable to religion, natural or revealed, nor to any of the affairs of human life. Yet miracles approach as near to this kind of proof, as any thing in the whole range of human experience, and he who can resist their force, "would not be persuaded, though one rose from the dead."

From what I have now said, let it not be thought that I undervalue the *internal* evidences of our holy religion, o reject the moral arguments which have so often, and so powerfully been urged in its favor. Yet while I would place a proper estimate upon this evidence, and these arguments, I cannot avoid the fullest conviction, that no man can reject the evidence of prophecy and miracles, without endangering the whole Christian faith, nay, without destroying it. It is not a case that admits of our election.

We are not at liberty to choose, that we will rest Christianity on merely internal evidence, to the exclusion of the external. We are not at liberty thus to do, because the Founder of Christianity himself has determined its proofs, and has so inwoven prophecy and miracles with his whole life and religion, that no man can separate, without destroying them. Historically, you can no more conceive of Christianity without miracles, than you can conceive of the free, democratic institutions of the United States, without the Revolutionary war. They are not only linked indissolubly together, but one is a growth, the developement of the other. Without miracles, no man ever yet assigned even a probable cause for the origin of Christianity, or its early and rapid progress. This has been the great problem for infidelity to solve, for eighteen hundred years, and it is as far from a solution now, as it was at the beginning. Take Christianity as it comes to us in its own authentic records, and it explains its own facts, and makes luminous every phenomenon which disturbs and harrasses the unbeliever. Reject the miracles, and as has been well remarked by a foreign writer, "the growth and spread of the Christian religion, may almost appear more miraculous without the miracles than with them."

I have 'before remarked, that this whole *Neologistic*, or *Rational* mode of thinking and of treating the miracles of the New Testament, is purely German. For the last hundred years, the German mind has been in a state of constant, and almost unparalleled ferment, and theology unfortunately, owing to the peculiar character of German institutions, has opened a wide field for the exhibition of every hypothesis and fancy under heaven. An unbounded reliance on philosophical *Gnosis;* an absolute rage for novelty, under the delusive notion, that whatever is novel, must therefore be true; a sincere desire, perhaps, in many cases, for a deeper insight and knowledge, and a real, but unavowed infidelity in many others; a wish, it may be in some instances, to remove our religion from the attacks of its enemies, by surrendering the chief points of assault, and a fixed purpose in others to betray it into the hands of the foe; a restlessness under authority, and a vain ambition to place Christianity in new lights, and on new grounds; these, and the like dispositions, have conspired

to produce these results to which I have referred. Talents, learning, ingenuity, an unwearied industry and perseverance, have been consecrated to the furtherance of such ends and aims. But the mania has reached its crisis, and more truly rational views are prevailing. Many of the notions that were rife a few years ago, are now growing obsolete; and I cannot doubt, that the time is hastening on when Germany shall take her place among the foremost of the nations of Christendom in a sound, a living, practical, Scripture orthodoxy.

Unfortunately for this country, a few, who are capable of better things, amuse themselves, and perhaps flatter a puerile vanity, by picking up the slough of the German mind, by gathering the froth and scum thrown off in its process of fermentation, and then sagely present it to us Americans, as the results of their own profound investigations, or lofty thought. But, beneath these Coryphei, there is another, and a less enviable rank, a class of young ardent spirits, who, ignorant alike of the German language and theology, have picked up, at third or fourth hand, a few German notions upon miracles and inspiration, and with a few learned words like "developement" and "moral consciousness," launch forth from this dark mundane sphere, into the bright Infinite, and revel to absolute satiety, amidst the Beautiful, the Good, and the True. What are miracles to them! What is the Bible, with its plain teachings, its simple gospel, to their illuminated souls! They can manufacture at will, their own Christs, and their own Evangels. They need no revelation from God, for their developed moral consciousness is at once the teacher, and the infallible judge of all truth. If they meet a miracle, which the dullness of other minds would require to be explained, it is easily done by appealing to animal magnetism, — of which it seems our Saviour was the original discoverer — or else to some mysterious laws of nature, to which they are just opening the way. To us poor plodders here in the dust of an earthly christendom; to us, the unphilosophical believers in Jesus of Nazareth and his religion, as they are exhibited in the New Testament, they seem, I confess, like men decked out in the threadbare, cast-off clothing of a Jew's shop, far more than like original gentlemen.

It is not for these I write. They are beyond my reach.

But there are some young minds, not well versed in the grounds and evidences of our holy religion, which the lofty pretensions and confident air of these sciolists, might affect and injure. To such I would say, in the very language of the apostle, "Beware, lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit." If there be any thing sacred in our holy religion; if there be any thing true, let it be reverently sought, not in the wisdom of the world, but in the inspired and authoritative teachings of the New Testament. T. J. S.

Art. XXVI.

The Ministry.

To the gospel ministry, no period in the moral and religious history of our world is fraught with more peculiar interest, than the present. We seem to have arrived at that epoch, in which men begin to think that we are no longer necessarily bound to the past, with its antique forms and customs, but are permitted to stand alone by ourselves, and shape a new destiny for the race. The symbols of other ages are turned into facts, and the old dreams of poetry and philosophy, robbed of the mystery of night, are converted into tangible precepts and principles, reduced to the sternest ordeal of practicability. What was once merely believed, must now be acted. Ours is the crucible-age of the moral alchemist, which seeks only for precious metal, and casts away the dross. What was once only the object of blind, formal worship, must now be seen as something worthy of worship, and more; it must be seen as adapted to human wants, or the Moseses of our day will have no more reverence for the god or the creed worshipped, than the ancient Moses had for the golden calf of Aaron.

The excessive veneration and credulity of olden times, have been succeeded by a moral latitudinarianism. The priesthood of Egypt and Chaldea held almost illimitable sway over both civil and ecclesiastical affairs. Even that of the Israelites, by the time of the later prophets, had risen

to the excesses of authority, and, under the popular rule of tyrannical domination, the people at length became too imbecile to desire it otherwise. Primitive Christianity exerted an opposite influence for a period, but even for ages afterwards, ecclesiastical oppression appears to have gained a dominating ascendancy over the masses, — an ascendancy, the power of which has been but slowly weakening since the rise of Luther and Melanchthon. We come down to the present, and now find the religious veneration and credulity of the enlightened masses measurably reversed. A change has taken place, which perhaps is attended with some of the evils of libertinism in sentiment, but one, nevertheless, more favorable than a state of mental enslavement. Germany has experienced the effects of this change in the transcendentalism of its theology; France, in the scepticism of its philosophy; and America, in some of the radicalisms of its reforms; but these effects may be regarded as only the temporary extreme of mental independence, naturally following the former extreme of religious servitude; and another age, perhaps, may restore the public mind back to its proper equilibrium. Every revolution is liable to be followed by some evils, opposite to those which gave rise to the revolution; and although these may sometimes appear alarming, yet they shall prove ordeals for testing the true, and correcting the false and the impracticable.

These remarks may call our attention to the present state of Christendom, with more direct reference to the ministry of Universal Reconciliation. The religious revolutions of this and the last century, have established an idea of personal independence from all ecclesiastical restraint, and placed the clerical profession in a position entirely unknown before. The ministry of old theological systems formerly dictated, and the people implicitly obeyed. Its superior wisdom and authority were unquestionable. Sufficient that it had been baptized in a holy name, and had been solemnly set apart as the highest human office of divine appointment. Now men are demanding the credentials of the ministry, and the intelligent require tangible, practicable evidences of its authority. The day of clerical infallibility is fast closing. Even the Pope is sometimes questioned by his subjects, and in some of the darkest

Romish provinces of Europe, the laity begin secretly to sneer at the pretensions of monks and priests. In our own, and in all Protestant countries, when the people are called to believe, to worship, to act, they demand the reasons. Prove to us that your god is the true God. Give us your evidences before we believe. Tell us the good to be accomplished, before you call upon us to act. Shew us that you are capable of guiding and teaching, before we are commanded to follow.

To a ministry whose claims can be supported by no enduring test, this state of religious independence may present occasion for alarm. And a love of politic power may dictate the use of means to intimidate the people in their want of implicit subordination to clerical authority. Hence, the course pursued, too often we fear, by the clergy of the elder schools, to restrain the free outbreaking of public sentiment. Even the most philanthropic reforms of the age, have been denounced, apparently for no other purpose than to sustain the time-worn conservatism of Orthodox theology, and the semi-infallibility of an assuming ministry.

Recent movements, both in England and America, indicate a fearful restlessness in regard to the waning unity and power of an exclusive priesthood. The cause of this waning is found, not only in the want of sentiments sufficiently liberal, but in the want of ministerial qualifications adapted to the demands of the age. With all the advantages of wealth and literature, and influence and antiquity, the hitherto popular Protestant ministry has made but little advancement in keeping with the progress of the arts and sciences, and at the present moment is far in the rear of almost every popular movement. This has been unwillingly acknowledged, although we cheerfully admit some honorable individual exceptions. The old familiar routine of ceremony and ministration, is unchanged, and but few seem to regard it important that new themes, or new interests, or new qualifications, should be introduced, in order to elicit the sympathies of the people. Theological truisms are repeated from Sabbath to Sabbath, to the same audiences in the same manner, as though the same round of changes must be eternally rung, to make salvation sure.

It is not wonderful that such a ministry should take occasion for alarm, at modern boldness and innovation. The cause of its waning influence over the masses, it is to be feared, may remain unknown, until after its glory shall have forever departed. But the state of things to which we have adverted, may create no unsettling alarm among liberal Christians. If we are compelled to see that new demands are made for an elevated ministry, we shall begin to cast about in search of the causes of deficiency, and the means of establishing a higher standard of qualifications.

But while we are convinced that some facilities for advancement are requisite, and that changes must necessarily come, it may be allowed, that no respect can be entertained for that innovating spirit which would sweep away every vestige of the past, and rob even the grey haired apostle of his glory, as pioneer in the kingdom of impartial Christianity. This spirit may be regarded as one of the evils attendant upon modern religious revolution, and it may be regretted, that the newly born of the present generation should so far forget their spiritual birth, as to imagine that they are no longer bound, by grateful remembrances, to their spiritual progenitors, but are at liberty to speak of them with the lightest flippancy, and to place them a century or less behind the age. It is not well to forget our sires, or undervalue their services, because they have done the rough, hard work, which might have been left for us to do, and which, had they left undone, might have found us but poorly prepared for the task, instead of now leaving us broad, open fields, waving with golden harvests, ripe for the reaper.

But while we reverence their memory, we may not believe, that the ministry of any one age can become the arbitrary precedent of every subsequent age. The perpetual change going on in the moral and religious condition of society, may demand a proportionate change in the matter and manner of ministerial labor. The danger lies in either one of two extremes: the extreme of conservatism, and the extreme of radicalism. The former adheres to the past with an idolatrous tenacity, and, with a servile imitation, deems that the mode of argument and illustration, adopted during the last century, is alike essential now. It is seldom suggestive or original, and never attempts to pre-

sent truth in a new light. It takes the slowest, circuitous route of proofs, and forgets that men now desire to come at the truth with the least possible circumlocution. It sometimes labors, perhaps, to indoctrinate those who are already indoctrinated, to convince those who have long since been convinced, to break down prejudices which have ceased to exert any considerable influence, to interpret passages of Scripture which have been familiarly understood from the days of Winchester; and, in brief, to regard theoretical theology as the Alpha and Omega of Christianity.

In some of its phases, this extreme is content with the work of mere demolition. If the old citadels of error can be demolished, nothing more is apparently requisite. Men's spiritual houses may be torn down over their heads, and the foundation be raised; and when this is accomplished, they are left to seek for themselves. We are unwilling to charge home any design of this character; and yet the fact is most undeniable, that much preaching has sounded more like an attempt to destroy the old, long cherished systems of faith, than an effectual attempt to build up the temple of truth, and to present its beauties in their loveliest attractions. And besides, a profession of utter indifference has been made, in relation to all other than apostolical qualifications for the ministry. It may appear singular, but no less so than true, that there are prejudices among us against many things, which arise merely from the fact, that these things have been advocated and abused by denominations of an opposite faith. We are unwilling, however, to admit, that these prejudices are either numerous or long-lived, especially in regard to the importance of denominational education, the interest demanded in behalf of judicious reforms, and the absolute necessity of a ministry, elevated in tone with the highest influences of the age.

The spirit of ultra-radicalism, to which we have alluded, seems as far in the opposite extreme. Outgrowing every thing of the past, it professes next, an utter contempt of all the former modes of argument, and thought, and appeal, and labors for an entire renovation in the hitherto existing matter and manner of ministerial proceeding. If it does not regard the fathers as exceedingly superstitious, it re-

gards them, at least, not as wise as they might have been. It virtually presupposes, that the circumstances of every previous age must have been equal with the present, in point of advantage, and whatever of the past is now deemed not strictly binding upon us, is cast aside as unsound, and as having, somewhere and sometime, indicated a great weakness of intellect. The absorbing idea of human progress, seems to have obliterated all remembrance of the fact, that we are but the children of the generation so much contemned, and that another generation coming, may have no more charity for our youthfulness, than we have for the benighted sons of the last age. To judge all men, both of the past and the present, by our highest standard of moral and intellectual consciousness, if not the leading, is far from being the least, mistake of this theological radicalism.

It is not readily believed, that this spirit is either very deep, or widely prevalent; and it never can be, without an entire change in the nature of truth and humanity. It is necessarily of a limited and temporary character. It is not surprising, that the rationalism and reform of the present century, should lead to some apparently startling excesses, but it may be believed, that these excesses will at length react, and bring the mind back to the medium of moderation. It was impossible that the religious sentiments of veneration and belief, should always remain taxed as they were for centuries, and it may become equally impossible, that these sentiments can long remain in the opposite state of reaction. Men may break loose for a time from all old allegiances, and in the rapid race of human progress, may seem to outrun every thing that belongs to the past. But men will still believe and revere, and associations yet will linger around the present, and weave in the enchantment of things old, and mysterious, and venerable.

But the fact that we may be able to see nothing finally destructive in the tendency of this radicalism, may not allow us to rest too secure from the evils of its present influence. We are not yet permitted to believe, that the spirit of reform requires us to forget the fundamental principles of our religion. The work begun by our spiritual fathers, is far from being completed. We have fallen into an erroneous position, if we regard the world as already

sufficiently indoctrinated, to warrant us in remaining comparatively indifferent in reference to the distinguishing features of liberal Christianity. Almost every community is still in need of light, on points with which we are so familiar, that we fondly suppose all should be equally informed with ourselves. The minister may have more relish for higher and deeper truths, and may feel more interest in views of a lofty and sublime character, beyond the developement of ordinary minds, but he may remember that there are other minds waiting for the first dawn of light,—minds among the young and the old, yet weak and infantile, or unborn into the kingdom.

The ambition to soar above all the ordinary heights of understanding, may succeed in gaining a certain reputation, but may often fail in proving the most edifying or profitable. Words that speak home with a winning familiarity to the human heart, and address the common, as well as the cultivated mind, and that communicate the plain, practical intelligence of truth, are the words most frequently needed among the wanting masses of society. It is not always so much in the sublimity of conception, and in the originality of matter, as in the winning and attractive spirit of presentation. The commonest thoughts may thrill with newly awakened interest, when clothed in the simplest sentences of natural eloquence. No one can commend the stale, unoriginal repetition of hackneyed phrases and themes; and yet a commendable distinction may be made between matter and manner, below mediocrity, and above ordinary intelligence. It is true that we may be delighted at times, with flights above the usual level, and we may regard that as a noble, Christian genius, which is able to plunge deep into the mine of thought, and to soar high in the upper elements. Such profundity, and originality of talent, become sometimes requisite to elicit the interest of cultivated minds, and without this, the ministry receives but little influence or sympathy from the learned and the intellectual.

But there is an excess of this talent, which may become fastidious in regard to every thing not entirely original or striking, and in its fastidiousness may even pass over many of the plain and most important truths of Christianity. In its gaze after something far-fetched, it may overlook that needful knowledge, which,

"——— Like our common food
Unhedg'd, lies open in life's common field."

It may sacrifice a sentiment to the smoothness of a sentence, or the roundness of a period. It may disrelish the explicit statement of any plain theological truth, lest definite doctrine should excite the distaste of the over-nice; and the use of the denominational name of Universalism, or any other *ism*, may be regarded as quite antiquated and very indelicate, to say the least, if not absolutely offensive and sectarian.

It will be remembered that we are alluding to an extreme, which we are unwilling to admit is, or ever will become, prevalent to any considerable extent, while our ministry is governed by the candid and rational spirit of Christianity, which has marked our history thus far; though the over-fastidious and non-committal course adopted by that popular ministry in New England, which entertains more sympathy in sentiment and fellowship for our fraternity, than any other, may not have been without its influence. It may seem inexpedient, perhaps, to some, that any allusions of this character should appear before the public. But if there are possible dangers, or apparent deficiencies, we are called to take an open position before that public, in which the ministry is appointed to labor. That we are still necessarily imperfect, is no more than every sect in Christendom must admit, in reference to its own ministry. And if our failings, in any respect, are manifested in community, unless there is a sufficient exercise of humility and candor to acknowledge it, to offer our protest, and to submit suggestions of a remedial character, that community must regard our silence as indicative of either weakness, or indifference, and will render us responsible for these failings, and all their hindrances to the cause of God's truth. Concealment is impossible before an Argus-eyed Christendom; and is not asked.

As delicate as we may feel, in reference to owning that we are still deficient, unless we do own it, and adopt some corrective measures, it must inevitably be told us by the loud-tongued world, in a manner to cause a deeper humiliation. There is no cause here for a panic, and yet there is a duty to be discharged on this subject, which permits of no indifferentism. We may trust, that those who

would read and appreciate a Magazine of this character, may be prepared to make some palliation for the circumstances under which our denomination has risen to its present comparatively promising condition, and to allow for the disadvantageous struggles, against which our ministry has labored. Considering all things, it will be believed, that there is no occasion for serious alarm, though there is unquestionable room for improvement.

Hitherto, many converts to the ministry have come over to the advocacy of our sentiments from the field of controversy, and have naturally brought with them the zeal of a bold, controversial spirit. This has been unavoidable. Inflamed by that noble ardor which becomes aroused from the long torpor of error, and which starts up with new life before the convictions of impartial truth and love, they have suddenly awakened into another being, and resolved to enlist as champions of the gospel. And many, prepared only by the natural gifts of God, trusting for the spirit of their Master, have gone out accomplishing a commendable work. Others again, inflamed only by an unnatural zeal, which has necessarily proved of a temporary character, under the impulse of weak and short-lived energies, have enlisted for a time, and after a few ineffectual efforts, have languished, and their ministerial existence has closed or lingered along in an intermediate state. Classes of a character somewhat similar with this may be grouped together, and none can fail to account for their limited success.

A zeal for controversy alone, must be acknowledged as inefficient for the gospel ministry. Something more than a desire to gain a theological conquest over the errors of the religious world is requisite. If this desire lies at the foundation of all hope, numerous defeats and disappointments will surely ensue. The young man, radiant with new light and strong in the faith, feels confident of the power lodged within him; and in the warmth of his energy, perhaps, resolves to commence public labors with little delay. Sanguine of immediate success, he fancies no possibility of failure, and believes that he can easily convince others of that which appears so evident to his own mind. Other than the ability to advocate and defend the impartial gospel as a theory, and to oppose the old

systems of theology, perhaps, never enters his mind as necessary to render him qualified for the ministry.

The frequent result in such cases is painfully obvious. The zeal of the uninitiated has transcended both knowledge and experience. He finds society still filled with men and women who are yet unprepared for a liberal Christianity, and he becomes impatient with the tardy advancement of truth, and the questionable manner in which his labors are received. He finds the field of the ministy one of long, unwearied toil, and a thousand difficulties and demands are made which had never been fairly anticipated. He wonders that community is not immediately aroused and convinced according to his own convictions. He sees many who are already favorable to the truth he attempts to advocate, but he is unable to enlist their interest or awaken a commendable spirit of action. Impatient of success, perhaps, he abandons all ennobling exertion, and attributes his failure to the ingratitude of friends or the want of being duly appreciated. We are aware that these statements may sound severe and censorious, but when facts meet us in the face there is no possible evasion. We may offer no impeachment of motives in instances of this character, for it is believed that motives may often be of the purest nature, where, at the same time, there is a lack of comprehensiveness in judgment relative to the demands and qualifications of the gospel teacher.

But neither purity of motives nor goodness of character alone can afford all the facilities of ministerial success. As indispensable as these are, by themselves they are unable to impart a vigorous power to public ministrations. We may sympathize with the emotions of that excellent man who appears willing to consecrate himself unreservedly to the Master's work, and we may admire his sacrificing spirit, yet while it is painfully apparent that he is deficient in some positive energies and attainments, indispensable to any considerable success as a minister, we are unable to hope otherwise. To onjoy the reputation of being called a "good man," is commendable indeed; but when this compliment is bestowed, it too frequently means —nothing more. A physician may be a good man, in a moral sense, and yet be regarded an unskillful physician.

But let it not be supposed that the absence of Christian

virtues of the most elevated character, will ever allow of any eminent usefulness in the gospel ministry. We only intended to premise that these alone cannot always supply the lack of other abilities. The minister's mere tact and speech, without a high exemplification of Christian excellences, may serve only to render all his professions odious to the world. Bare intellectual prudence and management and talent, governed only by the motive to succeed in gaining an influence, the policy of establishing a reputation or personal advantage, without that deep motive of duty and principle which would dictate the same course of life under every circumstance, may prevail for a time, but can never supply the place of those spontaneous virtues which emanate from a heart and mind under the influence of divine regeneration.

There are many spheres in the Christian ministry where unsoundness of heart and the want of a spirit baptised in the loftiest elements of religion, will be detected and cause failures in the fulfilment of duty. Nothing short of a thorough culture of all the moral and religious sentiments, can prepare the mind for the multiplied scenes of trial in which the pastor is called to mingle and render the hopes and the sympathies of Christianity. A cold form of duty may sometimes avail, but will more often reveal its hollowness, and react with an overpowering consciousness of an absence of deep, spiritual earnestness of soul. Patient instruction to the uninformed, consolation to the afflicted, strength to the weak and tempted, hope to the dispondent, and prayer either in the sanctuary or at the bedside of the sick and dying, and many other ministrations of the gospel, may seem like the services of a task-master, dictated as cold duties of necessity, without the impulse of motives that arise from the emotions of a spiritually cultivated heart. In fact, but few have ever felt themselves fully prepared for these trying occasions of duty.

A liberal ministry of the present age, perhaps, may be regarded as possessing some peculiar attractions to young men whose minds may have been upon other learned professions. While the medical and legal professions have been fluctuating and at the same time filled with supernumerary hosts, both with many indications of revolution and decline, and especially the profession of the bar, they

have ceased to offer the most flattering promises; while the revolutions of the religious world, of late, have measurably tended to give the ministry an almost entirely new sphere, and to offer inducements hitherto unknown, and of an exalted character. When science and philosophy and the higher branches of literature were considered obnoxious to theology, and foreign to the pulpit, the ministry presented little or no attractions to certain classes of minds. But liberal Christianity has effected a public revolution on this subject, and the ministerial field is now beginning to be regarded as demanding the whole range of science, philosophy and literature. Hence, it may not be surprising that many have turned their attention to it as the most favorable opening for lofty hopes and aspirations, without deeply considering its disinterested mission of philanthropy, and the higher motives requisite to the candidate. While the ministry may demand some proficiency in the popular branches of intellectual education, it may not be deemed the proper field of literary ambition. There are pulpit and pastoral duties which will admit of but little infringement. The highest hopes and the most arduous labors are demanded in behalf of the parish and pulpit. All ambition must become measurably confined to the one great profession itself, or a partial failure is almost inevitable. A love of Christian truth and the growth of genuine religion must be the absorbing aim. Every facility for mental advancement and every pursuit in intellectual science are needed as aids in the ministration of that highest and holiest of all missions. Unless the religious sentiments are kept in predominant activity, any ministry will prove ineffectual. More love for literature than for theology or religion, more ambition in behalf of intellectual attainments than in behalf of Christ's kingdom, will surely be succeeded by spiritual barrenness and desolation.

This is no field offering the mere luxuries of literature, but one of hard labor, in which are still found elements that demand subduing. A large portion of the world is yet unconvinced and unconverted. Trying sacrifices are still required, and he who hopes to find success here in ease, will meet with the worst disappointments. Without the most serious preparations, mental and religious, for the work of the ministry, young zeal and aspiration alone will

soon be followed by the most mortifying failure. Vague dreams of glory, with no hopes or qualifications of the true exalted character, after a few years of experience, will vanish before untried realities. And there is no flattery here for that impatience, which is sanguine of immediate conquests without one substantial basis for expectation.

There is much that might be said here, and more than is desirable. An allusion may be made to that ambition which is satisfied only with the most popular fields of labor, and unless such fields are immediately opened, it is thought that there is a lack of appreciation. But that ambition were better confined to a limited sphere; and the experience of years, perhaps, may bring some humiliating lessons of the vanity of inordinate aspirations. There are different fields of labor adapted to different talents, and the servant of Him who went about doing good at the call of humanity, may rest assured that he will be called where his labors are most needed and are the most appropriately adapted. And the more humble the sphere, the less the care, and the more the time for self-culture and the opportunity for noble exertions.

But the difference in the spheres of the ministry may not lead to indifferentism in regard to the importance of the highest preparation and improvement. There are excesses in application to study, and excesses in intellectual indolence. The former will induce failure in pastoral duties, and the latter in the demands of the pulpit. For a failure in the latter, there is no apology that will avail before a discriminating public. We may despise art and education as we please, and contend that apostolical qualifications are as efficient and complete now as they were centuries since; but when an intelligent community calls for an instructive, influential ministry, the call must be answered, or an immense loss of influence be suffered. What shall be done? That a high standard is needed, can no longer remain questionable. The time has passed, when nothing more than a knowledge of theology in its most superficial branches, as requisite in popular religious controversies, and a few smatterings in science and literature, will prove available. We are not prepared to commend modern fastidiousness in every particular, but we cannot, at the same time, avoid the conviction that there

have been some just reasons of complaint against the ministry. Not against ours more than all others; or as much; for we believe that no ministry has excelled it, or succeeded as well, under similar disadvantages, in making a deeper impression in the public mind. But professing the highest moral and religious position, a high position is requisite in regard to all the leading interests and improvements of the day. Our institutions, religious, reformatory and educational, must occupy a commanding platform. Our periodicals for the people need sustaining, but we have need also of sustaining works of the most elevated theological and literary tone. We have publications of this character which have done credit both to the authors and publishers, and they are constantly increasing. As an Annual, the Rose of Sharon now stands equal to any work of the kind in our country. But the fate of the Expositor is known to all. It has been succeeded by the Quarterly; but shall we ask how this elevated work is and has been sustained by many of the ministry during its first years of existence? It is now in its fourth year, and appeal after appeal has been put forth. But it may be regretted that its subscription list speaks but faintly in praise of many whose names are absent. To say that there is a want of taste and appreciation for a periodical like the Quarterly, is more than is freely confessed, and yet without this confession the deficiency in ministerial supporters is wholly unaccountable.

We shall not be understood as idolizing human qualifications, and yet their importance will be admitted as indispensable. The new age demands appropriate thought and style and illustration in presenting Christianity. Helps may be found in the works of the past, but every man is now required, besides, to think and communicate for himself. Without a knowledge of the themes of public interest in present vogue, there is no adaptation to public wants. The skeletons of old sermons that lived and spoke in the last century, need not be raised to life for the present. Men must now build and fill up for themslves, for plagiarism has become an employment of a questionable character. And yet there are some models of the past from which we may derive profitable lessons in thought and style. The earnestness of Massillon, the deep, varied

thoughtfulness of Saurin, the fervent, yet simple eloquence of Fenelon, the rich, chaste simplicity of Blair, may afford the most impressive influences. The sermons of Channing, of Martineau, of Dewey, and of some living divines in our midst, not wholly confined to other denominations, are worthy of the closest perusal in the formation of an efficient style of thought and communication. Yet no extraneous aids can supply a deficiency, in the absence of self-culture, of personal independence and application, of energies capable of educing some amount of freshness and originality, of close perseverance in thought and study, of careful preparation for the desk, and the ability to command a natural and an effective mode of communication. Let individuality be sacrificed, and the pulpit is not only turned into a stage, but the minister becomes a mimicking actor.

But while other things are borne in mind, it may be well also to remember the first requisitions of Christianity. The servant, not above his Master, may ever learn more readily at *one* school, than at the schools of all other authority, and learn too, with no pride or arrogance to lead into a state of mental self-sufficiency,— with no self-assurances of perfection in human tact or attainment, — with no inordinate love of ambition to soar above the multitudes, — with no mock heroism or philanthropy blushing at the humility of Jesus or the lowliest saintship of his disciples, and with no seeking after the favor or the emolument of men above the self-forgetfulness of Christian sacrifice and duty. There is much still to be learned of Him whom the world's conceited wisdom would disown.

In the love of innovation, and in the refinement of public tastes, heed may be taken lest all taste for the unadorned truth is lost, and the simplicity as well as the usefulness of the gospel become forgotten. A high state of cultivation, it is true, is not expected to tolerate the labors of the ministry without the assistance to be drawn from science and philosophy, from nature and poetry, from history and biography, — without a portion of the needed embelishments of elocution, nor without an interest in those reforms which are revolutionizing our race. In fact, the ministry is comparatively powerless without an evinced interest in those tastes and movements which are dictated by a higher state of humanity and intelligence.

The pulpit has long enough been denounced as a century behind the age; but in doing the duty now to be done, and in repelling this charge, no necessity exists to compel Christianity itself to be outstripped. The cry of bigotry need not frighten from the extreme of old conservatism into the other extreme of ranting radicalism; but, grounded on that truth which is as old as time, yet fresh as eternity, the genuine gospel ministry may stand on the equilibrium platform, and remain unmoved in principle among the surrounding revolutions. Well that a steadying balance is held somewhere, in these changing times, and that things long cherished are not too hastily laid upon the altar of sacrilege. New light shall yet come, and new revolutions; but neither the dawn of a brighter intelligence nor the change in human systems of religion, shall alarm the true sentinel of Zion. U. C.

Art. XXVII.

The Scripture Doctrine of Creation.

Not more remarkably does the Bible differ from all ancient books in the manner in which its teachings disclose the being, unity, spirituality, and moral government of God, than in its views respecting the origin of the universe, and of the myriad forms of existence with which it is peopled. Though written at different periods, and for the most part by men who knew nothing of the advantages of intellectual culture, its pages are radiant with a philosophy of nature which is transcendently simple, spiritual and sublime,—a philosophy, a theory, infinitely superior to all the other teachings of the ancient world; wearing upon its face distinct marks of the reality of its claims to a divine origin. It is marred by traces of none of the systems of pantheism, dualism, polytheism, or scepticism, which hung, spectre-like, over the early ages. Its difference from, and its superiority over, them all, are distinctly indicated by the sentence which forms the commencement of the sacred volume:—"In the beginning God created the heaven

and the earth;" and this doctrine, asserting that all things in universal nature have been created, made, or formed, (words having essentially the same meaning in the mouths of the sacred teachers,) by the direct agency of one God, pervades like a thread of gold the entire teachings of the book.

It is a great mistake to imagine, as many appear to have done, that the account of the production of the earth and its inhabitants, in the first chapter of Genesis, usually called the Mosaic Cosmogony, covers the whole subject of creation, as presented in the Scriptures. It is true, this account forms the only instance in which any of the sacred teachers have indulged in anything like detail, touching the order in which things were brought into existence; but if this account were torn from the Bible by the rude hand of a sceptical philosophy, there would still remain in it almost everything essentially important affecting the subject of creation, at least as regarded from a religious point of view. We have no fears, however, that this account will be effectually set aside. In freedom from absurd and sickening details, — in simplicity, beauty, and grandeur, it has no parallel in any of the cosmogonies that have come down to us from the past; and if it be compared, in the light of a liberal interpretation, with the disclosures of modern science, — disclosures of which the writer could have known nothing, — it will be found to be substantially true. It *has* stood, it *will* stand, investigation. But we must not allow it to engross our whole attention, in considering what the Scriptures teach in relation to the subject in hand. There is scarcely a page on which we are not expressly taught, that all things have had their origin in a work of creation, — in the will and energy of an all-wise and benevolent Creator; as in the following sublime passages: — "O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all; the earth is full of thy riches." "I consider thy heavens the work of thy fingers; the moon and the stars, which thou hast ordained." "He commanded, and they were created." "He spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast." "Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me." "The great God formed all things." "The Lord hath made all things for himself." "Thus saith the Lord, the Holy One of

Israel, and his Maker; Ask of me concerning the work of mine hands. I have made the earth, and created man upon it: I, even my hands, have stretched out the heavens, and all their host have I commanded. Thus saith the Lord, that created the heavens, God himself that formed the earth; he hath established it: he created it not in vain; he formed it to be inhabited." "We preach unto you, that ye should turn from these vanities to the living God, who made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are therein." "God made the world, and all things therein." "We are his workmanship." "Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honor and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created." "And God saw everything that he made, and, behold, they were very good."[1]

These are some of "the Vestiges of Creation," which have been transmitted to us in the archives of revelation, and they leave us no room to hesitate, in regard to the Scriptural view of the origin of things. They have their origin, not in chance, not in the repetition of mechanical forces, acting in a circle, nor in the action of a self-regulating law of natural developement, operating independently of a directing intelligence, nor yet in the perpetual evolution of different forms of being from one homogeneous mass, "changing through all, and yet in all the same:" but, on the Scriptural hypothesis, all things have their origin in the *creative energy* of one God, each appearing at the time, and with the qualities, which he is pleased to assign them. Nor are we left to doubt, in regard to the end or purpose for which they have been called into being. They have a destiny corresponding to the dignity of their origin, varying in degrees, of course, with the limits prescribed to each in the constitution of their natures. Receiving their existence from a Being who is as wise and good as he is powerful, they have all been created for benevolent purposes,—for his glory and their good. "For himself,"—"for his pleasure they are, and were created;" and as it is his pleasure to communicate to others the hap-

[1] Ps. civ. 24; viii. 3; cxlviii. 5; xxxiii. 9; cxix. 73. Prov. xxvi. 10; xvi. 4. Isa. l. 26; lv. 11, 12—18. Acts xiv. 15; xvii. 24. Eph. ii. 10 Rev. iv. 11. Gen. i. 31.

piness and virtue that dwell in himself, every thing has been made "very good."

Such is the Scripture doctrine of creation. Before attempting further to develope its nature and relations, and before considering its claims to truth in the light of modern science, we will bring it into comparison with the most prominent systems of theology and cosmogony, that prevailed among the nations of antiquity. We shall thus be able to see the originality and sublimity of the Scriptural view.

Beginning with the Egyptians, with whom the Jews were more intimately related than any other ancient nation, and in whose wisdom Moses was learned,[2] we find good reason for believing, that he acted no part of an impostor, in claiming to have received his views of God and nature through a miraculous enlightenment. That there was a radical difference between the Egyptian and the Jewish theology, and therefore that the latter could not have been borrowed from the former, has been amply shown by the unsuspicious testimony of Herodotus, Plutarch, and Tacitus. The latter of these heathen historians says: "With regard to the Deity, their creed is different. The Egyptians worship various animals, and also certain symbolical representations, which are the work of man; the Jews acknowledge one God only, and him they see in the mind's eye, and him they adore in contemplation, condemning, as impious idolators, all who, with perishable materials, wrought into the human form, attempt to give a representation of the Deity. The God of the Jews, is the great governing Mind, that directs and guides the whole frame of nature, eternal, infinite, and neither capable of change, nor subject to decay."[3] A living writer, in a very able work on the religion of ancient Egypt, after a wide survey of the subject, remarks: "With respect to theology, no two systems can be more directly opposed to each other, than the Mosaic doctrine was to that of the Egyptians. . . . We must therefore conclude, that in promulgating that great and conspicuous truth which Moses constantly displays, as the end and principal aim of all his regulations, he was neither guided by the lessons,

[2] Acts vii. 22. [3] Murphy's Tacitus, *History*, v. 5

nor influenced by the examples, of his Egyptian instructers." [4]

That the Egyptians were Polytheists of a very low stamp, is universally conceded. Besides numberless gods, heroes, and men, they worshipped various kinds of animals and plants. Juvenal reproaches them with making "every clove of garlic a god." It appears, however, that, beyond all these, the objects of their worship, they had a dim and misty conception of an infinite intelligent principle, pervading universal nature. It was their primitive god, but it was a god without creative power, and seemingly without personality. "It was the primitive obscurity, the incomprehensible being, the hidden source of all light and life." From him all things have their origin, not by creation, but by generation or emanation. His first emanation is an inferior being, called Kneph, or Cneph, from whom emanates another god, called Phta, or Phtha; from these an immense egg is generated, which, when hatched, produces the elements and the various tribes of being. Such, briefly stated, was the Egyptian cosmogony. Its distance from the Mosaic system will be still more apparent, when it is added, that the primitive god of the Egyptians was thought to be one with nature. Plutarch says, citing the words of Hecatæus, "they consider the primitive deity and the universe, as one identical being." It appears, then, that Polytheism was the body of the Egyptian religion, and Pantheism its soul. [5]

Passing to the Phenicians, we find little relating to our subject, except a system of cosmogony, attributed by Philo and Eusebius to Sanchoniathon, a Phenician historian, who is supposed to have lived about the time of Joshua. As it has been claimed by some, that it bears a close resemblance to the cosmogony of Moses, it is deserving of notice. As found in Eusebius, *Præparatio Evangelica*, it reads thus:—"The Phenician theology assumes, as the origin of the material universe, a dark and condensed

[4] Prichard's *Egyptian Mythology*, pp. 406, 407.

[5] See Prichard's Egyptian Mythology, pp. 170—175. 288—290. Enfield's History of Philosophy, B. I., chap. viii. Epitome of the History of Philosophy, by Prof. Henry, vol. i. pp. 89—94. In the latter, it is justly said, "the idea of creation, in the proper sense of the word, *does* not appear in the Egyptian doctrine."

windy air, or a breeze of thick air, and a turbid and black chaos. These were unbounded, and for a long time without form. But, when this wind became enamored of its own first principles, and an intimate union took place, that connection was called *Pothos;* and it was the beginning of the creation of all things. And it knew not its own production; but from its embrace with the wind, was generated Mât, which some call *Ilus*, but others, the putrefaction of a watery mixture. And from this sprung all the seed of creation, and the generation of the universe. And there were certain animals without sensation, from which intelligent animals were produced, and these were called *Zophasemin*, that is, overseers of the heavens; and they were formed in the shape of an egg; and from Mât shone forth the sun, and the moon, and the less and greater stars," &c. To us, this sounds far more like the theory of "the Vestiges," than the system of Moses; for though it talks less learnedly about the laws of nature, it seems not to differ from it in any very essential respect, except that it makes "a dark and condensed windy air," the primitive cause of all things, instead of a "universal fire-mist." The resemblance between them is very close, in representing the production of "intelligent animals" from "certain animals without sensation," on the principle of "the prolonged gestation of nature," and also in viewing every thing as produced by a law of developement inherent in nature, without the agency of a Creator. The modern theory, it is true, has a *name* for a God, though, in point of fact, no agency for a Creator; while the ancient theory has neither. From all that appears, it is thoroughly atheistical, an attempt at an explanation of the universe, by material causes;[6] or, in the words of another authority, an effort to account for the origin of all things, from "the energy of an eternal principle, active, but without intelligence, upon an eternal chaotic mass."[7]

In extending our view to Chaldea, the land of magic and astrology, we discover a religion almost perfectly identical with that of Egypt. Though the people were greatly given to the study of the material universe, particularly the heavenly bodies, they were unable to make any approach, in their views of nature and her author, to the spiritual

[6] Henry's History of Philosophy, i., p. 97.
[7] Enfield's History of Philosophy, B. I., chap. vii.

theology of the Hebrews. In practice, they were Polytheists, in theory, Pantheists. To the idea of creation by one God, they were total strangers. Of the existence of an infinite principle, diffused through universal nature, they had a dim conception, from *whom* the universe arose by emanation; and their cosmogony, as preserved to us in a fragment of Berosus, a priest of the temple of Belus, at Babylon, closely resembles the Egyptian, only that its features are perhaps a little more gross, and that it recognises, more distinctly, the action of an evil principle or god, as well as a good one, in the production of the world,—a feature which was not absent from any of the religious systems of ancient cosmogony, but that of Moses. It runs thus: "In the beginning, there was nothing but darkness, and an abyss of water, wherein resided most hideous beings, produced from a *two-fold principle*. Men appeared with two wings; some with two, and some with four faces. They had one body, but two heads; the one of a man, the other of a woman. Other human figures were to be seen, furnished with the legs and horns of goats. Some had the feet of horses behind, but before were fashioned like men, resembling hyppocentaurs. Of all these, were preserved delineations in the temple of Belus. The person who was thought to preside over them, was Omorea, a woman. Matters being in this state, a god came and cut the woman asunder; and out of half of her he formed the earth, and out of the other he made the heavens, and, at the same time, he destroyed the monsters of the abyss."[8]

The views of the Persians, especially as improved by Zoroaster, were somewhat more refined, though their notions respecting the origin of things, were far enough from agreeing with the doctrines of the Hebrew Scriptures.—Their religion was a system of Dualism, and, as it appears, a pantheistical Dualism. In their view, the first principle of all things was Time without bound, called *Zeruane Akirene*, who produced or evolved *Ormuzd* and *Ahriman*, the first an infinitely good being, the last an infinitely evil one. From these sprung the universe, half good and half evil. Ormuzd first produced an immense number of *good genii*, and his great antagonist an equal number of *evil* ones. Afterwards, Ormuzd proceeds to

[8] *Encyclopedia Brittanica*, Art. Mythology.

the production of a perfect world; but he is foiled in his efforts, and his works contaminated, by the interference of his arch adversary. The good god produces a *bull*, from the body of which spring plants and animals; but Ahriman, after urging his efforts against heaven, redescends to the earth, wounds the bull, and thus evil is introduced into all parts of nature. Such was the cosmogony of the Persians.

If we pass to India, we shall find a religion and cosmogony closely resembling, in their main features, those of Persia and Egypt. In neither the Vedas nor the Institutes of Menu, is any semblance of the Scripture doctrine of creation. The religion of the Indians, or Hindoos, was a polytheistic Pantheism. Above their innumerable gods, was recognized an eternal principle, called *Brahm*, or *Brama*, who generated and produced the universe, after having generated himself! The cosmogony of Menu, according to Sir William Jones, runs thus: "The world was all darkness, undistinguishable altogether, as in a profound sleep, till the eternal god, making it manifest with five elements, and other glorious forms, dispelled the gloom. He, desiring to raise up various creatures by an emanation from himself, first produced the waters, and impressed them with a power of motion; by that power, was produced a golden egg, in which was born Brahme, self-existing, the great Parent of all rational beings. The God having dwelt in the egg through revolving years, *Himself meditating on Himself*, divided it into equal parts, and from these halves, framed the heaven and the earth."[9] Moreover, the intense Pantheism of their system will appear, from a passage or two from the Vedas, or Sacred Writings of the Hindoos: "Fire is that" (original cause), (anticipating the author of "the Vestiges"); "the Sun is that; so is Air; so is the Moon; such, too, is that pure Brahme; and those waters, and that lord of creatures." "Even he is the god who pervades all regions; he is the first-born; it is he who is in the womb; he who is born; and he who will be produced; he severally and universally remains with all persons." "In him this world is absorbed, from him it issues. He *is this universe, and all*

[9] On the gods of Greece, Asiatic Researches, vol. i. p. 244.

that has been, or will be."[10] (These writings, we should think, would be high authority with our modern Transcendentalists.) There is, therefore, a wide disagreement between the two systems in question. To quote the words of learned and sensible writers on the subject: "In the genesis of Moses, He is the great, the only God; in the other, he is but the first creature. In Moses, too, the creation is clearly distinguished from the Creator; God works upon chaos, moulds into form already existing materials. In Menu, on the other hand, as chaos existed only in the Divine mind, so creation, (emanation), is but the manifestation of the Creator; Brahme is the soul of all beings; he produces various beings from his own substance, and their great All is but God under another form. In the former is laid the foundations of a great and pure religion; in the latter, is both Pantheism and Polytheism." "In this system, in fact, the world and all things else are clearly the results of chance. *There is no intelligent principle* to mould into any preconceived forms, the fermenting mass. Sun, and moon, and stars, shine forth, — wherefore, none can discover; they are there, in the broad heaven, beautiful by accident; parts of one great scheme, and dependant one on another, and mutually lending support to each other, and all by accident. *There is no intelligent principle*, and man, whose soul rises above this world and its systems, and whose history is one continuous struggle for moral excellence, is but a spawn of the turning sea, or the offspring of wind and of night, — yes, man, whose *intellect* is so imbued with the sense of order, that it abhors all accidents, is himself but a piece of the finest and most complicated machinery, — the very quintessence of dust — an accident. *There is no intelligent principle*, and the very gods themselves, dwarfed down into the sons of men, or of mud, are but accidents of an accident, whose will is an accident, whose law is an accident, and whose favor is an accident."[11]

We next pass to the most cultivated nation of antiquity,

[10] Prichard's Egyptian Mythology, p. 254 — 5. Compare also pp. 190 — 230. 288 — 290.

[11] Priaulx, *Quæstiones Mosaicæ*, or the Book of Genesis compared with the Remains of Ancient Religions. pp. 11, 12, 13.

the classic land of Greece. Here, too, we shall find ourselves surrounded by innumerable gods, as various in functions and character as it is possible for human imagination to conceive; though, in taking a wide and careful survey, we shall discover somewhat cheering evidence of improvement in the religious conceptions of the human mind. We shall examine the Grecian mind in vain, however, to detect in it, at any period or stage of its developement, a view of God and of the origin of things at all comparable, in point of simplicity and grandeur, with that which we have seen to pervade the sacred volume. In beginning the study of the religion of Greece, we find ourselves at work on almost the identical materials which had excited our solemn curiosity in Egypt and India, clearly indicating a kindred origin. In what is called the fabulous period of Greek philosophy, two forms of thought are especially prominent, as furnishing proof that the main elements of their religion were transplanted from the banks of the Nile and the Indus; first, the idea of an infinite chaos, in which all things, not excepting their gods, had their origin; secondly, a dim conception of the existence of an eternal principle or god, animating and governing the universe as its hidden soul. Their chaos and their eternal animating principle, let it here be observed, were both very different from the early state of the earth and the infinite Creator described by Moses. What some have called the Mosaic chaos is, in reality, no such thing, — it is certainly a very different thing from the poetic chaos of the ancient heathen world. The received translation may be a little unfortunate, and we are not alone in the opinion, that the fictions of the Greek and Latin poets respecting the awful chaos which their imaginations traversed, have materially affected the interpretation, if not the translation, of this part of the sacred narrative. "It is wonderful," says Rosenmüller, "that so many interpreters could have persuaded themselves that it was possible to detect a chaos in the words here rendered 'without form and void.' If we follow the practice of the language, the Hebrew phrase has this signification: — The earth was waste and desert, or as others prefer, empty and vacuous; i. e., uncultured and unfurnished with those things with

which the Creator afterwards adorned it." [12] The so-called Mosaic chaos was but a period in the early history of the earth, before it was fitted to be the theatre of vegetable and animal life, or during which it was undergoing a transition from a formless to a habitable state, constantly subject to the divine agency; whereas, the old heathen chaos, besides pertaining to the whole universe, was an eternal realm of disorder and lawless misrule, older even than the immortal gods, and from which, quite luckily, they had sprung. Still more manifest is the difference between the God of Moses and that of the Greeks. The former was the personal Creator of the frame of nature; the latter, only its animator or soul, giving existence only by the emanation of properties from himself; and though it is unquestionably true, that some of the Grecian philosophers rose above the idols and, in some measure, above the gods of their country, and made commendable approaches to a sublime Theism, it is painfully manifest that the Greek mind was, even in its last days, deeply Pantheistical, — "the Workman," as Gibbon has it, "not being sufficiently distinguished from the work."

A tolerably clear idea of the theology of the Greeks, including their notions of Jove, Zeus or God, and Chaos — in other words, their systems of cosmogony, may be obtained from the following extracts; the first from the verses attributed to Orpheus, the second from the theology of Hesiod, and the third from the Birds of Aristophanes:

"Zeus, god of the swift thunderbolt, was first, and Zeus was last;
Zeus the head, Zeus the middle: out of Zeus all things have been made.
Zeus is the foundation of the earth and of the starry heavens;
Zeus became a male, Zeus too was an immortal nymph.
Zeus is the breath of all things, Zeus is the rush of unwearied fire:
Zeus is the root of the ocean, Zeus is the sun and moon.
Zeus is king, Zeus is governor of all, by his swift thunderbolt.
For after hiding all things, again to the gladdening light
He restored them from his sacred heart, achieving wonderful deeds." [13]

"Chaos existed before all; next the wide-bosomed earth, the

[12] See Am. Biblical Repository, vol. vi., p. 318.
[13] Müller's History of the Literature of Ancient Greece.

ever-secure abode of the immortal host who dwell upon the tops of snow-clad Olympus, and within the dark Tartarus, in the recesses of the spacious ground; and Eros, or Love, who is the most beauteous of the immortal gods. From Chaos sprang Erebus and sable Night; from Night came Æther and Day, whom she brought forth in the embraces of Erebus." [14]

"Chaos existed first, and Night and black Erebus, and spacious Tartarus. And there was neither Earth, nor Air, nor Heaven. Then Night, clothed in sable plumage, in the boundless bosom of Erebus, first brought forth an Egg, spontaneously conceived, from which, in the revolution of ages, sprang the beautiful Eros, or Love, resplendent with golden pinions, swift as the whirlwinds. He fecundated the dark-winged Chaos in the vast Tartarus, and gave origin to our kind, (viz., to birds,) and first brought us forth to light. The race of immortal beings had no existence, until Eros confounded all the elements. But when discordant elements were mixed, the Heaven, and the Ocean, and the Earth arose, and the race of the immortal gods." [14]

The philosophers made some advances upon these notions, though we may safely doubt whether any of them ever came to entertain views of the origin of things agreeing with the Scripture doctrine of creation. Their supreme god, perhaps without a single exception, was the diffused soul of the world, not its Creator. Thales, the father of Grecian philosophy, reduced the poetical chaos of the theogonists so far towards order as to make water the cause of all things, instead of a "commixture strange of heaven, earth and hell;" and though it is probable that he acknowledged the existence of something above mere matter, it has been a subject of much dispute with philosophers since his time, whether he conceived water to be the efficient or the secondary cause of the universe. His disciple and successor, Anaximander, attributed the origin of all things to what he called a principle of infinity, by which he meant, according to Aristotle and Plutarch, an inherent tendency of all matter to repeat itself in new forms. As for mind or God, he acknowledged none, and his theory was an attempt to account for "the genesis of organic life as the effect of a long and composite series of natural processes," [15] corresponding with "the prolonged gestation of

[14] Prichard's Egyptian Mythology, p. 176.
[15] Ritter's History of Ancient Philosophy, i. 276.

nature" which figures so largely in the "Vestiges." He was followed by Anaximenes, who, in addition to acknowledging the infinity of matter with his master, contended that the first principle and cause of all things is air, or a subtle ether, which he supposed to have been universally diffused and eternally active, and which he therefore called a god. Anaxagoras, not satisfied with these materialistic theories, conceived that all things had their origin in mind, disposing and giving order to all parts of nature. It was a lofty conception, for which he was deservedly remembered after his death in the erection of an altar to his name dedicated to mind; but it does not appear that the mind to which he looked beyond the material universe, was any thing more than the animating soul of the world. There is no evidence that he regarded it as the personal Creator of the universe; it is certain that he did not regard it as the loving Father of the human race. Pythagoras, the founder of the Italic school, regarded number as the essence or first principle of all things, in such a way, however, as to make mind and matter play about an equal part in giving origin to the universe. All the god he acknowledged was an intelligent principle of universal animation, throwing off souls and worlds from himself by emanation. Cicero says, "Pythagoras never made any doubt that our souls are taken out of the divine soul." A large harvest of Pantheism was naturally the result of his teaching.

Among the ancient philosophers, none rose to higher religious conceptions than Socrates and Plato; but, though they saw the clear marks both of the reality and the unity of design in nature, and were, therefore, believers in the existence and unity of God, we can find in their teachings but a faint and feeble approximation to the Scripture view of the origin and government of things. They conceived but faintly the idea of creation, as applied to God, if, in fact, they really conceived it at all. Indeed, Socrates had the wisdom to acknowledge that it was above his ability to conceive how things have had their origin, and he was content to believe that mind presided over their origin, wholly devoting himself to the means of improving his fellow men. On a certain occasion, according to one of Plato's dialogues, Socrates said to his pupil, "I cannot find

out how the least thing takes rise or perishes, or how it exists;" [16] but to show that he was not, therefore, a sceptic, he added that he had been reading a book written by Anaxagoras, in which that philosopher had spoken of mind as the cause or source of all things, and that the thought filled him with transports of joy. In this simple conviction, the great Athenian was content to rest, without attempting to explain whether things had their origin in the Divine Mind by creation or emanation. But his pupil, having a more practical and speculative temperament, could not rest here. He essayed to spy out the very seat and centre of the Almighty, and describe the methods of his agency. He has produced a cosmogony, which, whilst acknowledging the agency of God in the production of the world, is totally wanting in the majestic simplicity and composed emphasis which distingish the tone of the sacred narative. He represents this Supreme Mind as producing — whether by creation or emanation we cannot distinctly perceive, — first, a race of gods, inferior to himself, whom he animates with intelligence. But the world itself, which is both called a god and a living animal, not counted worthy of being created by the Supreme Divinity, is described as having been made by an inferior god; and subsequently to this, a troop of gods is commissioned to bring into existence animals and men. It savors highly of the presumptuous, however, to attempt to unravel or explain his theory of the origin of things, it is involved in so much that is mystical and absurd. Not inaptly has it been called "a coalition between an eternity and a fabrication." In poring over it, one is constantly reminded of the sentence which occurs in it, showing how hard it is for man to find God without the light of revelation: — "It is difficult to discover the Maker and Father of the universe, and impossible, when discovered, to speak of him to the generality." In fine, "the Platonic cosmology, considered in its root, may be expressed by the following formula: — God is to the soul of the world as the soul of the world is to matter; the universe is a great law of proportion." [17]

[16] Phedon.

[17] Henry's Hist. Philos., vol. 1, p. 137. We are greatly pleased with the candid and discriminating manner in which Neander speaks of Plato,

Nearly all the rest of the Greek philosophers were sophists and sceptics. Aristotle, the founder of the Peripatetic sect, and almost the father of human science, contended for the eternity of the world, both in substance and form; and though he acknowledged the existence of a divine Being, or Mind, he regarded him merely as the centre and cause of motion, — a kind of infinite material *magnet*, and too distant from the mind and heart of man to be an object either of fear or love. The system of Epicurus was still worse; for in avoiding the absurdity that the world has existed eternally, he went still farther towards excluding a Creator from the universe, ascribing the origin of all things to a blind and undesigned concourse of atoms. He spoke of the gods, it is true, after the manner of his countrymen, but only, as Cicero alleged, to screen himself from the effects of avowing his atheism. Zeno, the founder of the Stoic philosophy, aiming for a middle course between Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus, taught a lofty and severe Pantheism. Confounding God and nature together as a mingled identity, he regarded the world as a sentient and animated being; and the souls of men were viewed as sparks thrown off from the central fire of the universe, into which they must soon return, and lose the identity which now reveals their existence.

We are, therefore, prepared to affirm, with a great degree of confidence, that the Scripture idea of creation was unknown in the most cultivated nation of antiquity. And to this we are happy to add the testimony of the learned Müller: "According to the religious notions of the Greeks, the deity who governs the world with omnipotence, and guides the destinies of man with omniscience, is yet without one attribute which is most essential to our idea of the godhead — *eternity*. The gods of the Greeks were too nearly bound up with the existence of the world, to be exempt from the law by which large masses are developed into more and more perfect forms. To the Greeks, the

in connection with the subject discussed in this article. While awarding to the philosopher the credit of viewing God as "the *architect* of the universe," he cautions his readers against "transferring over to this supreme essence of the Platonic philosophy, the *Christian conception of God, as Creator and Governor of the world.*" History of the Christian Religion and Church, (Torrey's Translation), i. 19, 26.

gods of Olympus were rather the summit and crowning point of organised and animate life, than the *origin* of the universe. Thus, *Zeus*, who must be considered the peculiar deity of the Greeks, was, doubtless long before the time of Homer or Hesiod, called Chronion, or Chronides, which, according to the most probable interpretation, means, Son of the Ancient of Days. The idea of *creation*, which supposes the Deity to have formed the world with design, as an earthly artificer executes his work, was foreign to the ancient Greeks, and could only arise in religions which ascribed a personal existence, and an eternal duration to the Godhead." [18]

We shall need to spend but little time with the Romans, as their religion and philosophy were little else but a repetion of those of the Greeks. Nothing occurs in all their literature, which bears so much of a resemblance to the Mosaic account of the creation, as the opening description in Ovid's Metamorphoses. It has been imagined by some, that the poet must have copied from the sacred historian, so apparent, to them, have been the marks of agreement between them. It is not impossible, indeed, that Ovid had access to the writings of Moses, as Juvenal testifies that they were known to the Romans; but we see no necessity for any such conclusion. Though having a general resemblance, there are several strong marks of difference between them. In the first place, the chaos of Ovid is the universal and lawless chaos of the Greek poets, instead of an early period in the history of the earth; and then, as widely different are the views which are given of the agency which calls forth light, and peoples the universe with living forms. According to Moses, it is a personal and spiritual God, and the work is done by successive acts of creative power; but according to Ovid, it is something variously called "Nature," "God," and "gods," and things are produced by *metamorphoses*, by the developement of nature in new forms. The hand of the Creator does not appear, even in the production of man; for instead of describing him as created, he represents him as growing up, on the principle of the "Vestiges," from a "paste tempered" by "Prometheus;" the description closing with,

[18] History of the Literature of the Ancient Greeks, vol. i., p. 87.

> "From such rude principles our form began,
> And earth was metamorphosed into man."

A learned writer has very justly remarked, that Ovid supposed a plurality of deities, and that one of them had a hand in the production of the world, but to which of them to ascribe it, he could not tell.[19] Lucretius wrote an elegant poem on the "Origin of Things," but his theory was that of Epicurus, ascribing the production of every thing to an unintelligent concourse of atoms. Virgil leaned to the same philosophy, though, in some of his descriptions, he joins the Stoics, and pictures the world as an enormous living animal. The same was true of Horace, though his more general strain was one of ridicule toward all schools and sects.

Similar darkness and doubt rested upon the minds of the philosophers. The learned Varro, who strove to deliver his country from idolatry, was a Pantheist, contending that "God is the soul of the world, and that this world is itself God." The accomplished Cicero, not satisfied with either Epicurianism or Stoicism, sided with the New Academy, which acted upon the principle of freely debating all subjects, without expressing any determinate conclusion. Though there are many eloquent passages in his works, describing the evidences of design in the constitution of nature, it does not appear that he had any intelligent view of God as Creator. Sometimes speaking of him in the singular number, though more frequently in the plural, he conceived of him very much in the light of the Stoics, regarding him as at once the soul and body of the universe, and believing that this intellectual fire, or ether, produces things according to their natures. In reading his principal religious work, — his "*De Natura Deorum*," in which he reviews the religious opinions of the philosophers, the conclusion forced upon the mind is, that the ancient heathens had a general conviction of the existence of beings higher than man, and that their views of the gods very greatly varied, those of the majority being very low, while those of the philosophers were more elevated; but that even the most enlightened failed to obtain clear and distinct conceptions of the unity of God, and of his char-

[19] Leland, Necessity of the Christian Revelation, vol. i., p. 180.

acter as Creator. Seneca, the elegant moralist, was a Stoic and Pantheist, contending that the world is God, and that we are parts and members of the Divinity; and Pliny, the natural historian, if not a thorough sceptic, held the same opinion.

At the time of the advent of Christianity, Epicurean and Stoical notions of the origin of things, were dominant doctrines in the heathen world. In this fact, we may perhaps see new significancy and beauty in the preaching of Paul at Athens, the very focus of heathen philosophy. Encountering "certain philosophers of the Epicureans and Stoics," he declared to them the "unknown God, — God that made (created) the world, and all things therein." It was a "new and strange doctrine" to their "ears."

We now take leave of this part of our subject, availing ourselves of the language and testimony of another: "Until Christianity spread, it never became a settled opinion at all in the world, that the earth was the planned and deliberate creation of an intelligent God. Nor does any one seem to have conceived it to have been so, in that full meaning, sublimity and certainty, with which the Hebrew writers inculcate the momentous truth. Take up the Timæus, or any other work of Plato, which treats on God and nature, or what fragments of antiquity remain about them, and compare these with the passages in the Genesis and Deuteronomy of Moses; with those in the book of Job, which is peculiarly splendid in many parts on this subject; with others in some of the Psalms of David, in the majestic and unequalled Isaiah, and in several of the other Jewish prophets; and I think you will feel, with me, that Christianity, by diffusing the Jewish Scriptures, or sacred writings, and by its own as sacred traditions, imparted a new intellect to mankind on all that concerns divine philosophy. A sun of mind then rose on our world, which has never set. Its beams consumed the popular paganism, and spread a purifying light over those who chose not to forsake their ancient favorite." [20]

[20] Sharon Turner, Sacred History of the World, vol. ii., p. 48. The absence of the doctrine of creation from the ancient heathen world, attracted the notice of the keen-sighted but infidel Gibbon. In reviewing the religion of the ancient pagan nations, in his essay on the Study of

But we cannot stop here. To those who accept the claims of the Scripture teachers to a superhuman illumination, for the communication of important religious truths to mankind, it is worth something to know that they give a view of the origin of things which they could not have borrowed from any of their contemporaries, and in which are presented conceptions of God and nature immeasurably transcending the loftiest speculations and views of the ancient philosophers; but it is of much greater consequence to know, whether this view is entitled to our confidence; — whether the doctrine of creation, which so frequently occurs in their teachings, and of which there is so much proof of originality, as there made known, is really true.

Before we can answer this question in an intelligent and satisfactory manner, especially if we pursue the investigation with an eye to the disclosures of modern science, particularly that of geology, we must clearly understand what is involved in the doctrine asserted. When the sacred teachers declare that all things have been *created* by God, it is not enough that our minds are directed to Him as the sole and universal Creator, or that we regard all things as having their origin in his agency and power. In order either to see the real beauty of the doctrine, or to test its claims to truth, we must have correct and distinct ideas of the meaning of the term "creation," as thus applied — of its meaning in reference to the nature and destiny of things created, as well as in reference to the source and manner of their origin. What is a creation, in the works of the Deity? — what does it do? The idea has quite extensively prevailed, that it is a creation out of nothing; in

Literature, he is led to make the following most sensible remark: "To gross minds the idea of generation (emanation) was more natural than that of creation; it was more easily apprehended; it supposed a law or degree of power, and it was brought to their minds by sensible comparisons." See his Miscel. Works, p. 664. We wish he had favored us with an attempt to explain how it happened, then, that the Jews, a nation far less cultivated, on his own admission, than the Greeks and Romans, came to hold the doctrine of "creation" with so much distinctness and in such sublimity, while the latter people received only the doctrine of "generation,"—without acknowledging their claims to a miraculous revelation. As in grappling with Christianity, he would have found it easier to assign "five causes" for the progress of the Jewish doctrine, than to have given a single good reason, on merely natural grounds, for its origin.

other words, a creation of the matter composing the universe or whatever things have been created. But what authority is there in the Scriptures for this idea? Which of the sacred teachers affirms that God created the world out of nothing, or that he created the matter of which its particles are composed? The truth is, not one of them has said so much as a syllable about it, one way or the other; and it is to us one of the proofs of the wisdom that presided over their instructions, that they are totally silent on the subject. The nature and origin of matter are subjects which are infinitely beyond the scope of human knowledge. Much and learnedly as metaphysicians have talked about matter, man knows and can know nothing of it, except from its combinations and effects. From certain observations and experiments, we know that there is something, called matter, which is capable of existing either as a solid, a liquid, or an ether; but what it really is, and why it acts thus and so, we cannot tell. Whether it has existed eternally, or whether it has been created, it were wisdom for us not to pretend to know, while thus ignorant of its nature, especially as the sacred teachers have not attempted to inform us. Pointing us, not to an abstraction, but to the objects which meet us in nature, — to "the heavens, and the earth, and all things therein," they are content to affirm that God created them, leaving us to infer that he was able to furnish the material for the work, whether we could form any conception of its nature or not. It has been argued by some, indeed, that the Hebrew word, in our version translated "created or to create," signifies creation out of nothing, but this ground has been generally abandoned, and philological criticism has learned to second the duties of good sense, in considering creation as pertaining to things as real entities, rather than to their abstract qualities.

In every production which is entitled to the credit of being a creation, two conditions meet and are fulfilled; first, the thing created has a beginning; secondly, it has a peculiar and definite constitution, making it a new thing and a thing by itself, and fitting it for a particular sphere and to a special end. In making a given number of articles, for instance, say a dozen musical instruments, we should not only give them each a beginning, but a distinct

and peculiar character, so that neither of them would be a copy of another, and so that one could not by any possibility become another, but each be an original and peculiar instrument, adapted to the production of a definite and particular kind of music. Now, as if to guard us against all misconception, those conditions are not merely implied, but explicitly affirmed, by the sacred teachers, in teaching that all things have been created by one God; for not only is each one described as having a beginning under his agency, but as receiving from him a peculiar nature or peculiar qualities, fitting it for a peculiar kind and sphere of action. One class of productions is not the offshoot and child of another, but each is a fresh creation, endowed with a peculiar and fixed constitution, having its "seed in itself," and with power only to propagate "its kind."

In this light of the subject, we are prepared for the question, — Is the Scripture doctrine of creation true? Has it received confirmation from the progress of human science, particularly that of geology, in laying open and interpreting the entombed treasures of the past history of the earth and its inhabitants? Our answer is emphatically in the affirmative. The results of the investigations of this science, touching the history of organic life on the globe, were presented in an article in the former number of this Journal, in which, following the first authorities in the science, we gave an account of the several kinds of vegetable and animal existence which have been brought to light as having flourished on the face of the earth, together with a statement of the geological periods during which they were each introduced. In that article, we dealt only with facts, as they had been furnished to our hands by others; we now deal with inferences, thereon resulting. These disclosures may amaze and possibly alarm us, in revealing to us how long a period the earth has been the theatre of organic life; but if we will keep our self-possession, and exercise patience and candor, we shall not be long in learning to see in these disclosures pleasing confirmations of at least all the essential features of the Scripture doctrine of creation.

In the first place, geology reveals to us a beginning to the various forms of the living system of nature. In prosecuting its work, it finds itself, either with or without in-

tention, carried back to the time or times when every form within either its province or its power to detect and describe of the living creation had a beginning; and though it is not the *manner* in which they have had their origin, it is thus able to demonstrate that each has really had a beginning. It were useless to make quotations to this point, as it is no longer a matter for doubt with geologists, that our whole mundane affairs, including the globe itself, have had a beginning. And what geology thus teaches of "the earth and all things therein," astronomy affirms of "the heavens;" several "solar lamps" having disappeared and others commenced their burning in the planetary space, since the heavenly bodies engaged the study of man.

We pass to the second condition involved in the Scripture doctrine of creation, — peculiarity and definiteness of constitution in each thing or being created. What says science to the reality of this predicate? Does it affirm it, or deny it? In opening to us the vaults of the charnel house of the mighty past, and in exhibiting to us the exhumed remains of the pre-Adamite generations, does she show each new branch or species of organic life, that was successively introduced, to have been a fresh creation, with a new and peculiar nature, adapting it to a particular field of action, with power only to propagate its kind? or to have been only a developement, — a growth from inferior types, without any definiteness or fixedness of constitution, and with power to generate races superior to itself? Science gives but one answer to this question, and it is in perfect harmony with, and in full confirmation of, the Scriptural hypothesis. Charlatanism may have another theory, but not science. There is nothing on which she is so confident, as the integrity of nature's arrangements, and the uniformity of her laws. In each class of her productions, she recognises distinctness and fixedness of constitution, though with a designed ability, among animals, to accommodate themselves, within certain fixed limits, to external circumstances; and the moment she should lose faith in this doctrine, she would lose all confidence in nature and in herself, and believe that "Chaos and Old Night" might come again, if indeed they ever held sway over the universe. A writer in the Edinburgh Review, in combating the idea of the growth of lower forms into higher ones, has

remarked that, if this were true, philosophy would be impossible, because it could have no permanent basis in nature on which to rest. He might have said, with literal truth, that, if this theory were true, *science* would be impossible, for the reason assigned. If the types of being were not permanent; if the reality of species were not a law of nature, there would be nothing in the universe on which to build an enduring structure; the classifications of to-day would be the useless lumber of to-morrow, by reason of the growth during the intervening period; for what was found to be fishes one day, might be serpents the next, birds the next, kangaroos the next, monkeys the next, and men and women the next. The whole history of science is but a record of man's success, in testing the permanency of nature's arrangements, and in finding her faithful in preserving to each race of creatures committed to her care, their individuality and identity. It has been only in her absence, that men have seen "gorgons and chimeras dire," or that they have fancied her as breaking up to-day the bounds which she had set for herself yesterday, or manifesting any thing like confusion, disorder or fickleness, in her methods of operation. In her infancy, indeed, the disciples of this handmaid of religion were hesitating and doubtful, in regard to the integrity of her economy, and were even suspicious that she was in the habit of crossing her tracks, and of mending and re-modelling the types entrusted to her keeping. But in proportion as they have succeeded in interpreting her phenomena, and in comprehending the principles on which she acts, they have found her worthy of their confidence, because true and faithful to fixed and immutable laws.

In the history of no science has this been more strikingly exhibited, than in that of geology. In its early stages, as it detected proofs of the length of the period during which organic life has prevailed on the globe, and as it discovered that the higher orders of being were introduced, as a general thing, at later geological epochs than those of a lower type, it occurred to the minds of some of its cultivators as a very probable hypothesis, that there is no stability in the difference between different orders, and that the higher species have grown up out of the lower, in virtue of a natural law of gradual developement. Hence the

origin of the theory of Lamarck, who contended, that very small beings, called *monads*, had been first produced by spontaneous generation, and that these, nursed by the kindness of nature, and impelled by an inward desire for enlargement and progress, have gradually multiplied and expanded their faculties, until they have finally succeeded in becoming monkeys and men; — whether they aspired for any thing higher, the author appears not to have been so anxious to discover. Thus, the doctrine of creation was denied, and a law of developement substituted in its place. But Cuvier, the Newton of geological science, condemned the theory as having no foundation in nature, discarding both the idea of the production of beings by spontaneous generation, and of their gradual developement into higher forms, and maintaining not only that all beings have their origin in the direct agency of God, but that the several races whose relics have been disentombed by the researches of geology, were respectively introduced by successive acts of his creative power, each with a higher degree of organization, as the earth became fitted for their residence and support. His definition of an animal or organized being, is worthy of special notice, as it perfectly harmonizes with the Scripture doctrine of creation: "Every organized body has its peculiar form, not only generally and exteriorly, but even in the detail of the structure of each of its parts:" or, in other words, "Every organized being forms an entire system of its own, all the parts of which mutually correspond, and concur to produce a definite purpose by reciprocal reaction, or by combining to the same end."[21] In rejecting the hypothesis of spontaneous generations, he affirmed that "all the efforts of those physiologists who believe in the possibility of it, have not succeeded in showing us a single instance." In investigating the question of the reality of species in nature, in addition to examining the bones of all the living and extinct races that could be found in the cabinets of Europe, he procured from the tombs and temples of Egypt, mummies of various animals, — cats, ibises, birds of prey, dogs, monkeys, crocodiles, &c., that lived more than three thousand years ago; concerning which, after the most careful and de-

[21] Animal Kingdom, i. 19. Theory of the Earth, p. 90.

tailed examination, he declared that "not the slightest difference is to be perceived between these animals and those of the same species which we now see."[22] In replying to those who argued that a much longer period had been allowed for the growth and alteration of species, before the present races were introduced, he employed the following language: "If the species have changed by degrees, as they assume, we ought to find traces of their gradual modification. Thus, between the Palæotherium, and the species of our own days, we should be able to discover some intermediate forms, and yet no such discovery has ever been made. Since the bowels of the earth have not preserved the monuments of this strange genealogy, we have a right to conclude, that the ancient, and now extinct species, were as permanent in their forms and character, as those which exist at present;" and, moreover, "animals have certain fixed and natural characters, which resist the effects of every kind of influence, whether proceeding from natural causes, or human interference; and we have not the slightest reason to suspect, that time has any more effect upon them than climate."[23] Such were the positions of Cuvier. They have stood the most searching criticism and thorough investigation, and have since become the fully-accredited doctrines of scientific geologists. The idea of the developement and transmutation of species, has been abandoned by them as an exploded hypothesis, having not the least support in nature; and it has become an admitted principle of their science, that each race of creatures has been created with a distinct and peculiar constitution, fitting it to a particular and definite end, with power only to generate its kind; and that the several orders, or species of organic life, which have existed in former ages, and whose relics are now detected in the strata of the earth, were severally introduced, not by the action of a law of natural developement, metamorphosing their natures, but by successive acts of creative power, with qualities as distinctly marked, as any at present existing, and in every respect, as perfect in their organization, considering the state of the globe, and the nature of the theatre in which they were destined to play the parts assigned them in the system of creation.

[22] Theory of the Earth, p. 123. [23] Do. p. 114, 122.

The doctrine of the developement and transmutation of species, however, has recently had an ingenious repetition in an anonymous work which, like other novel matter of its kind, has had many readers, known as "the Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation." The author's theory, whoever he may be, is essentially the one which was put forth by Lamarck, though he commences a little farther back, telling us how the heavenly bodies, as well as animals and men, have been produced. He has a name for a creator in his system, but he is careful to relieve him from the trouble of having any thing to do. He talks, too, of "creation," but, according to his reasoning, there has been, and can be, no such thing. Nothing in the universe, if we may believe him, has been fixed and determined by a sovereign Will and Disposer; the nature of every thing, and of every being, is indefinite and changing, liable to be to-morrow quite different from what it is to-day; and what is called "creation," is but another name for "developement." If his book had been called "Vestiges of the Natural History of Developement," it would have had some meaning; as it is, it is a perfect misnomer. On his hypothesis, nothing is created, because to nothing is given a fixed and definite nature; but every thing is developed; "fire-mist" is developed into revolving globes; fine particles of matter in "albumen," are developed into animalcules, animalcules into zoophites, zoophites into molluses, molluses into fishes, fishes into serpents, serpents into birds, birds into kangaroos, kangaroos into monkeys, and monkeys into men; — and by what agency? Why, by the almighty power of "law," — "organic law," — "a law of developement"! The fallacies of his reasoning have been ably and repeatedly exposed. "The whole scientific world has declared the theory a groundless hypothesis. In Astronomy, it has been condemned by Herschel; in Geology, by Lyell; in Comparative Anatomy, by Owen; in Physiology, by Carpenter; in Zoology, by Agassiz. In fact, it is universally agreed, among men having any solid claims to science, that the nameless author of the book, ingeniously as he has argued, has not "made out his case." [24]

[24] The latest light with which we have been favored on the subject

Lest the reader may imagine that we have dealt unfairly, in the treatment of this part of our subject, or that we have too strongly stated the case touching the testimony of science, in support of the doctrine of the reality and permanency of species in nature, against the idea of spontaneous generation, and progressive developement, we will here adduce a few specimens of the manner in which the leading men in the scientific world, particularly in the geological world, express themselves on the subject. Our extracts must be brief, but in each case, they will be from men whose lives have been devoted to a diligent study and classification of facts, in their departments of science, and whose opinion is therefore entitled to far more confidence than that of a mere sciolist, or theorist; and at the same time, they will be of a character to indicate their real sentiments.

Charles Lyell. "From the above considerations," (having ta-

here discussed, has come to us in an octavo volume of nearly eight hundred pages, bearing this title, "Revelations, &c. by A. Jackson Davis, the Clairvoyant." More than a hundred pages are devoted to a "revelation" of the manner in which the world and its inhabitants were brought into existence, but it is a revelation having not the least claim to originality, except in the *blabbery* (we must be pardoned the use of this word) manner in which it is announced. "The Clairvoyant's" theory, is but a diluted statement of that of the author of "the Vestiges." All permanency of types or species in nature, is denied, and "fire-mist and globes are manufactured out of animalcules and monkies, by the aid of a "law of natural developement." In one respect, however, he is more consistent than his gifted, but less favored brother of the "Vestiges;" namely, in disowning the reality of creation altogether, the origin of all things being referred to a "magnificent law of progressive developement!" On page 254, the "revelation" runs thus: "The term 'creation' has no signification;" and the reason assigned for it, partakes of the sublimity of the preceding announcement; "as the origin of every form, principle, and substance, in being, is owing to some prior cause!" That is to say, the Greek Slave is not a "creation" of Hiram Powers, because its origin is owing to a "prior cause," namely, the creative genius of the artist! This, we believe, is quite a fair specimen of the contents of the book. It contains just such a medley of sense and nonsense, as we had reason to expect from a "Clairvoyant," in communication with some three or four minds, whose brains had become half-addled with the sublime mysteries of Mesmerism, Swedenborgianism, Transcendentalism, and Fourierism. It has been recommend ed to me on the ground of its geological knowledge. Its merits, in this respect, are about equal to the story of "Sinbad the Sailor," and the "Arabian Nights' Entertainments," as books of geology.

ken a thorough survey of the whole subject,) "it appears, that species have a real existence in nature; and that each was endowed, at the time of its creation, with the attributes and organization by which it is now distinguished." "No geologists, who are in possession of all the data now established respecting fossil remains, will for a moment contend for the doctrine of the successive developement of animal and vegetable life."—*Principles of Geology*, iii. 83. i. 228.

William Buckland. "The doctrines of the derivation of living species, either by developement and transmutation from other species, or by an eternal succession from preceding individuals of the same species, without any evidence of a beginning, or prospect of an end, has nowhere been met by so full an answer, as that afforded by the phenomena of fossil organic remains."—*Bridgewater Treatise*, i. 435.

Adam Sedgwick. "At succeeding epochs, new tribes of beings were called into existence, not merely as the progeny of those that had appeared before them, but as new and living proofs of creative interference; and, though formed on the same plan, and bearing the same marks of wise contrivance, oftentimes as unlike those creatures which preceded them, as if they had been matured in a different portion of the universe, and cast upon the earth by the collision of another planet."—*Discourse on the Studies of the University.*

Gideon A. Mantell. "The theory of the progressive developement of creation, receives no support from the state of the vegetation in the early geological epochs, as Dr. Lindley has emphatically remarked." "It was from this apparent successive developement of living beings, from the most simple to the most complex organization, that the geological theory which once prevailed, took its rise; but I scarcely need remark, that the facts warrant no such inference." "The cell that forms the germ of each species of organism, is endowed with special properties, which can result in nothing but the fabrication of that particular species. The serious error which pervades the theory, advanced in the work entitled, 'The Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,' has arisen from its author having assumed analogy to be proof of identity."—*Wonders of Geology*, pp. 691, 778. *Thoughts on Animalcules*, p. 24.

William Whewell. "When species are modified by external causes, they usually degenerate, and do not advance. And there is no instance of a species acquiring an entirely new sense, faculty, or organ, in addition to, or in the place of, what it had before."—*History of the Inductive Sciences*, vol. iii. p. 629.

M. Agassiz. "I cannot admit the transformation of species from one formation to another." "The Zoophites, Molusca, and Articulata, existed in the earliest period of the earth's developement; but they do not allow of our supposing, that any progressive perfection to the present creation occurred."—*Report on the fossil-fish of the Devonian system*, p. 84. *American Journal of Science, March*, 1846, p. 280.

J. Müller, the distinguished German Physiologist. "All the phenomena at present observed in the animal kingdom, seem to prove, that the species were originally created distinct and independent of each other. There is no remote possibility of one species being produced by another."—*Quoted in North Am. Review*, vol. lx. 457.

Charles Bell. "Every thing declares the species to have its origin in a distinct creation, not in a gradual variation from some original type."—*Mechanism of the Hand*, p. 115.

Richard Owen. "Thus, though a general progress may be discerned, the interruptions and faults, to use a geological phrase, negative the notion that the progression has been the result of self-developing energies, adequate to ¶ transmutation of specific characters; but, on the contrary, support the conclusion, that the modifications of osteological structure which characterize the extinct species, were originally impressed upon them at their creation, and have been neither derived from the improvement of a lower, nor lost by progressive developement into a higher type." —*Report on British Fossil Reptiles*, p. 202.

D. T. Ansted. "From the investigations of Naturalists, concerning various groups of animals of high organizations, as they are now distributed in different parts of the world, there is, therefore, I repeat, no support for any theory of the progressive developement of species; while the comparison of the species themselves, with those found fossil, is equally opposed to any such view."—*Picturesque Sketches of Creation*, p. 394.

Edward Hitchcock. "As to the transmutation of species, geology has shown that it has never taken place; while physiology demonstrates, that species are permanent, and can never be transmuted."—*Inaugural Address*, p. 30.

Benjamin Silliman. "There is every reason to believe, that the creation of animals and plants was successive; not by equivocal generation — not by atomic action, but by the fiat of the Almighty." "There is no evidence that the animals of one period originated those of a preceding, by gradual developement. This

is one of those leaps in logic, especially favored by a large developement of 'the function of hypothesis.' Geology, if its facts mean any thing, fully shows that tribes of animals have successively disappeared, owing to physical causes; and that the new race have appeared by creation, and not by gradation, or 'progress.'"—*Course of Geological Lectures*, p. 65. *Am. Journal of Science, March*, 1846, p. 252.

Thus, then, the Scripture teachers were not in error, though they were long alone, in asserting the doctrine of the creation of all things by an infinite and eternal Being. As the light of Christianity has made its way among men, this sublime doctrine has gradually revealed itself to their minds, and it has at last found ample confirmation in the deductions of science. In the first stages of geological inquiry, it is true, the archives of nature were supposed to furnish the means of discrediting the ancient words of revelation, by showing either that the world and its inhabitants had existed eternally, or that they had their origin in a natural law of developement, without the agency of an intelligent Creator; but in the course of its progress, it has dissipated these apprehensions, and demonstrated the reality of Divine interference and agency, in the origin of the living system of nature. It is not in the power of this science, however, or of any other, to show us *how* the world, or any thing else, has been created. The *method* is totally beyond her power to detect; she can only demonstrate the fact. "When we inquire whence came the successive tribes of plants and animals into this our world, geology is silent. The mystery of creation is not within the range of her legitimate territory; she says nothing, but she points upwards."[25] Confident as she is that all things have had a beginning, and that each has a fixed and determinate nature, she is obliged to confess her inability to draw aside the veil that hides the *manner* of their origin, and humbly to accept the explanation of the mystery which comes from a higher source. "Through faith, we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen, were not made by the things which do appear." The doctrine came, and it still comes, "through faith;" the work of creation never has been, and never can

[25] History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. iii. p. 639.

be, an object of sight, or of physical analysis; and the use and benefit of science, consist in demonstrating to us the necessity and wisdom of this conclusion, and in leading us to receive the light which comes from heaven, to dissipate our darkness, and acquaint us with the attributes and purposes of the Divine Mind; and the history of geology, more, perhaps, than that of any other science, affords a striking verification of the truth of Lord Bacon's remark, that "a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion."

As yet, however, it must have been perceived, the cosmogony of Moses, properly so called, has not engaged our attention, as connected with the disclosures of geological science. This part of our subject we are not at all disposed to pass over, though our limits will not allow us to treat it at any length. We can only indicate the light in which we have been led to regard it, and allude to some of the instances in which the account has been verified by the progress of geology, and to the manner in which we interpret the alleged discrepancy between them.

1. Geology confirms the truth of the cosmogony in respect to the *order* or *succession* of creation, that "in the beginning, God created the heaven and the earth," — a simple affirmation that all things have their origin in the creative energy of God, — "the heaven and the earth" being a common Hebraim for all things. The earth was first brought into existence, and for a while it was covered with darkness and sterility, but its face was subsequently illuminated and improved under the hand of the Creator, until different orders of vegetable and animal life were introduced, and the work ultimately crowned in the creation of man. Geology reverently bows her head, and acknowledges the representation of the sacred historian to be emphatically true. It describes the earth as having undergone a course of preparation before it was fitted to be inhabited, and the work of creation was carried on through the vegetable and animal kingdoms until man himself was introduced.

2. Geology confirms the truth of the account in respect to the *manner* or *method* of enlarging the amount of organic life upon the globe. Moses describes it as having

been done, not by the gradual growth of species into higher ones, but by successive acts of divine power. At the birth of each new race, a fresh mandate goes forth; and lo! a new monument of the Creator's agency stands before him. We have seen how emphatic is the testimony of geology in re-affirming this truth.

3. Geology harmonizes with the Mosaic cosmogony in representing that the continents of the globe were formerly covered by the ocean, and subsequently elevated. In the account, the face of the earth is described as having been wholly submerged by water until during the third period of its history, when "the dry land" made its appearance, evidently in a quiet and orderly manner, above the surface of an all-pervading ocean. This revealed doctrine has become a geological fact. Our continents are shown to have been formed beneath the ocean and afterwards elevated, both by the water-worn materials of which they are composed, and by the remains of marine animals therein imbedded. Marine shells occur in the Alps and Pyranees, 9000 feet above the level of the ocean; in the Andes, more than 13,000 feet; and in the Himalayas, more than 16,000.[31] The origin of these shells was for a while referred to the deluge of Noah, but they have since been determined to belong to a species that became extinct long before the time of that event.

4. Geology agrees with our cosmogony in teaching that man was the *crowning* work of creation, the last race of creation called into existence. After all the other forms of the organic world had been introduced, according to the account, man is created in the image of his Maker, and delegated with dominion over the earth and its lower tribes. There is something peculiarly remarkable in the manner in which this has been confirmed by geological discovery. While the remains of other animals are found in solid rocks many hundred feet in the earth, the bones of man have been discovered only in the loose sand and gravel covering its surface, — in what is called alluvium, marking the latest period of time in the geological calender.

5. Geology agrees with our cosmogony in teaching that

[31] Lyell's Elements of Geology, vol. i., p. 8.

the human race has been in existence but a few thousand years. According to the usual modes of reckoning, the Scripture chronology makes a little more than 6000 years since the creation of man; according to Hale's method of interpreting the Scripture chronology, it is somewhat more than 7000. There is nothing in geology to lengthen out the period. Indeed, the science furnishes much evidence to the effect that man cannot have been long an inhabitant of the earth, by showing that he has yet made but little impression upon its surface and materials, and that none of his works exhibit marks of great antiquity. The great Cuvier gave the subject his attention, and after collating the annals of the earth and of the nations, some of the latter making extravagant claims to antiquity, he came to a conclusion in perfect agreement with our Scripture account of the age and history of the human race.

6. Geology harmonizes with our cosmogony in teaching that every product of divine power was adapted to a wise and benevolent end, and was, in fact, emphatically good. At each step in the work of creation, the Divine Being, after the poetical style of the Hebrews, is represented as looking upon his productions and declaring them to be "good;" and when the entire work is crowned in the creation of man, he reviews the whole, and they are all declared to be "very good." This account is the more remarkable from the fact, that it has had no practical recognition in the other systems of ancient cosmogony. Perhaps without a single other exception, all the ancient cosmogonies supposed evil beings and evil spirits to have dominion in the universe, even in the work of creation. But peculiar as this part of our cosmogony is, it has been wonderfully confirmed by the disclosures of science. So far from finding evidence of cruelty and malignity in the records of past creations, geology detects the most clear and convincing proofs that all things have been created on the principles of universal goodness, every race of creatures having been adapted to a wise and benevolent end, and so constituted as to be the partakers of the divine bounty, and at the same time to contribute their share to the good of the general system of which they were individual parts. This feature of the bearing of geology on the cause of religion has been very eloquently set forth in the writings of Presi-

dent Hitchcock; and how his positions can be reconciled with the idea of the existence of infinite evil and endless punishment under the divine government, we are totally unable to conceive.

But the creation of the earth and its living tribes is represented as having taken place in six days, — what shall we say to this? Because geology shows that a longer period than six literal days must have been consumed in the work, shall we therefore reject the whole account as a piece of religious imposture, although exhibiting so many remarkable instances of agreement with the results of scientific discovery? Candor would hold us back from a conclusion so rash and hasty, and suggest the possibility of finding an interpretation which will banish all appearance of contradiction, and allow of perfect harmony between the Scriptural cosmogony and modern science. The seeming discrepancy is accounted for and explained by many, both among theologians and geologists, by regarding the designations of time, called six days, as descriptive of so many long periods of indefinite length; and it is certain that the freedom and latitude with which the Scripture writers have employed the term *day*, lends much plausibility to this interpretation. But if we pay due attention to the poetical style in which the account is written, and to the immediate purpose of the writer, we may discover good reason for regarding these periods of time as mere costumes, or dress, for the purpose of giving his subject a form to make it the more impressive, or as mere framework, like scaffolding in architecture, designed merely for temporary use. This manner of speaking was frequent with the sacred teachers, as in the accounts of the temptation of Job and of Christ. And was there not need of its adoption by Moses in addressing the Jews? They were not a body of keen-sighted philosophers, who were qualified to master abstractions; and it was no part of his business to give them lessons in physics or metaphysics. Their education had been in the brick-yards of Egypt, under a system of Polytheism which had taught them to worship the sun, moon, stars and animals, as living and immortal gods; and it was the divinely-appointed purpose of his mission to deliver them from this system, and teach them the unity, spirituality and moral government of the

true God. How could he do it? In no way so effectually as by teaching them the doctrine of the creation of all things by one God, thus enabling them to look upon the universe as his temple and altar; and as it was to be to them an ordinance and a benefit to work six days and rest the seventh, how natural and how wise was it for their teacher and lawgiver to frame his representation of the work of creation after a model drawn from this institution, — representing God as creating the world in six days and resting on the seventh, wholly for the purpose of making the truth and reality of the great doctrine the more vivid and impressive to their as yet unspiritual minds. This view has been taken by several learned men, even independently of considerations drawn from geology. "If we would form a clear and distinct notion of this whole description of creation," says Knapp, "we must conceive of six separate pictures, in which this great work is represented in each successive stage of its progress towards completion. And as the performance of the painter, though it must have natural truth for its foundation, must not be considered or judged of, as a delineation of mathematical or scientific accuracy; so neither must this pictorial representation of creation be regarded as literally and exactly true. By such a representation, the notion of the creation is made easy to every mind; and common people seeing it so distinctly portrayed, can form some distinct conceptions concerning it, and read or hear the account of it with interest."[32] "The picture of the creation is sublime poetry," says Herder, "arranged by six days' works and numbers."[33]

We have now travelled over the ground we had intended; and though the journey has been somewhat long and tedious, we have reached an eminence which commands a goodly prospect, — a view in which are blended the beauties of earth and the glories of heaven. Whether we consider the revealed doctrine of creation in the light of history, or of modern science, we find it every way entitled to our reverence and confidence; and, adopting its sublime philosophy of the universe, we can say, with an

[32] Lectures on Christian Theology, vol. i., p. 356.

[33] Spirit of Hebrew Poetry, vol. ii., pp. 258 — 265. This view of the subject is very ably presented by Mr. Powel in his *Connection of Natural and Divine Truth.*

elevation of thought and feeling, known only to him who has drunk at "Siloa's brook that flowed fast by the oracle of God," —

"These are thy glorious works, Parent of Good!
Almighty! thine this universal frame,
Thus wondrous fair; thyself how wondrous then!
Unspeakable, who sitt'st above these heavens,
To us invisible, or dimly seen
In these thy lowest works; yet these declare
Thy goodness beyond thought, and power divine."

M. S.

Art. XXVIII.

Literary Notices.

1. Pages from the Ecclesiastical History of New England, during the Century between 1740 and 1840. Boston: James B. Dow, Publisher. 1847. 12mo. pp. 126.

On the ground of taste, we may complain that the title of this pamphlet is too vague, like the policy which the work exposes. The real subject is, the gradual preparation for Unitarianism, in the old Congregational churches of New England; the subsequent rise of that doctrine in them; and its successive developements. All this is traced out by a rapid, but comprehensive, historical review. The writer begins with the early state of religious parties among the Puritans here; shows the points of divergence between them, Orthodox as they all still were; follows the progress of this divergence till one of the tendencies began to come out into Arminianism, and then into glimpses of Arianism, — marks the transition to a latent Unitarianism, which grew more decided after the Revolutionary war; and finally he presents the successive forms in which this latter doctrine came out, down to its last and lowest manifestation in the "Discourse" of Rev. Theodore Parker.

The following is a synopsis of the history. When Whitefield came to New-England, in 1740, "there was already a stricter and a gentler party" among the Congregationalists here. The violent agitations that followed his preaching, brought these two classes into frequent collision, widening the apparent difference between them. The excessive dogmatism of the "stricter" party

provoked the "gentler" to latitudinarianism; and this departure from the ancient landmarks, led the latter, in an age of dominating and jealous Orthodoxy, to a degree of concealment on certain controverted points of faith. For a while, they seem to have rested on a form of Arminianism, as opposed to the Calvinism of their brethren. Some of the more adventurous were strongly suspected of Arianism, as early as the middle of the century, though all direct proof of this "heresy" was carefully guarded from the public eye. The style of preaching grew more studiously negative in respect to certain doctrinal tenets, — covering them up, under the plea that they were matters of indifference. The object was to preserve outward uniformity in the body of Congregational churches; notwithstanding this body was really so discordant in faith, that a plain avowal of the more recent opinions would probably have dissolved the bond at once. As usual, the forbearance was chiefly on one side, — that of the suspected; though members of both parties occasionally entered into warm controversy on Free-will and Calvinistic decrees, and on the Revival movements.

It was not till 1787, that Unitarianism had a *tangible* existence in New England. At this date, King's Chapel, formerly an Episcopal church, (now Stone Chapel, School street, Boston,) became avowedly Unitarian, under its new pastor, the excellent Freeman. But though, from this time onward, the ministers and theologians were, in general, conscious that some form of Unitariansm secretly prevailed, to a great extent, in Massachusetts, particularly in the capital and its neighborhood, yet, for twenty-five years longer, or till as late as 1812, there was not, among the Congregationalists of the Commonwealth, a preacher, nor society, nor church, nor an eminent individual, who openly avowed that doctrine, or who could be positively convicted of it; those connected with the Stone Chapel being, of course, excepted. In 1815, the mask, so long worn, was torn off, by the unexpected publication, at Boston, of Extracts from Letters written by Unitarians here, to Mr. Belsham, the distinguished Unitarian of England, to inform him of the real state of their doctrine in this country. "That can never be a bright page in the history of their cause in New England, which records that it was not their own hand that, at last, drew the veil aside."

Such is a summary of what the writer says of the rise and fortune of Unitarianism, in the Congregational churches of New England, down to the date of its exposure.

We are not sufficiently acquainted with the facts in detail, to pronounce on the accuracy of many of the particular statements in this pamphlet. The general representation, however, we sup-

pose to be correct; we mean so far as it regards the manner in which Unitarianism was historically developed here. The coloring, indeed, may be somewhat heightened; for this would naturally be the case in such a history, written by an Episcopalian, dispassionate and honorably disposed, as the writer seems to be. There may, also, be inferences, here and there suggested, which a reader, with different attachments, will think unwarranted. Some points are evidently strained beyond historical fact; as when it is said that Unitarians "extended the grasp of cordial fellowship" to Universalists. They did so, in no other way than as they extended it to all Christian sects.

The writer seems to think, (p. 29,) that Dr. Mayhew left nothing in his works which absolutely proves his rejection of Trinitarianism. He cannot have seen the note on pp. 417, 418, of a volume of his Sermons, published at Boston, in 1755. It is also said, (p. 53,) that the Treatise on the Atonement, by Mr. Ballou, ("by *Ballou*, the Universalist leader,") was published in 1803. It should be 1805.

In the early history of every denomination, there is some one characteristic fault of a moral kind. The Unitarians happily avoided most of those which have marked the rise of other sects. Would that they had also avoided the one here described! Still there are considerations that extenuate, though they cannot justify, the offence. So gradual was the divergence of opinions, and for a long time so slow was its progress, that the forerunners of the Unitarians, and then the early Unitarians themselves, were led, almost imperceptibly and unconsciously, into the practice of concealment. But there is a law in this matter, which works as surely as do the laws of physical nature. The practice became, at length, a habit; the concealment, had, by degrees, gathered under its folds a mass of opinions so unpopular, that no ordinary courage would suffice to draw aside the veil, and astound the church. It seemed a matter of necessity, now, that it should be maintained. Like all other habits, too, it grew more and more inveterate, more systematic. It gave rise to false maxims, to keep itself in countenance. The rule that all religious doctrines were indifferent, was needed, not merely to ward off unwelcome interrogations, but also to satisfy the conscience. But here again, there is a law that works with fatal certainty. This rule, or plea, once adopted, though under tacit reservations, was as sure to be followed, in due time, by Mr. Parker's "Discourse on Religion," as the grain that is sown is sure to produce a harvest of its kind; for the plea itself logically involves the germ of infidelity. With religious bodies, as with individuals, it is not what they resolve, that determines their course and results; it is the principles they

cherish. These are living forces, that will develope themselves according to their laws, in spite of all we can do the contrary.

Should this pamphlet give additional impulse to the good work in which we think the Unitarians are now engaging, — should it move them to a more general determination to correct the one fault that has come down to them like an "original sin," they will have cause to rejoice in its publication, whatever may have been the object of the writer.

2. Universalism the Doctrine of the Bible. By Rev. Asher Moore. Philadelphia: Printed for the Publisher, by J. H. Gihon, N. E. Corner of Sixth and Chesnut Sts., 1847. 12mo. pp. 196.

Without attempting any acute argumentations, or aiming at profound and exhaustive processes of reasoning, Mr. Moore has given us a very plain, sensible, and familiar illustration of the general field of Scripture doctrine, contrasted with the schemes of human invention, both ancient and modern. He does not descend to minute points, but presents the broad principles of his subject, and then follows them out, on the direct highway, to their results. The being, purpose, and government of God, the original and present condition of man, the character of Christ, together with the process and final consummation of his work, are the topics treated of. The book is written in a clear, popular style, and with a good degree of correctness.

3. Christian Non-resistance, in all its important bearings, Illustrated and Defended. By Adin Ballou. Philadelphia: J. Miller M'Kim, No. 31 N. Fifth street, 1846.

This book is one of the ablest we have seen, devoted to the subject of Non-resistance. Its author is a close and strong reasoner. He has written often and well, on various philanthropic subjects, but never more to the purpose than in this book. Whether he is correct in all his positions, will be questioned. But we should like very much for the questioner to fall into the hands of the author of this book.

He says, in his Preface, that "it is a book for the future, rather than the present, and will be better appreciated by the public, half a century hence, than now." He believes that "a better future is now dawning," and that "a work like this is needed to help develope the coming age of love and peace." The book contains seven chapters, as follows: 1, Explanatory Definitions. 2, Scriptural Proofs. 3, Scriptural Objections Answered. 4, Non-resistance not contrary to Nature. 5, The Safety of Non-resistance. 6, General Objections Answered. 7, Non-resistance in Relation to Government. It is written in a very *readable* style;

and will interest almost any one who loves reading at all. The author makes straight work with what he calls evasions and objections, often used in opposition to his doctrine, and calls in many facts to illustrate and enforce his positions. We hope the book will be extensively read. We have no fears that its extravagancies, if any, will do harm, while we have much confidence in the Christian spirit which pervades it. A.

4. Locke Amsden, or, The Schoolmaster: a Tale. By the Author of "Mary Martin," "The Green Mountain Boys," &c. &c., Boston: Benjamin B. Mussey & Co., No. 29 Cornhill, 1847. 12mo. pp. 231.

A Novel, which it will harm no one to read, who has leisure to spare for the purpose; and this is a commendation that can justly be given to few works belonging to this department of literature. The author informs us that it was "written less with the hope of gaining literary fame, than of awakening an interest, and imparting useful hints," on the subject of common schools, popular education, and self-intellectual culture. Miss Martineau's tales, or Illustrations of Political Economy, may have suggested fiction as the medium of conveying the sentiments; but we see no special resemblance between his work and hers, in other respects. His abounds more in stirring incidents, and in painting of manners, than the most of hers, if we remember aright. It is respectable in point of artistic merit; though we think it is in this that the author's greatest deficiency appears. He is a little prosy, now and then; and his language sometimes betrays a want of practice in composition. These, however, are but slight faults. The characters are well presented, as they are well chosen, the plot is easy and natural throughout, the manners are described to the life, and the interest of the story is sufficiently exciting, without becoming violent. There is more living human nature in the book, than we have found in any other recent novel that we now recollect. But its greatest excellence, we think, is the perfectly healthful tone which pervades it, so different from the morbidness that is now the rage. There is a *quant. suff.* of *love*, in it; but then it *is* love, such as a man need not be ashamed to feel, nor a woman to reciprocate. We had not seen any real love in a novel, or tale, for a long time. We thought the genuine article had utterly died out, and that its place would have to be supplied, till Miller's advent, by the artificial elixir that has flooded our market, or, still worse, by the vile philtres imported from France, and recompounded by some of our own geniuses. But we take courage, again.

Among the characters of the story, that of the noble-hearted Capt. Bunker, the good school-committee man, who could neither

write nor read, is an original, well drawn, and supported throughout. His clear common sense, and his general information, and even science, notwithstanding his total ignorance of letters, are brought out in striking relief, and made to serve at once the two objects of illustrating the importance of self-education, and of school-instruction. The other characters also, do credit to the author's acquaintance with human nature, and his true appreciation of it under its different phases.

5. History of the Conquest of Peru, with a Preliminary View of the Civilization of the Incas. By William H. Prescott, Corresponding Member of the French Institute; of the Royal Academy of History at Madrid, etc. &c. &c. New York: Harper and Brothers, 82 Cliff street, 1847. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 527, 547.

We have neither space for a regular notice of this work, nor time to write one, even were we capable of doing the subject justice. It is but repeating the opinions of critics on both sides of the Atlantic, to say that it sustains the reputation Mr. Prescott had acquired, by his two former historical works, and that it is a production which, like them, will reflect lasting honor on the literature of our country. It will take its place among the few classic histories in the English language. To those acquainted with his Ferdinand and Isabella, or with his Conquest of Mexico, it is unnecessary to say any thing of the manner of its execution, — the exhaustive collection of documents and authorities, the systematic arrangement of the work, and the clear, pleasant, and picturesque style of the author, which, like a garment of light, invests the whole. If the conquest itself of Peru wants the unity of action, and the imposing grandeur which characterize that of Mexico, the scenes in detail are scarcely less stirring. The same wonder is awakened at the extent to which the natives, in both cases, had carried their civilization, and at the wealth and magnificence of the two empires, when they were invaded by the Spanish adventurers. Nor is it less surprising, to mark how the innumerable hosts of the New World melted away before the handful of warriors from the Old. It becomes a citizen of our country to say nothing, at present, of the horrible waste of human life, which drenched in blood the homes of the devoted people, at every step in the progress of the invasion.



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